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I  
Abstract 
 
In modern democracies, parliament has numerous duties. As a key state organ it examines 
the  legislative proposals  in  the process  of  their passage  and  is  entrusted with  overseeing 
executive  responsibilities  and  keeps  an  eye  on  government  activities.  Parliamentary 
committee system  is  the most vital structure  that permits  the  legislators  to divide up  their 
labor  and  specialize  in  particular  areas  of  activities.  It  is  therefore  the  most  significant 
legislative mechanism and  is often referred  to as “miniature  legislatures” or “microcosms” 
of their parent bodies.   
 
There is a tendency around the world to rely on committees for accomplishing much of the 
parliamentary activities. In this regard, Bangladesh is not an exception. Being a South Asian 
country,  it has had  familiarity with committee system since  last century when  the country 
was  under  British  colonial  rule.  Bangladesh  emerged  as  an  independent  state  in  1971 
following nearly two centuries of British rule and a further quarter century of Pakistan. The 
new state of Bangladesh adopted parliamentary system of government. All legislative power 
of the state were vested to the parliament. Though all favorable conditions for parliamentary 
democracy were  ensured  in  the  constitution, differences between  the political parties and 
overwhelming domination of government party and  their  refusal  to  recognize  the official 
opposition  party  in  the  parliament  prevented  building  a  responsible  executive.  In  a 
sweeping  change,  parliamentary  form  of  government  was  replaced  by  one  party‐
presidential  system and  soon  the new  system was abolished when  the military  seized  the 
state  by  a  bloody military  coup  in  1975. Between  1975  and  1990,  the  country was  under 
military  dominated  civil‐military  regimes.  Parliaments  formed  during  this  period  were 
intended  to  serve  the purpose of  the  regime’s  interests. With mass upsurge, authoritarian 
regime was ended and parliamentary form of government was restored in 1991.  
 
Since the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh, committee system is taken 
seriously  in  the political as well as  in  the academic arena because of  its  importance  in  the 
parliamentary process. Therefore,  this study  intends to analyze the functioning and role of 
parliamentary committees  in  the post‐1990 Bangladesh parliament.  In doing so,  this study 
 
 
II  
identifies and examines  the  factors  that have  considerable  influence  in  the working of  the 
parliamentary committees in general and Bangladesh in particular.  
 
The  methodology  applied  in  this  research  is  a  combination  of  historical,  analytical  and 
descriptive approaches. Descriptive and analytical approaches are chosen  to show  in what 
institutional environments committees are working in the Bangladesh parliament. Much of 
the analyses that follow are based on the examination of the proceedings and reports of the 
important committees, Rules of Procedure of the JS. Other secondary sources include books 
of the reputed scholars and articles published in various journals, working papers and study 
reports,  newspapers  published  at  home  and  abroad.  Socio‐political  characteristics  of  the 
committee members  are  calculated  from  the parliamentary  records  and  the  questionnaire 
used  for  the  interviews.  Besides,  information  is  also  gathered  from  discussion  with 
prominent political leaders and academia.  
 
The  analysis  presents  in  this  study  showed  that  the  committees  were  more  active  in 
overseeing  government  activities  rather  than  analyzing  policy  issues.  In  a  conflicting 
political  environment,  committee  activities  are  greatly  influenced  by  the  political  parties. 
Lack  of  compromise  between  the  parties  to  some  extent  makes  the  committees 
dysfunctional. Despite the existing limitations, committees provide a training ground for the 
legislators to improve their parliamentary norms and procedural knowledge.  
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CHAPTER  I 
 
Introduction and Conceptual Framework 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This is a study on parliamentary committees with particular reference to Bangladesh. The 
main query of this study is ‘how do parliamentary committees perform when placed in the 
political context of post- colonial societies, where the political institutions, at least partly, 
have been imposed from outside rather than being fully indigenous?’ Drawing on a 
theoretically in-framed case study of the Bangladesh parliament, the present research focuses 
on the performances of parliamentary committees from 1991 to 2006.  
 
Bangladesh emerged as an independent state in 1971, after nearly two centuries of British 
rule and a further quarter century of Pakistani rule. After independence, the new constitution, 
which was promulgated in 1972, adopted a parliamentary system of government reflecting 
the aspirations of the people who had struggled to achieve such a democratic system since the 
British colonial days. The Bangladesh Constitution entrusted all legislative authority to a 
unicameral Parliament called the ‘Jatiya Sangsad’. The President was made the titular head 
of the nominal executive while the real executive power of the state was vested to the Prime 
Minister like the cabinet government as practiced in Britain. The Prime Minister and the 
cabinet were collectively responsible to the parliament. For ensuring government 
accountability to the parliament, constitution makers incorporated the provision of the 
parliamentary committee system in Article 76 of the Constitution. Article 76 of the 
Constitution formally granted the parliament the authority to appoint standing committees as 
necessary for discharging its functions. Though many favorable pre-conditions of the 
parliamentary system of the government were provided in the Constitution, lack of separation 
between state, government and party, depending party machinery on the leader, differences 
between the political parties, undermining of a free and fair electoral process, overwhelming 
majority of the government party in the parliament and their refusal to recognize the 
existence of the official opposition hindered the opportunities for the regime to practice 
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norms and conventions of the parliamentary form of the government.1 In face of political 
turmoil the parliamentary system of the government was replaced by a one-party presidential 
system through the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) on January 25, 1975.  
 
Though Bangladesh started well adopting parliamentary democracy in its Constitution, it did 
not work as it ideally should. The new system which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called his 
“second revolution” was not radically different from the way he governed the country from 
1972 to 1975. Rounaq Jahan argued that the new model was being put into operation by the 
same old leadership with the same style. With the adoption of a new model, all power was 
concentrated on one hand by making Sheikh Mujibur Rahman the head of the state, the head 
of the government and the head of the party. Though the two models were different in 
structural terms, behaviorally the two systems worked more or less in the same way.2 The 
model of the second revolution could not last longer since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was 
assassinated in a military coup led by a group of mid ranked army officers on August 15, 
1975.   
 
Following the assassination of Sheikh Mujib Rhaman martial law was declared and the 
country remained under two subsequent military governments until December 1990. After 
coming to power, military governments attempted to legitimize themselves. In the course of 
civilianization of the military regimes, three parliaments had been formed under a 
presidential form of government and these were mostly rubber stamp like institutions. At long 
last, military regime was overthrown by a mass upsurge in December 1990. Following the 
fall of military regime the parliamentary system of the government restored again in 1991 
with consensus of the major political parties, the student organizations, the professional 
bodies, the media and the civil society. Therefore, it is argued that the idea of liberal 
democracy was though rejected in 1975 by the ruling political elite; the ‘model’ itself did not 
lose support with the people as a whole.3        
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Jahan, Rounaq (1980), Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, Dhaka: University Press Ltd pp. 95-96, 
123,Choudhury, Jamsed S.A. (2004), Bangladesh: Failure of A Parliamentary Government 1973-75, Dhaka: 
Pathak Shamabesh, p. 121. Hasanuzzaman , Al Masud (1998), Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, 
Dhaka: University Press Limited, p.41. 
2 Jahan, Rounaq, op .cit., p. 123. 
3 Jahan, Rounaq, op .cit, p. 125. 
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1.2 Research Issues 
 
Since the restoration of the parliamentary system in 1991, the committee system has created 
interests both in political and academic circles. International organizations particularly donor 
agencies, citizen forums and media emphasize on strengthening the committee system 
towards demanding government accountability by the parliament. Considering the above 
discussion this study seeks to answer how do committees perform in a parliament where the 
political institutions mainly adopted from outside rather than being fully indigenous. 
Focusing on the following issues this research attempts to assess the performances of the 
committees in the post 1990 Bangladesh parliaments with necessary examples and 
illustrations.  
 
1) Formal arrangements of the committee system including composition, structure and 
functions of the committees. 
2) Institutional mechanism affecting the functioning of the committee system in 
Bangladesh. 
3) Performance of the committees of the Jatiya Sangsad regarding the legislative and 
overseeing processes. 
4) The parliamentary committees and the society nexus focusing on the role of the media 
and the civil society. 
 
1.3 Background of Conceptual Framework 
 
To explain the functioning of the parliamentary committees in Bangladesh it needs to draw 
out important factors that have considerable influence in their working. For this purpose three 
folds of factors are identified. These factors form the “conceptual out line” of this research. 
Before discussing the conceptual framework it needs to explain the significance of the 
committee system in general and particular in the Westminster model where the committee 
system has been reformed for the purpose of strengthening parliaments. In doing so, this 
section first analyzes the evolution of the parliamentary structures with necessary examples. 
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1.3.1 Evolution of Parliamentary Structure   
 
In today’s political systems, the legislative organ as the national representative body is 
considered indispensable for proper governance. In democratic framework the role of the 
parliament and parliamentary structures in establishing responsible government can hardly be 
overemphasized. It is therefore  argued that of all political institutions, none is more vital to 
the process of linking governors and governed in relationships of authority, responsibility, 
and legitimacy, than the modern legislature.4 In modern democracies, parliament can play 
significant role in making a bridge between the government and the public. Yves Mény and 
Andrew Knapp noted, “If there is one symbol that stands for a representative system, it is 
certainly that of the Assembly, a collegial body through which the will of all (or part) of the 
population is expressed.”5 Democratically elected parliaments are potentially important 
because they represent pluralist conception so that various segments of the society can 
contribute to law making and monitoring the executive and set value goals for the society.   
 
As organic body, parliamentary structures developed through a long process of 
institutionalization. The genesis of parliament traced back to the thirteenth century England. 
During that time, the Knights of the Shires and representatives from towns were allowed to 
attend the King’s Great Council to grant tax and for counseling. Due to War Between the 
States, debts and declining value of money occurred which compelled the King to increase 
tax and seek aid from the nobility of the towns. Besides financial necessity, Kings required 
their consent to his acts of governance. It was more convenient for the Kings to negotiate 
with ‘the council’ as a whole rather than as individuals. In the development of the English 
Parliament agreement of Magna Carta of 1215 was a turning point which established that the 
king required the consent of his royal council to levy or collect any tax.  Since then the royal 
council slowly developed into parliament. The first elected parliament was summoned in 
1265 by Simon de Montfort and Edward I enlarged the representative character. He 
summoned the ‘Model Parliament’ in 1295. The Model Parliament was consisted of 
representatives of the clergy and the aristocracy, as well as representatives from the various 
counties and boroughs. Each county returned two knights, two burgesses were elected from 
each borough, and each city provided two citizens. Since the period of Edward II, the Knights 
                                                 
4 Wahlke, John C. and Eulau, Heinz, eds. (1959), Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, 
Glencoe, 1ll.: Free Press, p.3.  
5 Meny, Yves (1990), Government and Politics in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.181. 
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and burgesses from the towns began to sit separately from the powerful barons and Church 
leaders as a result of which the former were represented in the ‘House of Commons’ and the 
latter in the ‘House of Lords’.6 Their functions mainly ranged from taxation to counseling. 
Since the 14th century these two Houses gradually gained control over grants of revenue to 
the King. The legislative and administrative power was obtained in the 15th century onwards.  
 
Like England, there had been the development of parliamentary structure under monarchial 
setup in other parts of Western Europe (i.e. Italy, Spain, England, France, and Germany) in 
between 13th and 14th centuries. In these countries, monarchs called the parliament in order to 
raise royal revenues and for counsel.7 America’s founders created legislature in the 
eighteenth century to safeguard their interests against the royal governors. Connie A. 
Veillette and Christopher J. Deering observed “The development of the American political 
system and the U.S. Congress reflects the ideology of its Founders for limited government 
even while it borrowed from the tradition of representative assemblies as they developed in 
Europe”.8 It may be mentioned that the US constitution is based on the theory of separation 
of power and the state organs have their own jurisdiction of power but they remain within a 
system of checks and balance.  
 
The concept of sovereignty of parliament is a British origin and has been a product of 
centuries of revolution and reform movements (e.g. Glorious Revolution of 1688, Petition of 
Rights, Bills of Rights and so on) that turned absolute monarchy into a constitutional 
monarchy. Through these transformations there had been a change in power relationship and 
transfer of authority from the Crown to the Parliament. Legislature began its ascendancy after 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and continued until the nineteenth century. Like many other 
scholars Walter Bagehot portrayed this period as an era of parliamentary strength. He 
described the British House of Commons as ‘efficient’ working body in his classic work- The 
English Constitution (first published in 1867). He argued that House of Commons at that time 
had been central to the governing of the country.9  This period is marked as the ‘golden age’ 
of the British Parliament.  
                                                 
6Grifith, J.A.G. & et. al (1989), Parliament : Functions, Practice and Procedure, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell,p.3, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_the_United_Kingdom. 
7 Strayer, Joseph R. (1970), On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, quoted from Connie A. Veillette and Christopher J. Deering (2003), “Evolution of the American 
Parliament”, paper presented in the Basque Parliament’s conference on “Parliament over Time. 
8 Connie A. Veillette and Christopher J. Deering (2003), op. cit. 
9 Norton, Philip (ed.) (1992), Legislatures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 36. 
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The idea of ‘golden age’ has been questioned in various writings. In this context Lord Bryce 
argued that there had been imbalance between the executive and the legislative relationships.  
However, he did not question the interpretations of Bagehot’s writing in his classic book 
Modern Democracies (published in 1921). He argued that the role of the House of Commons 
became less central. This concept developed in the study of parliaments as the ‘decline of 
parliament’ thesis. He generalized his argument to other systems of government including the 
United States, France and Italy.10 Like Bryce, K.C. Wheare also noticed that though the 
legislature gained more power, they have in almost all cases declined.11  
 
Since the late nineteenth century executive dominance became more visible. Many scholars 
argued that party system weakened the legislative strength. When Bryce wrote his decline 
thesis, he constructed that dignity and moral influence of representative legislatures had 
declined because of the activities of party caucuses and growth of pressure groups. He argued 
that effective control of law making was gradually transferred from the legislature to the 
executive and parliamentary scrutiny of the executive was increasingly ineffective. He again 
argued that where party discipline was stronger, the discretion of representatives was narrow, 
as they must work with their leaders.12 Sir Ramsay Muir also over-emphasized the decline of 
the British Parliament; he argued that role of the British Parliament had changed because of 
the emergence of an assertive, structured and well disciplined party system and consequent 
dominance of the executive.13 It has been argued that the growth of strong party discipline 
prevents the parliament from monitoring executive activities effectively. As David Hamer 
writes, “When there is a majority government, party discipline dictates that the cabinet is 
answerable not to the parliament but to the caucus of the majority party.”14  
 
There is a longstanding debate that parliaments in Westminster system are in decline. In the 
mid-1960s, Kenneth C. Wheare pointed out that with a few important and striking 
exceptions; legislatures had declined in certain important respects and particularly in power 
                                                 
10 Elgie, Robert and Stapleton, John (2006), “Testing the Decline of Parliament Thesis: Ireland, 1923–2002”, 
Political Studies, Vol.56, p. 467. 
11 Wheare, K.C. (1963), Legislatures, London: Oxford University Press, p.291. 
12 Bryce, J (1990), “The Decline of Legislatures”, in Philip Norton (ed.), Legislatures, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.49-50.   
13 Muir, Ramsay (1930), How Britain is Governed, New York: Richard R. Smith Inc.   
14 Hamer, David (2004), Can Responsible Government Survive in Australia? Canberra: The Department of the 
Senate, Parliament House, p.17. 
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in relation to the executive government. But he again pointed out that the legislators spent 
more time than they did before.15 Analyzing the activities of the four British Prime Ministers 
during the period 1868-1990, political scientists concluded that the direct accountability of 
the prime minister to the parliament had undoubtedly declined.16 Referring to the Indian 
Parliament Subhash C. Kashyap stated that after Nehru there was a steep decline in the role 
of parliament. Government with their majority in the House diminished the stature of the 
legislature. In this situation, parliament could hardly be expected to perform its role as the 
supreme representative institution of the people charged with the responsibility of ensuring 
administrative accountability and executive responsibility. There was general apathy among 
members, ministers and the public at large regarding working of the parliament.17 Similarly, 
Arthur G. Rubinoff has shown that many parliamentarians, instead of taking legislative 
process seriously, played to the media or focused on constituency problems. Legislators were 
more interested in attaining office than in legislating. He observed that the opposition 
members attempted to embarrass the government by focusing on scandals rather than 
substantive issues. As a result, law-making functions of the legislature declined in 1990s 
from 50 per cent to less than 20 per cent.18  
 
Challenging the decline thesis, parliamentary scholars like Mezey, Norton, Attila Ágh and 
others argued that parliament has certainly not declined in an absolute sense. In the context of 
the UK, Michael Mezey and Philip Norton challenged the thesis. Michael Mezey argues, ‘the 
theme of legislative decline was seldom supported by empirical data and seemed to be based 
on the largely unsubstantiated premise that at some time in the past a golden age of 
parliaments existed’.19 Philip Norton, a leading parliamentary scholar, however, found a 
decline in the level of activity of the legislators. He did not agree with the concept of ‘decline 
of parliament’. Norton argued that legislatures have not declined in the modern era; there is 
                                                 
15 Wheare, K.C. (1963), op. cit, p.148, 221.   
16 Patrick Dunleavy; G. W. Jones; Jane Burnham; Robert Elgie; Peter Fysh (1993), “Leaders, Politics and 
Institutional Change: The Decline of Prime Ministerial Accountability to the House of Commons, 1868-
1990”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 3,p.267. 
17 Kashyap, Subhash C. (2004), “Executive–Legislature Interface in the Indian Polity”, the Journal of 
Legislative Studies, Vol.10, No.2/3, Summer/Autumn, p. 282. 
18 Rubinoff, Arthur G. (1999), “ The Decline of India’s Parliament”, in Philip Norton and Nizam Ahmed (eds.), 
Parliaments in Asia, London or Portland : Frank Cass, pp. 22-25. 
19 Mezey, M.L. (1995) ‘Parliament in the New Europe’, in J. Hayward and E. Page (eds.), Governing the New 
Europe, Cambridge: Polity, p. 196. 
  - 8 -
an unequal relationship between the executive and the parliament. In that relationship, the 
executive is not just dominant but overly dominant.20 
 
In the context of Central Europe Attila Ágh, Gabriella Ilonszki and András Lánczi argue that 
parliament has not declined in relation to government; examining the process of 
democratization they observed that parliament has played an increasing role.21 Examining the 
decline of parliament thesis in Ireland, across the period 1923 to 2002, Robert Elgie and John 
Stapleton found a different situation. They observed that there had been decline in particular 
forms of activity but the overall level has been increased over time. Today there is a greater 
degree of indirect accountability in the Irish system than was previously the case. Therefore, 
they suggested that the decline of parliament thesis is not applicable to Westminster-style of 
parliamentary systems.22  
 
Despite the argument Westminster type parliaments are in decline, the experiences show that 
the decline thesis does not apply in all cases. Different research works cited above construct 
that parliament has not declined in absolute sense. In reality, however there is an unequal 
relationship between the legislature and the executive. The reasons for much imbalance in 
executive-legislative relations in Britain are well described in the Norton Commission report. 
The Commission was set up ‘to examine the causes of decline in the effectiveness of 
parliament in holding the executive to account and to strengthen democratic control over the 
government’. The Report of the Commission was published in July 2000 under the title 
Strengthening Parliament. In this report Philip Norton identifies the following long-term and 
recent developments that have weakened parliament: the increasing growth of party 
discipline, growth of civil service and government business, and growth of organized 
interests group. The recent developments include: partisanship, the growth of the career 
politician, concentration of power in Downing Street, the media revolution, constitutional 
change, and the de politicization of politics. A study dealing with similar problems was 
published in India. The study that was conducted in India reached similar conclusions, 
particularly on the matters of suggesting procedural reforms to eliminate archaic practices 
and changing parliamentary culture. To eliminate unequal relationship between legislature 
                                                 
20 Strengthen Parliament, the Norton Commission Report, July 2000, p. 10. 
21Ágh, Attila Ilonszki, Gabriella and Lánczi, András (2005), Economic Policy Making and Parliamentary 
Accountability in Hungary Democracy, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) Paper , p.8.  
22 Elgie, Robert and Stapleton, John (2006), op. cit., p.482. 
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and executive, Norton Commission suggested bringing back the ministers and the 
backbenchers to the House and reforming House committee structure. According to the 
scholar’s suggestion, parliaments, particularly those established after Westminster system of 
government, have extended their committee structure adding departmentally related 
committees. It assumed that departmental standing committees would be able to reinforce 
parliamentary supervision over the executive.  
 
It has been observed that over the last three decades, parliaments have become influential 
bodies globally, and according to some scholars this has occurred particularly due to their 
newly created or revived committee system. Lawrence, Davidson, Copeland and Patterson 
argued that since the mid 1970s parliaments became stronger, legislative activities have 
increased, legislators have come to participate heavily in floor debates and committees have 
become significant components of the parliaments.23A significant change has been made in 
the British parliament in 1979, creating series of departmental committees for holding the 
executive accountable. This change made the parliament a more effective body in terms of 
executive scrutiny than at any previous time this century.24  
 
1.3.2 Significance of Parliamentary Committee System  
The origin of parliamentary committees can be traced back to gradual working of parliament 
in Britain. The standing committee and select committee were first appointed in the 
seventeenth century. The standing committees were appointed to scrutinize the legislative 
bills and the Select committee was appointed by the House to perform a function which the 
House itself could not undertake. The British parliament took a strong initiative by appointing 
Public Accounts Committee in 1861 for overseeing public spending. This committee, in 
various ways, plays an increasingly important part in the work of the House. It has been 
observed that the parliaments established in America, Europe or else where relied on the use 
of various forms of committees. The genesis and development of modern parliamentary 
                                                 
23 Copeland, G and Patterson, S (1994), “Parliaments in the Twenty-first Century”, Copeland, G and Patterson, 
S (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World, Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, p.10-11.  Longley, 
Lawrence D. and Davidson, Roger H. (1998), “Parliamentary Committees: Changing Perspectives on 
Changing Institutions”, in Longley, Lawrence D. and Davidson, Roger H. (eds.), The New Roles of 
Parliamentary Committees, London or Portland: Frank Cass, p.5. 
24 Norton, Philip, “Nascent Institutionalization: Committees in the British Parliament”, in Longley, Lawrence D. 
and Davidson, Roger H. (eds.), op. cit. pp. 151-52. 
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procedure in Germany can be traced back in 1848.25 Germany’s first representative 
parliament was convened in Frankfurt on May 18, 1848. In the beginning of the first session, 
the Frankfurt parliament had appointed as many as 16 committees with directly elected 5 to 
50 members.26 Most of the committees also appointed sub-committees owing heavy 
workload. Every committee had a secretary whose responsibility was to keep records of the 
proceedings.27 In various ways, the committee system has become indispensable part of the 
German parliament since last one and half centuries. In the US Congress, committee system 
began to work in 1789 when the House members found that they did not have enough time to 
discuss every proposal in detail before making a law. Hence they introduced the standing 
committees to review and scrutinize the legislative proposal and to make the executive more 
accountable to the legislature. With gradual changes and reforms, the committees appeared to 
be the "little legislature". Observing the importance of committee system, the American 
president Woodrow Wilson described them as the very heart of the law making process in the 
United States. He wrote in 1885 that “Congressional government is Committee government,” 
and he argued “Congress in its committee room is Congress at work.”28 Since then political 
scientists have seen no reason to disagree with him. 
 
In the ‘age of parliaments’, the demands of a modern parliament are numerous and it is not 
possible for the whole House to undertake detailed investigations or even to discuss every 
matter at length in the house. In this circumstance, Committee system has evolved to make 
the parliamentary activities more effective. Parliamentary scholars like Susan R.Benda, 
Ingvar Mattson and Kaare Strøm argued that the parliament is often large and unwieldy body 
of representatives; the real deliberation, thus, takes place away from the plenary arena in 
much smaller groups of legislators such as parliamentary committees.29 Most of the day-to- 
day work of drafting legislation takes place in the committees; the plenary does much less, 
                                                 
25 During the period of Holly Roman Emiror, the Reichstag (imperial assembly) and Reichstände (provincial 
parliament) appointed committees to negotiate with the Empiror on finacial matter. It was more convenient 
for the Emperor to consul with the committees than the whole diet. 
26 Parliament began to meet in Frankfurt on May 18, 1848 and it was forced to yield to reactionary forces and 
convened for the last time on May 30, 1849.  
27 Eyck, Frank (1968), The Frankfurt Parliament: 1848-49, London: Macmillan, p.95, 198. 
28 Quoted from Huitt, Ralph K. (1954), “The Congressional Committee: A Case Study”, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, p.340.   
29 Benda, Susan R. (1996), “Committees in Legislatures: A Division of Labor”, Legislative Research Series 
Paper, No.2, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Mattson, Ingvar and Strøm, Kaare, 
“Parliamentary Committees”, in Herbert Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. 
New York: St. Martins Press, p. 249. 
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because it has only limited amount of time to consider the draft bill.30 For example, the 
German Bundestag devotes most of its time to committee work rather than the plenary 
assembly, and most of its energies to drafting and amending laws rather than, strictly 
speaking, monitoring the executive.31 It becomes a general feature that much of the real 
parliamentary deliberations take place in the committees. 
 
For the last three decades, throughout the world, committee system has emerged as vibrant 
and important structure of the parent body. Therefore it is a global trend to view the 
committee system as an important structural element of the parent body. Lawrence D. 
Londgley and Roger H. Davidson argue that a hundred years ago, or even thirty years ago, 
parliamentary committee did not matter globally; they were important in the American 
Congress but in recent times they have become major loci of innovation in the process and 
structures of parliaments.32 In most of the parliamentary studies, committee system is thus 
described as “miniature legislatures” or “microcosms” of the parliament.33 Malcolm Shaw 
notes, “Whether in America or elsewhere, it is widely agreed that the impact a parliament has 
is crucially dependent on its committee arrangements.”34 Around the world there is a trend to 
move towards more reliance on committees to conduct the work of parliament, and the 
greatest reason for this trend is a concern for efficiency. It is observed that the committees are 
not just used as soapboxes; they are the chief instruments for making decisions with regard to 
legislation and authorization and oversight of administrative actions.35 Committee system 
gradually has become the nucleus of many legislatures entrusted with the tasks of scrutinizing 
legislative proposals and monitoring government activities in favor of transparency and 
accountability.  
 
The most obvious purpose of committees is to scrutinize the activities of the executive 
branch, which includes administrative oversight and financial oversight. Permanent 
                                                 
30 Koen J. Muylle, “Improving the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Legislative Procedures”, Statute Law Review, 
Vol. 24, No.3, 2003, p.176. 
31 Meny, Yves (1990), Government and Politics in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.190-1. 
32 Londgley, Lawrence D.  and Davidson, Roger H. (eds.) (1998), The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees, 
London: Frank Cass, p.2.  
33 Strom Kaare (1998), “Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies”, Journal of Legislative Studies, 
Vol.4, No.1; Laundy Philip (1989), Parliaments in the Modern World, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing 
Company Ltd., p.96; Shaw Malcolm (1998), “Parliamentary Committees Global Perspective”, in Lawrence D. 
Longley and Roger H. Davidson, The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees, London: Frank Cass. 
34 Shaw Malcolm (1998), “Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective”, in Longley, Lawrence D. and 
Davidson, Roger H. (eds.), op cit., pp. 247, 229. 
35 Jewell, Malcolm E., and Samuel C. Patterson (1973), The Legislative Process in the United States, New York:  
Random House, p.219. 
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committees corresponding to the government departments are assigned to oversee particular 
government department. The Westminster style parliaments, which did not have such 
committees, have extended their committee structure for monitoring the executive. Most 
parliaments thus employ financial committees like Budget Committee, Public Accounts 
Committee, Estimates Committee or Government Undertakings Committees for monitoring 
financial matters. In the recent decades, the focus of the parliamentary committees has been 
shifted from legislative deliberation to placing an emphasis on their oversight role. Referring 
to the Italian Camera dei Deputati, Hazan noted that the amount of time spent on legislation 
has declined when the committees were formally granted responsibility to oversee the 
executive.36 Subject based departmental standing committees were introduced in the Italian 
parliament following the reforms of the British parliament. While parliaments declined in 
status and effectiveness, subject based new committees have been introduced to achieve 
effective control over government. The ‘mother of parliaments’, the British House of 
Commons shifted in activity from chamber to the committee by creating departmental select 
committees in 1979. The departmental select committees brought government policy and 
administration under far more detailed scrutiny than was the case even in the recent past.37 
Philip Norton therefore recognized the departmental select committees as the vital tools that 
offer the legislators authority to scrutinize the executive in detail. Considering the importance 
of the departmental select committees he suggested to strengthen the committees.38 In recent 
decades, subject based departmental standing committees open the windows for the 
legislators to develop their expertise on particular areas. Mezey argues that if a legislature is 
to have strong policy-making power, it also has to have a highly developed committee system 
generating policy expertise.39  In order to achieve this, many countries like Italy, India and Sri 
Lanka have expanded their parliamentary committee structure covering most of the executive 
departments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Reuven Y. Hazan (2001), Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in Comparative Perspective, 
Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, p.40. 
37 Malcom Shaw, “Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective”, Lawrence D. Longley and Roger H. 
Davidson (ed.), The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees, London: Frank Cass, 1998, pp.232-234. 
38  Strengthen Parliament, the Norton Commission Report, July 2000, p. 21. 
39  M. Mezey, Comparative Legislatures, Durham: Duke University Press, 1979, p.64. 
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1.4 Conceptual Framework 
 
The extents to which committees are able to perform their duties depend upon a variety of 
factors. The factors that affect the working of parliamentary committees can be divided into 
three folds: Political environment, Committee structure and Committee capacity.  State 
structure, political situation, parties, bureaucracy, interest groups, civil society, and media fit 
in into the category of political environment. The factors related to the committee structure 
include formal-legal framework, committee type and committee selection process. The social 
standing of committee members, committee staff and support services specify the committee 
capacity. These three factors documented in Table 1.1 have considerable influence on the 
working of committees. Taking into account all such factors, one can assess the performance 
of committees and can determine whether it is the legislature or the executive that has the 
upper hand.  
 
Box: 1.1 Factors Affecting Committee Functions 
 
Principles Subjects 
Political Environment 1) State Structure 
2) Political Situation 
3) Political Parties 
4) Bureaucracy 
5) Interest Groups 
6) Civil Society 
7) Media 
 
Committee Structure 1) Formal-Legal Frame Work 
2) Committee Types 
3) Committee Selection Process 
 
Committee Capacity 1) Social Standing of Committee Members 
2) Staff and Support Services 
                Source: Prepared by researcher 
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Factors:  Pol i t ical  Environment  
 
State Structure 
 
Three types of political systems are commonly found that are presidential system, 
parliamentary system and semi-presidential system. The former is based upon the principle of 
separation of power and operates through the constitutional system of check and balance. In 
this system, each branch of the government has some scrutiny of and control over other 
branches. The USA, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Latin American countries have 
presidential systems. In the United States, separation of power divides the government 
responsibilities among the legislative, executive and judiciary branches; check and balance 
method prevents each branch from ignoring or overpowering the others. In the parliamentary 
system, the principle of separation of power is absent. Parliamentary system makes a union of 
executive and legislative power where political executives operate within the parliament and 
lead it. Countries that have adopted a form of parliamentarism include the United Kingdom 
(UK), India, Japan and many of the former British colonies in Africa and Asia. 40 Hybrid 
system is an admixture of presidential and parliamentary system. In a hybrid system, 
executive power is shared between a separately elected a President and a Prime Minister or 
Chancellor who are separately elected. It is sometimes termed as the semi-presidential system 
if the constitution and/or political circumstances tend to place emphasis on the power of the 
President. If the Prime Minister and the legislative leaders enjoy more power than the 
President does, it may be referred to as a semi-parliamentary system. Germany is often 
referred to as a semi-parliamentary system and France is described as a semi-presidential 
system.  
 
The scope of operation of parliamentary committees varies, depending upon the political 
system. Malcolm Shaw argued that committees in the parliamentary system are not as strong 
as in the presidential system. The system where the separation of power is absent, legislators 
belonging to the majority party is reluctant to scrutiny or criticizes the executive policy 
because policy is formulated by their own party leaders.41 On the contrary, where the 
                                                 
40 Janda, Kenneth, Berry, Jeffrey M. and Goldman Jerry (1995), the Challenge of Democracy: Government in 
America, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, pp.78-79; Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., pp.14-15. 
41 Olson, D. and Norton, P. (1996), “ Legislatures in Democratic Transition”, in D. Olson and P. Norton (eds.), 
The New Parliaments of  Central and Eastern Europe, Frank Cass, London, p.7. 
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separation of power exists, the legislature is by definition intended to be strong and 
independent. Malcolm Shaw argued that a legislature couldn’t have this strength without 
having strong committees serving as a “counter-bureaucracy”.42   
 
Political Situation 
 
The political situation or environment where parliament works has considerable influence on 
the working of the committee system. Blondel categorizes four types of situation for 
justifying the role of parliaments: First, states where parliament was abolished or suspended. 
Second, authoritarian states where parliament was wholly manipulated by the executive. 
Third, states where parliaments are more or less tightly controlled by the executive. Fourth, 
the states where parliament constitutes a key element in the national decision making 
process.43 In many Third World states, particularly in most of the post-colonial states, 
democracy was broken down because of military intervention. In these states, parliaments 
were either abolished or suspended by the military rulers. They created new parties and 
constituted the parliaments when they needed to legalize their regime. In this situation, 
parliaments were used more or less as rubber stamp and committees existed for symbolic 
functions. Second situation is found in substantial number in post communist or post-colonial 
states, where either personal charisma or single party dominates the state apparatus. In this 
situation, parliament and its devices are dominated by the executive. Third situation is 
referred to Western liberal democracies. Blondel argued that in many liberal countries 
including many Western European countries, executive dominates the parliament through 
party discipline in a varying degree.44 In the case of fourth situation, parliament is given more 
autonomy for making policies and in this situation committees enjoy more power and 
autonomy, such as the Congressional committees.  
 
Apart from the above political situations, frequent government changes have an affective 
impact on the working of the parliament and its committees. Frequent regime changes 
brought new members to the parliament and later they were delegated to the committees. 
Malcolm Shaw claimed that discontinuity in committee membership has resulted in a 
                                                 
42 Shaw, Malcolm “Conclusion”, op. cit., p.401. 
43 Blondel, Jean, op. cit., p., 240. 
44 ibid. p., 242. 
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conspicuous lack of expertise on the part of committee members, a tendency reinforced by 
high absenteeism and erratic meetings; even some committee never meet.45  
 
Political Parties 
 
Political party is a significant factor which affects the working of committees. Parliamentary 
scholars found a strong relationship between party characteristics and committee behavior. 
Political parties that represent in the parliament called parliamentary party or group. 
Parliamentary party determines which member will go to which committee; and loyalty or 
connections with the influential party leaders also have influence in determining the 
committee leadership. Overall, parties have considerable influence over their committee 
members. New-institutionalists like Ingvar Mattson, Karre strøm, Cox and Mc Cubbins 
observed that committees are strongest where party control is low and week committees are 
found where party distance is substantial. Cox and Mc Cubbins argued that committees are 
simply extension of party in power and instruments of co-ordination wielded by the majority 
party.46 Ingvar Mattson claimed that party cohesion determines the strength of committees. 
He noticed that committee identity would be weaker in committees where party discipline is 
high.47 Ingvar and Karre argued: “committees are the handmaidens of political parties and 
their leaders … and the strength of committees varies positively with that of political parties. 
Strong parties should delegate authority to strong committees, particularly in key policy areas 
requiring extensive coordination of members’ interests.”48  
 
In those cultures where parties look upon one another with suspicion and distrust, there is 
possibility of dividing the committees on party lines. Members belonging to the ruling party 
remain reluctant to scrutinize the government activities and prevent the opposition party 
members from criticizing government activities.49 Opposition party tries to undermine the 
legitimacy of the ruling party by political movements. It has been observed that the absence 
of collaboration and consensus between the parties discourage to reach compromise in the 
committee deliberations.    
                                                 
45 Shaw, Malcolm, op. cit., p.239. 
46 Cox,Gary W. and Mathew D.McCubbins (1993), Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
47 Mattson, Ingvar (1996), “ Negotiations in Parliamentary Committees”, in Lars Goran Stenelo and Megnus 
Jerneck (eds.),The Bargaining Democracy, Lund: Lund University Press,p.117. 
48 Mattson, Ingvar and Strøm,Karre, op. cit., p. 296.  
49 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., p.19. 
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Bureaucracy 
 
Bureaucracy traditionally stands in an important position in the political system of the 
developing countries, particularly in most of the post-colonial states. In the post-colonial 
states (like Bangladesh, Pakistan) bureaucracy enjoys great prestige and freedom without 
interference from political sector. Hamza Alavi pointed out that bureaucracy was one of the 
instruments of the colonial power whose principal functions were to subordinate the various 
native classes and to repress the nationalist movement on behalf of their colonial masters. 
After independence India, Pakistan and Bangladesh inherited powerfully organized 
bureaucratic and military structures that were on opposite sides of the political barricades 
forming the leadership of the nationalist movement.50 The bureaucratic structure, which was 
evolved to meet the competing needs of colonial rulers, had remained essentially unchanged 
in the new state.51 However, it was assumed that they would be radically re-structured and 
political class would establish authority over them. The result is that they became 
overdeveloped compared to the socio-economic structure of the new states and remained a 
strong political force.  
 
Despite the legacy of colonial rule, fragile consensus on state fundamentals, loosely 
organized political institutions and above all weak political leadership have led the 
bureaucracy to assume greater role in state management with increasing power.52 Goran 
Hyden, Julius Court and Ken Mease observe in the sixteen developing states that bureaucratic 
influence over the political institutions depend on how the political leadership behaves. If the 
elected politicians are not corrupt, they tend to set an example that is emulated in the 
bureaucracy. If, on the other hand, they are corrupt, this tends to spread to the civil service 
too. They often use their offices to get rich and promote their own interests at the expense of 
the public. They concluded that political patronage sets the stage for undermining both merit-
based recruitment and efforts at holding civil servants accountable.53 Bureaucracy thus 
remains unaccountable to the political institution.  
 
 
                                                 
50 Alavi, Hamza (1974), “The Sate in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh”, New Left review, 
July/August. 
51 Kennedy, C.H. (1987), Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 29-31.   
52 Hasnauzzaman, Al Masud, op. cit., p.28.  
53 Hyden,Goran; Court, Julius and Mease, Ken (2003), “The Bureaucracy and Governance in 26 Developing 
Countries”, World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 7, Oversees Development Institute,  p.22. 
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Interest Groups 
 
Under public law, numerous groups, bodies and institutions are organized to uphold specific 
socio-economic interest. Comparatively, interest groups are more visible in the established 
democracies. In the United States, the members of the Congress represent a multiple 
interests-some of them conflicting from their own constituencies. German parliamentary 
party members also have a close relation with interest groups or associations. In the 
developing states, numerous donor agencies work through Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO) and these organizations articulate the interests of various parts of the societies and 
present them directly or indirectly in the political process. 
 
Interest groups or associations are directly or indirectly involved in the process of 
government through different channels. Among the various channels, parliamentary 
committee system is one of the important organs to influence government policies. Klaus von 
Beyme argued that interest groups’ penetration of parliamentary committees must be studied 
in order to understand the political decision making process.54 In the German parliament, 
committees occupy significant part of the parliamentary decision making process. Therefore, 
interest groups seek to influence government policies through committees. They pursue three 
strategies to accomplish their demands in the committees. They maintain a good contact with 
the committee members, they have members in the parties who peruse to get appointment on 
the appropriate committee or they maintain a contact with political parties out side the 
parliament. Saafeld observed that members of a parliamentary group whether small or large 
have strong ties with associations. They are nominated by the parliamentary group to serve in 
the ‘appropriate’ committee. Associations or interest groups have a formal chance to 
influence the committee deliberation by attending public hearing.55  
 
Civil Society  
 
Civil society has appeared as an important actor in strengthening democracy in the 
developing states. It is often populated by organized groups and institutions that are 
                                                 
54Beyme, von Klaus (1985), “Conceptualizing and Measuring Links Between Parties and Interests 
Organizations”, papers presented at the Consolidation of Southern European Democracies Workshop, 
European University, Florence, p. 21.   
55 Saafeld, Thomas, “Germany: Bundestag and Interests Group in a ‘Party Democracy’ ”, in Philip Norton 
(eds.), Parliament and Pressure Groups in Western Europe, London: Frank Cass, 1998, p.59. 
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independent of the state such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), professionals, 
academia, social and religious groups. Caroll defines civil society as ‘people coming together 
around a common concern, a concern which is linked to the values of the wider society, and 
insisting that the major institutions--the state, political parties, and business take these values 
into consideration.’56 Larry Diamond understands that civil society encompasses a vast array 
of formal and informal organizations engaged in a wide range of activities to achieve 
economic, cultural, educational, and developmental goals. He observed that it is concerned 
with public rather than private ends and relates to the state not to gain formal power but 
rather ‘to seek from the state concessions, benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, or 
accountability’.57  
 
Civil society is seen active in promoting participation, advocating for transparency and 
accountability in new and restored democratic countries. The developing states, particularly 
which emerged from decades of dictatorship need to find ways to monitor and restrain the 
power of the political leaders and bureaucracy. It has been observed that in these states, civil 
society raised public concern about any misuse of power. They worked for controlling the 
power of the state and corruption. The countries where electoral process and parliament 
remain weak and fragile, civil society actors work there to improve democratic governance. 
Patrick Molutsi and Anita Inder Singh pointed out that civil society is simultaneously a 
watchdog of democracy and a conduit between the state and citizens. Civil society has 
appeared as a vital partner in the quest for making a positive relationship between the 
democratic state and its citizens.58   
 
The importance of civil society for building democracy has become widely acknowledged as 
part of the post-cold war democratic paradigm.59 Since the early 1980s, developed countries 
including the United States, UK and EU have been supporting civil society organizations 
under their democratization programs in many developing and post-communist countries 
where democratization is incomplete or stalled. Parliaments of these countries have been 
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receiving assistance for improving the parliamentary support services and reforming their 
parliamentary procedure. Democracy or parliamentary assistance programs provide the civil 
society opportunity to influence both the input and the output sectors of the political system.    
 
Media  
The media have special responsibilities to provide a coherent and systematic account of what 
goes in Parliament and to convey public sentiment to the legislators. Mughan and Gunther 
pointed out that the mass communications media are the principal means through which 
citizens and their elected representatives communicate in their reciprocal efforts to inform 
and influence.60 In most of the countries of the world, parliaments recognize the right of the 
media to have access to the institution and to parliamentary processes, and to report on them. 
Consequently they grant certain facilities to the media to assist this activity. On the contrary, 
some parliaments, such as in India and Bangladesh, media is not allowed to their access to 
parliamentary documents and activities such as plenary sittings and committee meetings. In 
the German Bundestag, media is allowed to televise the plenary meetings but the committee 
meetings are not open to the public. The recent trend is that both the developed and 
developing countries made significant steps for developing information flow between 
parliament (including committees) and citizens through Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT). Most of the parliaments have their own home page in the Internet 
containing detail information about plenary debates and proceedings, committee composition 
including their functions and current activities. Apart from these, TV and print media are also 
prime sources of information.  However, in a number of parliaments, committee meetings 
are, in principle, not open to the public, but media and citizens have access to the committees 
through public hearings, press briefings and personal contacts. Electronic and printing media 
enable the parliamentary committees on the one hand to keep closer links with citizens; on 
the other hand, citizens can be better informed about their activities. The media where more 
space and time are given to publicize committee agenda and deliberations with criticism have 
greater chance to increase citizen’s access to committee information than the media where 
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merely coverage is done. Ricarrdo Pelizzo and his colleagues thus identified mass media as 
an independent tool that can promote the parliamentary committees more effectively.61 
 
The independence of the media from state control is crucially important in publicizing the 
activities of the parliaments. The countries where media is strictly regulated by the state 
apparatus have a great chance to promote partisan interests.62 On the contrary, media 'in 
private hands' and with regulatory flexible framework have wider opportunity to project the 
activities of the parliament neutrally. However, media houses tended to promote certain 
principle or ideology. Thus the role of media in publicizing the parliamentary activities 
depends upon the nature of the ideology of the owner and state principles. 
 
Factors:  Committee Structure  
Formal-Legal Framework 
 
It is important for the parliamentary committees to have formal power to perform their 
legislative and overseeing functions. Ingvar Mattson and Kaare Strøm categorized 
committee’s power into four types, including the committee’s right to initiate legislation, 
their authority to rewrite bills, control of the committee timetable or agenda and right to 
obtain information. The first three types of power are closely related with the legislation 
process. The process of obtaining information is an independent part of the committee’s work 
and is linked with the overseeing process.  
 
The ability to initiate legislation and/or to organize the bills in such a way that the committees 
can reframe legislation is a crucial source of power. Only a few countries granted their 
parliamentary committees to initiate a bill. For example, parliamentary committees in 
Sweden, Switzerland and Austria have such power.  Right to rewrite the bills is another 
important factor that is likely to have an important impact on the committees’ ability to 
influence on legislation. Ingvar Mattson and Kaare Strøm argued that if the committees 
cannot rewrite the government bills, the legislature as a whole is therefore in a comparatively 
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weaker position vis-à-vis the executive.63 Herbert Döring has investigated where the 
committees have right to rewrite the government bills and he found that in Germany, Italy, 
Norway, France and Norway parliamentary committees have the right to rewrite government 
text. In the British case, committees can only recommend amendments, but cannot adopt 
them if the minister in charge of the bill does not accept them. The third aspect of 
committee’s power is agenda setting or control of timetable. According to Döring the 
committees, which can determine their own timetables, enjoy more strength than the 
committees where the government majority controls their timetables.64 The committees, 
which control their own timetables, can settle the frequency of committee meetings, schedule 
for holding hearing or submitting committee report. Obtaining information independently is 
an important part of committee work. In most of the parliaments, committees are granted 
power to gather information when they review a legislative bill or scrutinize government 
activities. Method of obtaining information varies among the parliaments. In most cases, 
committees can invite ministers for witnessing but cannot force them to attend. Ingvar 
Mattson and Kaare Strøm argued that committee’s ability to influence or determine 
parliamentary outputs depends upon the formal power that are given to them.65  
 
The constitution and the rules of procedure are the two sources of committee organization 
and their functioning. The constitution generally delineates the jurisdiction of committees and 
in some cases, as for example in Germany, it is mandatory for the parliament to appoint some 
specific committees. The constitution also sets out broad principles of information 
acquisition. Right to demand presence of ministers for witnesses, right to demand documents 
or to hold public hearing depends upon the power given in the constitution. The rules of 
procedure specify actual number of committees and their method of functioning. According 
to David Olson, “Procedures and rules define and regularize the distribution and use of 
power.”66   
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Committee Types 
Comparative studies show that committee with the same sort of category performs different 
functions in different parliaments. Around the world, committees are broadly categorized into 
two types: permanent and ad hoc type committees. Permanent committees can further be 
broken into ministerial standing committees and non-ministerial standing committees. 
Permanent committees, which parallel the structure of the ministries, have greater 
opportunities for policy activity than those which are temporary and which have different 
principles of formation.67 Ad hoc type committees are set up very often with narrow mandate 
for a very specific matter. Around the world, parliamentary committees tend to have a clear 
legislative division of labor. In the U.S. Congress, however, standing committees play an 
important role both in legislative and overseeing process. As in the Congress, departmental 
standing committees in most parliaments review the related legislative matters. For example, 
standing finance committee reviews the legislation pertaining to finance-related matters. 
Unlike the Congressional system, the British parliament employs different types of 
committees for legislative and overseeing purposes. For example, ad hoc committees are 
appointed to review draft bills while select committees correspond to the government 
ministry, which perform oversight function.68   
 
The number and size of committees also varies among parliaments. Comparing the size of the 
committees of the 11 parliaments, NDI study group found that parliaments with larger 
number of members have relatively more committees than the parliaments with smaller 
number of members.69 There is an argument that committees with a larger number of 
members are more likely to experience problem in reaching agreement than the committees 
with small number of members. Analyzing the functioning of Defense committees of 30 
parliaments, George and Graham observed that the majority of committees are efficient and 
workable with 13 to 25 members.70  
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Committee Selection Process 
 
Distribution of committee seats and selection process is an important factor that conditions 
committee behavior. There are two distribution principles: proportional representation system 
and majoritarian system. Herbert Döring pointed out that in the majoritarian system; 
government tends to control parliamentary activities with a minimum share. In this system, 
most of the committee chairpersons are appointed from the members of the majority party. 
For example, in the American Congress, majority party holds all the committee chairs and in 
the British parliament all committee chairs except, the Public Accounts Committee, are 
appointed from the members of the majority party. In contrast to majoritarian system, 
consensual system provides the proportional representation of parliamentary parties in the 
committees. Thus in the consensual system, such as in Germany, France, Portugal 
composition of committees reflects the strength of different parties represented in the 
parliament. In the consensual system parliamentary activities are carried out by a negotiation 
and compromise between government and opposition. Opposition parties are facilitated to 
work closely with the government party in the parliamentary committees.71   
 
Several factors are involved in the process of appointment of committee chairpersons and 
members. Party and individual members’ preferences are the two main important factors, 
which have influence in the appointment of committee seats. Apart from these, constituency 
interests and geographic representation are likely to have influence in appointing committee 
members and chairpersons. Damgaard observes that the preference of individual members is 
never the sole basis for committee assignments. He claimed that other important factors also 
play important roles. He noted: “Member preferences are taken into account everywhere, but 
the party is also concerned with the seniority, loyalty and expertise of its MPs as well as with 
the need to satisfy the systemic demands on the party group as a whole.”72 The party has 
authority to decide which member will go to which committee and members create demand 
to sit in a committee either as member or chairperson. Each actor has different goals. During 
the distribution of committee seats, a party generally wants to promote electoral safety of its 
members, provide senior members with appropriate positions, ensure geographic and interest 
representations. On the other hand members have their own goal such as making nation-wide 
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reputation by making good public policy, advancing political career, providing service to 
constituency and gaining power or holding influence. When each factor has multiple goals, 
the committee becomes heterogonous with respect to interests that will be represented within 
a committee.73  
 
Factors:  Committee Capacity 
Social Standing of Committee Members  
 
Committees in the parliament differ from one another with respect to committee assignment, 
policy environments, decision-making processes and the member’s goals.74   For that reason, 
on the one hand, some committees play great attention to the interests of certain members and 
some committees demand specialized knowledge; on the other hand, member’s goals or 
interest and expertise have a correlation with the social background of individual members. 
Therefore, social backgrounds and expertise of the individual members can affect the 
functioning of the committees. Occupational status, educational status, age and sex are used 
as simple indicators of social backgrounds while party office experience, previous 
parliamentary experience, public office holdings and knowledge on particular issue are 
considered as indicators of expertise.75 Olson argued that the gap between member’ skills and 
committee jurisdiction can lead to either lack of attendance or willingness to follow party 
preferences.76 In other words, Norton said that pre-legislative backgrounds or specialization 
within the legislature or through ministerial assignments is required for proper functioning of 
committees.77 In view of the above, if expertise, experiences and seniority principles are 
followed during the process of selection rather than personal lobbying or party loyalty or 
family ties, one could assume that committees can be used more strongly because besides the 
partisanship committee members also act as policy entrepreneurs where in depth knowledge 
and expertise on subject matter are required. 
 
                                                 
73 Frish, Scott A. and Kelly, Sean Q (2004), The Politics of Committee Assignments in the U.S. House, Channel 
Islands: California State University, p. 25. 
74 Feno,R.F (1973), Congressmen in  Committees, Boston: Little Brown. 
75 Frnakland, E. Gene (1977), “Parliamentary Career Achievement in Britain and West Germany: A 
Comparative Analysis”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No.2, p. 138. 
76 Olson, David M., op. cit. 
77 Norton, Philip, “Introduction: The Institution of Parliaments”, in Philip Norton (ed.), Parliaments and 
Governments in Western Europe, London: Frank Cass, 1998, p.1. 
  - 26 -
Committees are also effective training ground for the amateur. This is why new comers are 
appointed to the less important committees while senior or experienced members sit in the 
more important or prestigious committees. Frankland shows that committee chairpersonship 
or membership in particular committees are considered to be the highest degree of 
parliamentary career achievement by a Member after cabinet position, parliamentary party 
chairmanship, and speaker and whip positions accordingly.78 On the one hand, experience 
and expertise of the members are required to improve the functioning of committees; in 
addition, better performances advance member’s political career.  
 
Staff and Support Services  
Adequate resources and institutional support is one of the important factors which can 
promote the effectiveness of committee system. Parliamentary scholars found a clear and 
positive relationship between committee resources and committee effectiveness. They argued 
that legislatures where committees are facilitated with qualified staff and research assistants; 
there is a greater likelihood of more effective committees.79 In the Western democracies, 
committee members and chairpersons tend to rely on the committee secretariat and personal 
staff to prepare background material for committees. Despite the personal assistance, staff 
also undertakes secretarial and research works. They are also asked to communicate with 
interest groups, work on summaries of legislation and subsequent amendments, and negotiate 
with the staff of other Members and with government officials over the details of bills and 
amendments.  From the experience of the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand 
parliaments, Grant Klinkum concluded that the personal research assistants allow committee 
members to be better informed and thereby enable them to be more active participants in 
parliament and its committees.80 Scholars observe that the parliaments where committees are 
less important, volume of staff and other support services are leaner than the parliaments 
where committees are considered strong.81 Therefore, it might be assumed that number of 
staff and other facilities provided for committees affect their works. 
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1.5 Literature Review 
 
The role of parliamentary committee system can be understood in the contexts of its 
emergence and working. Here, a review of the existing literature about various issues of the 
committee system will be discussed. 
 
In the age of parliament, Committees, however, are referred to as working horses of the 
parliament. Until 1950s, parliamentary committee system was not studied deeply and 
extensively by the scholars. A pioneering comparative research on committee system was 
carried out in 1979 by a group of scholars, titled Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative 
Analysis, edited by John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw.82 It is an outstanding work on cross-
national parliamentary committees. In this work, the contributors present an important and 
insightful look at eight committee structures. This study focuses on the socio-political factors 
affecting the committee’s work: basic committee structure, recruitment of committee 
members, relationship between committee members and other external entities and processes; 
the relationship between the committee members and parties, the functions committees 
perform and so on. Comparing eight-committee structures Malcolm Shaw makes a rank order 
in the conclusion in accordance with the importance of committees to the parliament. Among 
the eight parliaments, the strongest is the American Congress while the Diet committees are 
the weakest committee system in the rank order. It is worth mentioning that after three 
decades from the year of publication of this book, the Japanese committee system has been 
radically changed.  The study found that the political parties are the crucial important factors 
on the working of committees in the legislatures. Committees are the strongest in those 
parliaments where the party controls over the committees are found the lowest. Constitutional 
arrangement, institutionalization, committee structure, informality and privacy are other 
important factors that shape the working of parliamentary committees.   
 
The next significant study, Parliaments and Majority Role in Western Europe,83 focuses on 
West European parliaments in general and committee systems in  particular. Herbert Döring 
edited this book and published it in 1995. This comparative analysis contained substantive 
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collection of studies on 18 parliaments with a brief comparative analysis made by the editor. 
In this book Ingvar Mattson and Karre Strøm comparatively analyze parliamentary 
committees by focusing on their structures, procedures and power. Their data show that 
parliamentary committees in 18 European parliaments differ greatly.  They show that in 16 
countries of Western Europe, parliamentary committees deal meaningfully with legislation. 
They find that nine legislatures allow minorities to submit ‘minority report’, while minority 
right does not exist in the five legislatures and the practices in the remaining parliaments are 
not clear. In the parliaments where minorities are not allowed to submit a report, the majority 
party has prerogatives regarding agenda control and legislative initiatives.      
 
In the mid -1996, a turning point was reached in the study of parliamentary committee 
system. Parliamentary scholars from 20 different countries participated in a conference on 
‘The Changing Roles of Parliamentary Committees’ in Budapest, Hungary. A total of 32 
papers were presented in the conference. The Journal of Legislative Studies published a 
special issue in 1998, with some of these papers and again appeared in a book in 1998 titled, 
The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees84, edited by Lawrence D. Longley and Roger H. 
Davidson.  In this book, scholarly works illustrate changing pattern of nine committee 
structures. They show that in many ways parliamentary committees have emerged as vibrant 
and nerve centre of democratic parliaments and have begun to define new and changing roles 
for themselves.  
Reuven Hazan presents an inside look at five committee structures, with a particular focus on 
the Israeli Knesset in the book titled Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in 
Comparative Perspective. 85 First he comparatively examines the committee structures of the 
Knesset of Israel, the British House of Commons, the German Bundestag, the Italian Camera 
dei Deputati, and the Dutch Tweede Kamer. In this book Hazan shows that the Knesset 
committees used to be the primary location where cross-party agreements were negotiated in 
Israeli politics.  
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Chris R. Kyle and Jason Peacey, edited a book titled Parliament at Work: Parliamentary 
Committees, Political Power and Public Access in Early Modern England86. In this book 
contributors explain the changing role of the British parliamentary committees within the 
parliamentary process and national government. This book explores the contribution of 
committees in law making from historical aspects and their role in making a bridge between 
the parliament and the public.  
 
The book titled Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior: Passage of Legislation Across Western 
Europe87 examines the legislative behavior of the legislatures across parliamentary 
democracies. In this book two papers empirically analyze committee behavior. One is 
written by Ingvar Mattson and Kaare Strøm, titled “Committee effects on legislation” that 
explores the role of parliamentary committees in European parliaments on legislation from 
three perspectives: the arena perspective, the universalist perspective and partisan 
perspective. Erik Damgaard and Ingvar Mattson wrote another paper titled “Conflict and 
consensus in committees”. In this paper authors examine the causes of variation in the level 
of consensus and conflict in committees. They have observed that conflict occur primarily in 
strong committees.   
Philip Norton and Nizam Ahmed edited Parliaments in Asia that explores the structures and 
the roles of seven Asian parliaments including India, Bangladesh, Korea, Japan, China, 
Mongolia and Nepal. In this book, contributors assess the key variables that determine the 
impact of parliaments. Among the variables ‘committees’ is considered as internal structure 
that determines the basic relationship of the legislature to the executive.    
Parliamentary Committees in Japan and India: Their Functions and Relevance88 is an 
important addition to the literature on legislative systems. This edited book studies the 
functions of parliamentary committees in Japan and India, and examines their relevance. 
Contributors show that both Japan and India have strong commitments to parliamentary 
democracy and from these commitments parliamentary committees are gradually reformed 
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for strengthening their parliaments. The limitations of their committees in comparative 
perspective have been analyzed in his volume.     
 
Numbers of research reports and scholarly papers have been published in various books and 
journals, focusing on the committee procedures. Two research articles were published in a 
comparative legislative research book titled The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag:  
Comparisons of Democratic Process89. Samuel C. Patterson describes the structure of 
legislative parties and committees in his article titled “Parties and Committees in Congress”, 
and his counterpart Winfried Steffani describes the structures and functions of the Bundestag 
parliamentary parties and committees in the article “Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and 
Committees in the Bundestag”. In these two articles, the authors constructed that 
parliamentary parties and committees play a central role in the parliamentary process. They 
observed that parliamentary parties are an indispensable element for the efficient working of 
the committees in both the legislatures.   
 
A Washington based non-governmental organization named ‘National Democratic Institute 
for International Affairs' published a Legislative Research series Paper on committee system, 
titled “Committees in legislatures: A Division of Labor”.90 It is an outcome of a research 
work conducted in 1996 on 11 committee structures (i.e. the USA, UK, Germany, France, 
India, Japan and other five countries). This research shows that the number, type, size and 
function of committees vary considerably from one legislature to another. It is concluded that 
committees are an increasingly important organizational component of effective legislatures.    
  
Shane Martin in his research paper titled “Legislative Committees in Comparative 
Perspective: The Politics of Multiparty Government and Legislatures’ Preferences” observed 
that in a multiparty government, committees are the optimal institutional devices to hold 
ministers accountable. From an empirical survey on 31 advanced industrial democracies, he 
concluded that in countries with coalition government, the legislature tends to have stronger 
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committees and in contrast legislatures in countries with single party government tend to 
have relatively a weak committee system.91   
 
The standard works on committee system cited above are based on cases where committees 
as institutions are the product of long institutional and increasing evolution of political 
representation. Since the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991, parliament has 
received greater importance in the academic world. Though numbers of books and articles 
have been published embodying the politics of Bangladesh, very few of them are exclusively 
on parliament. The following paragraphs analyze the available books and articles published 
from home and abroad.   
 
Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies (BIPS) has taken a significant step in doing 
some research works on the Bangladesh parliament from different aspects. With the 
assistance of UNDP, BIPS has published nine monographs. This section reviews some of 
these monographs, particularly, which included parliamentary committees in their 
discussions. Riazur Rahman Chowdhury analyses the parliamentary duties of the CAG in 
ensuring public sector accountability in the monograph titled Parliamentary Duties of the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General in Bangladesh.  This monograph examines the relationship 
between CAG and parliamentary committees (particularly PAC). In the monograph- 
Democracy and Good Governance: The Role of Ombudsman A T M Obaidullah traces the 
process in which Ombudsman is associated with ensuring good governance in Bangladesh. In 
the monograph Women, Democracy and Parliament, author Barrister Rabia Bhuiyan analyses 
women representation in the parliament from historical aspects. The author also examines 
their position in different political parties. In this research, the author gives a detailed account 
about women participation in the committee proceedings. She noted that during the seventh 
parliament, although the opposition Members boycotted the parliament, they were regular in 
the committee sessions. As a result the Members in the committees exerted more power and 
control over the Executive than in the parliament. It is worth mentioning that during the 
seventh parliament women members have been included in all committees. The author also 
identifies barriers to women’s participation in legislative process. Abul Hashem in his 
monograph titled The Parliament Secretariat: Public Administration at the Service of the 
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House elaborately analyses the strength and status of parliament secretariat.  This monograph 
gives a detailed account about the Committee Wing that serves the parliamentary committees. 
The author identifies that committees are not provided with professional staff and therefore, 
committee members depend on the government ministry for technical assistance. In a 
monograph titled Parliament and Public Spending in Bangladesh: Limits of Control Nizam 
Ahmed analyses the role of financial committees in ensuring financial discipline in the 
government departments. Public Accounts Committee, Public Undertakings Committee and 
Estimates Committee are cortically discussed in this monograph.     
 
Nizam Ahmed’s The Parliament of Bangladesh92 is an outstanding work, which identifies the 
key dimensions of the parliamentary activities in Bangladesh. This book comprehensively 
analyses the growth of the Bangladesh parliament. Analyzing the formal-legal framework of 
the parliament, the author examines the legislative activities of the parliament and the limits 
of government domination in the legislative process. This book also provides an insightful 
look to the parliamentary surveillance. One separate chapter is devoted to analyzing the 
committee structure and procedures. This chapter analyses the pattern and performance of 
committees set up in the parliaments until the seventh parliament. The author observed that 
parliamentary committees do not appear to be good watchdogs in Bangladesh. But the 
committee system provides a training ground for members to become familiar with 
parliamentary procedure.  
 
The same author writes another book titled Limits of Parliamentary Control: Public Spending 
in Bangladesh on legislative control over financial matters.93 The main focus of this book is 
on the activities of the financial committees in overseeing financial matters. This book 
explores the scopes and the limits of parliamentary control of public expenditure in 
Bangladesh. With empirical data the author reveals that the parliaments that have been 
elected in the post-1990s appeared to be more active in scrutinizing public expenditure than 
the previous parliaments because of the changes that have taken place in party composition 
and parliamentary procedures in recent years.    
 
                                                 
92 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), The parliament of Bangladesh, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
93 Ahmed, Nizam (2006) Limits of Parliamentary Control: Public Spending in Bangladesh, Dhaka: the 
University Press Limited.  
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Al Masud Hasanuzzamn in his Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics exclusively studies 
opposition politics in Bangladesh from the first parliament to the seventh parliament.94 The 
parliamentary election of 1991 brought strong opposition in the parliament. The author 
analyzes the opposition activities in and out side the parliament. He gave a detailed account 
of the use of parliamentary weapons by the parliamentarians in monitoring government 
activities.  The writer in his research work shows that some of the important standing 
committees became moribund due to lack of legislative compromise between the Treasury 
Bench and the opposition both in the fifth and the seventh legislatures.   
 
Besides these books cited above, different scholars have published articles at home and 
abroad, dealing with the parliamentary procedures. Zaman explains the committee structure 
and procedure in “Parliamentary Committee System in Bangladesh”.95 After the election of 
the fifth JS, committees were given greater emphasis in making the parliament effective. 
From this aspect, this article analyzes the performance of the committees. Similarly Nizam 
Ahmed gives a detailed account of the committee structure and procedure in his article, 
“Parliamentary Committees and Parliamentary Government.”96 The legal basis of 
committees, their composition and scope of work are thus discussed.  
 
Taiabur Rahman makes a critical review of the performances of cotemporary Bangladesh 
parliaments and particularly focuses on the eighth JS in a paper titled “Governance and 
Parliament: Does the Jatiya Sangsad Matter in Promoting Good Governance in 
Bangladesh?”97 The author in this paper analyses the role of parliamentary committees in 
overseeing ministerial activities as well as their role in conflict management. The author 
observes that committees comparatively appeared to be active at present than in the past; the 
committees thus had been able to hold their meetings even when the main opposition 
boycotted the plenary session. He concludes that the parliament has gradually degenerated 
into a mere instrument of regime maintenance, which gives legitimacy to the governing 
regime.   
                                                 
94 Hasanuzzaman , Al Masud (1998), op.cit.. 
95 Hasanuzzaman , Al Masud (1994-95), “ Parliamentary Committee System in Bangladesh”, Regional Studies,  
Vol.XIII, No.1.  
96 Ahmed, Nizam (2001), “Parliamentary Committees and Parliamentary Government”, Contemporary South 
Asia, Vol. 10, No.1, pp.11-36. 
97 Rahman, Taiabur (2006), “Governance and Parliament: Does the Jatiya Sangsad Matter in Promoting Good 
Governance in Bangladesh?” in Salauddin M. Aminuzzaman (ed.), Governance and Development 
Bangladesh: Bangladesh and Regional Experiences , Dhaka: Shrabon Prokashani.    
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To sum up, it can be said that throughout the world committee system has emerged as the 
nucleus of the democratic parliaments. However, until recently, the parliaments particularly 
those established after Westminster model was plenary oriented; committees did less. In the 
recent years, they expanded their committee structure adding departmental permanent 
committees to eliminate imbalance between the legislature and the executive. In order to 
achieve this Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad also has expanded its committee structure covering 
the executive departments. Since the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991, some 
significant changes have been in the committee structure and procedure for making the 
parliament more effective and vibrant.    
 
1.6 Methodology of the Study  
 
The methodology applied in this research is a combination of historical, analytical and 
descriptive approaches. In the course of analysis, six committee systems are chosen from 
developed and developing countries. They represent three different systems, i.e. Westminster 
System of Government (i.e. the British, Indian and Japanese Parliaments), Presidential 
System of Government (i.e. the American Congress and the Sri Lankan Parliament) and the 
German system, which is, referred as hybrid system of Westminster and American system of 
government. The criteria, which are chosen to analyze the committees of these three systems, 
will be used to examine the committee system of the Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad. Adopting 
the above approaches present research intends to identify the role of historical forces and 
factors in the evolution and development of parliamentary committee system in Bangladesh.  
 
Although this research analyzes the working of the committees of the Bangladesh parliament 
in general, four ministerial standing committees, three financial standing committees, 
Petitions Committee, Committee on Government Assurances and special committees that 
were formed in the post 1990 parliaments are purposively chosen for in depth analysis of the 
overseeing of the executive. 
      
Present research analyzes functioning of the committees in the Bangladesh JS by bringing 
together new information and data, most of which were unavailable in the existing literature.  
Data and information for this are collected from two sources: primary and secondary. The 
secondary source includes books, articles published in various journals, working papers and 
study reports which are found relevant for the study. Seminar papers and publications of 
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different political parties are also taken into consideration. In addition to the secondary 
sources, information and data are also collected from the primary sources. Much of the 
analyses are based on the examination of the parliamentary proceedings, committee reports 
and Rules of Procedure of the JS. The socio-political characteristics of the committee 
members are calculated through parliamentary records. In addition to the data collected from 
the above sources, committee members and parliamentary staff have been interviewed and 
their views sought.  Information is also gathered from the discussion with prominent political 
leaders, civil servants and academia.  
 
1.7 Overview of the Study 
 
Bangladesh as a developing country has been gradually becoming familiar with 
parliamentary instruments since the colonial experiences. However, parliamentary democracy 
was discontinued, but it was again restored in 1991.  Since the beginning of the fifth JS, 
parliamentary research has emerged as a new area of institutional studies in Bangladesh. 
Most of the parliamentary studies were intended to focus on parliamentary structure and 
procedure. The present study intends to focus on the functioning of the committee system in 
Bangladesh with necessary illustrations.  
 
This study is organized through the following chapters. The chapter one presents a detailed 
background about parliamentary committee system in general. This chapter also justifies the 
importance of parliamentary committees in functioning of the parliament. To understand the 
recent phenomenon regarding parliamentary committees, published books and articles are 
reviewed in this chapter. Drawing a conceptual outline major research issues are identified in 
this chapter. Chapter two analyses the committee structure from comparative perspective with 
the examples of the United States, Britain, Germany, India, Japan and Sri Lanka. Chapter 
three traces the genesis and development of committee system in Bangladesh until 1990. In 
this chapter an attempt is made to look into the origins of the representative institutions from 
the Vedic period (Circa 3000-1000BC). This chapter specifically focuses on the development 
of parliament and its committee system in British-India (1857-1947). Working of parliament 
and committee system during Pakistan (1947-71) is also discussed in this chapter. The 
committee structure and functions of the Bangladesh parliament is presented in chapter four. 
This chapter illustrates legal framework, structure and procedure of the committees and 
analyses the relationship between committees and parliamentary parties. Social standing of 
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committee members and chairs is discussed in Chapter five. Educational qualification, 
profession, age, parliamentary and political experience of committee members and 
chairpersons are explored in this chapter. Chapter six focuses on staff and research facilities 
that are provided for the committees in Bangladesh. Reforms of parliamentary committees 
from the first parliament to the eighth parliament are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 
seven is devoted to examine legislative and overseeing performances of the parliamentary 
committees in Bangladesh in the 1990s. The limits of parliamentary committees in legislative 
and overseeing processes are also discussed in this chapter. This chapter presents the level of 
activities of financial standing committees in scrutinizing financial activities of the 
government. Chapter eight analyses the role of media and civil societies in strengthening 
parliamentary committees. An overall summary and concluding remarks are presented in the 
final chapter.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
Parl iamentary Committees in the Developed and Developing 
Countries:  A Comparative Discussion 
 
From a comparative perspective this chapter attempts to discuss the parliamentary committee 
procedures. Examples are thus drawn from the selected development systems of the USA, the 
UK and Germany while the Indian, the Sri Lankan and Japanese parliaments represent 
developing countries. Major focus in the discussion is placed on the structure and procedures 
of the committees. From the discussions on the USA, UK and Germany, it is possible to 
delineate the classical attributes of democratic systems as well as the democratic patterns in 
the developed countries. Examples of developing democracies can be many, but for this 
discussion India, Sri Lanka and Japan are chosen. As South Asian countries and having 
colonial history India and Sri Lanka are closer to Bangladesh. Japan is a good example of 
emerging democratic system in Asia. Parliaments of these three countries have undergone 
reforms since 1989 and these changes can provide lessons for understanding the changes in 
the Bangladesh parliament as a developing country.   
 
2.1 Formal-Legal Basis of Committee Structures  
 
The legislatures of the developed and developing countries and parliamentary committee 
systems have functioned with varying degrees of success. Within the democratic system of 
the parliamentary government, committees are vested with the power for carrying out 
varieties of activities relating to the legislative and overseeing process. These power are 
formally defined either in the constitution or in the ROP or in the both, and these are the 
sources of the formal-legal basis of the committee system.  
 
Among the legislatures of developed democracies, the British Parliament has made fair use of 
the committees since middle of the nineteenth century. Committees are governed and 
regulated by the Standing Orders, passed by the House. There are at present (as of 2007) 163 
public business standing orders, of them standing orders from 84 to 152 specifically delineate 
power and procedures of various committees. Composition, sitting, information gathering and 
decision making procedures of all regular committees are specifically defined in these 
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Standing orders. As far as legislation is concerned, general committee is appointed to 
consider each of the public bills. Under provision of the Standing Orders committees cannot 
initiate any bill but they can only move amendments. In the House of Commons bills are 
referred to a Public Bill committee after second reading. In line with the provision of the 
Standing Order 63 (2b), when a Public Bill committee scrutinizes a bill it can take written 
and oral evidence from outside the parliament. According to the Standing Order 135, all 
select committees have power to send for persons, papers and records and also have power to 
publish the names of persons who have appeared as witnesses before them. Every committee 
can determine its own agenda and can appoint specialist advisors if necessary. In short, the 
British parliamentary committees formally enjoy wide range of autonomy and power.    
 
Although, the American Constitution does not mention the committees, Chamber Roles of 
Business is the formal-legal basis of the Congressional committees. Through over the period 
Roles of Business has been modified. Among the major changes, Legislative Reorganization 
Act, 1946 sets a framework for the modern committee system. Under this Act Senate and 
House committees are organized along parallel lines, although over the time divergences 
have emerged. Unlike the previous Act, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 focused 
more on the rules for governing committees there on the committee structure. Within the 
guidelines of chamber rules, each committee can adopt own rules addressing organizational, 
structural, and procedural issues.98 Over the period Congressional committees have been 
developed through modification of their structure and procedure. 
  
Among the legislatures of the developed democracies, the German Bundestag is unique in the 
sense that the Basic Law (the Constitution) makes it mandatory for the Bundestag to appoint 
the following five committees- Foreign Affairs Committee, Defense Committee, Petitions 
Committee, Committee of Inquire and Committee on the Affairs of the European Union. 
These committees are established according to a provision in the Gundes Gesetz. Therefore, 
they enjoy constitutional status. The privileges and power of these committees are similar to 
those in other committees.  According to the provisions of the Rules of procedure other 
permanent committees are set up for the preparation of parliamentary deliberations. Rule 68 
of the ROP authorizes the committees to demand the presence of a member of the Federal 
Government and Rule 70 states that a committee may hold public hearings of experts, 
                                                 
98 Carr, Thomas P. (2003), Committee Types and Roles, Congressional Research Service Report, the Library of 
Congress, p.1. 
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representatives of interest groups and other persons for the purpose of obtaining information 
on a subject under debate. Sitting of committee meetings, holding public hearing, gathering 
information and privileges of members are well defined in the ROP of the Bundestag. Under 
the provisions laid down in the ROP, the committees are relatively free to organize their work 
and draw up agenda.    
 
Japan is the first Asian country to have a parliament, created in 1889 under the Meiji 
Constitution. After the Second World War, Japan adopted a new constitution in 1947 
characterized by Westminster type of parliamentary democracy. The new constitution 
describes the Diet as the highest organ of state power. It performs a variety of works in the 
area of legislation and overseeing. For the purpose of effective rule making and overseeing, 
the Japanese Diet depends upon its committee system. Article 50 (II) of the Diet Law 
authorizes the committees to propose a bill concerning matters under its jurisdiction. 
According to the provisions of Diet Law committees can examine law bills, budgets, treaties, 
and petitions in detailed. They also investigate other matters that fall within their jurisdiction. 
Article 45 of the Diet Law empowered the House to set up Special Committees in order to 
consider matters that are deemed necessary by the House or particular matters, which do not 
come under the jurisdiction of any Standing Committee. The Diet Law provides the 
opportunity to the committees to oversee government activities. In accordance with Article 
71 of the Diet Law, a committee may demand through the presiding officers the presence of 
any member of the executive including the Prime Minister and other Ministers to explain 
certain specific matters.99 These provisions formally allow the Diet to call for the members of 
the government to clarify their activities.    
 
Each House of the Indian parliament has provisions for appointing committees for the 
purpose of discharging its legislative and overseeing functions. The Constitution in its 
Articles 118 and 208 authorizes each House of the parliament to make own rules for 
regulating their procedures and to conduct their business. Article 118(1) of the Constitution, 
specifies the role and functions of committees. Chapter XXVI of the Rules of Procedure and 
Conduct of Business of the Lok Sabha contains detailed provisions about the functions and 
procedures of individual committees. In keeping with the spirit of parliamentary democracy, 
each House has a set of rules of procedure that guide the working of parliamentary 
                                                 
99 The Diet Law, available at http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/index.htm 
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committees. To strengthen the executive accountability, the ROP prohibits the ministers from 
becoming members of committees. Under the provisions of the ROP, departmentally related 
standing committees can consider demands for grants by the related ministries/departments 
and then report them. Regarding legislation, committee does not take up a bill on its own. 
When the House refers a bill to the committee, only then it can examine the bill.100     
 
Sri lanka is only the South Asian country that adopted the executive presidency replacing the 
parliamentary system of the government in 1978. Under the constitution of 1978 the 
executive enjoyed enormous power and the traditional parliamentary committees began to 
decline in their effectiveness. In the context of the declining of the legislature, departmentally 
related standing committees named ‘Consultative Committees’ were introduced in 1978 for 
overseeing the activities of ministries. The committee procedure is governed by the Standing 
Orders of the Parliament.  Under Article 74 of the constitution, promulgated in 1978, the 
Parliament is given power to make standing Orders for appointing various committees and 
for regulating their business. The Standing Orders empowers the Consultative Committees to 
summon witnesses, call for documents and records, to move from place to place, and to 
initiate any Bill or motion through its Chairperson. The Standing Orders also require senior 
civil servants of the relevant Ministries to be present at the monthly meetings of the 
committees. Despite the administrative accountability the parliament set up financial 
committees (the Committee on Public Accounts and the Committee on Public Enterprises) for 
overseeing financial matters.  
2.2 Committee Structure  and Size 
 
Parliaments set up different types of committees as they need for discharging their functions. 
In general, committees can be categorized into two types:  permanent and ad hoc. Permanent 
committees are set up for the whole period of the parliament and ad hoc committees are set 
up for particular period and cease to exist it once they have completed their assignment. Most 
of the parliaments have two types of standing committees- ministerial and non-ministerial 
committees. The ministerial committees are specialized by subject matter and parallel to the 
government while the non-ministerial standing committees are generally responsible for 
monitoring financial matters, investigating specific issue or providing services for the House. 
Select, special and investigative committees fall into the category of ad hoc committees. 
                                                 
100 Ramacharyulu, P.P.K. (2003), “Parliamentary Committees and Executive Accountability: A Case Study of 
Departmentally Related Standing Committees in India”, in K.V.  Kesavan (ed.), op. cit., pp.142-144. 
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Apart from these, bicameral parliaments also appoint joint committees from the 
representatives of both the Houses.  
 
The committee system has been evolved in the British parliament within a political 
environment characterized by single-party control and executive dominance over the 
parliament. This has served as the contextual factor affecting the formation, development, 
and working of parliamentary committees.101 The British Parliamentary committees can be 
categorized into standing committees, select committees, joint committee and committee of 
the whole House. Standing committees of the British House of Commons are appointed on 
the basis of subject of the bill to be considered and the relevant expertise or interest of 
particular MPs from different parties. There is no formal limit on the number of standing 
committees, but usually ten such committees are formed. Until the reform of 2006, standing 
committees had no distinctive names; they were referred as standing committee A, B, C and 
so on.102 From the beginning of parliamentary session of 2006-2007, standing committees 
have been renamed as 'General Committees'. There are two types of general committees. 
General committees, which consider the proposed public bills, are now called 'Public Bill 
Committees'. This committee mainly scrutinizes the proposed public bills, in detail. Each 
Public Bill Committee is named after the Bill it considers. For example, a committee 
considering a Bill titled the Climate Bill would be called the ‘Climate Bill Committee’.103 
Other general committees include: the Scottish Grand Committee, the Welsh Grand 
Committee, the Northern Ireland Committee, the delegated legislation committees, European 
Standing Committees and the Regional Affairs Committee. These committees exist to debate 
on matters referred to them by the House. They do not take evidence or make substantial 
reports of any kind. Normally, the matters referred to them are of special interest to limited 
groups of Members.  
 
The British parliament was traditionally a chamber-oriented institution. Much of the 
legislative works was done in the plenary; committees did a less. As Taylor noted, “In no 
country, perhaps, do committees occupy such a small place in the operations of the 
representative assembly as in Great Britain.”104  In 1979, the British parliament acquired its 
                                                 
101  Hazan, Reuven Y. (2001), op. cit., p.21. 
102 Grifith, J.A.G. Ryle , op. cit., pp. 270-72.  
103Information is collected in April 28, 2007 from the British Parliament home page: 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees.cfm 
104 Taylor, Eric (1951), The House of Commons at Work, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, pp.162-63. 
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own set of permanent specialized committees corresponding to the government department. 
With this structural change, the House of Commons has been shifted in activity from the 
chamber to committees incorporating the departmental standing committees. As Philip 
Norton noted, “Since 1979, the House of Commons has thus become a far more specialized 
body, with shift from general debate on the floor of the House to more rigorous scrutiny in 
committee.”105 At the beginning twelve departmentally related select committees were 
introduced in the House corresponding to each of the government department. Numbers of 
Departmental Select Committees (DSC) have been enlarged from 12 in 1979 to 19 in 2006 
due to the creation of new government departments.  Observing the changing nature of the 
British parliamentary committee structure, Stephen F. Downs noted,  “structure of committee 
system has been gradually expanded in the House of Commons when they realized that 
committees would need to be more extensively used in order to cope with the heavier 
responsibilities of ruling in the age of ‘big government’.”106 The departmental select 
committees are entrusted with power of scrutinizing activities of the executive departments. 
They can examine activities of the concerned department through witness and public hearing 
and can issue reports. The House of Commons assigned the tasks of the legislative scrutiny 
and the overseeing activities of the government departments to different sets of committees. 
Although, under the Standing Order No. 130 the role of the DSCs was confined to examine 
the expenditure, administration and policy of the department it shadows, things have changed 
somewhat in recent years, with DSCs now scrutinizing draft bills.107        
 
The House of Commons also has domestic or non-departmental select committees. They have 
a role that crosses departmental boundaries. The Public Accounts Committee, the 
Environmental Audit Committees, the European Security Committee, the Procedure 
Committee and the Committee on Standard and Privilege are well-established non-
departmental select committees of the House. Among the domestic select committees the 
PAC is undoubtedly most effective committee. While the Parliament realized that close 
scrutiny of public accounts was not possible in the whole House, on the motion of Mr. 
                                                 
105 Norton, Philip (1998), “Nascent Institutionalization: Committees in the British Parliament”, Longley, 
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107 Ahmed,Nizam (2007), “Departmental Select Committees in the British House of Commons”, in Nizam 
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Gladstone the Select Committee on Public Accounts was established in 1861. This was later 
renamed as ‘the Committee of Public Accounts’. Since the inception, the British House of 
Commons made extensive use of the PAC. 
 
The House of Commons has four other 'domestic' select committees, which cover services 
provided for the House, while others are concerned with the internal workings of the 
Parliament.  The House of Lords generally appoints four select committees on four main 
areas, such as Europe, science, economics, and the UK Constitution. Occasionally, other 
committees are set up to look at issues outside the four main groups. Besides standing 
committees and select committees, joint committees are also appointed for a temporary 
period. Joint Committees consist of members of both the Houses with similar power like 
select committees and they also operate like select committees. They may conduct an 
ongoing examination of a particular area (such as human rights) or of a specific matter, such 
as Draft Bills or House of Lords reform. Some permanent joint committees are also appointed 
in the House of Commons, such as ‘Joint Committee on Human Rights’. 108 
The American House of Representatives introduced standing committee system in 1789 by 
adopting the Committee on Enrolled Bills. From the beginning, Congressional committees 
perform a broad range of functions, i.e. preparing groundwork for legislation, bringing public 
issues into spotlight and taking active role in overseeing the executive.109 In fact, most of the 
legislative works take place in the committees; therefore committees system is referred as the 
‘Legislative Workshop” of the American Congress. 
 
Germany is one of the few countries with parliamentary system where some features of the 
American and British parliamentary system exist. It has adopted the American process of 
hearings, strong power of inquiry for parliament and adequate staff facilities. It also 
resembles the British system of government with regard to close co-operation between the 
majority parliamentary groups and the government.110 In the early days of the parliaments the 
German Bundestag was more plenary oriented and it was called a debating parliament. After 
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the Second World War committee system shifted the balance from a debating parliament to a 
working parliament that devotes most of its time for committee activities rather than for 
plenary assembly. The committees are therefore called the workhorses of the German 
parliament.111  
 
The committee structure of the US Congress and the German Bundestag are mostly similar. 
The Congress and the Bundestag divide their legislative, oversight, and internal 
administrative tasks among the standing committees. In both the legislatures, most of the 
standing committees are parallel to the government departments. These committees are 
specialized in particular areas, such as the foreign affairs, agriculture, judiciary, armed 
service, finance, etc. But in some cases more than one committee can cover particular subject 
matter relating to single ministry. For example, financial and budgetary matters are rendered 
to more than one committee. In the American Congress, three types of committees are 
involved in financial matters. Firstly, the Ways of Means in the House and Finance 
Committee in the Senate consider all proposals for taxes, tariffs and other receipts contained 
in the president’s budget. Secondly, Appropriations Committee discharges funds. Thirdly, 
Committee on Appropriations decides which program will actually be funded.112 Similarly, in 
the Bundestag, Finance Committee and the Budget Committee are responsible for matters 
relating to the Finance Ministry. The Finance Committee considers the matters relating to 
financial legislation and the Budget Committee is authorized to scrutinize finance bills.  
 
Other than ministerial standing committees, the Congress and the Bundestag have non-
ministerial standing committees, which do not correspond to the government ministry. The 
Joint committee of the American House of Representatives is an example of non-ministerial 
standing committees. Similarly in the Bundestag, the Committee for the Scrutiny of 
Elections, the Immunity and the Rules of procedure Committee, the Petitions Committee, the 
Committee on Economic Affairs and Technology, and the Committee on the Affairs of the 
European Union fall out side the ministerial standing committees. It has been observed that 
over the year number of permanent committees have been reduced in both the legislatures 
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because it was unmanageable for the House to coordinate large number of committees. As of 
2007, the Congress and the Bundestag each had 22 standing committees. 
 
Apart from the standing committees, ad hoc committees are set up for the duration of a 
particular period. For example, the Congress can appoint select committees to deal with the 
issue that falls outside the areas of standing committee. The conference committee is also a 
temporary committee, set up to work out the differences between the two chambers on 
specific legislation. Special committees (Sonderausschüsse) of the Bundestag are in nature ad 
hoc committee. They deal with a specific matter and do not live as longer as standing 
committees and their composition and authority are much similar to those of the permanent 
committees. Although the provision of special committee existed in the Rules of Procedure, 
the Bundestag rarely appoints such a committee.  
 
The Japanese Diet has adopted Congressional committee system for the purpose of effective 
rule making. In post war Japan, the new constitution adopted the British-style of 
parliamentary cabinet system replacing the pre-war Meiji constitution. The American style of 
committee system was superimposed on the British type of parliamentary system.113 As in the 
American Congress, the Japanese Diet has two types of committees: standing and ad hoc 
committees. In 2007, each House of the Diet set up 17 standing committees. The majority of 
the standing committees correspond to the government ministry. These committees enjoy a 
wide range of autonomy to oversee the activities of the government. They have the right to 
call members of the government for interpellations and to conduct investigations. Other than 
ministerial standing committees, each House has several other standing committees (i.e., 
Committee on Fundamental National Policies, Budget Committee, Committee on Rules and 
Administration, Committee on Audit and Oversight of Administration), which do not 
correspond to the government ministry. These committees deal with general subjects without 
having jurisdiction over the legislative process. In addition to the regular standing 
committees, each house may appoint special committee/s for a particular session in order to 
examine those matters that do not come under the jurisdiction of any standing committee. As 
of May 2007, six special committees and three research committees were appointed in the 
House of Councilors. Research committees were appointed to carry out long-term 
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comprehensive studies of particular issues and to propose legislation. Due to their brief 
existence they are termed as ad hoc committees. 
 
The Indian Parliament transacts a great deal of its business through committee system, which 
are, in fact, microcosms and extensions of the Houses. The Indian committee system owes its 
origin to the British parliament. Mitra notes, “Keeping to the British practice, a number of 
parliamentary committees impart a sense of continuity and specialization to the functioning 
of the parliament in all spheres of its competence.”114 Some of them are ad hoc in nature and 
others are standing or permanent committees. Ad hoc committees are those ones that are 
constituted by the House or by the Speaker. They consider and report on specific matters and 
become ceased as soon as they have completed their duties. Select committees or joint 
committees of both the Houses are ad hoc in nature and constituted for temporary period to 
consider a bill in detail before becoming a law.  
 
Two types of standing committees can be found in the Indian parliament: ministerial and non-
ministerial standing committees. Non-Ministerial standing committees of the Lok Sabha can 
be further divided into following categories: 1) Financial Committees (the Committee on 
Estimates, the Committee on Public Accounts and the Committee on Public Undertakings), 2) 
Committees to Scrutinize (e.g., Committees on Subordinate Legislation and Committee on 
Government Assurances), 3) investigative committees (e.g. Committee of Privileges and 
Committees on Petitions), 4) House keeping committees (e.g., Business Advisory Committee, 
Rules Committee, Committee on Private Members Bills and Resolution, and Committee on 
Absence Members from the setting of the House), 5) Service Committees (e.g., House 
Committee, Library Committee and General Purpose Committees). Among the non-
ministerial standing committees financial committees have contributed a great deal in 
overseeing governmental spending and financial management.115 
 
The ministerial or department-related standing committees were introduced in India for 
making the Parliament more effective in exercising control over and giving direction to the 
executive. Departmentally related Standing Committee (DRSC) system was first introduced 
                                                 
114 Mitra, Subrata K. (2004), “Politics in India”, in Gabriel A. Almond et. All (eds.), Comparative Politics 
Today: A World View, Delhi: Pearson Education (Singapore) Pvt. Ltd., Indian Branch, p.661. 
115 Ramacharzulu, P.P.K. (2003), “Parliamentary committees and executive accountability: A case of 
departmentally related standing committees in India”, in Kesavan, K.V. (ed.), Parliamentary Committees in 
Japan and India: Their Functions and Relevance, New Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd., pp. 134 -38.  
  - 47 -
in August 1989. Initially the Standing Committee on Agriculture, the Standing Committee on 
Science and Technology and the Standing Committee on Environment and Forests set up. A 
full-fledged system of department-related standing committees came into being in April 
1993, which led to the increase in the number of committees in the House. The number of 
departmental standing committees has further enlarged from 17 in 1993 to 24 in 2004.116  
Department related standing committees are still formative phase. They have been working 
with following shortcomings. Most of the committees oversee more than one ministry/ 
department, which prevents more focused work. Secondly, every committee is appointed for 
one year meaning that members hardly develop their expertise/knowledge in a particular 
subject unless they can persuade their whips to let them continue to serve on a particular 
committee.  
 
 The Committee System in Sri Lanka follows its mother Parliament, the House of Commons. 
From its inception, the Sri Lankan Parliament has employed a number of committees to 
transact a great deal of its business. The committees of the Sri Lankan parliament can be 
classified into four categories: Standing Committees, Select Committees, Consultative 
Committees and Committees for Special Purposes. Functions of the standing committees are 
similar to standing committees of the British House of Commons. Jurisdiction of the standing 
committee is confined to considering the bills referred to it by the parliament. Select 
committees are ad hoc in nature. These committees are appointed by the Speaker to inquire 
into matters, which may be refereed to them by the parliament. There are also eight 
committees appointed for special purposes such as House keeping committees (e.g. 
Committee of Selection, Committee of Standing Orders, disciplinary committee and 
Committee on Parliamentary Business), investigative committees (e.g. committee on 
Privileges and committee on Public Petitions), and financial committees (e.g. Public 
Accounts committee, Committee on Public Enterprises and Committee on Privileges). The 
Committee on Public Accounts is one of two financial committees of the parliament that set 
up to see that public moneys are applied for the purposes prescribed by Parliament. 
According to Section 149(1) of the constitution, all public revenue and expenditures have to 
be channeled through the Consolidated Fund and the Public Accounts Committee has the 
authority to preview this fund. The Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) is another 
financial committee appointed to examine public enterprises. These examinations are based 
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on the current performance aspects and queries raised by the Auditor-General (AG) on the 
activities of such enterprises. The Chief Accounting Officers (CAO) and The Accounting 
Officers (AO) are examined in depth on the submission of Annual Reports to Parliament, 
preparation of Annual Budgets, Corporate Plans and implementation of such plans. Among 
the committees for special purposes the High Post Committee, which selects the nominees for 
higher positions, is a specialized committee. In a recent study a South Asian researcher 
commented, “This committee is unique in South Asia and modeled, to some extent, on the 
U.S. Senate which approves presidential appointments”.117    
 
The Sri Lankan parliamentary committee system has changed its character in keeping with 
the changing developments in the Sri Lankan Parliament and the society. Significant changes 
were brought into the committee structure in 1978, adding department-related permanent 
standing committees namely “Consultative Committees” for overseeing activities of the 
government departments. These committees have power to call for persons, papers and 
documents as are necessary to accomplish their duty. However, the creation of new type of 
departmentally related overseeing committee is one step forward to enhance the 
accountability of the executive to the parliament their activities are hampered by a constraint 
in overseeing the executive departments as the Consultative Committees are set up with the 
Cabinet Ministers as the chairpersons.  Another weakness is that the Consultative 
Committees are only corresponding to the number of cabinet ministries because under Article 
45(1) of the Constitution Ministers of non-cabinet rank are not responsible to the parliament. 
Therefore, non-cabinet ministers remain outside the regime of parliamentary scrutiny.118  
 
For the sake of convenience in committee procedure sub- committees exist in most of the 
parliaments of the world. Parliaments of the America, Britain, Germany, India, Japan and Sri 
Lanka have the provisions of appointing subcommittees in order to consider a bill or 
problem, or to deal with certain areas of the committees. They are appointed for the whole 
electoral period or for a limited time with specific terms of reference connected with the 
activities of the main committee. The American Congress has comparatively a large number 
of sub-committees. Since the post-World War II number of sub-committees began to grow in 
the Congress due to demands for legislative action, escalating complexity of public policy 
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issues, enlargement of the federal bureaucracy, internal congressional demands and so on.119 
The widespread use of subcommittees in the House of Representatives does not match with 
those in the House of Commons. Occasionally a committee forms a sub committee to look at 
one issue in greater depth. The permanent committees of the Indian, Sri Lankan and the 
Japanese Diet also appoint one or more sub-committee, each having the power of the 
undivided Committee. The Bundestag has small number of subcommittees. Each committee 
can appoint subcommittee to deliberate on particular bills or problems. Most notably, some 
specific standing committees employ subcommittees to deal with certain specific aspects of 
policy throughout an electoral term. For example, the Foreign Affairs committee has set up 
four subcommittees; the Defense Committee and the Budget Committee have set up one sub-
committee each. In accordance with the Rule 55(1) of the Rules of procedure, standing 
committees may set up a joint sub-committee if an item of business has been referred to 
several committees or if a particular item falls within the terms of reference of several 
committees.120     
 
The size of committees varies among the parliaments; some parliaments have large number 
of committees with small number of members; on the contrary some parliaments have small 
number of committees with large number of members. The sizes of the Congressional 
standing committees are set forth in the rules of procedure of each House but the rule may be 
changed by an agreement of the majority and minority party leaders. Generally, 17 to 20 
members serve on each Senate’s standing committee and about 12 to 57 members serve in 
each standing committee of the House of the Representatives. Statistics reveal that most of 
the standing committees of the House of Representatives are constituted with 40 to 50 
members. The British Parliament limits the size of the departmental select committees to 11 
members. Other select and standing committees have membership of different sizes as they 
consist of 16 to 50 members. Like the British Parliament, the Indian parliament limits the size 
of various standing committees in varying numbers. The membership of ministerial standing 
committees is confined to thirty-one, among them twenty-one members are nominated by the 
Speaker from amongst the members of the Lok Sabha and ten members are nominated by the 
Chairperson of the Rajya Sabha from amongst the members of the Rajya Sabha. Similarly, 
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most of the non-ministerial standing committees also consist of members of both the Houses. 
Only a few committees such as Business Advisory Committees, Estimates Committees and 
General Purpose Committee are set up with the members of the Lok Sabha. Similarly 
composition of the committees of Sri Lankan parliament is limited by the Rules of the 
Standing Orders. The Select Committees, the Committee on Public Accounts and the 
Committee of Public Enterprises are set up with 12 members, the House Committee, Petitions 
Committee and Privileges Committee have 10 members. At the commencement of every 
session, the standing committee is appointed with 20 members to consider the bills referred to 
it by the parliament. The Consultative Committees are set up with highest number of 
members (32 members) while the Committee on Standing Orders consists of 9 members. 
Unlike the Indian, the Sri Lankan or the British parliaments, standing committee size is not 
fixed in the German Bundestag and in the Japanese Diet by their rules of business. The 
committees of these two parliaments are generally constituted with large number of members. 
The size of the Bundestag committees generally ranges from 12 to 45 members and the Diet 
committees have 20 to 50 members.  
 
2.3 Selection of Committee Chairpersons and Members 
In the parliaments of the USA, Britain, India and Sri Lanka, committees consist of a 
chairperson and a number of members. In the Bundestag each committee is headed by a 
chairperson and is assisted by a deputy chairperson. In addition to the regular members, every 
committee has substitute members who can attend all the committee meetings and has the 
right to vote as a representative of a regular member from their parliamentary group, who is 
unable to be present.121 The Japanese Diet committees have a chairperson and a number of 
members; in addition, a committee may choose several directors from among its members. 
The number of directors chosen depends upon the size of the committees. If the committee 
chairperson is not available or becomes disabled for some reasons, one of the directors 
discharges the functions of the chairperson. The chairperson and the directors must affix their 
signatures to the minutes of the committee meetings. 122   
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Most of the parliaments apply one of the following three methods for appointing their 
committee chairpersons and members: firstly, the appointment by the parliament itself; 
secondly, a committee is appointed for selecting committee members; and thirdly, the 
President or the Speaker of the parliament is rendered authority for this purpose. 123 
Whichever of these criteria or method is used, the parliamentary parties or groups play an 
important role in the appointment of the committee members and chairpersons. Where party 
strength determines the share of committee positions, these positions are allocated on the 
basis of negotiation between the government and the opposition parties. In the majoritarian 
system, most of the committee chairs go to the government party but the memberships are 
generally distributed according to the proportional representation method.  
The British parliament appoints a committee named ‘Committee on Selection’ for 
recruitment of committee chairpersons and members (except the Committee of the Whole 
House where all members of the House become automatically members of this committee). 
Standing committee members are nominated from both sides of the House. On the 
government side, the Minister, the Whip and the backbenchers who have specialization in the 
relevant area of bill, may be selected and the same criterion applies for the opposition side. 
The Committee of Selection enjoys the right to change membership of a committee time to 
time. But once the committee has started its work on a bill, the membership cannot be 
changed, except in cases of illness or change of Ministerial or opposition office.124 
Departmentally related select committee members are selected by the Committee on 
Selection. But other select committee members are nominated by the House on the motion 
made by the government Whip after discussion between parties. When these committees are 
formed, the Whips on both the sides of the House have influence in the determination of the 
memberships.  
 
In the British Parliament, the standing committee chairpersons are appointed by the Speaker 
from the panel of chairpersons drawn from both the sides of the House. More experienced 
chairpersons, of whatever party, are given bigger and more controversial bills. Unlike the 
standing committees, select committee chairperson is elected by the members of the relevant 
committee. Although there is no written prohibition under the Standing Orders that Ministers 
do not chair parliamentary committees, the Minister or the opposition spokespersons usually 
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do not sit in the select committee.  The Modernization Committee was an exception which 
was formed in 1997 with the Leader of the House (a Cabinet Minister) as chairperson.  
 
The number of committee chairs taken by the governing party and the opposition party is a 
matter of bargaining between the government and the opposition. The selection of the 
committee chair starts once it is decided, which committee shall have the chairperson from 
the government party and, which from the opposition party. Before the election of the 
committee chair, members of both the sides receive clear indications from the respective 
Whip office but occasionally the party members do not follow the indication. It happens that 
all the members of the committee participate in the election of a chairperson.125      
 
At the beginning of each session of the U.S. Congress, the chairpersons are elected by the 
House from the members nominated by the majority party. The members of every committee 
are nominated on the basis of party strength in the House and the Senate.  At the beginning of 
the session, the Democrat parliamentary party sets up a ‘Steering and Policy Committee’ to 
settle which member will go to which committee and the Republican Party renders the same 
authority to the ‘Executive Committee on Committee’. When the Democrat is in power, 
“Steering and Policy Committee” is appointed and chaired by the Speaker. This committee 
nominates the chairpersons for all committees excluding the Rules committee, which is 
chaired by the Speaker. When the Republican is in power ‘Executive Committee on 
Committee’ is led by the Minority party leaders. Both the Democrat and the Republican 
parties have similar type of committees in the Senate for determining the committee 
membership. In both the Houses, committee recommendations require the approval of the 
respective party caucuses.  
 
Unlike the practice of the US Congress and the British Parliament, the Bundestag does not 
employ any committee for the purpose of appointing the committee members and the 
chairpersons. The committee positions are proportionally distributed among the 
parliamentary groups. Thus the party strength in the House is reflected in the committees. 
The practice shows that the chairperson and the deputy chairpersons of each committee do 
not come from the same party group. This gives a party balance in the committees.  In the 
process of appointment of committee members and chairpersons, the Council of Elders plays 
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an important role. However, this is not a typical selection committee like the American or the 
British system.  In accordance with the Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure, the chairpersons 
and the deputy chairpersons are drawn from both the opposition and the coalition sides with 
mutual agreements reached in the Council of Elders. The respective committee finally 
confirms the decision taken by the Council of Elders. Since the 13th electoral term refining 
the previous method, an arithmetical method has been applied to rank order numbers on the 
basis of the party strength in the parliament.126  
 
The Japanese Diet follows the proportional representation method in distributing committee 
seats among the parliamentary parties but the committee chairs are allocated by following the 
majoritarian policy. Therefore the committee leaderships go to the grip of the governing party 
like the US Congress or the British parliamentary committee leaderships. In the process of 
the election of committee chairperson, the Speaker plays a key role. According to the Diet 
Law, the chair shall be elected from the members of the respective committees, but in 
practice the Speaker selects the committee chair from the members of the majority party. In 
addition to the position of the chair each committee has a position of the director (Riji). The 
opposition members obtain some of the posts.127  
 
The appointment procedure of the Indian parliamentary committees is different from that of 
the other committee systems described above. The members and the chairpersons of the 
ministerial and the non-ministerial standing committees are either elected by the House or 
nominated by the Speaker. According to the Rules of Procedure the chairpersons of the 
Estimates Committee and the Committee on Public Undertakings are elected by the House. 
The Speaker acts as the ex-officio chairperson of the Rules Committee and Business Advisory 
committee. The chairpersons of other non-ministerial standing committees are appointed by 
the Speaker. The members of the departmental standing committees are nominated by the 
Speaker, Lok Sabha and the Chairperson, Rajya Sabha. Most of the members (21members) 
are nominated from the Lok Sabha and ten members are nominated from the Rajya Sabha.  
Both the ministerial and the non-ministerial standing committee seats are allocated among the 
parliamentary parties on the basis of their strength in the House. When the committee seats 
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are allocated, parties give preference to their members as per their quota. According to their 
preferences and quota, the members are nominated or elected. Thus the committees give a 
true reflection of the Parliament in their composition.  Although, the members are appointed 
on the basis of party strength in the House, the committee chairs are mostly occupied by the 
party that holds the majority in the House. Like the British Parliament, only a few chair 
positions are offered to the opposition. 
  
The Sri Lankan Parliament has devised a well-knit committee system, working under a 
uniform set of rules. At the beginning of the first session the party Whips prepare a list for the 
committee positions, no member shall be appointed to a committee if s/he is not willing to 
serve on it. In accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders the members of the 
Select Committees are appointed by the Speaker and  the members of the Special Purposes 
Committees (8 committees) are selected by the Committee of Selection. The Committee on 
Selection also considers the number, function and constitution of the Consultative 
Committees and the Legislative Standing Committees. The Speaker acts as ex-officio 
chairperson of the following four committees: Committee on Selection, House Committee, 
Committee on Standing Orders and Committee on Parliamentary Business. The Chairpersons 
of the other special purposes committees are elected from among the members of the 
Committee. The chairpersons of the Standing Committees on Legislation are appointed from 
the members of the respective committee while the Consultative Committees are headed by 
the cabinet members. Although committee members are appointed from different 
parliamentary parties according to their strength in the House the committee chairs normally 
go to a member belonging to the party in power. 
 
Different methods and policies are applied in different parliaments for distributing committee 
positions and the appointing the legislators to these posts. The parliaments followed by 
majoritarin policy appoint committee chairpersons from the party that holds majority in the 
House. But the committee members are proportionally appointed from the members of all 
parliamentary parties. In the consensual system, the committee chairs are proportionally 
distributed among the parliamentary parties. In this system, smaller parties also have chance 
to get committee chairpersonship. Among the above parliaments, only in the Bundestag both 
committee member and chair positions are distributed through proportional representation 
methods while in other cases committee chair positions are occupied by the party that holds 
majority in the House. There are a few exceptions, such as in the parliaments of Britain and 
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India certain committee chairpersons are drawn from the opposition party and the Speaker or 
the Deputy Speaker holds some particular committee chair positions. Generally, the 
committee chairs are selected through one of the following methods: an election among 
committee members, an appointment by the Speaker of the House, or a special committee.  
 
2.4 Committee Procedure 
 
The committee procedures define the organizational principles under which the committees 
make decisions. Every legislature has its own rules of procedure or standing order that 
governs the committee procedures. In some cases, constitutions have some specific 
provisions relating to the operation of the committee system. The committee procedures vary 
from parliament to parliament.  
 
In the above-mentioned parliaments, committee members, substitute members, committee 
staff and authorized parliamentary staff may attend the committee meetings. But committee 
openness varies among the six parliaments. There is a debate on the question whether 
committee meetings should be open to the public or should be held in private. It is argued that 
close door committee meetings enable members to engage in more open discussion and 
important information reside behind the close door. On the other hand, open committee 
meetings enable the party leaders to monitor the performance of the committee members and 
to enforce strict party discipline.128  
 
The sittings of a committee are not open to the public in the German, the Indian, the Japanese 
and the Sri Lankan parliaments. The Bundestag allows non-committee members to attend the 
meeting without having voting right. By contrast, committee meetings in the American 
Congress are, in principle open to the public. The British parliamentary committees 
sometimes begin their meeting in public and then go to private for certain parts of the 
evidence, or vice versa. Since 2003, the public proceedings of all select and standing 
committees of both the Houses of the British parliament are made available either in audio-
visual or audio-only format. Similarly, the Congressional committee proceedings are 
broadcast in the web TV. The Indian and the Sri Lankan parliaments do not allow the 
broadcasters to broadcast committee deliberations. However, in the Japanese parliament, 
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committee meetings are, as a rule, closed to the public, members of the press, radio and TV, 
and other media with prior permission of the committee chairperson can enter into the 
committee room. Although, the Bundestag restricts the broadcasting of committee meetings, 
only the Investigative Committee allowed live television coverage of its hearings for the first 
time in 21 April 2005.129   
 
In the developed democracies, parliamentary committees make a yearly plan in advance for 
holding meetings.  In most cases, committee chairpersons themselves determine their agenda 
together with the venue, date and the duration of the meetings.  For example in the 
Bundestag, the committee chairperson determines the date and the agenda of the committee 
meeting and in practice, prior to the committee meeting, spokespersons' meeting takes place 
where the chairperson, the deputy chaperons, the spokespersons of the parliamentary groups, 
the policy advisors of the parliamentary groups, the representatives of the Federal 
Government attend to discuss the agenda for the next meeting. Based on the outcome of this 
meeting, the chairperson sets the agenda. In other cases, the chairperson him/herself sets the 
date and agenda for the committee meeting and communicates to committee members before 
the meeting.  
In modern parliamentary age, most of the parliaments empower their committees to hold 
hearing and meeting for receiving testimony from witness. Ministers, civil servants, 
representatives of the interest groups, experts and even individual citizens are called for 
hearing or witness. Such power is commonly used while preparing legislation or policy 
formulation or examining specific government's action. Public hearing is a common part of 
committee deliberations in the parliaments of America and Germany. Although the Japanese 
Diet Law prescribes that a committee must hold public hearings on the general budget and 
important revenue bills and may do so on important bills of public interest in order to hear the 
opinions of interested parties or people of learning and experience, but this device is not 
utilized as fully in Japan as it is in the Congress or the Bundestag.130 The Indian and the Sri 
Lankan parliaments do not have such accountability mechanism. But like other parliaments 
they empowered their committees to demand the presence of any member of the government.  
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In most of the cases, committee deliberation and decisions are prepared by a majority of votes 
cast in the committees. The voting quorum for committees varies among the legislatures. For 
example, the House of Representatives and the Lok Sabha require one-third majority while 
the House of Commons and the Sri Lankan Parliament require the presence of three 
members. The Diet and the Bundestag committees do not require majority or absolute 
majority of the members. Half of the committee members can take decision in the Diet and 
the Bundestag committees can take decisions even if lower than half of their members are 
present. Once the committee takes its decision, a report is submitted to the plenary. In some 
cases any dissenting member alone or in collaboration with other members has right to attach 
a reservation to the committee report and in some cases parliaments allow submitting a 
minority report. Some other parliaments do not offer such right. The British Parliament does 
not permit minorities to submit any report; on the contrary in the House of Representatives 
individual member or group of members who wish to file a minority report is allowed to do 
so. In the Indian parliament, committee decisions are made by majority vote. If any member 
or a group of members disagrees with the report or any portions of it, member/s can record 
his/her ‘note of descent’ with the report to be submitted to the House.     
 
2.5 The Delineation of Committee Functions 
 
Parliamentary committees are not just used as soapboxes; they are the chief instruments for 
making decisions in the area of legislative and overseeing of administrative action.131 
Committee functions can be categorized into two-folds: legislative function and oversight 
functions. Oversight function can be further separated into administrative oversight and 
financial oversight (including budget making and scrutiny budget implication). K.C. Wheare 
argued that administrative and financial oversight functions are connected with and arise 
from its function of law making. He pointed out that in the course of law making parliaments 
have opportunities to look into administration.132 In addition to reviewing legislative 
proposals and scrutinizing government activities, the committees also perform an 
investigatory function, either as part of administrative overseeing responsibilities or the 
parliament has established to investigate a particular issue. Many parliaments have a 
particular committee for the purpose of house keeping. From the broader aspects Malcolm 
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Shaw identified five different purposes, for which committees are established in the 
parliament, including legislative, financial, investigative, administrative overseeing and house 
keeping purposes.133  
 
Committees in the Legislative Process 
  
The involvement of committees in the legislative process differs considerably among 
parliaments. For example, in the United States, Germany and Japan, the same standing 
committees perform both the legislative and overseeing functions while the British, Indian 
and Sri Lankan parliaments employ separate committees for the purpose of legislative and 
overseeing functions. This has been a feature of Westminster type parliaments where 
particular committees are appointed for the consideration of bills.  
 
The process of writing bills and enacting them into law is a complex process in the sense that 
it is done through several stages. The Inter-Parliamentary Union shows in their study that 
most of the parliaments (35 parliaments out of 83) follow the “Three Reading” procedure 
whereas only 18 parliaments and 30 parliaments respectively follow “Two Reading” and 
“One Reading” procedure.134 The legislative stages at which bills are referred to committee 
also differ among parliaments. In some cases a bill is first considered by the House itself 
while in other cases a bill is first scrutinized by a parliamentary committee.135 
 
In the US Congress, the law making process is simple in the sense that it follows a series of 
specific steps. When a bill is introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives or in the 
Senate, it is assigned to the committee with jurisdiction over that policy area. When a 
committee actively considers a piece of legislation assigned to it, the bill is usually referred to 
a specialized subcommittee. Bills are scanned and finalized at the committee stage through 
three steps: holding hearings; marking up the bill; and reporting. In the first step the 
subcommittee holds hearings in order to gather information on particular issue as well as to 
take testimony from witness who have specialized on the subject matter.136 At this stage, 
committee staff may do research on the problem. At the end of the hearing, committee or 
subcommittee meets to “mark up” the bill. It considers line-by-line and clause-by-clause the 
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specific language of the bill for amending the basic draft to suit the member’s view. The 
“mark up” sessions are crucial arenas of conflict, compromise, and bargaining within 
committees. Sometimes senior committee members or small group of committee members 
may meet before the markup session to decide on strategies.137  In the “mark up” session, 
subcommittee can approve the bill unaltered or can rewrite it, or amend it and then send the 
recommendations to the full committee. If committee considers the bill in some form, then it 
goes to the Rules Committee to issue a rule that governs the debate in the House. If the bill is 
in a form different from the Senate version, it must go to the Conference Committee and 
come back again to the full House for final consideration.138  If the bill is passed in both the 
Houses, it goes to the President for his/her signature or veto. If s/he vetoes the bill, sends it 
back to the Congress with reasons for rejecting it. However, the Congress can override the 
veto by two-thirds vote of each house. If the president neither signs nor vetoes the bill within 
ten days of receiving it, the bill becomes a law. 139 The way, in which bills are enacted into 
law, committees play significant role because an original bill is modified and revised at the 
committee stage through bargaining and negotiation. Eventually it develops into a 
compromise version for enacting a bill. However, the Congress had a difficult time reaching 
an agreement on some particular bills; for example, in the late 1980s welfare reform 
legislation was enacted after a long bargaining between the Democrats and the Liberals.  
 
Like the US Congress, the Bundestag committees also play a significant role in the process of 
legislation. Bills are modified and amended at the committee stage through bargaining and 
compromise between parliamentary groups. As in the US Congress, the Bundestag generally 
deals with bills in three readings in the plenary. The process of legislation starts from the 
introduction stage. At this stage, a debate can take place if it is recommended by the Council 
of Elders or demanded by one of the parliamentary groups. With this debate, the government 
states its reasons for introducing them. Parliamentary groups make public their initial position 
and citizens are made aware of the issues involved.140 Once the first reading is completed, the 
bill is automatically referred to the appropriate committee for detail consideration. If a 
particular bill covers different subjects, it is referred to one or more committees in addition to 
the committee responsible for it. The associated committees submit a report to the concerned 
                                                 
137 Lees, John D. (1979), “Committees in the United States Congress”, in Lees , John D. and Shaw, Malcolm 
(eds.), op. cit., p.40.   
138 Janda, Kenneth, Berry, Jeffrey M. and Goldman Jerry (1995), op. cit., p. 379, Lok Sabha (1988), 
Parliamentary Committees, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, pp. 90-97.  
139 Janda, Kenneth, Berry, Jeffrey M. and Goldman Jerry (1995), op. cit., p. 379.  
140 Schick , Rupert and Zeh, Wolfgang(1999),op. cit., pp, 90-91.  
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committee with proposed amendments or suggestions. The concerned committee prepares a 
report along with some recommendations, which are agreed upon in the committee to be 
adopted. The Bundestag may decide to dispense with the committee stage if two-third 
majority of the Members agree to proceed to the second reading without reference to a 
committee. However, it occurs very rarely.  
 
Once a bill is referred to a committee, legislative process starts with the appointment of 
rapporteures from among their members based on the proposal of the parliamentary groups. 
Under the provision of Rules of Procedure, rapporteures are responsible for “supervising the 
progress of deliberations, drawing up the results of deliberations and, in particular, for 
signing the report submitted to the plenary. The rapporteurs must familiarize themselves 
thoroughly with the content and major points of a bill. They must also consider statements 
relevant to the bill, read specialist literature in the relevant field and take into account the 
wishes and demands of interest groups as well as opinions in the press concerning the bill.”141 
They communicate between the committee and their respective parliamentary group in the 
discussion of the bill. Once the committee chairperson and rapporteures have made 
themselves familiar with the bill, the committee chairperson sets the agenda and date of 
committee meeting in agreement with the spokespersons of the parliamentary groups.  
 
During the committee meeting a bill is presented along with the detailed contents. All 
members of the Federal Government have access to this meeting. However, committee 
meeting in principle is not open to the public. If the committee permits citizens, experts, 
representatives from interest groups, journalists may attend the meeting. Committees may 
seek information from the Federal ministers, the officials as well as other persons who are 
able to provide relevant information. Even committees may ask the experts, representatives of 
the interest groups or any other groups for hearing and discussion, which are designed to 
create sensible and workable legislation.142 Based on hearing and witness, the committee 
gathers necessary information and prepares decisions, which are generally made final by a 
majority vote. In the case of an equality of votes on any matter, committee chairperson has 
the right to cast his/her vote, the committee also allows substitute members to cast vote when 
a regular member is unable to be present. The chairperson prepares the final report with the 
                                                 
141 Rupert Schick and Wolfgang Zeh (1999), The German Bundestag: Functions and Procedure, 
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support of the committee secretariat. The committee report generally contains the 
recommendations, opinion of the minority who are outvoted and other comments of the 
committees concerned. The committee report shall be presented to the House by the 
chairperson or in his/her absence by any member of the committee. Subsequently, second 
reading is held in the plenary and voting takes place on the amendments followed by final or 
third reading.143 
 
After reporting stage, second reading is called for a detail debate on each clause and 
individual vote or vote on the bill as a whole, particularly if no motion for amendment has 
been tabled.144 Under the provisions laid down in the Rules of Procedure, during the second 
reading, individual member and members who do not belong to any parliamentary group has 
right to move amendments at this stage. Once a bill is adopted as it stands during the second 
reading, the third reading can begin straight away and the final vote is taken on the bill. The 
third reading generally starts on the second day after distribution of paper containing the 
amendments adopted.  At this stage, only parliamentary groups may move amendment, and 
no individual member can move amendment. Once the bill is adopted in the Bundestag, it is 
then transmitted to the Bundesrat without delay and finally it is sent to the Federal 
Government to be signed by the appropriate Minister and Federal Chancellor. 
 
The law making process of the Sri Lankan Parliament is also similar to that of the Congress. 
The legislative process starts with the introduction of a bill called first reading. Once a bill 
accepted in the House in principle it is thereon sent to the standing committees for detailed 
securitization. This is called second stage of the second reading. But the use of standing 
committees for considering the bills is limited. Only a few private bills are referred to the 
committee while government bills are usually taken up in a Committee of the Whole House 
for reasons of expeditiousness.  
 
In contrast to the Congress and Bundestag, the British and the Indian parliaments rely on ad 
hoc standing and select committee respectively for scrutinizing legislative proposals. In these 
two parliaments, all government bills are considered by ad hoc committee in detail and then 
disband. In both the parliaments ‘Private Bills Committee’ is formed for considering each 
                                                 
143 Hazan, Reuven Y. op. cit., p.25. 
144 Legislation process is detail available at www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/legislat/02initleg 
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private member bill. Particularly, in the British Parliament some draft bills are looked into by 
the select committee before being formally presented to the Parliament. This ‘pre-legislative 
scrutiny’ process enables committee members to make suggestions and recommendations at 
an early stage. In the British and the Indian parliaments, legislative process starts with the 
first reading. At this stage a bill is formally introduced into the House and a date is 
announced for second reading. The Minister in charge explains the main purpose of a bill in 
the second reading stage and answers general questions about the bill. Following this stage, a 
bill is referred to a committee for detailed scrutiny. At the committee stage, a bill is examined 
in detail, clause by clause, and schedule by schedule. The committee stage enables its 
members to move suggestions or amendments to the bill and vote for. The committee 
decision is made by majority vote. If any member disagrees with the report or any portions of 
it, s/he can record his/her opinion. Once the committee concludes its deliberation, it hands 
back the bill to the plenary with or without amendment for third reading. The third reading 
stage is largely a formal stage. It does not take much time for debate. The bill cannot be 
changed at this stage.  After completing the third reading stage a bill is finally sent to the 
upper House for its approval. In the case of the British system, a bill is enacted into a law 
with the consent of the Lords while in the Indian system a bill is sent to the President for his 
approval.  
 
Unlike the American or the German system, the law making process is comparatively simple 
in the Japanese Diet. There is no difference in procedure between bills introduced by the 
cabinet members and those introduced by individual members of the House. The legislative 
process begins with the introduction of a bill. Once a bill is introduced in the plenary, 
whether it is government or private bill, the Speaker at once refers it to an appropriate 
permanent committee where the bill is scrutinized through a process of interpellation, debate, 
investigation, public hearing and witness. This is the second stage of the legislation process. 
The time taken for examination of a bill in the committee is generally much longer than that 
taken in a plenary sitting. In the Japanese parliament, the committee enjoys the right to 
amend or shelve a bill. After successful committee procedure, a bill receives the final vote 
and a report is made to the speaker. The third stage begins with the plenary sitting.  Upon 
presentation of the committee report, the speaker puts the bill on the order of the day of a 
plenary sitting. In the plenary session the committee chairperson explains the results of the 
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committee proceedings.145 If the two Houses put different opinions on a bill, both the Houses 
call for a joint committee to consider a compromise. After passage by both the Houses, a bill 
is sent to the Emperor for his consent which is the last stage to pass a bill. Following these 
procedures, a bill is promulgated into a law.  
 
The above discussion reveals that the legislative committee process of the Congress and the 
Bundestag are almost similar. On the other hand, the House of Commons and the Lok Sabha 
mostly follow similar procedures. The committee procedures in the Diet and the Sri Lankan 
parliament are different from those of the above cases. Nonetheless, jurisdiction and the kind 
of committees on legislative process vary considerably among parliaments. Most of the 
committees perform a greater range of functions in the legislative process and spent most of 
their time on legislation.146  
 
Committees in Overseeing Process 
 
K.C. Wheare argued that the modern legislature fares better in making the government 
behave than in making law.147 In overseeing government activities, the parliament can use 
both individual and collective techniques. An individual technique includes asking written or 
oral questions, holding debate on government policies and action, raising adjournment 
motions or call-attention motions. The committee system is referred as the collective 
technique of overseeing method. Compared with the individual techniques the committee 
system has a better scope to go much deeper into particular issue. According to Malcolm 
Shaw, “the committees allow the legislators to pursue a line of questioning with ministers in 
more detail than is possible during question time or during debates on the floor of the house.” 
148 Therefore, all over the globe, parliaments rely on committee system for reviewing the 
activities of the executive branch.  
The British Parliament appoints departmental select committees and financial committees 
(the PAC and the Estimates Committee) for the purpose of overseeing government activities.  
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It is observed earlier that departmental select committees have been created in the House of 
Commons to bring government policy and administration under far more detailed scrutiny 
than was the case even in the recent past.149 Select committees can monitor the activities of 
the government departments by taking written evidence and examining witnesses. They can 
also conduct an inquiry on particular issue or area. The committees at the end of their inquiry 
make a report and submit it to the Parliament.  The Government must respond to all reports.  
 
Among the financial committees, the PAC is perhaps the most important select committee 
that can monitor government expenditure. As discussed earlier, the PAC was first established 
in the British House Commons in 1861 for examining the accounts showing the appropriation 
of the sums granted by the Parliament to meet public expenditure.150 The main task of this 
committee is to examine the reports submitted by the Comptroller and Auditor General 
(C&AG). This report contains the detailed records of expenditure of the Government 
Departments and other bodies. In examining audit reports, the PAC has power to take oral or 
written evidence. The Committee's objective is to draw lessons from past successes and 
failures which can be applied to future activities by the department examined or more 
generally by the government. 
 
The Congressional standing committees are regarded as a model of strong oversight 
committee. As in the U.S. Congress, the German Bundestag and the Japanese Diet also have 
departmental standing committees. In these parliaments, most of the standing committees are 
parallel to the government departments; they serve both the legislative and overseeing 
functions. These ‘watchdog committees’ employ two mechanisms for overseeing executive 
departments. They can call the relevant government department and offices for oral or written 
information. Public hearing is another oversight tool. In the hearing process, the committee 
can ask the bureaucrat, citizens, representatives of the private organizations and interest 
groups for providing their opinion on particular issue or making comment on the 
effectiveness of the government program. In addition to the departmental standing 
committees, financial committees are also appointed to monitor government expenditure. For 
example, the budget committee of these three parliaments has broad areas of jurisdiction on 
financial matters including taxation, apportionment of budget fund and spending. In these 
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parliaments, the budget committee systemically scrutinizes the whole budget before the final 
vote in the plenary. In addition to the budget committee, the Committee on Audit and 
Oversight of Administration has been established in both the Houses of the Diet in1998, to 
improve and strengthen the quality of legislative supervision.151 
  
As discussed earlier, following the experiments of the British and other European 
parliaments, the parliaments of India and Sri Lanka introduced department-related standing 
committee system in the late 1980s to improve overseeing functions of their parliaments. 
Despite these department-related standing committees, financial committees play an 
important role in keeping the government accountable for spending.  The Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) is a well-known oversight committee that exists in the Indian and the Sri 
Lankan parliaments. Following the British practice, PAC was introduced for critical 
evaluation of government spending. In addition to the PAC, Sri Lankan parliament has 
another financial oversight committee named ‘Committee on Public Enterprise’ (COPE) 
which examines the activities of the public enterprise. Including the PAC, the Indian 
parliament has three financial committees.  The Public Undertaking Committee and the 
Public Estimates Committee are equally important standing committees that offer a wide 
scope to monitor financial matters.  
 
Different parliaments use different committees to perform overseeing activities. As it is 
observed, department-related permanent committees are mirror images of the government 
departments, which oversee a particular area of the executive. On the other hand, different 
types of financial committees are appointed to oversee the financial management of the 
government in general. In overseeing the financial matters, the financial committees examine 
financial documents and audit reports. Most of the parliaments also have provision/s to set up 
special investigative committee on specific matters, mostly on scandal, misconduct and 
corruption. Such a committee enjoys power to summon and swear in witnesses and to 
demand the appearance of any government or state official. 
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CHAPTER III  
Parl iamentary Structure in  Bangladesh: A Historical  Account 
 
The Indian subcontinent has a rich record of institutional development since ancient time. 
The spontaneous development of institutions and practices had been hampered with the 
advent of colonial rulers. The countries of this region had first exposure to the western 
parliamentary system during the British colonial period. In the post-independent period these 
countries adopted democratic structure and legislative framework as a legacy of the British 
colonial rule. This chapter analyzes the genesis of representative institutions and the 
legislative structure in Bangladesh from historical point of view.  
 
3.1 Sabha -Samiti and Panchayats: Tradition of Representative Institutions  
 
Historians and indigenous ancient literature show that democracy was well in place in India 
long before the British came. As early as Vedic age (Circa 3000-1000 BC), a state was as 
small as a city-sate. It had a capital surrounded by a few villages. The state was ruled by a 
rajan (king) chosen by the people and governed by the people with their consent and 
approval. The main duty of the king was to protect the people and promote their welfare. 
There were two popular assemblies named as Sabha and Samiti. According to the Rig Veda1 
these two assemblies were established to assist the King and inspire and encourage him to 
work for the welfare of the people. If the King made mistakes or took a wrong decision, they 
would correct him by giving proper advice. These bodies kept a check on the absolutism of 
the king. People could express their grievances against the government servants before them   
without fear.2  
 
The Sabha and Samiti were differentiated from each other in their status and functions. The 
Samiti literary meant an assembly or getting together. The term Samiti was used in the Rig 
Veda as a general assembly or a house of people while Sabha was a body of selected elder 
persons discharging legal duties like providing justice. Some scholars identified Sabha as an 
assembly of a village and Samiti as a national or central assembly of the whole state, 
constituted of all the male members of the kingdom and probably convened at the capital for 
                                                 
1 The Rig Veda is the oldest book in Sanskrit or any Indo-European language; modern Western scholars tend to 
date it around 1500 B.C. It contains the oldest form of all the Sanskrit mantras. 
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the ratification/election of a new king. Neither the Sabha nor Samiti could formulate laws 
because laws were either sacred or secular. The former was based upon scared texts and the 
latter upon customs and traditions.  They had no jurisdiction over the matter of laws.   
 
The Sabha and the Samiti were given sacred positions. The Atharvaveda described them as 
the twin ‘daughters’ of the ‘Prajapati’, the chief of the people. The King convened the two 
bodies but there was no indication that he presided over the meetings. He could address the 
joint meetings of the two bodies only with the permission of the elders (pitaras). He looked 
for permission from the combined gathering to ensure that the person whom he proposed to 
select as his ‘ally’ will respect and support him.3 The Sabha and the Samiti were the most 
democratic of the Vedic aristocracies. Parliamentary scholars and historians found that these 
had good tradition of practicing democracy and they contained rudiments of a modern 
parliament.4 
 
The two largely democratic institutions- Sabha and Samiti gradually died away before the 
time of Dharmasutras (c.500 B.C). At that time, republics became larger and elected chief 
turned towards hereditary and absolute monarchy. Kings were always eager and anxious to 
grab all power in their hands. In these circumstances, the Sabha and the Samiti ceased to 
function.5 After this, India had no democratic legislature till the British times. During the 
Muslim rule, the Sultanates introduced federal system modeled on the Persian system. The 
central government was formed with a Consultative council consisting of four ministers who 
existed on the sufferance of the King. Throughout the Sultanates and the Mughal period, 
Ministers or Councilors were appointed by the King to assist him and to carry out his 
commands. Neither the King nor his councilors were responsible to any other popular body. 
However the village level, Panchayat survived and continued during the Islamic period and 
even thereafter.     
 
One of the unique democratic institutions that evolved in the ancient period and continued till 
the British period was the Panchayat system. It was a sort of village assembly consisting of 
five elder members of the village. The members were either nominated by the king or elected 
by the people of the village. It elected or nominated its own headman who served as a link 
                                                 
3 Nagarajan,V (2000), Prologue to Hindu Political Sociology : Studies in Ancient Indian Social Polity, 
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between the village and the government. The Panchayat was accountable to the villagers for 
overall management of the administration of the village. Generally, it performed judicial and 
social welfare duties including land distribution among the villagers, tax collection and 
payment of government tax.  The Panchayat also had some social responsibilities including 
holding fairs and festivals, looking after religious practices and moral contacts. All activities 
were conducted in a public place. If any member failed to satisfy the villagers or could not 
justify the use of public funds he was considered disqualified for his office. The Panchayat 
system was gradually replaced by the new institutions invented by the British rulers in India 
since 1885. It was finally replaced by the Union Board (local self-government) with the 
passing of the Bengal Village Self Government Act 1919.6 
 
3.2  Parliamentary Structures: British Colonial Period (1854-1947)  
 
There were representative institutions in ancient India at various levels but none of them 
existed during the colonial period except Panchayat system. In addition to the Panchayat 
system, local self-government system was introduced at local levels to build up and 
consolidate the British rule in India. The main purposes of these institutions were to collect 
revenue, maintain law and order situation. Until 1853, there was no legislative body at all. 
Both the executive and the legislative power were vested to the Governor-General Executive 
Council.7 The Charter Act of 1853 first differentiated legislative functions from the 
executive. But the Indians were not appointed as members of the legislative council. The 
Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 made it abundantly clear to the rulers that they must associate Indians 
with the law-making process.8 The Indians also expressed their interests to be included in the 
legislative process. For example, two petitions were placed to the British Parliament by the 
inhabitants and taxpayers of Calcutta and Bengal proper, in March 1861 and the inhabitants 
of Bombay and Madras submitted another petition in the same year. The native elites and the 
intellectuals gradually raised their voice for the addition of Indians in the legislative organs. 
One factor that contributed to the reformation of the existing legislative structure was the 
growing national feelings among the Indians. In the early nineteenth century, the spread of 
western education and liberal ideas brought changes in the socio- cultural aspects and 
generated national feeling. With these societal changes, the political leaders raised demands 
                                                 
6 Shibnath Banerjee, “Panchayet System”, Banglapedia, Dhaka: Asiatic Society, available at 
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for constitutional reforms so that they could participate in the governing process. The Indian 
Council Act of 1861, 1892 and 1909 made great efforts in expanding Indian participation in 
the legislature. In establishing a representative parliament, the Government of India Act of 
1919 and 1935 were two further important steps. 
   
The Charter Act of 1853 made an effort to differentiate between the Executive and 
Legislative Council. Under the provision of the Charter Act, the Legislative Council (later 
Council) consisted of twelve members for the purpose of legislation. The legislative 
procedures adopted by the Council were similar to those in the British Parliament. Bills were 
scrutinized by a select committee before final consideration in the House. Besides legislative 
function, the Council had right to criticize the executive for any lapses and excesses. The 
Council was also constituted for the purpose of inquiry into and redress of grievances. But it 
was hardly possible for the Governor-General to know the Indian views on legislative 
measures because among twelve members of the Council, none was an Indian. Thus it can be 
argued that the Council was just an enlarged body of the Governor General’s Council.   
 
The Act of 1861 enlarged the size of the central legislature from twelve to minimum fifteen 
and maximum twenty-one. Under this Act, the council was consisted of three different types 
of members: ordinary members (5 members), extraordinary member (one member) and 
additional members (6 to 12members). The ordinary members were nominated from among 
the Governor-General’s Executive Council, the Commander-in-chief was an extraordinary 
member and one half of the additional members were official while the other half were non-
official members, nominated from among the Indians. This political inclusion of the Indians 
was a reflection of the British policy to associate the Indians with administration.9 
 
In line with the provisions of the Act of 1861, the Legislative Council was established in the 
Bengal province in 1862 when only a few countries outside Europe and North America could 
claim to have established representative institution.10 Among the five provincial legislatures 
Bengal was chosen for three reasons. Firstly, from the beginning the British presence in the 
Indian sub-continent was centered in Bengal and over the years, they extended commercial 
contacts and administrative control to other parts of India. Secondly, Bengal was the center 
point of national movements. Thirdly, Bangladesh was a part of Bengal as East-Bengal and 
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the parliamentary norms and procedures that the Bangladesh parliament inherited were the 
colonial legacy of the practices of the Bengal Legislative Assembly.  
 
The Bengal Legislative Assembly was first set up in 1862 with official and non-official 
members selected by the Lieutenant Governor. The Assembly was constituted only with non-
Indians because there was no statutory provision for the nomination of the Indians in this 
Assembly. Under the Act of 1861, Provincial Assembly had enjoyed limited legislative 
power. They had no power to alter the Acts made by the Central Legislative Assembly. All 
the bills passed by the Provincial Legislative Assemblies were subjected to the assent of the 
Lieutenant Governor.  
 
The Act of 1861 did not establish a representative government as practiced in England. Sir 
Charles Wood, the Secretary of State who proposed this Act, did not desire to establish any 
representative government in India. He confirmed it in the House of Commons that the 
Central and Provincial Assemblies were not intended to be representative law-making bodies 
in the normal sense of the concept. This Act was in fact framed for strengthening the hands of 
the Government.11 Therefore, the Act did not allow the central and provincial legislatures to 
make any law or regulation affecting the sovereignty of the Crown or the Parliament over 
Indian possessions. The Act also restricted legislators to ask any question or criticize 
executive policy. Regarding these limitations, the central and provincial legislatures could not 
hold their supremacy over the government. They were deliberately controlled by the central 
government. For that reason, the Indian Council Act of 1861 could not satisfy the Indian 
aspirations. Subsequently the nationalist political leaders and the educated middle class 
started agitation for substantial reforms in the existing procedures of the legislatures. 
   
The Indian Council Act -1892 brought some changes in the composition and functions of the 
central and Bengal legislatures. This Act increased the number of additional members of the 
Indians but they did not override the official majority in the Assembly. Despite this, non-
official members of both the central and Bengal legislatures were given rights to participate 
in the law making process. They had enjoyed opportunities to ask questions on executive 
policies and discuss annual statement of revenue and expenditure. But they had no right to 
put supplementary questions or to move resolutions. Although, the Act of 1892 was 
                                                 
11 Berriedale, Keith A. (ed.) (1922), Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy: 1750-1921, Vol. II. London: 
Oxford University Press, p.15. 
  - 71 -
advancement upon the previous measures, it did not provide much scope for criticizing and 
controlling the executive. Non-official members were not able to influence the executive 
policies and to press any demand against official majority. The executive’ dominance over 
the Assembly remained as before and the Council functioned more or less as a Durbar of the 
Viceroy. 12   
 
While the people became frustrated with the development of representative institutions, Lord 
Curzon, the Governor-General of India partitioned Bengal into two separate provinces: West 
Bengal and Eastern Bengal (along with Assam) in 1905 on the ground of administrative 
efficiency. This elicited a storm of protest, which forced the government to rescind this 
decision within six years.13  However, partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911 but it 
contributed to the loss of faith of the Muslims on the British and decreased Hindu-Muslim 
relationship. A growing dissatisfaction resulted in organized mass political agitation for 
increased participation in the legislative process. On the other side, extremist activities forced 
the British rulers to change their attitude towards Indian demands. When the political 
conditions in India were rapidly changing, the liberals came to power in England, who 
believed in freedom and autonomy more than discipline and efficiency.14 John Morley, the 
Secretary of State of India, along with Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India took up reform 
measures. Lord Minto appointed a committee under Sir Arundle for submitting a report on 
the question of increasing the Indian representation in the legislative Assemblies. Upon his 
proposal Indian Legislative Council Bill was passed in the House of Lords in February 1909. 
  
The Legislative Council Act-1909 enlarged the size and functions of both the Central and 
Bengal legislatures.  Though the new Act allowed the legislators to move resolution and ask 
supplementary questions, the central and Bengal Legislative Assembly remained subordinate 
to the executive as before.15 The non-official members could hardly pass any proposal against 
the official majority. The major backdrop of this Act was the introduction of indirect method 
of election. It divided the electorate in different blocks, such as Muslims, Landlords, Muslim 
Landlords, Chambers of Commerce or business class. This communal system of 
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representation significantly divided the electorates that ultimately contributed to the division 
of the country.16  
 
Until 1920, the Indians who were appointed to the Legislative Council as non-official 
members were not typical politicians; they were mainly landlords or Zamindars, rich 
merchants etc. They were not in fact hostile to the British administration.17 Parliamentary 
records reveal that they were less interested in the debates as much as they were interested in 
the discussion of the Bills related to property, taxation and inheritance.18 A limited number of 
educated Indians were elected to the council but the number of subjects they could discuss 
was limited. Most of the legislative bills passed in the House were government initiated.  
 
Above discussion reveals that the non-Indian groups were dominant in both the central and 
the Bengal legislatures and the power granted to the legislature was not much. The Indians 
were, therefore, constantly engaged in demanding greater amount of self-government rather 
than working within the Legislative Councils.19 Political agitations, aspirations and 
expectations all over India turned into national movement. The Muslim League and the 
Indian National Congress picked up the issue and raised demand for making the parliament 
more representative. In the mean time, based on the report submitted by the Secretary of 
State for India, Mr. Montagu, and the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford, the Government of India 
Act-1919 introduced federal legislative system and turned ‘durbar of native prince’ into a 
democratic legislature.  
 
Under the new scheme, the central legislature was reconstituted with two chambers: 
Legislative Assembly as the lower House and Council of State as the upper House. The lower 
House was constituted with 144 members of whom 41 were nominated while the upper 
House was constituted with 34 elected and 26 nominated members. The provincial 
legislatures were all unicameral consisting of elected and nominated members.  
 
In accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1919, the Bengal Legislative Council 
consisted of both the elected (70% members) and nominated members (30%), and among the 
                                                 
16 Subhash C. Kashyap, op. cit., pp.55-56.  
17 Dutta, Satyabrata, op. cit.,  p. 42. 
18 Rashiduzzaman, M. op. cit, p. 5. 
19 Dutta Satyabrata, op. cit., p. VII. 
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nominated members 20% were officials.20 The elections for the Bengal Legislative Assembly 
were held in 1920. For the first time, members of the Assembly were elected from the banner 
of political parties.21 Since the inception of new electoral elements in the legislatures, a new 
type of political class emerged who had contributed to the development of the parliamentary 
process in this region. Most of the prominent members of the Assembly were leading lawyers 
of the country and landowners. It has been observed that they took an intelligent part in the 
legislative process and their speeches lasted longer, they raised questions, moved amendment 
bills and criticized government policies on the floor.22  
 
The Government of India Act, 1935 further extended the scope of operation of the central and 
the provincial legislatures. Major features of this Act were the autonomy of the province and 
formation of provincial legislatures with wholly elected members. The Federal legislature 
remained bicameral; upper house was known as the Council of State consisting of 156 
representatives of the British India and not more than 104 representatives from the Indian 
States. The lower house, the House of Assembly had 375 representatives, of whom 250 seats 
were filled by the representatives of the British India and the rest by the representatives of the 
Indian states. Although, Indian participation was enlarged in the federal legislature, element 
of indirect election was still against the participation of real democracy. The Act placed a 
number of restrictions on the legislative power of the Federal Assembly; for example, no law 
could be passed without the consent of the Governor General, and he could, at his 
discretionary power, promulgate ordinances during the recess of the legislature. 
 
The provinces of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar and Asam had 
bicameral legislatures and the other provinces had unicameral legislatures. The bicameral 
legislature consisted of two chambers: the Legislative Council (upper house) and the 
Legislative Assembly (lower house). Where the legislature was unicameral, it was called the 
Legislative Assembly. The Act provided the provincial legislature authority to make laws for 
the province but prohibited from making any law affecting the sovereignty or dominion of the 
Crown over any part of India, or amending any part of the Government of India Act.  
 
                                                 
20 Nomination element was removed from 1937 by the Government of India Act 1935.  
21 Between 1921 and 1936 Bengal legislative Assembly hold its election for four times, last time it was in 
session for more than seven years. 
22 Rashiduzzaman, M. op. cit, p. 5. 
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The elections of the Legislative Assembly were held in April 1937. In these elections the 
Congress Party had won majority in eight provinces. The Congress Party had formed 
government where they turned up in majority. In Bengal Congress government could not 
emerge as a stable government. Their performance was far from the satisfaction of the 
people. The opposition had moved no confidence motion against the government when they 
had delayed signing the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act Bill. However, it was rejected by 
130 votes to 111 votes. The Congress government functioned in Bengal till March 1945. But 
the legislative activities had decreased since 1939 due to Second World War.  Following the 
end of the War, Bengal Legislative elections were held in 1946.  In these elections Muslim 
League won the majority and the Congress became the second largest party. The Muslim 
League formed government in 23 April 1946. Before the legislature could do any significant 
work, India was partitioned and two dominions named India and Pakistan were established. 
In the Independence Act, constituent assemblies of the two dominions were made fully 
sovereign and were given power to frame their own constitutions.23      
 
Table -: 3.1 Constitutional Acts: Central and Provincial Legislatures (1853-1947)    
 
Acts Provisions Regarding Central 
Legislature 
Provisions Regarding Provincial 
Legislature 
The Charter Act of 
India, 1853 
Transference of the Government of 
India from Company to the Crown. 
 
Separation of the Legislative 
Council (CLC) from the Executive.
Appointment of a separate Governor of 
Bengal 
 
Provincial Governments were given right 
to represent in a matter of legislation. 
The Indian Councils 
Act, 1861 
Legislative Council was enlarged 
as well as empowered to make 
laws and regulations for all 
persons. 
 
 
Every law required the assent of 
the Governor-General to become a 
law. 
Governor-General of the provinces was 
empowered to nominate the Additional 
Members for the purpose of provincial 
legislation. 
 
Bengal Legislative Council (BLC) could 
make laws for the Province but could not 
alter laws made by the LC. 
The Indian Councils 
Act, 1892 
Introduced elective element in the 
CLC. 
 
Enlarged the functions of the CLC. 
 
Provided right of questioning. 
Enlarged the number of Additional 
Members. 
 
Enlarged the functions providing right of 
interpellation on matters of public interests 
and discussing the policy of Govt. 
 
Provided right of questioning. 
The Indian Councils 
Act, 1909 
Enlarged the size of the CLC. 
 
CLC was given the right of 
discussion, asking questions and 
Enlarged the size of the BLC and fixed to 
52. 
Members were classified into elected, 
officials and nominated non-officials. 
                                                 
23Khan, Hamid (2005), Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
pp.20-44. 
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supplementary questions.  
BLC was given the right of discussion, 
asking questions and supplementary 
questions. 
The Government of 
India Act, 1919 
Provided bi-cameral legislature: 
Council of State (Upper Chamber) 
and Legislative Assembly (Lower 
Chamber) 
 
Majority Members of LA were 
elected and tenure was fixed at 3 
years. 
 
Legislature was given more right 
of criticizing and controlling the 
Executive. 
 
Governor-General was remained 
powerful.  
BLC was renamed Bengal Legislative 
Assembly and number of members were 
fixed at 140 out of them 114 were to be 
elected.  
 
Tenure was fixed at 3 years. 
 
 
 
Legislature was given more right of 
criticizing and controlling the Executive. 
 
Governor-General was remained powerful 
as a matter of summons and dissolve the 
Assembly. 
Source: Compiled by the author from Satyabrata Dutta, Bengal Legislature: 1862-1920, Calcutta: Resonance, 
1980, S.L. Sikri, A Constitutional History of India, Jullundur City, India: 1964. 
 
Committees in the Indian Central Legislative Assembly 
 
The committees, which had worked in the Central Legislative Council before 1920, can be 
categorized into three types: the Committee of the Whole House, the Select Committees and 
the Petition Committee. The provision of the Committee of the Whole House was abolished 
and some new committees such as departmental standing committees and Public Accounts 
Committee started to work in the Legislative Assembly as late as 1921 (Table 3.2).24  
 
The Appointment of Select Committee was first recorded in Britain in the third Parliament of 
Elizabeth in 1571 and in the Indian Central Legislative Council (1854-55) in 1854. The main 
purpose of the first Select Committee was to classify several matters of pending business and 
to distribute them among the members of the council. Under the Government of India Act, 
1919, the Rules of the Central Assembly provided that every bill should be referred to a 
Select Committee for the purpose of detailed thrash out. It was then considered as one of the 
important organs in scrutinizing legislative proposals. As mentioned in the Rule 39(1) of the 
Rules of Business of the Central Legislative Assembly, Select Committee consisted of 12 to 
20 members. The members of the Government to whose departments the Bill was related and 
the member of the Law Department of the Governor-General’s Executive Council, if he was 
a member of the Assembly, were selected to be members of every Select Committee. The 
                                                 
24 The Central Legislative Council resolved itself into the Committee of the whole House on 1st July 1854 and 
continued until 1920.  
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other members were appointed by the Assembly from the prominent members of parties, 
groups and representatives of special interests.25 If the Member of the Law Department was 
not a member of the Assembly, the President of the Assembly became the chairman of this 
committee. His power and functions were similar to those of the President of the Assembly. 
The Chairman had absolute authority for deciding whether a bill should be enlarged in scope 
or not. He had right to point of order and ruling which were considered to be final and the 
President of the Assembly was not a court of appeal against such rulings.  
 
 
                                                 
25 Kashyap, Subhash C., op. cit. p 137. 
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Table -: 3.2 Committees in the Indian Central Legislature (1854-1947) 
 
Types of 
Committees 
Date of First 
Emancipation 
Composition Jurisdictions 
 
Select 
Committees 
 
1854*  
 
 
Chairman: Law Member 
 
Members: Number was varied from 8 
to 12. 
 
Review and modify the 
bills.  
Joint Select 
Committee 
 
1921 Chairman: Elected from among the 
Committee Members 
 
Members: number was not fixed but 
convention restricted the number to 12 
 
Review and modify the 
bills, which were of 
equal concern to both 
House.  
Standing 
Committees 
 
1922 Chairman: Head of the Dept. of 
Government 
 
Members: 2/3 elected by the Council 
of State and Legislative Assembly   1/3 
Government nominated. 
 
Advising the relevant 
department 
Public 
Accounts 
Committee 
 
 
 1923 
Chairman:  Finance Member 
 
Members: 8 elected by the non-official 
members of the Assembly and 4 
nominated by the Government 
 
Scrutinizing public 
expenditure for finding 
irregularities as well as 
made recommendation. 
Standing 
Finance 
Committee 
 
1921 Chairman: Finance Member as the ex-
officio chairman 
 
 
Members: 14 Elected Members 
 
Examining the voted 
estimates of all 
departments, sanction 
allotments out of lump 
sum grants, assist and 
advising the Finance 
Department  
 
Standing 
Finance 
Committee 
for Railways 
 
1924 Chairman 
Nominated official member of the 
Assembly 
 
Members 
11 Elected Members 
 
Examine the estimates 
of the Railways 
Military 
Accounts 
Committee 
 
1931 Chairman:  Finance Member  
 
Members: Finance Secretary and three 
non/official members nominated by the 
PAC 
 
Examining the military 
expenditure 
Committee on 
Public 
Petitions 
 
1924 Chairman: Deputy President of the 
Assembly 
 
Members: 4 members nominated by 
the President of the Assembly 
Deal with the general 
question of Petitions to 
the legislature  
 
*Select Committees were first appointed by the Indian Imperial Legislative Council in 1854 and subsequently 
by the Central Legislative Assembly in 1921. Source: Table is compiled by the researcher. 
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The meetings of a Select Committee were held in private; no public or media person was 
allowed to cover or to observe the meetings and the committee proceedings were treated as 
confidential. Therefore, the members were not permitted to give any reference in the plenary 
in connection with the Select Committees. After scrutinizing a bill, the committee submitted 
a report with a brief discussion about the reasons for alternations and amendments of a bill if 
there was any. The Select Committees could not amend beyond the scope of a Bill without 
specific instructions. Secondly, the committee had no option to disagree with the principles of 
a Bill. Therefore, the Select Committee could not reach a conclusion at variance with the 
principles accepted.26 Despite these limitations, during the time span between1920 and 1947, 
the Select Committees had submitted 151 reports scrutinizing as many as 213 bills. In some 
cases, the committee was used as a dilatory tactic for killing bills. For example, between 1923 
and 1938 as many as seven bills were killed in the committee stage. Apart from these, the 
Select Committees had developed a procedure similar to that of the British House of 
Commons. The members also had paid attention with the best of their knowledge to become 
familiar with the committee process in scrutinizing legislative proposals. 
 
The Standing Committees were first introduced in the Indian central legislature in 1922 
according to the recommendations of the Montagu-Chelmsford report. The authors noted in 
their report: “We wish to apply the procedure of standing committees, as far as may be 
possible, to both portions of the Indian legislature." 27 According to their recommendation 
nine standing committees were set up in the Legislative Assembly parallel to the department 
of Commerce, Education, Health and Lands, Emigration, Home, Industries and Labor, 
Revenue and agriculture, Roads, and Finance Department.28 In addition, a separate Standing 
Finance Committee for Railways was set up in 1924 as the railway budget was separated 
from the general budget. The main jurisdiction of this Committee was to examine the 
estimates of the Railways on behalf of the Assembly.29  In accordance with the ROB, the 
Standing Committee was constituted with official and non-official members every year. Two-
thirds of the members of each committee were non-officials, who were elected by ballot from 
among the members of the Assembly and the Council of State in proportion to their strength 
                                                 
26 Suri, Promila (1977), Growth of Committee System in the Central Legislature of India: 1920-1947, New 
Delhi: Associated Publishing Co., p.65.   
27 Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1918 (reprinted 1925), pp. 
191,229.  
28 Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1918 (reprinted 1925), pp. 
191,229.  
29 Rashiduzzaman M.  op. cit., pp. 214-15. 
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and the remaining one-third of the members were nominated by the Government. The head of 
the respective department held the committee chair. 30 
 
Functions of the standing committee were determined according to the regulations made by 
the Governor-General. The standing committees could not prevent introduction of any 
legislation and they did not have any administrative control over the respective departments. 
The Government could refuse any information, which was inconsistent with public interest. 
The committees held their meetings once or twice during the course of the year and their 
reports and proceedings were strictly confidential. It is therefore said that the standing 
committees could hardly perform any constructive work in framing policy or in controlling 
government departments.31  
 
The PAC was first introduced in the British Parliament in April, 1861 and later it transplanted 
to the Indian soil. The idea of the PAC first came in the Indian Central Legislative Council in 
1896 in the form of recommendation of the Welby Commission and it became a permanent 
arrangement by the Government of India Act, 1919. The idea of the PAC was taken from the 
British Parliamentary Committee system so sharply that W.H. Morris Jones firmly noted"… 
it took the British Parliament a very long time to create this particular device, but it was 
transplanted quickly to the soil of India's quasi-parliamentary institutions".32  The strength of 
the PAC was fixed to be of twelve members with the Finance Member as the ex-officio 
chairman. One-third of the members were nominated by the Governor-General and the 
remaining two-thirds were elected by single transferable vote by the non-official members of 
the Assembly. Abolishing the nomination system the PAC became a fully elected committee 
in 1937.  
 
According to the Rules of Business, committee meetings were convened before the beginning 
of the autumn session and number of meetings varied from ten to twenty each year. The 
committee started its meetings after consultation for a few minutes with the Auditor-General. 
During the course of witnesses, every department was to be represented by their highest 
officer for explaining accounts to the PAC. The committee was authorized to call for persons, 
papers and records from any government department and to recommend for disciplinary 
action against officers responsible for mismanagement of public money. Apart from these, 
                                                 
30 Ibid, p. 229. 
31 Suri Promila, op. cit., p.130. 
32 Jones, W.H. Morris (1957), Parliament in India, London: Longmans, p. 279. 
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the PAC was deprived of the opportunity to scrutinize military expenditure. Therefore, a sub-
committee was set up in 1925 for scrutinizing military expenditure with the Finance Member 
as chairman. The committee was reconstituted in 1931 as Military Accounts Committee with 
the Finance Member as chairperson. The Finance Secretary and three non/official members 
nominated by the PAC were members of this Military Accounts Committee. 
 
The Petitions Committee was appointed in the Legislative Assembly in 1924 with the Deputy 
President of the Assembly as Chairman and with other four members nominated by the 
President. This committee was constituted at the commencement of each session for 
examining every petition referred to them and for reporting back to the assembly.33  Until 
1947 the committee had submitted as many as 17 reports examining similar number of 
petitions. The Petitions Committee could not become popular because of the non-sovereign 
character of the Assembly.        
 
A Joint Select Committee was first set up in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1921 with 
twelve members equally from each Chamber. The chairman of the Joint Committee was 
elected by the members. If a bill was equally concerned in both the Chambers, Joint 
Committee was appointed on the basis of agreement from both the sides. Between 1921 and 
1947 as many as 18 Bills were referred to the Joint Committee and four proposed Bills were 
negated. The committee facilitated expeditious consideration of legislation as well as avoided 
duplication of proceedings, saved time and developed closer relationship between the 
Chambers.34            
 
Committees in the Bengal Legislative Assembly 
 
The growth of committee system in the Bengal legislature may be traced with the 
establishment of the legislative assemblies in the provinces. The committees, which 
functioned in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, can be divided into four types: Committee of 
the Whole House, Select Committee, Finance Committee and Public Accounts Committee. 
 
The Bengal Legislative Assembly often turned into Committee of the Whole House. 
Following the British parliamentary practice, House itself resolved into a committee with all 
members of the Assembly to review important bill or particular parts of legislation without 
                                                 
33 Standing Orders 80 (1) and 82, The Gazette of India Extraordinary, date, 14 July 1923, pp. 678-79.  
34 Suri Promila, op. cit., p.86. 
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observing the formalities required by the Rules of Procedure. It was a different manner of 
sitting of the Assembly. Some important bills including the Calcutta Municipal Bill were 
considered in the Committee of the Whole House in 1876. Besides legislation, the Assembly 
also turned into Committee of the Whole House every year to examine the Budget. Following 
the committee stage budget was finally introduced in the Assembly for general debate.  
 
The predominant role of the Bengal legislative Assembly was in the realm of law making. 
When a bill was introduced in the Assembly, the mover made a motion either for 
consideration of the bill at once or sent for eliciting public opinion or sent it to the Select 
Committees for discussing and thrashing out the proposed bill thoroughly. In the committee 
stage a bill was examined clause-by-clause. After a detailed discussion on the bill, 
recommendations were taken by majority votes.  After scrutinizing a bill the committee 
submitted their report in the plenary. In this report, the committee made suggestions whether 
a bill will be published in more than one Gazette in an amended form or whether it was 
unnecessary to be proceeded. The committee even made suggestions for withdrawal of a bill. 
For example, the Bill for Appointment of the Calcutta Municipal Commissioner was 
withdrawn according to the committee recommendation in January 1863. On the other hand, 
the Select Committee was sometimes discharged even from the reporting stage. For example, 
the committee was discarded while "fines on villages for outrage and trespass committed” bill 
was withdrawn in 1862.  
 
The Select Committee was composed of both official and non-official members including the 
Members who introduce the bill, the Member of Government to whose department the bill is 
related and the Law Member of the government. The member in charge acted as chairperson 
of the committee in absence of the Law Member. In case of an equality of votes, chairperson 
was authorized to have a second or casting vote. The committee chairman convened the 
meeting and meetings usually sat intermittently. It is observed that during the sitting time, the 
committee provided scope for a detailed discussion on conflicting issues more freely than in 
the Assembly as a whole. The committee members were devoted to improve the quality of 
the bill and made a good use of their knowledge for amending and modifying bills. As 
Surendra Nath Banerjee wrote in his biography, “I was a member of the select Committee; 
and for three months, and from day to day, we were hard at work until we submitted our 
Report".35  
                                                 
35 Banerjee,S.N. (1925), A Nation in Making, Calcutta, p.130; Satyabrata Dutta, op. cit., pp.61-62. 
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Among the committees established in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, the Finance 
Committee was appointed every year, within the first week of January on ad hoc basis for the 
purpose of discussing and suggesting on the Draft Financial Statement. The committee 
consisted of twelve members, half were official members nominated by the government and 
the rest were non-officials elected by the Assembly members. The member of the government 
who was in charge of Provincial Finance department was appointed as the chairperson of the 
committee. Although the members were allowed to make free discussion the chairperson had 
right to close discussion if these were considered to be disadvantageous. The chairperson was 
allowed to exercise second or casting vote.  
 
The Finance Committee met in private. Decision to change the estimated revenue or 
expenditure was taken by majority votes. As regards the responsibility, the committee was 
concerned only about non-obligatory items of expenditure of the Provincial Budget. The 
committee could not exceed the aggregate expenditure fixed by the Government of India. But 
the committee was free to make variations and even to insert new items occasionally.36 The 
committee ceased to exist when they submitted their budget report to the Government of 
Bengal and it was not later than 28th January. 
 
The PAC was appointed in the Bengal Legislative Assembly comparatively later than the two 
other types of committees. It was first set up in the Assembly in 1923 with twelve members, 
of whom two-thirds were elected by the non-official members while other members were 
nominated by the government. The Finance Member was appointed as an ex-officio 
chairperson of the PAC. Like in the Finance Committee, PAC chairperson had a second vote 
or casting vote in case there was an equality of votes. The jurisdictions of PAC were confined 
to deal with the appropriation of accounts of the Government of Bengal. This committee was 
responsible to review the course of public expenditure and to check on the regularity of 
accounts. After general discussion, the PAC submitted its report to the Assembly for 
consideration and created pressure on the Government to implement committee suggestions.  
 
From the discussion it is understood that the executive had an upper hand over the 
legislatures. In real sense, legislatures in both the central and provinces were subordinate to 
                                                 
36 Ambedkar, B. R. (1925), The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India a Study in the Provincial 
Decentralisation of Imperial Finance, Westminster: P. S. King & Son Ltd., available at 
http://www.ambedkar.org 
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the executive. Governor-General enjoyed supreme authority in convening and dissolving the 
House even before completing the tenure. Any bill scrutinized by the committees and passed 
by both the Houses required his assent to be enacted into law. Even the Assembly could not 
vote upon or discuss a number of items in the budget. The Acts of 1861 and 1909 could 
significantly change the legislative structure in both the center and the provinces. The 
discretionary power of the Governor General reduced the autonomy of the legislatures. The 
Government of India Act, 1919 comparatively added democratic elements and the 
Government of India Act, 1935 introduced the notion for responsible government. Between 
1920 and 1939, Assembly met more regularly and discussions were more vibrant than any 
other previous legislature. Activities of the Assembly were decreased during the Second 
World War (1939 –1945) and Assembly met occasionally. The Congress party decided to 
boycott the session against unilateral decision of the British government to involve India in 
the War.37     
 
 3.3  Parliamentary Structure in Pakistan (1947-1971) 
When the British ceded power in 1947, India was partitioned into two states as India and 
Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Independence Act 1947, Bengal province was divided 
into two provinces known as East Bengal and West Bengal. According to the policy of 
boundary commission East Bengal (Bangladesh) became a province of Pakistan as East 
Pakistan and continued to be so until its emergence as an independent state in 1971.38 
Economic deprivation, authoritarian attitudes and political domination led to disintegration 
of Pakistan. Finally a military crackdown culminated in a full-fledged civil war, which 
brought independence of Bangladesh.39  
Following the end of the British rule, Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 as 
its interim constitution with the amendment of some clauses and continued until the 
proclamation of new constitution in 1956. Although the constitution envisaged the 
parliamentary form of government, it could not function longer than two-and–a half years. 
The constitution was abrogated with the proclamation of martial law in 1958 and shifted 
towards a presidential form of government. Until the proclamation of martial law, there were 
two legislative assemblies in the centre as well as in the provinces. First Constituent 
                                                 
37 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., p.30.  
38 Officially the name East Bengal was redesigned in 1956as East Pakistan in the constitution of 1956.   
39 Choudhury Dilara (1994), Constitutional Development in Bangladesh: Stresses and Strains, Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, p.99.    
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Assembly was constituted at the time of independence in 1947 and continued until the 
election of second legislative assembly in March 1954.  
The first Constituent Assembly consisted of 69 members and subsequently it was increased 
to 74 members. Among the total number of members, the Muslim League had 59 members 
and the rest belonged to the Congress. The members of the Assembly were not elected by 
universal suffrage; they were elected by the provincial legislatures whose members in turn 
were selected by an electorate consisting fifteen per cent of the total population.40 Under the 
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, all power and functions of the central 
legislature were conferred to the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly had two major 
responsibilities: to prepare a constitution and to act as the Federal Legislative Assembly. 
The first significant step towards the framing of the constitution was taken by the 
Constituent Assembly when it passed a resolution on the ‘Aims and objectives of the 
Constitution’. Following the passing of the resolution, the Assembly appointed number of 
committees and subcommittees to work out the details of the Constitution. The Basic 
Principles Committee, the Committee on Fundamental Rights and the Committee on Matters 
Relating to Minorities were the most important committees set up for framing the 
Constitution. They submitted their reports, which were accepted in the House. While the 
constitutional issues were settled the draft constitution was placed to the House for final 
consideration. But the Governor-General dissolved the Assembly before promulgating the 
constitution. He did so because the Assembly attempted to curtail the power of the 
Governor-General by enacting two important bills- one was repeal of the Public and 
Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act of 1949 and the second was the amendment of 
the Government of India Act 1935 which was earlier adopted in Pakistan with some 
modifications. The former aimed at reducing mismanagement and corruption and the latter at 
curtailing the Governor-General’s power to dismiss the ministry.41             
The second Constituent Assembly consisted of 80 members equally from East and West 
wings of Pakistan. The Assembly members were elected by the members of the provincial 
legislatures according to the proportional representation method like its predecessors. The 
major achievement of this Assembly was to unify West Pakistan into a single unit. West 
Pakistan formerly had one Chief Commissioner’s province, number of states and tribal areas. 
                                                 
40 One representative for each million of population. For detail, Ahmed Muneer (1960), Legislatures in 
Pakistan, Lahore: University of Punjab,p. 14. 
41 Khan, Hamid,  op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
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All of these various units were merged into a single province called West Pakistan by 
adopting the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955. The most important task of the 
Constituent Assembly was to pass the draft Constitution framed by its successor. The draft 
Constitution was passed in the House on 8 January 1956 with certain changes and 
amendments. The constitution makers were in favor of parliamentary form of government in 
the centre as well as in the provinces. Under the provisions of the constitution, the parliament 
of Pakistan named the National Assembly, consisted of 300 members, half of whom were 
elected from the eastern wing and the remaining half from the constituencies of the western 
wing. The Provincial Assemblies like the National Assembly were unicameral. The rules of 
procedure were based on the spirit and substance of those at the Westminster.42 
The parliamentary form of government could not last longer than two-and-half years. No 
general election was held under this constitution. However, the first general election was 
scheduled for early 1959. But President Isikandar Mirza first tried to postpone the general 
election. He finally dissolved the National and the Provincial Assemblies declaring Martial 
Law on 7th October 1958 and General Muhammad Ayub Khan was appointed the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator who later replaced himself of Mirza on 27 October 1958. All 
parliamentary institutions were abolished with the declaration of marital law. The military 
government banned all political parties and declared politicians disqualified for seeking 
public office.  
 
General Ayub Khan appointed a Constitution Commission to make a proposal for giving the 
country a firm and stable government. Examining the progressive failure of parliamentary 
government in Pakistan, the Commission found three major causes: firstly, lack of proper 
election procedure; secondly, undue interference of the head of the state in the ministries, 
political parties and undue interference of the central government in the functioning of the 
provinces; and thirdly, lack of well-organized and disciplined political parties. However, 
politicians disagreed with the observations of the commission. Ayub Khan himself was 
against parliamentary form of government. He consistently argued that the British 
parliamentary system, which was inherited from the colonial experience, was not suitable for 
Pakistan and it brought political instability in the country. He also believed that the political 
system, which was adopted in the Constitution of 1956, required many social prerequisites 
                                                 
42 Khan,Hamid, op. cit., pp. 60-111. 
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for its success such as high literacy and well developed education system.43 The Constitution 
promulgated in March 1962 adopted the presidential form of government replacing the 
parliamentary system. In support of the presidential form of the government, Ayub Khan 
stated, “We have adopted the presidential system as it is simpler to work, more akin to our 
genius and history, and less liable to lead to instability, a luxury that a developing country 
like ours cannot afford.”44    
 
The Constitution envisaged a strong and centralized government. All executive power of the 
republic was vested in the office of the President. The cabinet members were appointed by 
him and they were directly responsible to him. He had power to make and promulgate 
ordinances when the National Assembly remained dissolved or was in session. Every bill 
passed in the National Assembly required his assent to be a law. Under the new Constitution 
election for the provincial and central legislative assemblies were held twice in the 1906s but 
the assemblies could not be made active.   
 
President Ayub Khan introduced a new system designated as ‘Basic Democracy’, which 
aimed at building a strong base of popular representation at the bottom and then constructing 
the super structure of co-operation between the people and the administration at the top.45 But 
this institution failed to raise Bengali participation in the political system.46 Political 
movements in the eastern wing aimed at the reintroduction of the parliamentary form of 
government. The Awami League under the leadership of late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
adopted the famous ‘Six Point Formula’ for the autonomy of East Pakistan at its council 
meeting held in Dhaka in 1966. There is an argument that the language and cultural 
differences, socio-economic imbalance and large geographical distance between the two 
wings of Pakistan made the demand for autonomy more logical and strong.47  Since the 
adoption of the ‘Six Point Formula’, the political situation faced turmoil and finally the 
government lost its control over the country. General Yahia Khan took over the presidency 
and declared martial law on March 26, 1969.    
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The new regime announced general election in December 1970. This was the first general 
election held on adult franchise. The AL won an absolute majority in the National Assembly 
(AL won 167 seats out of 313 seats including 13 reserved seats for women) as well as in the 
East Pakistan Provincial Assembly (288 out of 300 seats). But the emergence of the AL upset 
Yahia Khan because he expected that the election results would either bring his favorite 
parties to power, or would not fundamentally threaten the ruling elite’s position.48 The 
political differences between the three factions: Yahia government, the Al and the Pakistan 
Peoples Party led to non-cooperation movement in East Pakistan when both Yahia and Bhuto, 
leader of the Peoples Party avoided transfer of power to the elected representatives. Finally, 
no political arrangement could be reached, and as a result Pakistan Army cracked down on 
the Bengalis in the late night of March 25, 1971. After the military crackdown, Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman proclaimed East Pakistan to be the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on 
March 26 1971. The declaration turned into a full-scale war of liberation. Bangladesh became 
independent after nine-month long liberation war.49     
 
The parliamentary procedures that Pakistan inherited from British India could not be properly 
cultivated because of the political differences between the political elites and the military 
interventionist. Considering the existing political environment it was observed that the 
constitution of 1956 provided wider scope for the legislature to hold its supremacy over the 
executive. But the legislators were not much active in parliamentary business; they were 
more active in finding a place in the government and floor crossing was a regular feature.50 
Thereby serious political and governmental instabilities became regular features throughout 
the period of 1947 to 1958.  
 
The following sections attempt to analyze the structure and functioning of the parliamentary 
committees of the National Assembly and the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly in the light 
of the emerging changes in the parliamentary procedures. 
Committees in the Pakistan National Legislative Assembly  
The committees as set up in the National Assembly were similar to the Constitutional 
Assembly in structure and procedure. The Assembly had two types of committees: the 
standing committees and the select committees. The standing committees further had two 
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types- Ministerial standing committees and Non-Ministerial standing committees. The Public 
Accounts Committee, the Committees of Privileges, the House Committee, the Petitions 
Committee and the Library Committee were non-ministerial standing committees in nature. 
The standing committees were set in the parliament every year for a fixed term while select 
committees were constituted on ad hoc basis for dealing with particular Bills, drafting rules 
of procedure, or specific task as assigned to them. The following sections attempt to examine 
the working of the selected (departmental standing committees, PAC and select committees) 
committees in the National Assembly.  
Each of the departmental standing committees was set up every year with five elected 
members based on proportional representation of the party in the legislature. The committee 
was headed by the Minister of the concerned department, which weakened the overseeing 
scope of the committees. Altogether ten departmentally related standing committees were 
formed in the First Constituent Assembly in 1954. Every standing committee was formally 
required to sit at least twice a year. Few committees, such as the Standing Finance 
Committee, the Education Committee and the Law Committee met frequently and worked 
actively, but most of the standing committees could not fulfill their mandatory meeting 
requirements. Some committees even did not meet at all. For example, the Standing 
Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not call any meeting during 
1949-50.51 The committee members themselves were not satisfied with the committee 
activities. The ministers were reluctant to call committee meetings regularly in order to avoid 
attack from the opposition. One of the committee members alleged that, “ … committees 
have proved to be nothing but a farce and they do not meet at all.”52 In fact the government 
attitude was not in favor of the committee’s effectiveness. The Prime Minister answering a 
question stated that there was no matter which could be referred to this committee.53 
Negative attitudes of the government towards the standing committees were truly reflected in 
his statements.   
The PAC was one of the most important committees appointed in the first and the second 
Constituent Assembly. The committee was appointed every financial year with seven elected 
members and the Finance Minister as its chairperson. It was designated to perform the same 
functions as its counterparts in the British Parliament. But its chairperson was a member of 
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the Government rather than of the opposition. 54 Major responsibility of this committee was 
to probe into public expenditure as sanctioned by the parliament in the form of estimates for 
demands for grants, based on the audit report of the Auditor-General.55 In addition, the PAC 
could also deal with such matters referred to it by the Finance Minister.   
Compared to any other standing committees in the central legislature, the PAC worked 
actively and spent most of its time for examining expenditure of the various ministries and 
placed reports before the House. The PAC first met in 1952, after three years of its formation 
and the committee submitted its report to the Assembly in 1953 on the Appropriation of 
Accounts for the year of 1948-49 and 1949-50. But the PAC could not continue its work due 
to serious constitutional crisis. The next PAC examined accounts of the year between 1950 
and 1953 and submitted its report in 1957. The reports were considered to be fairly 
penetrating studies into the budget and expenditure of different ministries. The PAC’s 
reports disclosed that public money was not fully utilized.56    
The problems faced by the PAC were that the committees started working after the money 
had been spent, audit reports were not supplied to them duly and the Secretary of the 
Ministry concerned did not attend the meetings regularly. However, from the beginning the 
PAC was asking the government to provide them with proper and sufficient information 
without hiding any fact, to ensure the representation of various ministries and to supply them 
with audited report of the Auditor-General.57 Apart from these drawbacks, the PAC 
attempted to explore the mismanagement of public money and found a number of financial 
malpractices, which later became the subject matters of ‘leaders’ in the newspapers. 58 
The select committees were ad hoc committees appointed in the parliament to deal with 
legislative measures. There were tendencies in both the Constituent and National Assembly 
to conduct most of the legislative business in the plenary. Therefore a few of the bills passed 
in the Assembly were earlier referred to the select committees. For instance, during the entire 
tenure of the Constituent and National Legislative Assembly, altogether 26 bills (9%) were 
processed through the select committees. There were other select committees formed in the 
assembly include the Administrative Enquiry Committee, the Zakat Committee, the 
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Economy Committee, the National Anthem Committee and so on. With a few exceptions, 
recommendations of these committees were not always accepted. For example, the Zakat 
Committee report was placed in the cold storage. On the contrary, the government 
considered one of the vital recommendations of the Administrative Enquiry Committee for 
the purpose of improving efficiency of administration. The fact was that the systems of the 
select committees were mostly neglected and ineffective.59      
Committees in the East Pakistan Legislature (1947-71) 
Until the promulgation of martial law in 1958, there were two legislative assemblies 
constituted in the province of East Pakistan. The first Legislative Assembly was constituted 
in 1947 and continued until March 1954. The second Assembly was elected in March 1954 
and was dissolved in October 1958, when the military took over the state power. The 
parliamentary procedure, devices and committee structure were inherited from the Bengal 
Legislative Assembly in accordance with the section 84(1) of the Government of India Act 
1935. The Assembly first appointed a Rules Committee on October 2, 1956 to make a draft 
Rules of Procedure for the Assembly that appeared in 1958. But the Assembly was dissolved 
before its presentation to the House.  
Like the National Assembly, there were two types of committees: the standing committees 
and the ad hoc select committees. The select committees were either selected by the Speaker 
or elected by the House. The Select committees were elected in the Assembly on the spur of 
the moment to scrutinize a particular bill as referred to them by the plenary. Such 
committees were ad hoc in nature as their terms of reference were limited to examine and 
report on the referred bill. The Committee was constituted with not more than 17 members 
representing various parties and was chaired by the Minister in charge of the concerned 
department. At the committee stage, bills were discussed clause-by-clause. Experts and 
representatives of special interest groups were called for gathering or for gaining opinions. 
Most of the bills passed by the Assembly were not sent to select committee. These were 
mostly non-controversial in nature or ordinary amendment bills.60   
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Among the standing committees the PAC was set up for each financial year with nine 
members including the Finance Minister as an ex-officio member. The committee members 
were elected by the assembly and the chairperson was elected from among its members. The 
committee composition was roughly proportional to the party strength in the Assembly. Its 
responsibilities were to scrutinize and report on appropriation of accounts of the provincial 
government by examining the report of the Auditor General. The experiences reveal that such 
a potential and powerful watchdog weapon could not work properly. The reasons that made 
the committees dysfunctional are as follows: firstly, the Auditor-General’s office did not 
submit audit report to the Assembly duly; and secondly, the PAC meetings were not called 
regularly. For example, between 1948 and 1953, committee did not call any meeting. 
Explaining the delay the Chief Minister accused the Auditor-General’s office for not 
submitting any appropriation statement since 1947. Despite all of these limitations, the PAC 
attempted to find out the irregularities in various government agencies and criticized some of 
them for lack of proper control of expenditure.61 Comparatively, PAC of the Second 
Assembly was far more active. It met more frequently and scrutinized more audit reports. 
From August to December 1957, the PAC met nine times and examined the audit reports up 
to the period from 1951-52. 
The Committee on Privileges was also adopted in the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly 
from the tradition of Bengal Legislative Assembly.62 This committee was appointed at the 
commencement of the first session of each financial year to protect the rights of the 
parliamentarians. It consisted of 11 members with the Deputy Speaker as the chairperson. 
Like other committees, the members were elected on the basis of proportional representation. 
According to the Rules of Procedure, the committee members had to move motion for 
referring a case of breach of privilege to the committee. After examining the motion 
committee submitted a report to the House. During the period of the first Assembly a number 
of such motions were referred to the committee against various newspapers. For Example, 
committee had a tussle with the daily Azad for an editorial published on 1 December 1949. 
The Committee found that the editorial board constituted a breach of privilege of the 
legislature. Afterwards, the committee recommended for a proper apology from the 
newspaper.63 
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The committee on Public Petitions was constituted at the commencement of the first session 
in each financial year with seven members nominated by the President. The Deputy President 
was an ex-officio Chairperson of this committee. The major responsibility of this committee 
was to examine every petition referred to them and to report to the assembly either through 
the members or through the Secretary. The parliamentary records reveal that the first 
Assembly had three petition committees during five years tenure, while in the second 
Assembly the committee was constituted regularly.    
The House Committee was constituted with the Deputy Speaker as the chairperson and with 
six members. This committee looked after all the matters connected with the comfort of the 
members. The Accommodation Committee was added to the Second Assembly to deal with 
any matter affecting accommodation of the members in or out of the session.64 This 
committee consisted of six members with the Chief Minister as the chairperson. The 
committee members were elected on the basis of proportional representation of the party.  
 
The parliament and the committee structure that were transplanted in Pakistan did not 
function properly. The legislators failed to develop necessary skill to compromise as 
solutions to conflicts. The parliaments at the central and provincial level could not resolve a 
wide variety of conflicts and differences within the society. In fact, the political elites who 
were in the government did not try to accommodate the ideas of the opposition in the 
decision-making process.  
 
3.4 Parliamentary Structure in Independent Bangladesh 
 
After the independence of the country in 1971, the new constitution adopted the 
parliamentary system of the government in 1972. The constitution vested all legislative 
power to the parliament called the ‘Jatiya Sangsad’. According to the constitutional 
provisions, the Prime Minister and the cabinet were collectively responsible to the parliament 
and the President was made ceremonial head. The constitution makers provided with many 
favorable pre-conditions of the parliamentary systems of the government in the constitution. 
Article 76 of the constitution empowered the parliament to appoint necessary standing 
committees in its very first meeting in each session of the parliament.  It is worth mentioning 
that the first parliament had two separate ROP. From April 1, 1973 to July 22, 1974 the 
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House was regulated by the old ROP and from July 22, 1974 onwards by the new ROP. 
According to the provisions of the old ROP (Rules 77 to 233A), the JS had set up seven 
standing committees and the new ROP provided for four more standing committees. The first 
parliament constituted eleven standing committees including three financial committees; two 
investigative committees (i.e. the Petitions Committee and the Government Assurance 
Committee) and six domestic committees.  According to the ROP, the House appointed select 
committees only three times for the scrutiny of bills.65 It is observed that the first parliament 
could not ensure its supremacy over the executive due to overwhelming majority of the 
government party and their refusal to recognize the opposition party officially.  Soon, the 
parliamentary form of government was replaced by one party presidential form of the 
government in 1975.     
 
In a sweeping change, Bangladesh was placed under military rule in August 1975 and 
remained under military dominated civilian regimes until December 1990. It is important to 
find out the nature of the military, which ruled over Bangladesh for such a long time. The 
political scientists observed that the process of politicization of armed forces in Bangladesh 
was linked with the tradition of colonial rule. During the colonial rule the British-Indian 
Army was not politically neutralized. They were trained with a view to promoting imperial 
interest. They were by nature anti-national, anti-political and anti-democratic and they kept 
themselves away from the mass peoples.66 After the independence in 1947, the Indian 
government did not follow the methods of training, recruitment and motivation applied by the 
colonial rulers. On the contrary, the structures and regulations of the Pakistan army in many 
ways developed a close resemblance to those of the British Indian Army. Hamza Alavi 
argued that the Pakistan army, which was the predecessor of the Bangladesh army, remained 
culturally and physically distanced from the civilian sector.67 This was reflected in their 
attitudes towards the political institutions. Regarding this aspect, the political scientists 
analyze that the ambition of the army to capture political power was one of the main reasons 
for the declaration of martial law in Pakistan in 1958. It is also argued that the Bangladesh 
army, which is the lineal descendant of the British-Indian and Pakistan Army, has inherited 
its orientation against civilian rule and its sensitivity to state power. Most of the military 
officers who led military coups since 1970s were recruited and trained under the shadow of 
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Ayub Khan’s martial law regime. The Ayub regime had affected them in many ways: they 
became confident that the military could play important rule in the political system and they 
became sensitive to political power.68  
 
Since the independence, the Bangladesh army was in state power directly and indirectly about 
15 years. During these periods, three parliaments have been formed to civilianize the civil-
military government. It was expected that parliament would play a proper role in establishing 
parliamentary supremacy over the executive. But none of them had any real scope to 
minimize the executive dominance. In the real sense, the public did not have positive image 
of these parliaments. The legislative power of the parliament passed into the hands of the 
executive. The parliament was frequently used as a tool for endorsing policies and granting 
legitimacy to rulers who assumed power through unconstitutional means.69 The parliamentary 
image began to change after the fall of the military dominated civilian government in 
December 1990 by a mass upsurge. After the fall of authoritarian regime, the parliamentary 
system of government was reintroduced in 1991. From the beginning of the democratic set 
up, committee system has gained importance for strengthening parliamentary democracy in 
the country. The structure and functions of the committees of the Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad 
will be discussed in next chapter.        
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CHAPTER  IV 
 
Committees in the Jatiya Sangsad:  Structure and Functions  
 
 
The present chapter attempts to analyze the legal basis, institutional capacity and working 
procedure of the committees in the Bangladesh parliament. In doing so, the first section 
analyzes the formal-legal arrangements from the viewpoint of institutional power, the second 
and the third sections discuss committee structure and procedure respectively. By analyzing 
the relationship between committees and political parties the fourth section seeks to answer 
how the parties control their committee members.    
 
4.1 Formal-Legal Framework 
 
The committees in most of the parliaments of the world are increasingly serving as the 
nucleus of both legislation and parliamentary oversight of the government.70As in other 
parliaments, major functions of the parliamentary committees in Bangladesh are to ensure 
accountability of the executive and to filter the legislative proposals before enactment into 
law.  
    
As discussed in a previous chapter, the parliamentary committees need to have formal power 
like the right to initiate legislation, the authority to rewrite bills, the control of their own 
timetable and obtaining information. The committees, which have such power, have greater 
chance to influence parliamentary deliberations. The parliamentary committees gain their 
power and legitimacy from two sources: the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure. The 
committees of the Bangladesh parliament get their legitimacy from the Constitution while 
their operation and terms of reference are regulated by the Rules of procedure. 
 
The ability to initiate legislation is a crucial source of power as it gives authority to the 
parliamentary committees to reframe legislation. The committees of a few parliaments have 
such right.  In the Bangladesh parliament, committees cannot initiate bills, the members of 
the government and the members of the JS have such right. Two types of bills are moved in 
the parliament: government bills and private members’ bills. The bills initiated by the 
ministers are called the ‘government bills’ while private members’ bills are proposed by the 
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private members belonging either to the treasury bench or to the opposition bench. The 
parliament has fixed one day in a week for the private members (government and opposition) 
called “be-sorkari dibos” (Private Members’ Day); when they have the priority to introduce 
bills. The government bills are sent to the appropriate standing committees while the private 
members’ bills are sent to the “Standing Committee on Private Members' Bills and 
Resolutions”. This committee is set up in the Parliament for the whole electoral term to 
examine and report on private members' bills. Whether the government or the private 
members’ bills, the executive has ample opportunity to control the initiation of legislation in 
the parliament either directly or through the Members of the Parliament who are persuaded to 
support the government.  
 
After the first reading, bills are referred to this committee for scrutinizing a bill line-by-line, 
clause-by-clause and proposing amendments to any of the provisions of the bill. But they 
cannot adopt any amendment if the majority of the members do not agree. The government 
with majority in the committees and in the House can avoid such altering if they have little or 
no interest in changing the government bill. The committee members, however, can record a 
minute of dissent on any matter or matters connected with the bill and can even walk out 
from the committee session. The committees in the Bangladesh parliament do not enjoy the 
authority to rewrite the text of a bill. Their autonomy is limited to propose amendments and 
to make suggestions regarding linguistic problems or vagueness of the bill. 
 
Another aspect of the committee power is the control of its own timetable. As Ingvar Mattson 
and Kaare Strøm argued, “the less external actors can control the committees’ timetables, the 
greater the committee autonomy. The committees which control their own timetables can 
decide when to introduce the committee report to the plenary assembly.”71 The Rule of the 
Procedure of the JS clearly specifies in the Rule 213(1): “a committee shall have power to 
regulate its own procedure.”72 When a bill is referred to a committee, the committee itself 
allocates the time limit for discussion of a bill at which various stages of the Bill in a day 
shall be completed. However, the committee does not enjoy elasticity of time for its’ 
reporting. The committees other than the Select Committee have to submit report within one 
month of the date on which reference to the committee was made. If the House has not fixed 
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any time, the Select Committee has to submit its report within three months from the date on 
which the House adopted the motion for the reference of the Select Committee. Nonetheless, 
the House at any time can extend time limit for committee reporting. Sometimes, the 
committee submits its report within a very short time when parliamentary majority party 
wants to pass particular bills hurriedly.  
Information acquisition is an important power that can make scope for the committees to play 
distinctive and deliberative roles. In the established democracies, committees provide their 
members two powerful tools for gathering information. One is investigation and compelling 
written information from relevant members of the government departments. In this process, 
the committees allow their members to pursue a line of questioning with the executives for 
obtaining information. Article 76(2) of the Bangladesh Sangbidhan (the Constitution) 
authorizes the parliamentary committees to make investigations and enforce the minister and 
government officials for witness. With this power, the committees can investigate or inquire 
into the activities or administration of a Ministry. In doing so the committees can request the 
Ministers to appear before the committee or send authorized representative of the Ministry to 
provide with relevant information and answer questions either orally or in writing. But the 
ROP limits their power to summon government documents. In this regard, Rule 203 states: 
“… if any question arises whether the evidence of a person or the production of a document 
is relevant for the purposes of the Committee, the question shall be referred to the Speaker 
whose decision shall be final.” 73 As in India the executive can deny to produce document 
before the committee in the name of interest of the state. Rule 203 specifies that “The 
government may decline to produce a document on the ground that its disclosure would be 
prejudicial to the safety or the interest of the State.”74 On this ground, any reluctant minister 
can refuse the request of the committee.  
The second method of obtaining information is public hearing. The committees in the 
Bangladesh parliament do not enjoy power to hold public hearing on legislative or other 
matters. They can only invite experts for eliciting their opinion and can summon persons for a 
witness. The committee is authorized to settle its mode of procedure for examining witness. It 
can also settle the relevant points and the nature of questions that may be asked before a 
witness is called for examination. The committee chairperson may ask the first question and 
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then other members of the committee put their questions. In principle, the witness is not open 
to public. During a witness, proceedings are recorded and make it available to the members 
before signing the report. But the evidence and proceedings of witness along with committee 
report are considered confidential. It can be informally publicized after presentation to the 
plenary through the committee members if he or she chooses.  
The parliamentary committees in the JS are regulated by their own rules of procedure and to 
some extent by the constitution of the country. Over the periods, numbers of changes have 
been brought into the rules of procedure, which enhanced committee’s formal power and 
status within the parliament. After the first reading the bills are automatically referred to the 
committees for detailed consideration. The Speaker is given authority to convene the 
committee meeting if the chairperson fails to conduct mandatory monthly meeting and 
backbenchers replace ministers as the committee heads.75 The committees are authorized to 
regulate their sitting and business, and committee members are free from immunity for 
whatever they say or the way they vote. Although there are few limitations in committee 
power, after scrutinizing the government activities, the committees can make 
recommendations and decisions but these are not mandatory for the ministry. The ministers 
and the bureaucrats therefore can defy the recommendations or decisions made by the 
committees. A general observation is that the committees are formally granted power and 
authority for their legislative and overseeing activities, but lacking weakens the effectiveness 
of the committees.    
4.2 Committee Structure  
 
The committees are broadly categorized into two types: permanent and ad hoc committees. 
The permanent or standing committees further can be divided into ministerial and non-
ministerial standing committees. In accordance with the ROP, standing committees can 
appoint sub-committee. The sub-committee enjoys power similar to the main committee and 
its report is considered as the report of the parent committee. The ad hoc committees also can 
be categorized into two heads:  a) the committees which are appointed primarily to deal with 
legislation, they are truly concerned with proposed Bills; b) the committees which are 
constituted time-to-time to consider specific subject matter referred to them. Compared to the 
ad hoc committees, the permanent committees are given major mandates. As Mezy notes, 
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“Permanent committees which parallel the structure of the ministries have greater 
opportunities for policy activity than those which are temporary and which have different 
principles of formation”.76 In the American Congress and the German Bundestag the 
permanent committees serve a critical function in both legislative and overseeing process. In 
these parliaments permanent committees are mostly parallel to the government ministry. On 
the contrary the British and the Indian parliaments set up ad hoc committees to consider and 
report on particular bill; departmentally related permanent committees work in the area of 
overseeing. As in the American Congress and the German Bundestag, ministerial standing 
committees in the Bangladesh JS perform both legislative and overseeing functions. 
However, ad hoc committees (select and special) are also appointed to securitize and report 
on legislative proposals.  
 
The Standing Committees 
 
All the committees of Bangladesh JS, other than the special and the select committees are 
termed as the Standing Committees. The departmental standing committees are mirror images 
of the ministries of the Government. The committees are responsible for scrutinizing the 
legislative bills before consideration in the House and overseeing the activities of the 
respective ministry. Following the practices of the U.S. Congressional committees, 
departmentally related standing committees were first set up in the second JS in 1979. 
Although the Rules of Procedure framed in 1974 provided for setting up 11 Ministerial 
Standing Committees (MSC), the first JS did not such committee. The second JS constituted 
36 departmental standing committees, which were dropped to 35 in the fifth JS and remained 
same in the seventh JS. Again the number was increased to 37 in the eighth JS (Table 4.1). 
The number of the departmental standing committees depends on the size of the government 
ministry. So, any change of the ministry brings change in the number of the committees. For 
example, when the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief 
merged with the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management in 2003, the two relevant 
standing committees were replaced by a single committee. Similarly, Standing Committee on 
Ministry of Textiles and the Standing Committee on Ministry of Jute were merged into a 
single committee when the Ministry of Textiles and Jute was created replacing the two 
relevant ministries in 2004. Since 2001, government has expanded the size of the ministries. 
                                                 
76 Olson, David M. and Mezey Michael L. (eds.), op. cit., quoted from Olson, David M., “Committees in New 
and Established Democratic Parliaments: Indicators of Institutionalization” available at 
www.uncg.edu/psc/pdc/wps.html 
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Four new ministries- Ministry of Liberation War Affairs, Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Affairs, the Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Oversees Employment and the Ministry of 
Primary and Mass Education were created. There is an argument that the ministries were 
expanded to provide patronage than to rationally allocate government business. It helped the 
government to accommodate their backbenchers as ministers and the members who could not 
enter into the cabinet were given position in the important committees. The expansion of the 
ministry contributed to enlarge the committees in number and to provide the scope for the 
disenchanted backbenchers to take part in the committee process. 77 
 
Table 4.1 No. of Committees Formed in the Jatiya Sangsad (1973-2006) 
Number of Committees Types of Committees 
1st JS 2nd JS 3rd JS 4th JS 5th JS 7th JS 
 
8th JS 
Standing Committees        
Ministerial Standing Committees 0 37 0 35 35 35 37 
Non Ministerial Standing 
Committees 
11 11 4 11 11 11 11 
Ad hoc Committees        
Select Committees 3 3 2  5 1 - 
Special Committees - 1 0 2 2 1 - 
Total 14 52 6 48 53 48 48 
       Note: As the sixth JS worked only three days it does not consider for this study.  Source: Compiled by the 
researcher based on information provided by the Committee Wing-2, Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad.  
 
The Non-Ministerial Standing Committees (NMSCs) are set up for the whole electoral period 
for five distinct purposes: house keeping, service, scrutiny, investigative and financial. From 
the functional point of view, NMSC can be divided into five distinct categories, such as the 
housekeeping committees comprise of three different committees including the Business 
Advisory Committee, the Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions, and the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure. Secondly, the House committee and the Library 
committee fall into the category of service committees. Thirdly, the Committee on 
Government Assurances is in nature a scrutinizing committee. Fourthly, the Committee on 
Privilege and the Committee on Petitions are investigative committees. Finally, the 
Committee on Estimates, the Committee on Public Accounts and the Committee on Public 
Undertakings fall into the category of financial committees. Out of eleven NMSC, seven are 
appointed by the House and others are nominated by the speaker.  
                                                 
77 Ahmed Nizam (2002), op. cit., p.133. 
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Among the three Housekeeping committees, the Business Advisory Committee consists of 
the Speaker as the chairperson and 15 Members. The leader of the House, the opposition 
leader, the deputy speaker and the chief whip are conventionally appointed as members by 
the Speaker. It is an important committee that is responsible for conducting internal affairs of 
the JS under the Rules of Procedure. The area of jurisdiction, role and functions of the 
Business Advisory Committee of the JS are mostly similar to those of the Council of Elders 
(Ältestenrat) of the German Bundestag, which works as de facto committee of the 
Bundestag.78 Under the Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Private Members' Bills and 
Resolutions is responsible to examine every Bill seeking amendment of the Constitution for 
which a notice is given by a private member. All private members' Bills are referred to this 
committee to classify them according to their nature, urgency and importance. The committee 
recommends the time that should be allocated for discussion of each private member’s Bill 
and indicates in the timetable different hours at which various stages of the Bill in a day shall 
be completed. The functions of the Committee on Rules of Procedure of the JS are very much 
similar to those of the Committee for Scrutiny of Elections, Immunity and the Rules of 
Procedure of the German Bundestag. The Committee on Rules and Procedure is established 
“to consider matters of procedure and conduct of business in the House and to recommend 
any amendment (by way of addition, alteration, substitution or repeal) to these rules that may 
be deemed necessary.”79  
 
The House committee and the Library committee are service committees in nature. The 
House committee is appointed to deal with all questions related to residential accommodation 
for the members of the Parliament while the Library committee considers and advises on such 
matters concerning the Library. These two committees assist the members in utilizing fully 
the services provided by the MP Hostel and the Library.  
 
The Committee on Government Assurances is relatively a new type of scrutinizing 
committee, which was first established after the independence of the country.80 According to 
the Rules of Procedure, the committee scrutinizes assurances, promises, undertakings, etc., 
given by a Minister, from time to time, on the floor of the House and reports on whether such 
assurances, promises, undertakings, etc. have been implemented or not.  
                                                 
78 Nevil Johnson, “Committees in the West German Bundestag", John D.Lees and Malcolm Shaw (ed.), 
Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis, Durham: Duke University Press, 1979, p.115. 
79 Bidhi (Rule) 263, Gonoprajatantri Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsader Karjo Pronali Bidhi (Rules of Procedure of 
the Parliament of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh), Dhaka: Jatiya Sangsad Schibalya, 2007.  
80 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., p. 131. 
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The Committee on Petitions and the Committee on Privileges are investigative committees in 
nature. The former is appointed by the JS Speaker consisting of not less than ten members 
and is chaired by the Speaker. As stipulated in the Rules of Procedure, “Minister shall not be 
nominated a member of the Petitions Committee, and that if a member; after nomination to 
the Committee is appointed a Minister, s/he shall cease to be a member of the Committee 
from the date of such appointment.”81 Having an investigative power, this committee can 
examine every petition referred to it and can suggest remedial measures in a concrete form. 
The Petitions Committee ensures investigation of cases of irregularities of the government 
departments or misconduct of individual politicians or government officials. The Committee 
on Privileges is set up to examine every question referred to it and to determine with 
reference to the facts of each case whether a breach of privilege is involved. In accordance 
with the Rule 240 of the ROP, if this committee finds out the nature of the breach, 
circumstances leading to it then it can make such recommendations as it may deem fit. 82 
 
The financial committees are considered as the most powerful and important committees for 
sanctioning, scrutinizing and monitoring of public expenditure. The parliaments modeled on 
the British parliamentary system set up three financial committees, while in the Bundestag 
the Finance Committee and the Budget Committee together cover the whole area related to 
the financial matters. The Bangladesh JS sets up three financial committees: the Committee 
on Estimates (EC), the Committee on Public Accounts (PAC) and the Committee on Public 
Undertakings (PUC). Among these committees, the PAC is distinguishable from two other 
committees because it enjoys constitutional status. Article 76 of the Constitution makes it 
mandatory to set up the Public Accounts Committee.  As discussed earlier, the PAC was first 
set up in the early 1920 while the other two financial committees were introduced in the JS 
after the independence of the country.  
 
The EC has a broader remit; it can examine any expenditure and make suggestions about 
achieving efficiency in administration. This committee can examine entire administration of 
the Government, including financial, administrative and policy matters while the PAC can 
examine the expenditure after it has actually incurred. As practiced in India and Sri Lanka, 
the Comptroller and Auditor-General (C&AG) submits yearly reports to the President, which 
                                                 
81 Bidhi (Rule) 231, Gonoprajatantri Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsader Karjo Pronali Bidhi (Rules of Procedure of 
the Parliament of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh), Dhaka: Jatiya Sangsad Schibalya,  1994.  
82 Bidhi (Rule) 240 to 243, ibid. 
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is later placed to the Parliament, usually through the Minister for Finance. The PAC closely 
scrutinizes the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General and fortifies the Principal 
Accounting Officers against the temptation of financial irregularities. The PAC expresses its 
opinion thereon and records its findings and recommendations.83  
 
Among the three financial committees, the PUC is responsible to examine the reports and 
accounts of the public sector organizations specified in the Schedule IV of the Rules of 
Procedure. PUC can also examine any deficiency of the public undertakings, whether the 
affairs of the public undertakings are being managed in accordance with sound business 
principles and prudent commercial practices. 84 It should be mentioned here that the PUC is 
not given authority to examine or investigate the following matters: major Government policy 
as distinct from business or commercial functions of public undertakings, and day-to-day 
administration. This committee cannot examine matters for the consideration of which any 
machinery is established by any special statute under which a particular public undertaking is 
established.85  
 
None of these three financial committees have power to scrutinize the budget because budget 
does not require detailed review by any committee. However, the Indian Lok Sabha has no 
budget committee. In the JS, the Estimates Committee can examine the budget estimates 
immediately after their presentation. The budget committee is seen to be more important in 
the parliaments of America, Germany and Japan. 
 
Ad hoc Committees 
 
While standing committees carry the main burden of the parliament, some special and select 
committees are also formed to deal with particular matters. Their life expires when they 
finish their specific task. Due to their brief existence they are termed as Ad hoc committees. 
The Bangladesh JS traditionally sets up two types of ad hoc committees: the Select 
Committee on a Bill and Special Committees. The Rules of Procedure of the JS pledges in 
the Rule 266 that the Parliament may, by motion, appoint a Special Committee, which shall 
have such composition and function as may be specified in the motion.  As in the German 
                                                 
83 Asraf, Ali (1997), “The Budget and Role of Committees”, paper presented in the International Conference on 
“Committee System”, organized by the Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies. 
84 The World Bank, (2000), Parliamentary Control over Public Expenditure in Bangladesh: the Role of 
Committees, available at ww1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/BangladeshParliamentary.doc 
85 Rule 238, Rules of Procedure of the Bangladesh Parliament, Dhaka: Jatiya Sangsad Schibalya, 2006.  
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Bundestag JS rarely appoints special committees. For example, no special committee was 
formed in the first JS and in the eighth JS. The second and the seventh JS appointed one 
committee each. The fifth JS appointed five special committees. One of them was appointed 
to investigate complain about corruption of the Agriculture Minster and others were set up to 
deal with a difficult preparatory work on large or important legislative projects. The Select 
Committee is traditionally established to examine a bill if the member-in-charge of the Bill 
referred it to such a committee rather than a standing committee.  
 
Committee Composition  
 
Each ministerial standing committee is constituted with chairperson and nine members. On 
the contrary, number of members of the non-ministerial standing committees varies from 8 to 
15 (Table 4.2). Among the NMSCs, the PAC and the Business Advisory Committee are the 
largest committees, constituted with 15 members. The Government Assurance Committee 
and the Library Committee are set up with eight and nine members respectively. All MSCs 
are appointed by the House. Among the NMSCs seven are appointed by the House and all the 
remaining are nominated by the Speaker. Among the four committees appointed by the 
Speaker, Business Advisory Committee and Library Committee are headed by the Speaker 
and Deputy-speaker accordingly as ex-officio. Chairpersons of two other committees are 
nominated by the Speaker from amongst the members of the JS. The committee structure and 
composition can be seen from the Tables 4.2 & 4.3. 
 
The ROP does not make any restriction for the Minister or the opposition leader to sit in a 
permanent committee. The ministers traditionally were nominated as the chairpersons of the 
departmental standing committees until 1996. The seventh JS brought an amendment in the 
ROP which stipulated that standing committee would be chaired by a non-minister MP. Now, 
the ministers are nominated as members of the departmental committees but not as chairs. 
Besides this, the ministers are not allowed to appoint as the member of the Petitions 
Committee, the PAC, the EC and the PUC under the Rules 231, 234, 235 and 239 of the 
Rules of procedure respectively. It is also stated that if a member of any of these four 
committees is appointed as a Minister, he/she shall cease to be a member of the committee 
from the date of such appointment. The Bangladesh JS does not impose any restriction on 
multiple memberships. On an average 1.4 to 1.5 committee seats were allotted for every JS 
member in the post 1990s parliaments. 
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    Table: 4.2 Committee Structures of the Jatiya Sangsad 
Standing Committee Size Chairperson Appointing 
Authority 
Remarks Rules 
MSC 
 
10 usually     
Backbencher 
House ministers are not   
eligible 
146-8 
Financial Committees  
Public Accounts 
Committee 
15 Do Do No minister as 
member 
233-4 
Estimate Committee 10 Do Do Do 235-7 
Public Undertaking 
Committee 
10 Do Do Do 238-9 
Investigative Committee  
Committee on Privileges 10 Usually Speaker Do to form in the 
first session 
240-3 
Petition Committee 10 Do Speaker No minister as 
member 
231-2 
Scrutinizing committees      
Government Assurances 
Committee 
 
8 
 
Not specified 
 
House 
 
-------- 
 
244-5 
House Committees  
Business Advisory 
Committee 
15 Speaker Speaker -------- 219-21 
Committee on Private 
Members’ Bill & 
Resolutions 
10 Backbencher House --------- 222-4 
Committee on Rules of 
Procedures 
12 Speaker House --------- 263-5 
Service Committee  
House Committee 
 
12 Not specified Speaker advisory 
functions 
249-56 
Library Committee 10 Deputy Speaker House -------- 257-8, 262 
Ad-hoc committees  
Select Committee on Bills   House  225-30 
Special Committee   House  266 
Source: Nizam Ahmed, ‘Strengthening Parliamentary Committees in Bangladesh: Options, Constraints  
and Prospects’ Seminar III, organized by the MSS, Dhaka, May 2002. 
 
    Table: 4.3 Average Committee Seats for Each Member 
Committee Size JS 
No. of SC No. of Members 
(each Committee) 
Committee 
seats 
Total 
Committee 
Seats 
No. of 
total MPs 
No. of seats 
per MP 
5th 35 
2 
2 
6 
1 
10 
15 
12 
10 
8 
350 
30 
24 
60 
8 
472 330 1.4 
7th 35 
2 
2 
6 
1 
10 
15 
12 
10 
8 
350 
30 
24 
60 
8 
472 330 1.4 
8th 37 
2 
2 
6 
1 
10 
15 
12 
10 
8 
370 
30 
24 
60 
8 
492 330 1.5 
Note: JS- Jatiya Sangsad, SC- Sanding Committee. Source: data compiled from the proceedings of  
the parliament (1991-2006), Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, Dhaka, 2006. 
  - 106 -
4.3 Committee Procedure 
 
 
The committees deal with all matters referred to them by the House from time to time. Proper 
operational procedures give the committees right way to carry out their tasks. The committee 
decision-making procedures are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
The distribution of committee seats and the selection process are important factors that 
condition the committee behavior. In some systems, committee positions are distributed 
according to the proportional party strength in the house, while in other cases seats are 
distributed following the majoritarian policy. In this sense, the committee behavior depends 
upon the distribution of seats and the chair positions of the committees. Among several 
factors involved in the distribution of committee seats preferences for party and individual 
members are significant. Damgaard observes that the preference of individual members is 
never the sole basis for committee assignments. He claimed that other important factors also 
play roles such as party role. He noted: “Member preferences are taken into account 
everywhere, but the party is also concerned with the seniority, loyalty and expertise of its 
MPs as well as with the need to satisfy the systemic demands on the party group as a 
whole.”86 Two factors are involved in the process of appointment of the committee 
chairpersons and the members. The parliamentary party has authority to decide which 
member will go to which committee and the members create demand to sit in a committee 
either as members or chairpersons. The actors have different goals. A party generally wants 
to promote electoral safety of its members, provide senior members with appropriate 
positions, ensure geographic and interest representations. The members have their own goals 
such as making nation-wide reputation by making good public policy, advancing political 
career, providing service to constituency and gaining power or holding influence. When there 
are multiple goals, the committee becomes heterogonous with respect to interests that are 
represented within it.87  
 
The ROP does not specify any method for distributing committee seats. All committee chairs 
are traditionally distributed to the ruling party following the majoritarian policy and members 
of different committees are appointed from the parliamentary parties on the basis of their 
                                                 
86 Damgaard, Erik (1995), “How parties Control Committee Members", in Herbert Döring (ed.), Parliaments 
and Majority Rule in Western Europe, Frankfurt: St. Martin's Press, p.315 
87 Frish, Scott A. and Kelly, Sean Q (2006), Committee Assignment Politics in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, University of Oklahoma Press,  p. 25, 
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strength in the house.88 This distribution principle does not ensure representation of different 
parties in committee leadership. Therefore the opposition party strongly claimed committee 
membership and chairpersonship on the basis of proportional representation but the ruling 
party did not offer any chair position to the opposition. One exception was made in the 7th JS 
where one chair position was given to the second major opposition party but none was made 
chairperson from the main opposition party. 
 
Ministerial standing committee formation was delayed in the post 1990s parliaments for up to 
seventeenth session (Table 4.4) due to disagreement between the two major political parties 
about the distribution of committee chairs. Experience shows that compromise or agreement 
was hardly reached between the treasury and opposition benches before committee formation. 
In the seventh and the eighth JS, numbers of meetings were held between the ruling party and 
the opposition party whips in the presence of the senior leaders to negotiate on the demand 
for committee positions. The Speaker also called the ruling and opposition party leaders to 
resolve the problem. But they failed to reach an agreement. In this circumstance, Ministerial 
Standing Committees were first formed keeping slots vacant for the main opposition. 
However, they were later incorporated in the vacant seats of the standing committees. The 
Seventh and the eighth JS had passed nearly one quarter of its tenure without having 
committees in proper sense. With the proposal of the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Procedure, the eighth JS amended the ROP to avoid unwanted delay in forming standing 
committees. According to this amendment, the formation of all parliamentary standing 
committees should be completed within the third session of a parliament. 
 
Once the committee seats are allocated, the parliamentary parties begin to appoint their 
members at the beginning of the parliamentary session. The appointment of committee 
chairpersons and members as well as the recall and the replacement are left to the 
parliamentary parties. With the consent of the parliamentary leader, the Whip prepares the list 
showing which member will go to which committee and submits it to the Chief Whip. Before 
submitting the final list to the House, the Chief Whip takes initiative to negotiate with the 
opposition parties. After negotiating with other parliamentary parties and receiving the list of 
their nominated members, the Chief Whip presents the names of chairpersons and members 
of different committees to the House with the permission of the leader of the House.   
 
 
                                                 
88 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., p. 135. 
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Table 4.4 Session wise Standing Committee Formation (1991-2006) 
(Total sessions are shown in the bracket.) 
Fifth JS 
(22sessions) 
Seventh JS 
(23sessions) 
Eighth JS 
(23sessions) 
Session 
NMSC MSC NMSC MSC NMSC MSC 
First Session 3 - 6 - 5 - 
Second Session 5 1 5 - - - 
Third Session 1 33 - - - - 
Fourth Session 2 - - - - - 
Seventh Session - - - 14 6 5 
Eighth Session - - - 21 - 32 
Seventeenth Session - 1 - - - - 
Total 11 35 11 35 11 37 
Note: NMSC-Non-Ministerial Standing Committee, MSC- Ministerial Standing Committee. Source: Calculated 
from the proceedings of the parliament (1991-2006), Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, Dhaka, 2006.  
 
In the developed democracies, committee seats are in principle distributed on the basis of 
seniority, specialization on subject matter, competence, personal choice and interest of the 
constituency. Conventionally re-elected members and senior party members are included in 
the committees of their choice while newcomers have to look for the best at the hands of 
party leaders. In case of the Bangladesh parliament, party chief who is also leader of the 
parliamentary party controlled all parliamentary party decisions and his\her personal choice 
and consent were given special importance in the appointment of committee members. 
Therefore, loyalty to the party chief, dedication to the party and lobbying are the real factors 
for qualifying members to get positions in important committees rather than their seniority or 
expertise. The major daily national newspapers illustrate that legislators start lobbying to get 
assignment on particular standing committees parallel to the ministries connected with 
resource distribution, local and national level planning, and development works.89  
 
The roles and responsibilities of the committee members are quite different in nature from 
those in the plenary. These are not particularly defined in the Rules of Procedure. It is 
generally said that an individual member, who sits in a committee has three functions: as 
legislator reviewing, modifying and amending legislation; as overseer reviewing government 
policies, programs and expenditures; and as representative, hearing various voices of the 
citizens, representing concerns of the constituency. The reflection of public interest in the 
deliberations of the committees depends upon the committees’ jurisdiction. The members 
who sit in the Select Committee only work on legislation because this committee is set up in 
the Bangladesh parliament for scrutinizing the legislative bills. The members of the Standing 
                                                 
89 Jugantor(Bengali daily news paper), Dhaka: 3rd February 2002. 
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Committee on Private Members Bills also deal with legislation but their activities are limited 
to those bills initiated by the individual members. The members of the ministerial standing 
committees have both legislative and overseeing functions. They examine government bill 
and other matters referred to them. The committee members may ask questions to witness or 
seek expert opinion for gathering information about pending legislation or controversial 
policy issues or government’s activities. The members of other standing committees do not 
work for legislative activities. The members of the financial committees work for improving 
the financial discipline of the public organizations. The Government Assurance Committee 
members examine the status of implementation of assurances and promises given by the 
executives in the House. The members of the Business Advisory Committee are entrusted 
with house keeping. The Committee prepares the timetable for the house and allocates time 
for discussion of the stage or stages. The members of the Petitions Committee consider the 
prayers of the citizens and the Privileges Committee members deal with the interests and 
rights of the legislators.   
 
To increase effectiveness, the committees require the right of setting their own timetables. 
Döring argued that the committees, which can determine their own timetables, enjoy more 
strength. On the contrary, the committees where the government majority controls the 
timetables are comparatively weaker.90 Mattson and Strøm similarly argued: “the less 
external actors can control the committee’s time tables, the greater is the committee 
autonomy.”91 The committees which control their own timetables can decide when the report 
is to be introduced to the plenary session. Besides the control of timetables, committees 
require sufficient time to settle the detailed provision of a bill or to settle the technical 
questions or to hold hearings. Thus, the frequency of committee meetings and given time 
affects the working of committees.  
 
The committees in the Bangladesh parliament can regulate their sittings and the ways of 
conducting their business. The ROP defines the procedure of convening meeting, preparing 
decision and reporting to the House. The first step in preparing a committee meeting is fixing 
venue, date and time. The committee chairperson has right to set up the agenda, venue and 
schedule.  In accordance with the Rule 197 of the ROP, the sittings of a Committee shall be 
held on such days and at such hours as the Chairperson of the Committee may fix. Thereafter, 
                                                 
90 Döring, Herbart, “Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda”, in Döring, Herbert (ed.), 
op. cit., pp.237-38. 
91 Mattson,Ingvar  and Strøm,Kaare, op. cit.,  p. 292. 
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the committee secretariat announces the meeting schedule and communicates to the members 
and concerned ministries before the meeting.  
 
It is mandatory for all standing committees to convene at least one meeting once a month and 
the members are obliged to attend committee meetings and to participate in discussing, 
investigating and preparing the committee reports. If a standing committee chairperson is not 
readily available or s/he fails to call mandatory monthly meeting for any reason the Speaker 
may direct the Secretary to call a meeting of that committee and the Secretary shall convene a 
meeting of the committee at a date, time and place fixed by the Speaker.92 The committees in 
the Bangladesh parliament do not prepare yearly program for the coming year well in 
advance and the ROP does not fix a day in a week for committee meeting. The sitting of a 
committee depends upon the schedule fixed by the committee chairperson.  
 
With the permission of the Speaker a committee may sit whilst the parliament is sitting and 
make sure that meeting will not interrupt other parliamentary affairs. Meetings usually take 
place within the area of a parliament, but if it becomes necessary, the meetings can also be 
held out side the parliament and in that case the matter shall be referred to the Speaker whose 
decision shall be final.93 A committee is deemed to have quorum, which means that one third 
of its members are needed to be present. If the quorum is not found, the chairperson can 
suspend a sitting of the committee to some future days. Unlike the Congress, the committee 
meetings in the Bangladesh parliament are not in principle open to the public. Although, the 
meetings are closed to the media and public, authorized parliamentary staff and people other 
than the members of the committee may attend the meetings without taking part in 
deliberations. Ingvar Mattson and Karee StrØm argue that closed-door meetings are more 
likely to foster inter-party compromise than the open meetings. They again argue that if the 
committee meets in private, information resides behind the closed door.94  
 
The second step in preparing a committee meeting is agenda setting. A committee meets in its 
first or policy meeting for discussing committee’s jurisdiction, responsibilities and settling 
the agenda for the next meeting. Based on this introductory meeting, the chairpersons set the 
agenda for the next meeting. The agenda can be extended by the chairperson if any member 
                                                 
92Gonoprajatantri Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsader Karjo Pronali Bidhi (Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh), op. cit. 
93 For detail Bidhi 200, Gonoprajatantri Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsader Karjo Pronali Bidhi (Rules of Procedure 
of the Parliament of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh), op. cit. 
94 Ingvar , Mattson and StrØm, Karee op. cit., p.282. 
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wants to put a new agendum. Prior to the next meeting copies of the agenda are circulated to 
the members. Like the Speaker of a parliament in plenary, the committee chairperson 
allocates speaking time for the members and has authority to take measures for maintenance 
of order as well as for suspending the meeting if necessary.  
 
Box 4.1: Procedure of Committee Meeting: Public Accounts Committee 
 
The meetings of the Public Accounts Committee generally take place in the committee 
room on any day during the weeks when the JS is sitting. The meeting is usually started at 
11 hrs or evening time between 14 and 17 hrs and lasted around up to three hours. Before 
embarking on the agenda, the committee meeting normally begins in the name of God and 
by giving thanks to the participants. At this point the chairperson introduces the 
committee staff and other officials to the committee members. Thereafter, the chairperson 
starts the meeting with a discussion of procedural matters related to the meeting, general 
information. At this point, proceedings of the previous are tabled and passed by the 
members.  The Chairperson then announces the agenda and the members have to agree 
which agenda items should be dropped or postponed, debated and which can precede 
directly to a vote without debate. At the start of each agenda item, the chairperson 
provides the background information and opens the floor to other members representing 
different parliamentary parties. The representative of the CAG office and senior officials 
from the ministry or even Minister him/herself speak during the debate. The Chairperson 
calls the speakers in order who have already put requests to speak. In the beginning the 
Chairperson mentions that the debate should be concluded within fixed time. The 
deliberations on an agendum item conclude with a vote on the item after each 
parliamentary group has spoken once.  
Source: summarized by the Author from the Proceedings of PAC Report, 2006. 
 
The committee decisions are made by a majority vote. When a vote is taken on draft 
legislation or a complex matter, each separate provision or clause is put up separately. In 
other cases, the committee decisions are prepared in a draft report and placed for vote or 
amendment. When disputed issues go for voting, the members cast their votes in party line; 
both the government and the opposition parties make sure that all of their members are 
present. If the opposition or other committee members disagree with the majority, they can 
record ‘note of descent’ but they are not allowed to submit ‘minority report’. In case of an 
equality of votes on any matter, the committee chairperson, or the person acting as such, can 
cast vote. Like the US Congress and Indian Lok Sabha, the Bangladesh parliament does not 
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allow any proxy vote in the committees.95 Only few parliaments allow proxy voting, for 
example, in the German Bundestag substitute members have the right to vote when a regular 
member is unable to be present.96  
 
The concluding deliberation takes place after the final vote and at this stage no amendment 
can be brought. A record of the decisions are maintained and circulated to the members of the 
Committee under the direction of the Chairman. Finally, the chairperson prepares the final 
report with the assistance of the committee secretariat. The committee report generally 
contains recommendations, the opinion of the minority and other comments of the 
committees concerned. The committee report shall be signed and presented to the House by 
the chairperson on behalf of the committee. In absence of the committee chairperson, any 
member of the committee can submit the report within one month of the date on which 
reference to the Committee was made, if an appropriate time limit is not fixed by the house 
for the presentation of the report.  The House may at any time be able to extend the time for 
the presentation of the committee report to a date specified in the motion. A Committee may, 
if it thinks fit, make a special report on any matter that arises or comes to light in the course 
of its work, which it may consider necessary to bring to the notice of the House.  
 
Although the departmental standing committees are required to submit a report to the House 
regarding the examination of legislative proposals but the Rules of Procedure does not 
specifically mention that they shall have to submit a report to the House relating their general 
activities referred in the Rule 248 of the Rules of Procedure. The reporting of the 
departmental standing committees is not mandatory, but the ROP has made provisions for the 
Select Committee on Bills, Committee on Petitions, Committee on Public Accounts, 
Committee on Public Undertakings, Committee of Privileges, Committee on Government 
Assurances, Committee on Rules of Procedure and Committee on Estimates to submit a 
report to the House.97  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 The U.S House of Representative eliminated this provision of voting by proxy in House Committees in 1995. 
96 Benda, Susan R. op. cit., p.13. 
97 Rules 228, 232-3, 235,237-38,241, 244,248and265, Gonoprajatantri Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsader Karjo 
Pronali Bidhi (Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh), available at 
http://www.parliamentofbangladesh.org/rprocedure.htm  
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4.4 Committees and Parties 
 
 
Parliamentary functions are largely prepared and steered by the parties in the parliament 
called parliamentary parties or parliamentary groups. Parliamentary parties are the groups or 
fractions of the members of the parliament that belong to the same party. Though 
parliamentary party organizations are separate from the party organizations outside the 
legislature, in the developing democracies like Bangladesh political parties have an upper 
hand over the activities of their parliamentary party groups. This section attempts to discuss 
how the parties control their members in the legislative process particularly in the committees 
through their parliamentary parties. 
 
In the parliamentary process, the parliamentary parties control legislative procedure through 
agenda setting, tabling motions for plenary discussion, amending laws and scrutinizing 
government activities through committees. The parliamentary parties determine the general 
guidelines for their committee members. There is hardly anything that can be done by their 
committee members against their party position or policy. For organizing and commanding 
the committee members in on going committee activities, the parliamentary parties use 
different methods, such as recruitment and removal, reward and sanction. The parliamentary 
party has the authority to decide which member will go to which committee. In the name of 
party interest, the parliamentary party can also replace them. Besides, the parliamentary 
parties use the rewards and sanctions method to control their members who sit in the 
committees. The members, who serve party interests in the committees, are indeed rewarded 
in a number of ways: the members may get seats on better and more prestigious committees, 
become chairperson of a committee, can advance in the party group hierarchy, get leading 
positions within the parliament as a whole or be promoted to government posts. On the 
contrary, three different sanctions are used for recalcitrant committee members: the member 
will lose committee seat if his/her party feels inadequately represented by him/her, party 
possibly strips him off tasks to be performed for the party group and s/he might not be 
reappointed to the committee in the next session or term.98 With these mechanisms, the 
parliamentary parties control their committee members and make sure that every committee 
member belonging to the party group is loyal to his/her party.  
 
                                                 
98Damgaard, Erik, op. cit.,  pp.320-321. 
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The following sections analyze party ideology and structure, leadership selection process, 
parliamentary candidate selection process and parliamentary party organization that have 
considerable influence on the performances of the legislators in the committee process. 
 
Party Ideology and Structure  
 
The political parties in Bangladesh have distinct characteristics in terms of their internal 
structure, ideology and functioning. All the parties are not made from the same mould. Some 
of the parties originated during the British colonial period and led the independent 
movements while some parties were established in the course of legitimacy of the military 
regime. Since the independence, Bangladesh has shifted from one system to another. The 
years between 1975 and 1990 were marked by a continuous power struggle within the army. 
Military rulers consolidated their positions by creating new political parties and holding 
national elections.99 After following a mass movement in 1990, Bangladesh returned to 
parliamentary democracy.  
 
Over one hundred political parties contested in the post-1990 parliamentary elections. Among 
the contesting parties, less than eight parties put up candidates for more than 50 seats. Only a 
few of them return to the parliament, and consequently different smaller parties either merge 
or become allied with the two major political parties- the BNP and the AL. In the post-1990 
parliaments, the JIB and the JP came up as large parties. Table 4.5 shows that the BNP and 
the JP are by nature centrist parties and are comparatively new. It is worth mentioning that 
Gen. Ziaur Rahman and Gen. H.M. Ershad established them in the process of civilianization 
of the military government. On the contrary, the AL is a ‘left-of-centre’ party, which was 
founded in 1949. The JIB, unlike the BNP, the JP and the AL, is a pro-Islamic party; it 
opposed the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 and was banned until 1976 (Table 4.5).  
 
Party structure is generally paramedical, major parties include AL, BNP, JP and JIB are 
comprised following the government administrative hierarchy, the national or central 
committee is the central policy making body and then they have divisional, district, Upzila 
(Sub-district), Union and village committees. At the municipal and city level they have 
municipal/ city council and municipal/city word committees. From national to grassroots, 
                                                 
99 Mitra, Subrata K. And Enskat, Mike(2004), “Introduction’’, in  Mitra, Subrata K. And Enskat (ed.) Political 
Parties in South Asia’’,London: Praeger, pp.20-21.    
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every committee is led by Chairman or President, Vice-Presidents, General Secretary, 
Additional General Secretary, Joint Secretaries and number of members. The committees at all 
levels are responsible to the national committee and finally to the party chief.    
 
    Table 4.5  Profiles of Major Political Parties in Bangladesh 
Name of 
Party(founded) 
Self-description Support basis Splits 
Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party 
(1978) 
Nationalist, 
democratic and 
liberal 
All sections and classes of 
people, but get greater 
support from religious, 
military and business group 
Some leaders 
left and formed 
new parties 
Bangladesh  
Awami League 
(1949) 
Liberal, 
democratic, secular 
and nationalist 
All groups of people, 
including ethnic and 
minorities 
1975,1983 
Jamat-e-Islami, 
Bangladesh 
(1979) 
Islamic and 
conservative but 
pragmatic 
Religious and business 
group 
No splits 
Jatiya Party-Ershad 
(1986) 
Nationalist, 
believed in  Islamic 
Shariah Laws 
All sections and classes of 
people but   business group 
and a section of people 
benefited from Ershad 
government 
Split in to three 
factions in 
2000 
Source: Suri, K.C. et.al (2007) Political Parties in South Asia: The Challenge of Change, International For 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Sweden, p.67. 
 
Selection of Party Leadership  
 
Political parties in Bangladesh have their own constitutions that define the way they will be 
structured and govern their internal functioning. Though these constitutions prescribe 
democratic rules relating to the election or selection of party leaderships, there is a big gap 
between what is laid down in the party constitution and how parties actually work.100   The 
BNP’s constitution prescribes in Article 8(KA) that the party Chairperson will be elected by 
direct vote of the members of the National Council for a term of two years, and the 
Chairperson can be removed if two thirds of the national council demands so and three 
fourths of the national council votes in favor of this demand. But it is observed that the BNP 
did not call any National Council meeting last fourteen years. The BNP chairperson Begum 
Khaleda Zia entered into politics after the death of her husband and became vice-president in 
1983 and president in 1984. The BNP’s former Secretary General Abdul Manan Bhuian 
                                                 
100 Suri, K.C. and others (2007), Political Parties in South Asia: The Challenge of Change, South Asian Regional 
Report, Stockhom: IDEA, p.90. 
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argued that they did not fell necessity for holding the council, as they did not want to change 
the leadership.101  
 
Similarly the AL constitution prescribes democratic rules and procedure for the purpose of 
the selection/election of party office bearers. According to the AL constitution, all office 
bearers including the party president, presidium members, secretaries and treasure are to be 
elected to their posts by the councilors at the triennial council meeting. Although the AL 
holds its council meeting at very three years, no one contests with present Chairperson 
Sheikh Hasina for the post of party president while other positions were filled through 
elections. According to the AL’s constitution the presidium (15 members) is able to take up 
and decide upon all programs of the organization. Each member of the presidium has 
specific duties. Although it is assumed that presidium will be able to play independent role 
in policy making, it is observed that most of the presidium leaders have a tendency to show 
their loyalty to the party president.  
 
The third largest party of the country is Jatya Party (JP). Following the footsteps of Gen. 
Ziaur Rahman, the JP was established by former President Gen. H.M. Ershad to civilianize 
his military rule. Still holds the party leadership by virtue of his role in founding the party. 
Although the Central Committee, in accordance with the party constitution, is the supreme 
policy making body, it mostly works under the direction of the party Chairman. According o 
the Article 46 of the JP Constitution, the party chairman has absolute power to form, suspend 
or abolish committees at all levels. The chairman also has absolute power to appoint anyone 
to any post or suspend anyone from any post, with the power to replace any official of the 
party with any person of his choice. In the constitution, the party chairman is given absolute 
power of interpreting the constitution. Therefore, Kohanerc states that the formal rules 
establish a ‘single man’ dictatorship in the JP.102  
 
The next largest party is Jamat-e- Islam Bangladesh(JIB). The JIB is headed by Amir-e-
Jamat who is elected for three-year term by the direct secret ballot of the rokons. It is worth 
mentioning that Central majils-e-sura members first elect a three-member panel for the 
                                                 
101 New Age, September 4, 2006. 
 
102  Kochanek, S.A. (2000), “ Governance, Patronage politics, and democratic transition in Bangladesh ”, Asian 
Survey, Vol. 34, No.11, pp.530-550. 
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Amir-e-Jamat. If he is unable to carry out his duties for more than six months, he can select 
one person from the Naib-e- Amirs consulting with the central working council and made 
him the temporary Acting Amir.  The JIB’s constitution prescribes that within six months, 
the Acting Amir should arrange an election for a new Amir for the remaining period. But the 
majlis-e-sura can postponed the election for a reasonable period and extend the term of the 
Acting Amir, but this period cannot exceed the time limit for the normal election period.        
 
Table 4.6 Highest Executive Bodies of Four Major Political Parties in Bangladesh 
Parties Highest executive body Method of selection 
BNP National Standing Committee All (15) members are nominated by the 
chairperson.  
AL Central Council Comprised of 73 members. Of them 26 
members are appointed by the party president 
in consultation with other office bearers. 
JIB Central Majils-e-Sura Elected by the Rokons.  
JP Central Working Committee Members are  elected by the council 
 Source: Compiled by the author based on the constitutions of the BNP, the AL, the JIB and the JP. 
 
Parliamentary Candidate Selection 
 
All parties have their own rules and procedure for selection of candidates for the 
parliamentary elections. For the purpose of selecting candidates for parliamentary polls the 
political parties set up parliamentary boards or committees. The BNP’s constitution provides 
for setting up a high powered parliamentary board headed by the party president. The 
standing committee members, three vice-presidents, general secretary and the president of the 
district committee (in the selection of a candidate for particular district) are appointed as 
members for that meeting. Though the party constitution prescribes that the decision of the 
board will be final in nominating candidates, in practice the Chairperson takes the final 
decision. It is observed that BNP’s Senior Joint Secretary Traeq Zia, son of Begum Khleda 
Zia, played a vital role in selecting candidates for the eighth parliamentary election.       
 
The AL also forms a parliamentary board (PB) with eleven members to nominate candidates 
for the parliamentary elections. According to the party constitution, the president and general 
secretary, the leader of Awami League's parliamentary party will be members of the board by 
virtue of their office. The remaining eight members will be elected by the council from 
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among the Awami League council members. This parliamentary board is however given all 
authority to select candidates; the party chief takes the final decision.  
 
Likewise the BNP and the AL, the JP also has a parliamentary board comprising with eleven 
members. The party chairman acts as chairman of the PB, and general secretary is the ex-
officio secretary of the PB. Other nine members are selected by the party chairman. Although 
the PB is constitutionally empowered to select the candidates, but in practice the party 
chairman chose the candidates, the PB formally approves his decisions only. Article 25 of the 
JP constitution asserted that the party chairman will chose parliamentary leader, deputy 
leader, chief whip and whip from the reliable members of the JP parliamentary party and they 
will work in the parliament consulting with the party chairman. Article 25(4) makes it 
mandatory for the members of the JP parliamentary party to comply with the direction of the 
party chairman. Such constitutional provisions authorized the party chairman to control 
parliamentarians tightly.   
 
However, political parties in Bangladesh have their own parliamentary borads and 
institutional procedure for selecting candidates for the parliamentary elections, but practically 
they did not exercise a democratic selection procedure. Though the aspirant candidates were 
appeared to the PB for a formal interview but there was no written procedure or grading 
system for selecting candidates. The PB organized an ostensible interview board and after an 
instant evaluation they offered the nomination, which is undemocratic.103 It is observed that 
the party chief awarded nomination to the aspirants considering their social status and ability 
to win the poll. In the post-1990s parliamentary elections, major political parties (the BNP, 
the AL and the JP) awarded nomination to those candidates who were able to contribute huge 
amounts of money to the party fund and to spent money in the election campaign for winning 
the polls which is called “mononoyan banijya” or "nomination trade".104  It is calculated that 
58 business-industrialist contested in the eighth parliamentary elections with the ticket of the 
AL and 67 contested as the candidates of the BNP. Many of them got the nomination paying 
huge sums of money to the party funds. Besides the moneyed men the BNP and the AL 
equally awarded nomination 17 retired civil military bureaucrats who entered politics just 
                                                 
103 Hossain, Amran, Parties and Party System in Bangladesh, unpublished Ph.D theisis, the University of 
Sheffield, England, 2007, p.65.  
104Karim, Rezaul (2004), “Party Nomination on Sale”, The Daily Star, 13th Anniversary issue, December. 
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before the election.105 They were given nomination because the parties have apparently given 
maximum emphasis on 'seat politics'.  
 
The political parties in Bangladesh are not democratic to the extent they ought to be. 
Formation of various levels of party committees and their office-bearers are subject to the 
party chief. Key positions of various levels of party committee are nominated by the party 
chief.  The party chief control all matters with an iron hand, all important decisions on policy 
matters are taken unilaterally by the party president without hearing the views of the others 
and they had not been questioned in their parties.   
 
How Parties Control Committee Members  
 
Political Parties considerably influence the activities of the parliamentary parties through 
formal and informal manner. The following paragraphs explain ‘how do the parties control 
their members in the legislative process.’ 
 
The members of the political party who are elected to the Jatiya Sangsad are obliged to form 
the parliamentary party. For example, the AL parliamentary party comprises the members 
who are elected to Jatiya Sangsad; likewise parliamentarians of the BNP, JP and JIB form 
their own parliamentary parties. According to Article 28 of the AL Constitution, the party’s 
members who will be elected to the parliament shall be obliged to form the Awami League 
Parliamentary Party. Similarly, BNP parliamentary party is formed with the parliamentarians 
belonging to BNP. Similarly, the Jatya Party Constitution states in the Article 25 that 
parliamentary party will be formed with members of the JP’s MPs and parliamentary party 
members will be obliged to follow the direction of the JP Chairman.  
 
Parliamentary parties are also pyramidal in structure. The party chief traditionally becomes 
the parliamentary party leader if s/he elected as member of the parliament. For example, the 
BNP or AL chief, when in office as Prime Minister was also the leader of the House. In the 
parliamentary party hierarchy, the next position is occupied by the ‘Deputy Leader’ followed 
by the Whips. Following the Westminster model, the Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad has adopted 
and established the office of the ‘Whip’. The Bangladesh (Whips) Order, 1972 provided the 
positions for Chief Whip from the ruling party as well as from the opposition. The Chief 
                                                 
105 Information is gathered from Bengali and English dailies (August to September 2001) and calculated by the 
researcher 
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whip of the ruling party is assisted by a Deputy Chief Whip and other whips. In addition to 
the Chief Whip there are six Whips. Parliamentary parties heaving at least 30 seats in the 
Jatiya Sangsad have the position of Whip. Though in principle, including the Leader and the 
Deputy Leader all positions are to be elected by their MPs, in practice parliamentary party 
leader decides which member will go to which position. It is worth mentioning that unlike the 
AL and the BNP, the JP Chairman according to the party constitution enjoys supreme power 
to selects members for parliamentary positions.  
 
Among the parliamentary parties, the leader of the treasury bench, who is also the Prime 
Minister and the Leader of the House, holds strong control over committee members 
representing his/her party. The Prime Minister holds executive power and s/he distributes 
executive positions of the government. Therefore, MPs of the government party did not want 
to dissatisfy the party chief or other influential leaders. One example can be cited here related 
to the removal of a committee chairman. The chairperson of the Estimates Committee of the 
eighth parliament was removed from the committee when he dissatisfied the top party 
leaders. The influential members, including several ministers and the Mayor of the Dhaka 
City Corporation made a negative image of him to the Prime Minister and they influenced her 
to act against the committee chairperson.106 Another example can be cited here related to the 
expulsion of two BNP law makers during the period of the seventh and the eighth 
parliaments. Major Akhteruzzaman was a law maker of the seventh parliament expelled from 
BNP for his outspoken criticism of party leadership and attending the parliament session 
while his party boycotted the session. He lost his parliamentary seat under Article 70 of the 
Bangladesh Constitution. Again in 2005, Abu Hena MP was also expelled from the BNP after 
bringing allegation against the JIB, partner of the Four-Party Alliance government, to spread 
Islamic militancy in the country. But the party chief had cancelled his party membership in 
the name of misconduct and tarnishing the image of the party.   
 
All parties have their own constitutions that govern party activities and behavior of their 
parliamentarians. The constitutions of the respective parties grant supreme power to the 
parliamentary party leader to appoint their members to different parliamentary positions like 
the Deputy Leader, the Chief Whip (only for government party), the Deputy Whip and to 
different committees.  The parliamentary party leader decides which member will go to 
which committee. Although seniority, expertise, constituency and party interests are to be 
                                                 
106 Daily Bhorer Kagoj, Dhaka, 29th August, 1997.  
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considered in the selection of members to different committees, personal likings and disliking 
of the party chief affect the selection process. It was observed that the MPs could not go 
beyond the decisions taken by the parliamentary party leaders. If any MP dares to question 
their authority s/he is quickly sacked or faces intimidation.107 The following paragraphs 
discuss how major political parties control their committee members.  
 
The AL Constitution in its Article 28(b) states that their MPs must be obliged to perform their 
functions according to the advice and direction of the President of the Executive Committee. 
The MPs who were appointed to the committees or any other parliamentary position could 
not go against party line or refuse to comply with party decision. Otherwise, the party 
president in consultation with the Presidium Members could take disciplinary action against 
the reluctant members. Article 28 (a) states, “the decision of the majority of the members of 
the Parliamentary Party shall be regarded as final decision but the Parliamentary Party shall 
not take any decision inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the 
Bangladesh Awami League or any section thereof.”108 However, parliamentary decisions 
were mostly taken by the party chief in consultation/without consultation with the senior 
party members. The AL's constitution has no provision for impeachment of the party chief or 
disciplinary action against any central leader.   
 
The BNP in its constitution entrusts absolute authority to the party chief. The party 
chairperson can take necessary action against the MPs who do not comply with the party 
decision or policy.109 The party Chairperson holds all the executive power of the 
parliamentary party, as s/he selects the members and chairpersons of different parliamentary 
committees and holds power to remove or replace him/her from any committee for violation 
of discipline and party interests. As a result the committee members could not speak freely. 
An example can be cited. Chairpersons and members of different committees raised their 
allegations in a seminar in 2005 against several ministers and high officials for gross 
irregularities in the ministries, but they could not take a hard stand to unearth the serious 
irregularities committed by them because the party high ups pressured on them not to speak 
much about those ministries. The member of the Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Commerce G.M Quader belonging to the Jitya Party (Ershad) claimed that “the government 
                                                 
107Chowdhury, R. Mahfuz, “Is Bangladesh A Democracy or Autocracy”, November 30, 2006, the American 
Chronicle.  
108The Constitution of The Bangladesh Awami League, available at http://www.albd.org  
109 Constitution of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), available at http://www.bnpbd.com  
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is always trying to control the standing committee”, the government had the opportunity to do 
this, as he added “because the majority members of the standing committees are from the 
government party so the government make sure that they do not dig out any irregularities of 
the government.” 110    
 
The MPs of smaller parties were also loyal to their party chiefs. The legislators of the JP were 
absolutely dependent upon the decisions of the party chief, Gen. H.H. Ershad. They could not 
go against his decision in the committee process. The constitutions of the major political 
parties make it mandatory for their MPs to be loyal to their party leaders or executive 
committee. Therefore the MPs cannot go against their party policy. The JIB is an exception in 
this regard. Its party chief is elected from amongst party members and he is accountable to 
the party members.  
 
Article 70 of the Bangladesh Constitution is another instrument which makes mandatory for 
the parliamentary members to be loyal to their parties. The Bangladesh Constitution specifies 
in Article 70 that the members of all parliamentary parties should be loyal to their own 
parties. Article 70(1) of the Constitution entrusts that " a person elected as a member of 
Parliament at an election at which s/he was nominated as a candidate by a political party shall 
vacate his/her seat if s/he resigns from that party or votes in Parliament against the party". 
The provision of this Article can be used the party chief to expel a member from the party if 
s/he go against or challenge party decision.   The Constitution again states in Article 70(2) 
that with regard to voting in the Parliament, any member who does not comply with the 
direction of the leadership so determined shall be deemed to have voted against that party. 
This Article does not allow the legislators to go against party policy in the parliamentary 
process. So the committee members were obliged to cast vote in the committees according to 
party line. Some parliamentarians argue that the Article 70 of the Constitution is an 
impediment for the members of the parliament; it curbs the democratic rights of the members 
of the parliament. A prominent parliamentarian argues that Article 70 alone is responsible for 
instilling autocratic attitude in party chiefs.  An MP cannot even speak in the parliament 
without the endorsement of his party leaders. Any obstruction or objection will lead to the 
loss of seat of a member. He argued that Article 70 can be explained in a manner that suits 
the party leader.111 There is another argument that Article 70 is the strongest safeguard for 
                                                 
110 The Daily Star, Dhaka, March 24, 2006. 
111 Major (retd.) Mohd. Akhtaruzaman, “Keeping MPs under the Thumb”, the daily Star, 14th Anniversary 
Special Issue, Dahaka, January 14, 2005.  
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stability of the government. Constitution makers framed this article after much thought to 
ensure stability and strengthen parliamentary democracy.112 Considering both argument 
academia and civil  society members have suggested to suitably amend Article 70 
incorporating the option of an MP to speak freely on any subject other sensitive defense 
matters which may be debated in camera  and members should have right to vote according to 
his conscience except when the no-confidence motion is brought against a particular 
government. In the case of ‘no-confidence’ motion the concerned member shall invariably 
vote for the party on whose ticket he was elected.113 
 
Above discussion revealed that political parties in Bangladesh though provided democratic 
principles in their constitutions regarding the selection of party leadership, these were not 
practice properly. Top brass party leaders were either appointed or nominated by the party 
chiefs from their trusted ministers and members of the parliament. Similarly parliamentary 
positions were distributed to the trusted and loyal members. The analysis presented above 
shows that personal choice, loyalty and satisfaction of the party chief played important role in 
making appointments of committee members and chairpersons and the committee members 
were tightly controlled by their party chiefs personally rather than institutional norms. 
Therefore in and outside the parliament committee members could hardly say anything about 
party policy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
112 Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad and Parliamentary Studies Institute (1999), Parliamentary Committee System, 
Conference Report, Dhaka, May 1999, p.78.  
113 Mondal, M. Abdul Latif, “Floor Crossing in the House”, the Daily Star, Dhaka: June 13, 2005. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Social Standing of  the Committee Members  
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the members of the most European 
parliaments were representatives of some small propertied groups of the society such as the 
landowners, clergymen, business elites and bureaucrats. According to Max Weber, 
parliament at that time was a place of Honoratioren (notable persons). The parliament 
members were amateurs in politics and their social status was not defined by their political 
role. As he put it, they lived “for politics” not “off politics”.1 After the turn of the century, 
most of the political scientists have expounded the idea that parliament requires skilled and 
experienced members who can give full time attention and are capable of working in a 
complex environment. Since then, political parties appeared as exclusive channels of 
parliamentary recruitment. In the developed democracies majority of the parliamentarians 
turn out to be professional politicians. The parliamentary nominations are usually distributed 
on the basis of qualifications like length of political career, devotion to the party, academic 
qualification, resource capacity, and attachment with intra party organizations, quota for 
women, and specialization on subject matter or experience. After the parliamentary elections 
legislators are appointed to different parliamentary committees as chairperson and members 
according to their seniority, experience and expertise. Besides these, constituency’s interest 
and member’s interest or desires are also taken into consideration.2 Keeping these 
characteristics in view the present chapter explains the social standing of the committee 
members of the Bangladesh parliament.  
5.1 Occupational Background  
 
Occupation is one of the important sociological criteria to distinguish between the members 
because every occupation has different implication to one’s political socialization. Although 
all committees are equally important, Thomas Stratmann and Martin Baur classified 
                                                 
1 Weber, Max (1918), “Politics as a Vocation”, speech delivered at Munich University, in 1918, available at 
www2.pfeiffer.edu/~Iridemer/DSS/INDEX.HTML. 
2 Stratmann, Thomas and Baur, Martin (2002), “Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German 
Bundestag: How incentives to pork barrel differ across electoral systems”, American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 46, No.3, July 2002; Kaak, Heino (1990), “The Social Composition of the Bundestag’’, Uwe 
Thasen, Roger H. Davidson, Robert Gerald Livingstone (ed.), op. cit., pp.133-4; Frankland, E. Gene (May 
1977), “Parliamentary Career Achievement in Britain and West Germany: A Comparative Analysis”, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.2, No.2 , pp.137-154. 
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parliamentary committees into two types’ based on legislators preference: party committees 
and non-distributive committees.  The committees through which funds can be channeled to 
the home district are referred as ‘party Committees’, for example, the Agricultural 
Committee, Communication Committee, Social-Welfare Committee and etc. On the other 
hand, there are some committees in which legislators cannot engage in resource distribution 
politics are identified as ‘non-distributive’ committees. These committees help members to 
spread their reputation nationwide. The Petitions Committee, the PAC and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee are the example of ‘non-distributive’ committees.  
 
The members of the Bangladesh parliament had different likings to secure a committee 
assignment. Among the departmentally related standing committees the Defense Committee, 
the Legal, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and 
the Education Committees are referred to as prestigious committees. Among the non-
ministerial standing committees, the Business Advisory Committee and financial committees 
also fall into this group. The members who were appointed to these committees were senior 
party members. By being members of these committees they had a chance to influence 
government policies. The legislators who wanted to be reelected from their constituencies or 
wanted to secure specific benefits usually prefer those committees where they could engage 
actively in resource allocation politics. The Standing Committee on Ministry of LGERD, the 
Communication committee, the Social Welfare committee, the Relief and Rehabilitation 
committee were such examples. The backbenchers or who could not secure the blessings of 
the party chief were nominated to the less important standing committees like the Youth and 
Sports committee, the Cultural Affairs committee, the Women and Children Affairs 
committee. The members in these committees hardly influenced or provoked concerned 
ministry to dispense extra money for their constituency.  
 
Apart from the departmental standing committees, the financial committees are also 
important with regard to scrutinizing financial matters. The Public Accounts Committee, the 
Estimates Committee and the Committee on Government Undertaking are financial 
committees with well-defined subject areas. The parliamentarians who intended to flourish 
their national reputation generally preferred these committees where they had a chance to 
play an ombudsman role. The following sections analyze the professional, academic and age 
composition of members in different committees as well as their parliamentary experiences.  
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Politicians by Profession 
 
The persons who are whole heartedly devoted and dedicated to politics are called the 
professional politicians. They hold full time positions in the party and have no other 
professional involvement. The members who hold ministerial or parliamentary positions such 
as the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker, the Chief Whip and the Whip are generally politicians in 
profession. The members who work in their parties for a long time before achieving a 
political position or holding local electoral office as members of the city or local council are 
also considered professional politicians. Moreover, the housewives who join politics and take 
up political career seriously are also accounted as professional politicians. These politicians 
have long political background and experience of membership either in the city council or in 
the parliament. Heino Kaack argued that full-time performance of political functions being on 
the rising trend shows a sign of growing professionalization of politics. He observed in 
Germany, “Political positions that once were held on a part-time or honorary basis are now 
also increasingly being performed on a full-time basis.”3 Compared to the United States, 
political professionalization in Germany occurred much later, but earlier than that in most of 
the European countries.4 Similar to the German tradition, parliamentary positions in India 
were held on honorary basis until 1920. The members of the Central and Provincial 
Legislatures of India did not receive any salary until that time. The Central and Provincial 
legislatures became the focus of professional political careers in the late 1920s when 
legislative elections took place on party line.  
 
Traditionally, the Bangladesh parliament was dominated by the members who had served 
their parties for a long time and acquired experience in professional politics. But the number 
of professional politicians has been gradually declining in the JS since 1975. As demonstrated 
in Table 5.1, the rate of representation of the professional politicians declined from 12% in 
the first JS to 2% in the fifth JS. The military intervention and rise of business industrial class 
in politics weakened their positions. Since 1975 both civil-military government offered 
various incentives to enrich the wealth of the business-industrialist class who in turn used 
their wealth to capture political power and used it for their further enrichment. This 
patrimonial politics marginalized professional politicians in the parliament and in the 
committees as well. Apart from few exceptions, most of the committee members were 
                                                 
3 Kaak, Heino op. cit., p.133 
4 Borchert, Jens and Golsch, Lutz (2003), “ Germany: From: Guild of Notables” to Political Class”, in Jens 
Borchert (ed.) The Political Class in Advanced Democracies: A Comparative Handbook, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
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amateurs in politics. Among the legislators, professional politicians were mostly appointed to 
the Business Advisory Committee, the Public Accounts Committee, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the Agricultural Committee, the Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs 
Committee and the Commerce Committee with varying numbers.  
Table 5.1: Social Composition of the Members of the Jatiya Sangsad (Figure shows in %) 
 
Background  1st  JS 5th JS  7th  JS  8th  JS 
Occupational Background Businessmen & Industrialists 24 53 48 57 
 Former Army Officers - 6 6 5 
 Former Civil Servants 1 2 2 3 
 Lawyers 26 19 17 11 
 Doctors, Eng., Journalists 15 14 9 11 
 Politics 12 2 4 7 
 Landlords 18 4 7 4 
 Others 4 - 7 2 
Educational Background Postgraduate  28 38 40.25 42.38 
 Graduate  45 46 45.28 47 
 Undergraduate 27 16 10.37 10 
 Others - - 4.1 0.62 
Parliamentary Experiences No Experience 33 68 40 29 
 Experience of one JS 57 17 27 28.33 
 Experience of two JS 10 7 33 27 
 Experience of three JS - 4 - 10.33 
 Experience of four JS - 4 - 4 
 Experience of five JS - - - 1.33 
Source: Talukder Maniruzzaman, Politics and Security of Bangladesh, Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994, 
pp. 150-57, Nizam Ahmed, op cit., p.70, A S M Samsul Arefin, Election in Bangladesh (1970-2001), Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Research and Publications, 2003. Data on the eighth parliament is calculated by the author. 
 
Business and Industrial Class 
 
Since the independence of Bangladesh, according to Kochanek, the professional 
businesspersons have gradually got involved in politics resulting in their higher 
representation in the JS. It has been observed that during the military rule the business-
industrialists were promoted in political arena. Besides, political patrimonialism massive 
foreign aid also contributed in fostering the growth of the new business-industrialists as a 
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political class.5 The business-industrialist class therefore appeared as the dominating force in 
the JS. In the post -1990 parliamentary elections, major political parties gave nominations to 
a section of people, who contributed huge amount of money to get nomination without 
having any political background. It was also observed that political parties gave maximum 
emphasis on 'seat politics' and therefore people having a long political background failed to 
get party nomination because of their financial weakness.6 The parliamentarians belonging to 
the business-industrialist class intended to use their parliamentary position to advance their 
economic interests and to build up their social status and wealth. Kochanek rightly observed 
that the business-industrialist legislators spent most of their time taking care of their own 
business. They served as lobbyists largely to secure local development benefits for their 
constituencies and personal benefits from themselves.7 Similar situation was also found in a 
survey of the Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB). The TIB survey report shows 
that the members who mostly remain absent in the plenary session were the business-
industrialists. They spent most of their time taking care of their business rather than 
parliamentary activities.8 With a few exceptions, they were used to remain absent from the 
committee meetings regularly.  
 
Compared to the first JS, the representation of the business-industrialist class highly 
increased from 24 percent in the first JS to 53 percent in the fifth JS. The percentage declined 
a little in the seventh JS, 47.8% of the members of the seventh JS came from the business-
industrialist class (Table 5.1). The same trend was reflected in the committees, as shown in 
the Table 5.2., percentage of business industrialist class increased in the Standing Committee 
on Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 20% in the fifth JS to 60% in the seventh JS. Their 
percentage also gradually increased in the Standing committee on Ministry of Agriculture. 
Majority of the members of most of the standing committees including the LGERD 
committee, the Commerce committee and the Communication committee belonged to the 
business-industrialist class. Simultaneously they also occupied most of the committee chairs. 
It is worth mentioning that most of the members of different committees coming from 
military background presently belonged to the business- industrialist class.  
 
                                                 
5 Maniruzzaman, Talukder (1993), Politics and Security of Bangladesh, Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994, 
pp. 153-54, Kochanek, Stanley A (1993), Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh, Dhaka: 
University Press Limited, p.222. 
6 Karim, Rezaul (2004), “Party Nomination on Sale?”, The Daily Star, 13th Anniversary Special Issue.   
7 Kochanek, Stanley A, op. cit., p.222. 
8Ahmed, Tanvir (2005), Parliament Watch 2005, Survey Report, Dhaka: Transparency International 
Bangladesh, pp. 44-46. 
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Civil-Military Bureaucrats 
 
Like the business-industrialist legislators, civil servants and military officials also enter 
politics without political experience. The military intervention in politics in 1975 and 
onwards encouraged them to enter the political arena either after finishing their tenure or by 
resigning their profession. Over the last two decades, they also appeared as the dominating 
force in politics and their representation in the JS is continuously increasing. Statistics shows 
that in the first JS only 2 members (0.67 percent) came from the civil service but no member 
came from military background. In the fifth JS their share was increased to 8 percent (6 MPs 
from civil service and 17 from military service). Their representation rate was again increased 
in the seventh and the eighth JS.  Compared to the military professionals, the strength of the 
civil servants was comparatively low and they were scattered in different committees. On the 
contrary, the legislators with defense background were mostly appointed to the Defense 
Committee because of their experience and interest on defense issues.  
 
Other Professional Groups 
 
The representation of other professional groups such as Lawyers, doctors, engineers, 
journalists, academia and scientists continuously declined in the parliament from 41 % in 
1973 to 22% in 2001. After the end of Mujib regime, the professional groups became 
gradually marginalized in parliamentary politics. The nature of politics turned out to be 
patrimonial and it increased the rate of representation of the business-industrial class. Unlike 
the business-industrial class professional groups could not get the blessings of the party 
chiefs. As a consequence politics was engulfed by the vicious cycle of the business people in 
conjunction with ambitious partisans.  
 
Available statistics shows that the lawyers had an outstanding representation in the Standing 
Committee on Legal, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. The members who either were 
lawyers or had a higher degree in law were appointed to this committee. The lawyers were 
not appointed to the Women and Children Affairs committee, the LGED committee and the 
Defense Committee.9 The number of members from teaching profession also declined in the 
parliament. Among the teachers who represented in the parliament very few were university 
teachers and most of them were teachers of private colleges. Their teaching background was 
                                                 
9 Only in the fifth JS, two members from law background appointed to the Defense Committee but in the 
seventh and eighth JS no law professional was appointed to this committee.  
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not considered important to get membership in the education committee. For example, in the 
eighth JS, only one member with teaching background was appointed in the Standing 
Committee on Education, although six percent of the total members of the eighth parliament 
were teachers. In the seventh JS, one teacher who previously taught in the Bangladesh 
Agricultural University belonging to the opposition party was appointed as the Chairperson 
of the Agriculture committee. The members from other professions such as doctors, 
journalists, and media representatives were not appointed in the committees relevant to their 
professions. The members who were appointed in the Public Accounts Committee, the Public 
Undertakings Committee, the Government Assurance Committee and the Agricultural 
committee from various professional groups were senior party members. In many cases, 
professional groups gradually lost their strength in the parliament and professional experience 
was not recognized as a determining factor for distributing committee seats. This is also seen 
in the composition of the Education committee and the Health committee. Although the JS 
had some members belonging to teaching or medical professions but they were not appointed 
to these committees, most of the members of these committees were business-industrialist 
legislators. It is worth mentioning that since1991 business-industrials class has been investing 
capital in both the education and the health sector.  
 
It is observed that very few trade union activists, student leaders, employees of the private 
business or corporate office, workers and women were represented in the JS. Most of the 
political parties in Bangladesh have their political fronts among the students, workers and 
employees and they play important roles in national politics. But very few of them were 
represented in the parliament mainly because of their weak financial capacity. For the same 
reason they failed to find strong patrons in the party. It is also observed that few trade union 
or CBA leaders who earned enormous illegal money defeated the businesspersons in the 
competition for nomination in the parliamentary elections.  
 
5.2 Educational Background 
 
Education enables the legislators to understand and play by the rules in the legislature honing 
the arts of negotiation and representation.10 In the Western parliaments, most of the 
parliamentarians have strong academic background because higher studies or expertise on 
subject matter is one of the preconditions for securing a parliamentary mandate. More than 
                                                 
10 Maniruzzaman, Talukder (1994), Politics and Security of Bangladesh, Dhaka: University Press Limited, 
p.156. 
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half of the members of the German Bundestag have higher degrees and members with higher 
education dominate in the parliamentary working groups and committees. Gerhard 
Loewenberg found a link between educational training and parliamentary appointments. He 
showed that the members with law background are usually appointed to the Legal Affairs 
Committee and the members trained in finance or banking become members of the Finance 
Committee.11   
 
Majority of the members (85.6%) of the fifth JS were graduates while 14.4% of the members 
were undergraduates. Similarly, most of the members of the seventh and the eighth 
parliaments were college or university educated while very few of them had doctoral degree 
or undergraduate degrees. Membership to the parliamentary committees in Bangladesh was 
not necessarily linked with the educational training. Nevertheless, the usual practice was that 
the members trained in law were generally appointed to the Law, Justice and Parliamentary 
Affairs Committee and the members who were educated in the college or university were sent 
to important committees like PAC or the PEC. Less educated members were rarely appointed 
to the Foreign Affairs or the Defense committees. Most of the members of the Defense 
Committee were graduates from the Military Academy.   
 
5.3 Age and Seniority  
 
Age is not always considered an important factor when committee seats are distributed, but 
some experts like Kalus von Beyme, Lowenberg and Heino Kaack considered age and 
seniority as one of the vital factors that can influence committee performance. They argued 
that aged committee members with their long legislative experience can contribute more and 
can influence committee performances considerably.12 There is an argument that a young 
legislator can be a firebrand but the middle-aged legislator can be more mature and 
thoughtful in much the same way as an elderly legislator can bring his/her accumulated 
experience to bear on the legislature’s proceedings.13 The older members who are involved in 
politics for a long time have good opportunities to use their experiences in the functioning of 
the committees. On the other hand, newcomers serve the committees as parliamentary 
apprentices. 
                                                 
11 Loewenberg, Gerhard (1966), Parliament in the German Political System, Intheka: Cornel University Press, 
1966, pp.106-7.  
12Beyme,  Kalus von ( Die Politische Elite in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Munich: Piper,p.98 &112; 
Lowenberg,Gerhard op. cit., p.130,432-36; Kaack, Heino  op.cit., p.136-7. 
13Maniruzzaman, Talukder op. cit., p. 156 
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Table 5.4 shows that the members of the JS belonging to the age group under 36 years were 
not very large (8 % in 1991). It was found that 38 percent of the members belonged to the age 
group 36 to 45 and 34 percent of the members belonged to the age group 46 to 55. Similar 
trend was found in the committees. The newcomers who were members of the fifteen 
different standing committees mostly became members of the JS at the age of 40 and above 
while only few of them were below 35 years. Only a small group entered JS just after 
finishing their academic career and it is found that they were engaged in student politics. But 
a larger group became parliamentarians after completing long professional careers in the civil 
service or military service or other services. The members who came from the business-
industrialist class joined formal politics at least three to seven years before becoming 
parliamentarians. It is a fact that the majority of the members of different standing 
committees belonged to the age group of 46 to 55 years. Only a few committees were 
dominated by the members belonging to the age group of 56 and above. For example, the 
majority of the members of the PAC and the Foreign Affairs committee belonged to the age 
group of 56 and above. They had served in the JS either for three to five terms or held 
important party positions at the regional or district levels for a long time before being 
representatives in the JS. 
 
5.4 Party Experience 
 
Though long party experience is not a guarantee to obtain a better position in the parliament 
such as chairperson or members of important committees, senior party members who are 
elected to the parliament usually get such appointment. It has been observed that in the 
developed democracies party leaders and senior legislators are generally appointed in the 
important committees while newcomers have less chance to sit there.14 In case of the 
Bangladesh parliament, the members who were formally attached with the party for a long 
time and hold positions in the party organization had more chance to be appointed to 
important committees such as the Foreign Affairs committee, the Defense committee, the 
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs committee, the Business Advisory Committee and the 
financial committees. In the post-1990 parliaments, among the legislators who were senior 
party members and held important positions in their parties were appointed to the above-
                                                 
14 Patzelt, Werner (1997), “German MPS and Their Roles,” Journal of Legislative Studies, 3:1, Spring 79-90; 
Lowenberg, Gerhard (1966), op. cit., pp.192-3. 
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mentioned committees. On the contrary, newcomers were appointed to the less important 
committees such the Sports and Youth committee, the Cultural and Media Affairs committee, 
and the Religious Affairs committee. It is observed that the members who had strong 
patronization in the party were appointed to the important committees. It is interesting to see 
that about 12% of the members of the eighth JS had changed their party loyalty before the JS 
election for getting better position in the government or the parliament.  
 
Experiences show that the legislators who were businessmen/industrialists or retired civil 
military bureaucrats joined political parties five years before becoming members of the JS. 
They formally got involved in party politics with the intention of getting nomination to the JS 
election. It became so easy because nomination procedures were mostly controlled by the 
party chief rather than by the party caucus. A small group of members who served their 
parties actively for 20 to 35 years were nominated to those standing committees which played 
the role of ombudsman like the Business Advisory Committee, the Public Accounts 
Committee and the Petitions Committee. The members who were potentially ministerial 
candidates were nominated for committee chairs while senior leaders from the opposition 
parties got only membership but no chairpersonship in the committees.15    
 
5.5 Parliamentary Experience  
 
Individual members who are reelected have opportunity to develop his/her knowledge on a 
particular committee. The American and the German parliamentary practices show that 
among the experienced or reelected members who desire to stay in the same committee 
usually are nominated there and others are usually moved to important committees for 
making their contributions towards better public policy.16 Generally, the newcomers are 
appointed to the less important committees. But those who have achieved prominence in the 
party organization, or have powerful patrons or have skills are appointed to important 
committees from the beginning of their parliamentary career.17 Although experiences and 
knowledge are indeed important for getting position in some particular committees, 
                                                 
15 Only exception was happened in the 7th JS, one member from the JP was nominated as chairman to the 
Committee on Agricultural, named T.I.M. Fazlay Rabbie.   
16 Keefe,William J., ‘The Functions of the State Legislature’, in Alexander Heard, ed., State Legislatures in 
American Politics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall; Lockard, Duane, “The State Legislator, in Alexander 
Heard (ed.), op. cit.; Broder, David (1982), “The Legislators and the Lobbyists”, San Francisco Chronicle, 
August 2, 1982, quoted from Peverill Squire (1988), ‘Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in 
Legislatures”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XIII, No.1, February 1988, Lowenberg , Gerhard (1966) , 
op. cit., p.195.  
17 Lowenberg , Gerhard (1966) , op. cit., p.195. 
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sometimes loyalty appears as an important factor. It is observed in the Bangladesh Parliament 
that the newcomers who had strong patron in the party had opportunity to choose generally 
prefer important committees, which might help them to advance their political career. But the 
recent World Bank study shows that in the absence of experience in parliamentary practice 
most of the MPs failed to participate knowledgeably in the committee activities.18 
  
Statistics reveals that in post-1990 parliaments most of the parliamentarians were newcomers 
while only 33.4% members of the seventh JS had experience of more than one JS, which was 
13.9% in the fifth JS. Though turnout rate increased in the seventh JS and percentage of 
newcomers declined from 58.8% in the fifth to 39.95% in the seventh JS, they were still 
majority in the eighth JS. According to parliamentary experience, newcomers can be 
distinguished into two groups - one group entered into JS with a short political career while 
another group either served their parties for a long time, or served in the city or local council. 
It is observed that the members, who were re-elected for three or more times, dominated in 
the important oversight committees such as the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Agricultural 
Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. About 20 percent of the members both from 
the treasury and opposition bench were appointed in the less important committees such as 
the Sports Committee, the Women and Children Affairs Committee.   
 
The patterns of mobility of chairpersons or members of the different committees indicate that 
either the members were not interested to stay longer in the committees where they were first 
appointed or the party leaders did not consider their previous experience. Among the 
members of the seventh and the eighth JS representing in the standing committees both from 
the opposition and the treasury bench moved to new committees. About 47% of the members 
of different 15 standing committees were reelected from the seventh to the eighth JS. Among 
them 65.8 percent of the members moved to new committees. During these periods, changes 
in government also brought changes in the committee leadership. For example, during the 
tenure of fifth JS all committee chairs were occupied by the BNP legislators. When the AL 
came to power in 1996, the committee chairs again were distributed to the AL members 
except one position, which was offered to the second opposition party. Consequently, all 
chair positions were occupied by the ruling BNP members in the eighth JS. Due to the 
absence of proportional representation method, the committee leaders cannot stay longer in 
the same committee in the same position unless his/her party comes to power again. Thus the 
                                                 
18 World Bank, Bangladesh: Government That Works,p.52  
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career patterns of committee members in the JS are less stable than those in the established 
democracies. In the developed countries members mostly stay longer in the same committee 
and sometimes with the same position. While in the Bangladesh parliament, very few 
chairpersons could stay in the same committees for the next term as member.  
 
5.6 Status of Different Committees 
 
Although, in principle, all committees are equal in impertinence and status, few of them are 
often referred to as more important and prestigious. Such internal hierarchy makes a 
difference between different committees. Accordingly, the members who sit in the important 
watchdog committees as chairpersons were senior and experienced members of the parties 
while back benchers were appointed to the less important committees. The committee 
chairpersons have generally built their career serving for a long time in their parties and 
finally becoming central parliamentary policy makers. In the developed democracies, either 
promising politicians of the party who wish to be promoted in a higher political position or 
senior leader of the party who previously held important positions in the parliament or in the 
government are appointed the chairpersons. With the example of the German parliamentary 
system, Klaus von Beyme noted that top politicians of the party, particularly from 
oppositions sit in the important committees while government party loses some top personnel 
to the executive.19 Unlike the American or the German practice, until the seventh JS, Minister 
sat in the respective ministerial committee as the chairperson. The practice of making 
minister chairperson of the ministerial standing committee was changed in the seventh JS. An 
amendment was brought in the ROP to restrict the Minster or State Minister to be nominated 
as a chairperson to any of the committees but they can be appointed to any committee as 
members. Since the seventh JS, the members who were potential ministers were nominated to 
the important committees as chairpersons. Former Ministers were also appointed as 
committee chairperson. Under the provisions of the ROP, the Speaker him/herself acts as a 
chairperson in two non-ministerial standing committees. Due to absence of proportional 
representation opposition members did not get sit in any committee chair. The mobility 
pattern of committee members returning from the seventh to the eighth JS is shown in the 
Table 5.6. 
 
                                                 
19 Klaus von Beyme, The Legislator: German Parliament as a Centre of Political Decision-Making, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1998, p.41. 
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5.7 Women in the Jatiya Sangsad and the Committees  
 
The actual role and position of women parliamentarians depend on a number of variables, 
like the political context in which the assembly functions, party system and policies on 
women’s issues, the type and number of women who are in the parliament. To promote 
women’s participation in parliamentary politics, by constitutional provision 15 seats were 
reserved for women in the first JS in addition to the three hundred regular seats. It was 
increased to 30 in the Second JS and continued to be so until the seventh JS. The eighth JS 
increased reserved seats for women to 45 by the 14th constitutional amendment. It is observed 
that excluding the reserved seats no women were elected from the general seats in the first 
and the second JS. For the first time two women candidates were returned from the general 
seats in the third JS and their number increased to 9 in the Fourth JS.  Between the fifth and 
the eighth JS the number of elected female MPs fluctuated from 5 to 7. Excluding the 
reserved seats number of women MPs elected from the general seats was low compared to 
their male colleagues. Most of them were elected from the general seats after the death of 
their husbands. The housewives who entered the political field with the patronization of their 
husbands or any other relative were mostly nominated for reserved women seats. They used 
their social links rather than personal political experience or activities. It has been observed 
that women contestants in electoral politics depended on men for money and support to get 
access to public political space.20   
  
Women’s status within the party structure is important to obtain nomination for contesting in 
the JS election and for getting position in the desired committee because political party is the 
exclusive channel of parliamentary recruitment. With a few exceptions, party positions are 
mostly occupied by the male members. The AL and the BNP have been headed by two 
female leaders who achieved these positions for their familial connections with the two 
charismatic leaders. The AL chairperson Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the former Prime Minister and the Chief of AL, similarly the BNP chairperson 
Begum Khaleda Zia, wife of Ziaur Rahman (former President of Bangladesh and founder of 
the BNP) came to her present position by using her family connection. Two of them have 
been promoted to the position of the party chief as dynastic successors. Similarly, the Jatiya 
party leadership has also assumed a tendency towards establishing dynasty. Thus the women 
                                                 
20 Hassanuzaman , Al Masud and Hussain, Naseem A. (1998), “Women in the Legislature in Bangladesh”, 
Asian Studies, No.17, p. 80. 
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who are successors of their father or husband are promoted to party leadership. It has been 
observed that women’s reserved seats in the parliament were usually captured by female 
candidates with familial connections with the male leaders.21 Excluding the reserved seats, 
women were underrepresented in the parliament. They were marginalized in party leadership. 
No women quota was reserved in the parties. The result is that women members who 
contested in the general seats or were selected for the reserve women’s seats, with few 
exceptions were not drawn from the ranks and files of the party. The studies show that most 
of them (65.8% in the fifth JS and 62.2% in the seventh JS) had no previous experience on 
parliamentary politics.22 
 
It seems that once the women enter the parliament, they enter a male domain as parliamentary 
positions are mostly occupied by the male members. Records reveal that no female 
parliamentarian was elected to the chair of the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker of the JS; even 
they did not hold the position of the Whip. The JS is traditionally male dominated and 
therefore women were marginalized in the committees. The female legislators were not 
appointed as members to some important committees, such as the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
the Agricultural Committee, the Defense Committee or the Law, Justice and Parliamentary 
Affairs Committee. They were mostly appointed to the less important standing committees, 
for example, the Women and Children Affairs committee, the Cultural Affairs committee. 
These committees were treated as feminine and proper place for the female parliamentarians. 
None of the women legislators was appointed to any financial committee or Petitions 
Committee or Government Assurances Committee. In the fifth JS, only two women 
legislators chaired two committees as Ministers of the concerned ministries. While in the 
seventh and the eighth JS no female member obtained any committee chair. However, there 
were several women members who had the competence to become chairpersons. Women 
members were treated more as women than the parliamentarians. In these circumstances, the 
women legislators had little scope for obtaining vital experience in the committee system.  
 
As discussed above, women parliamentarians remained significantly under-represented and 
male dominated in the JS and its committees because of the political context in which 
parliament works. The nomination process and the electoral principle of reserved seats for 
women make women’s participation in the legislature dependent on the patrons of the male 
                                                 
21 Jahan, Rounaq (2005), “Dynastic Leadership of Political Parties, the Daily Star, 14th Anniversary Special 
Issue, January 14, 2005. 
22 Hassanuzaman , Al Masud and Hussain, Naseem A., op. cit., p. 83. 
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elites of the party in power. They hide incapacities as legislators behind the wholehearted 
support for male patronage. This only accentuates women’s dependence and subordination in 
the political sphere.23  The female parliamentarians mainly served the purpose of gender 
biased political parties by being a `vote bank'. These are reinforcing male domination within 
the legislature. 24  
 
The system of reservation of seats for women in the parliament gives undue power to the 
government. On the other hand, it makes the female parliamentarians vulnerable as they have 
no permanent constituency and there is no assurance that they will be reelected. As women 
MPs in reserved seats have not gone through a competitive election process, they are taken 
less seriously by their directly elected colleagues who feel to be superior as ‘guardians’ of 
women MPs in the parliament. For example, women MPs were often told by male MPs that 
they were selected and not directly elected and thus they indirectly reminded them of their 
vulnerable position.25 
 
Though, directly elected women members had higher status in legislature and they were 
qualified and experienced. They did not seem to have extra attention for women’s agenda and 
apparently, they did not show their interests to educate female members coming from 
reserved seats. It is observed that the women parliamentarians had lacked in experience and 
knowledge for effectively participating in parliamentary affairs. They took more time in 
understanding the functions of the legislature and learning the procedures through which 
committees work. Inside the parliament and the committees, women were not found to be 
organized against the “feminization” of legislation and other policy outputs. Beyond party 
line, women parliamentarians did not establish any instance to come together for putting their 
issues on agenda for making woman-friendly or gender-sensitive legislation. It is worth 
mentioning that women's issues were not put on the agenda with priority and thereby women 
issues were given less priority in the standing committees.  
 
Women parliamentarians particularly those elected from the reserved seats were neglected by 
their male colleagues. A woman parliamentarian coming from reserved seats reported, “We 
                                                 
23 Rahaman, Z and Kamal, A (1991), “Accountable Administration and Sustainable Democracy” in R. Sobhan. 
(ed.) The Decade of Stagnation. Dhaka: UPL, 1991.  
24 Hassanuzaman, Al Masud and Hussain, Naseem A., op. cit., p. 80. 
25 Bhuiyan, Rbia (1999), “The Representation of Women’s Issues in the Parliamentary Committee System”, in  
Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad and Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Parliamentary Committee System, 
Conference Report, Dhaka, 1999, p.221.  
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were nothing but bonus of our male colleagues”.26 Joni Lovenduski and Azza Karam describe 
this situation as “institutional masculinity”. They argued that male-dominated organizations 
reflect certain male biases, the precise kind varying by country and culture. Until recently, 
this “institutional masculinity” has been an invisible characteristic of legislatures; it was 
embedded, pervasive and taken for granted. Only recently legislatures' masculine biases have 
come under scrutiny.27  
 
The political role of women in the legislature became a public issue in Bangladesh since 
1990. The donor agencies, the NGOs, the civil society and the academia raised the demand 
for making parliament more “woman-friendly”. They propagate for bringing reforms in the 
political parties and to amend the constitution in order to bring more women to legislature by 
direct election. As two major political parties are headed by female leaders, they could use 
their power for improving political opportunities for women. They could also develop new 
legislation and institutions to benefit women. But no such initiative is observed. 
 
                                                 
26 Firoj, Jalal, Women in the Fifth and Seventh parliaments of Bangladesh: A Study on Opinion of Women 
Members of Parliament, A Study Report, funded by USAID, Dhaka, p.27.  
27  L o v e n d u s k I, J o n i   a n d K a r a m, A z z a (2002),  “Women in Parliament: Making a Difference”, International 
IDEA, Stockholm, available at http://www.idea.int 
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Table: 5.2 Party Representation in the Standing Committees (selected) 
Fifth Jatiya Sangsad Seventh Jatiya Sangsad Eighth Jatiya Sangsad Standing Committee on 
 
Govt. Main 
Opp 
Others Govt. Main 
Opp 
Others Govt. Main 
Opp 
Others 
Ministerial Standing 
Committees on 
         
Foreign Affairs 70% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
80% 
 
20% 
 
0 
Defense 60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
80% 
 
20% 
 
0 
Law, Justice and Parliamentary 
Affairs 
 
70% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
80% 
 
20% 
 
0 
LGED 60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
70% 20% 
 
10% 
 
Agriculture 60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
Relief and Rehabilitations 60% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
Commerce 60% 30% 10% 60% 
 
40% 
 
0 70% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
Communication 
 
60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
80% 
 
20% 
 
0 
Women and Children Affairs 80% 10% 10% 60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
70% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
Youth and Sports 50% 40% 10% 60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
80% 
 
20% 
 
0 
Social Welfare 50% 40% 10% 60% 30% 10% 70% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
Cultural Affairs 
 
70% 20% 10% 60% 30% 10% 60% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
Financial Committees          
PAC 53.3
% 
26.7
% 
20% 60% 33.3% 6.6% 66.7% 20% 13.3% 
 
PUC 60% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
50% 
 
30% 
 
20% 
 
70% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
PEC 60% 
 
30% 
 
10% 
 
60% 30% 
 
10% 
 
60% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
Investigative Committee          
Petitions Committee 
 
80% 20% 0 60% 40% 0 60% 40% 0 
Scrutinizing Committee          
Committee on Government 
Assurances 
50% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
50% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
30% 
 
20% 
 
30% 
 
Source: Compiled by the Researcher from the information materials provided by the Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad 
Secretariat, Dhaka.  
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Table 5.3 Social Compositions of the Standing Committee Members (selected) 
Standing  
Committee 
on 
Jatiya 
Sangsad 
Business/ 
Industrialists 
Politicians Lawyers Profession
als 
Army 
Officer
s 
Civil 
Servants 
Others Total 
5th  6 0 1 2 0 0 1 10 
7th 4 1 2 0 1 2 0 10 
Government 
Undertakings 
8th  6 0 2 1 1 0 0 10 
5th  7 2 2 3 0 0 1 15 
7th 7 0 1 2 2 2 1 15 
Public 
Accounts 
Committee  8th  8 0 2 2 1 2 0 15 
5th  2 1 1 2 2 0 2 10 
7th 5 0 0 3 1 1 0 10 
Estimates 
Committee 
8th  6 0 0 3 0 1 0 10 
5th  2 1 2 1 0 0 2 8 
7th 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 8 
Government 
Assurances 
8th  6 0 0 2 0 0 0 8 
5th  2 2 2 2 1 0 1 10 
7th 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 10 
Pubic Petitions  
8th  3 0 6 1 0 0 0 10 
5th  2 4 2 0 2 0 0 10 
7th 3 4 2 0 1 0 0 10 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
8th  6 0 2 0 2 0 0 10 
5th  2 1 2 0 5 0 0 10 
7th 3 2 0 0 5 0 0 10 
Ministry of 
Defense 
8th  0 1 0 0 8 1 0 10 
5th  1 0 9 0 0 0 0 10 
7th 0 1 9 0 0 0 0 10 
Law, Justice & 
Parliamentary 
Affairs 8th  2 2 6 0 0 0 0 10 
5th  5 1 2 0 0 0 2 10 
7th 0 1 4 3 0 0 2 10 
Ministry of 
LGERD 
8th  5 3 0 1 1 0 0 10 
5th  3 1 0 3 1 0 2 10 
7th 4 3 0 1 0 0 2 10 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
8th  6 1 0 1 0 2 0 10 
5th  4 3 1 0 0 0 2 10 
7th 6 2 0 0 0 0 2 10 
Ministry of 
Relief and 
Rehabilitations 8th  9 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 
5th  4 1 1 0 0 2 2 10 
7th 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 10 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
8th  8 0 0 1 1 0 0 10 
5th  5 0 3 0 1 0 1 10 
7th 5 0 2 1 0 0 2 10 
Ministry of 
Communication 
8th  6 0 3 1 0 0 0 10 
5th  2 3 1   1 3 10 
7th 2 1 0 6 0 0 1 10 
Ministry of 
Women and 
Children 
Affairs 
8th  5 1 0 2 0 0 2 10 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on interview questioners and the Biography of Members of the 
Eighth Parliament (in Bengali), Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, Dhaka, April 2005. 
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   Table 5.4 Educational Background of the Standing Committee Members (selected) 
Name of the Committees JS Doctoral 
Degree 
Post 
Graduate 
Graduate Under 
graduate 
Total 
5th  1 3 2 4 10 
7th 0 6 4 0 10 
Committee on Government 
Undertakings 
8th  0 6 4 0 10 
5th  0 10 5 0 15 
7th 0 8 7 0 15 
Public Accounts Committee 
(15 members) 
8th  0 7 8 0 15 
5th  1 2 7 0 10 
7th 1 6 3 0 10 
Committee on 
Estimates 
8th  1 3 6 0 10 
5th  0 3 5 0 8 
7th 0 3 5 0 0 
Committee on Government 
Assurances 
8th  0 2 4 2 0 
5th  0 3 5 2 10 
7th 0 3 7 0 10 
Committee on Pubic Petitions  
8th  0 3 7 0 10 
5th  0 5 5 0 10 
7th 0 2 7 1 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
8th  0 5 5 0 10 
5th  0 2 6 2 10 
7th 0 1 8 1 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Defense 
 8th  0 4 5 1 10 
5th 0 5 5 0 10 
7th 0 3 7 0 10 
Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Parliamentary Affairs 
8th  0 6 4 0 10 
5th  0 3 5 2 10 
7th 0 6 4 0 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
LGERD 
8th  0 5 5 0 10 
5th  0 2 6 2 10 
7th 1 3 4 2 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Agriculture 
8th  1 5 4 0 10 
5th  0 2 5 3 10 
7th 0 3 6 1 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Relief and Rehabilitations 
8th  0 4 6 0 10 
5th   4 3 3 10 
7th 0 3 7 0 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Commerce 
8th  0 5 3 2 10 
5th  0 1 5 4 10 
7th 0 3 6 1 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Communication 
8th  0 4 5 1 10 
5th  0 4 5 1 10 
7th 0 3 6 0 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Youth and Sports 
 8th  0 6 4 0 10 
5th  0 2 5 3 10 
7th 0 6 4 0 10 
Standing Committee on Ministry of 
Women and Children Affairs 
8th  0 3 4 3 10 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on interview questioners and the Biography of Members of the 
Eighth Parliament (in Bengali), Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, Dhaka, April 2005. 
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Table 5.5 Age Background of the Standing Committee Members (selected) 
Committee On JS 20 – 30Years 31 – 35Years 36 – 45Years 46 – 55Years 56 – Years Total 
5th 0 0 2 4 4 10 
7th 0 0 2 2 6 10 
PUC 
8th 0 1 3 4 2 10 
5th 0 0 1 12 2 15 
7th 0 0 2 6 7 15 
PAC 
(15 members) 
8th 0 1 4 7 3 15 
5th 0 0 2 5 3 10 
7th 0 0 2 4 4 10 
PEC 
8th 0 0 1 5 4 10 
5th 0 0 2 5 2 10 
7th 0 1 1 4 2 10 
Government 
Assurances 
8th 0 0 4 0 6 10 
5th 0 0 1 3 6 10 
7th 0 0 2 4 4 10 
Pubic Petitions 
8th 0 1 2 2 5 10 
5th 0 0 1 7 2 10 
7th 0 0 2 2 6 10 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
8th 0 0 1 6 3 10 
5th 0 0 3 5 2 10 
7th 0 1 2 5 2 10 
Ministry of 
Defense 
8th 0 0 0 4 6 10 
5th 0 0 2 5 3 10 
7th 0 1 1 4 4 10 
Ministry of 
Legal & Par. 
Affairs 8th 0 0 1 4 5 10 
5th 0 0 3 6 1 10 
7th 0 0 3 4 2 10 
Ministry of 
LGED 
8th 0 0 1 6 3 10 
5th 0 0 5 3 2 10 
7th 0 1 2 2 5 10 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
8th 0 0 2 6 2 10 
5th 0 1 4 5 0 10 
7th 0 0 3 4 3 10 
Ministry of 
Relief & 
Rehabilitations 8th 0 2 2 3 3 10 
5th 0 0 3 4 3 10 
7th 0 0 1 8 1 10 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
8th 0 0 0 5 5 10 
5th 0 0 5 4 1 10 
7th 0 2 3 5 0 10 
Ministry of 
Communication 
8th 1 0 3 4 2 10 
5th 0 2 4 4 0 10 
7th 0 2 1 4 3 10 
Ministry of 
Youth & Sports 
 8th 0 1 5 2 2 10 
5th 0 0 4 1 5 10 
7th 0 0 5 4 1 10 
Ministry of 
Women & 
Children Affairs 8th 0 1 0 4 5 10 
    
Source: Calculated by the Researcher from Biography of Members of the Eighth Parliament (in Bengali),   
Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, Dhaka, April 2005. 
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Table 5.6: Return of the standing committee (selected) members from the 7th JS to the 8th JS 
Committees Committee 
Size 
No. of members 
re-elected in the  
 eighth JS 
 
No. of members 
appointed  in the 
same committee 
 
No. of members 
moved to other 
committees in the 
eighth JS  
No. of members 
appointed to  
Executive/parliam
entary Position 
Public Undertaking 
Committee 
10 4 1 3 2 
 
Public Accounts Committee  15 8 2 6 4 
 
Estimates Committee 
 
10 1 1 - - 
Government Assurances 
Committee 
8 5 0 5 1 
Petitions Committee 
 
10 7 1 6 1(Speaker) 
Foreign Affairs 10 5 2 3 3 
 
Defense Committee 10 7 1 6 2 
 
Committee on Legal Affairs 
& Parliamentary Affairs 
10 4 2 2 1 (Speaker) 
LGERD Committee 
 
10 7 1 6 
 
1 
Agriculture Committee 
 
10 2 0 2 0 
Relief & Rehabilitations 
Committee 10 5 0 5 
 
0 
Commerce Committee 
 
10 5 0 5 
 
1 
(Deputy Speaker) 
Communication Committee 
 
10 4 1 3 1 
Youth and Sports Committee 10 2 0 2 
 
1  (Minister ) 
Women & Children Affairs 
Committee 10 3 3 
 
0 0 
Total 153 38 13(34.2%) 25 
(65.8%) 
14 (Ministers) 
2(speaker, deputy 
speaker) 
   Source: calculated by the researcher from the proceedings of the JS (1996-2002). 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
Parliamentary Support Services 
 
The growth and complexity of government activities lead to a greater expansion in the 
volume of parliamentary activities. For handling huge volume of legislative works, in modern 
democracies, parliament delegates tasks to particular bodies, usually committees.1 Legislative 
committees perform a broad range of functions and in doing so they require adequate staff 
and other facilities. It is generally argued that the quality and quantity of committee staff tend 
to reflect the relative importance of the committee system to the legislative institution. Where 
the committees are of central importance, these are replete with qualified professional staff. 
On the other hand, legislatures where committees are less consequential, there are few staff 
assigned for committees and they largely perform administrative functions.2 From this point 
of view, this chapter attempts to analyze structure and functions of the Bangladesh Jatiya 
Sangsad Secretariat, and also focuses on research and other facilities available for the 
parliamentary committees.   
 
6.1 Nature of Parliamentary Support Services 
  
Factors indicative of support services are broadly of three types: staff facilities, institutional 
facilities and financial facilities. Again the staff that are working in the parliament can be 
categorized into two types:  parliamentary staff in general and committee staff in particular. 
The parliamentary staff assist the parliament in general while the committee staff are in 
particular responsible for committee’s works. Their responsibility is different from that of the 
other parliamentary staff. The committee staff with their organizational and substantive skills 
assist the committee members at various levels of committees’ activities.3  They prepare the 
paper works associated with legislating, investigating and overseeing purposes. After the 
meeting, they also prepare the draft report for the committee.4 They maintain contact with the 
ministries and other concerned agencies for supplying information to their committee 
members and in turn to the relevant ministry. The committee staff are better informed about 
                                                 
1 Norton, Philip (1998), op. cit., p.143. 
2 Benda, Susan (1997), op. cit., p.16.  
3 Summarized from discussion of various participant in the workshop on “the Role of Committees in an 
Effective Legislature”, organized by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, in 1997.  
4 Lees, John D. “Committees in the United States Congress”, in John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw (eds.), op. cit., 
pp.43-49. Smith, Steven S. and Deering, Christopher J. (1990), Committees in Congress, Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, pp. 148-49.   
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committees than other parliamentary staff. Other than committee staff, research assistants, 
library staff and legal officers also work for the committees from time to time. Adequate 
office rooms with modern equipments are also considered to be important factors that fall 
into the category of institutional facilities. The pay and allowances for committee members, 
allowances for experts or persons who provide information in the committee hearing and 
office management costs fall into the category of financial facilities.  
 
6.2 Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat: Legal Basis and Structures   
 
Article 79 of the Bangladesh Constitution guarantees establishment of a separate secretariat 
for the Bangladesh JS. Article 79 says: “(i) Parliament shall have its own Secretariat.  (ii) 
Parliament may, by law, regulate the recruitment and conditions of the service of persons 
appointed to the secretariat of the Parliament. (iii) Until provision is made by the Parliament 
the President may, after consultation with the Speaker, make rules regulating the recruitment 
and conditions of service of persons appointed to the secretariat of the Parliament, and rules 
so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any law.”5 The first section of the 
Article uses the word “own” to mean that the parliament secretariat shall be independent in 
all matters. The second section empowers the JS in making laws for regulating the 
recruitment and conditions of service. Until the formulization of such laws the recruitment 
and service conditions were regulated by the law made by the president. It is observed that 
the parliament did not frame any law for the establishment of an independent parliament 
secretariat until 1994. However, the parliament secretariat existed since the beginning of the 
first JS. During the period of the fifth JS, the parliament has initiated and passed “Parliament 
Secretariat Act, 1994”. Some of the major features of this Act are as follows6:  
 
1. The Parliament Secretariat is not under the administrative control of any ministry, 
department or office of the Government;  
2. The administrative responsibility for the Parliament Secretariat is entrusted to the Speaker 
and he/she discharges his/her responsibility either him/herself or shall impose it on an 
officer determined by rule. The Speaker is accountable to the JS in respect of all activities 
of the Parliament Secretariat; 
                                                 
5 Government of Bangladesh, The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka: the Ministry of 
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, as modified up to 2006.  
6 Government of Bangladesh, “The Parliament Secretariat Act, 1994”, Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, May 
18, 1994.  
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3. The Parliament Secretariat shall be constituted with officers and staff who shall be 
recruited according to the Parliament Secretariat Officers and Employees Recruitment 
Rules, 1982, until the rules have been made;  
4. The Speaker is finally responsible to approve the budget of the Parliament Secretariat 
with the advice of the Parliament Secretariat Commission before forwarding it to the 
Ministry of Finance for its incorporation in the annual financial statement of the 
government;  
5. The Parliament Secretariat Act (PSA) has constituted the Parliament Secretariat 
Commission, which can determine its own procedure. The commission is consisted of the 
five members, the Speaker, as its Chairman; the Prime Minister, the Leader of the 
Opposition, the Minister in charge of the Ministry or Department of Parliamentary 
Affairs, the Minister of Finance. The Act also provides that any Member of this 
commission can appoint an MP to represent him/her in the commission. The Parliament 
Secretary Commission has advisory function with regard to the determination, diminution 
and increase of the number of officers and employees of the Parliament Secretariat and on 
the preparation of the annual budget of the Secretariat and the expenditure of the budget 
appropriations; 
6. The PSA defines that the Parliament Secretary shall discharge all necessary secretarial 
duties for the Parliament and shall perform all functions imposed on it by the Rules of 
Procedure of the parliament of Bangladesh. 
 
Until the enactment of the PSA, most of the Class-I officers of the Parliament Secretariat 
were deputed from civil service. Therefore, the Secretariat was dependent upon the approval 
of the Ministry of Establishment and the Ministry of Finance for creating new posts. After the 
promulgation of the Parliament Secretariat Act, the officials who were deputed to the 
parliament secretariat were absorbed as parliament Secretariat staff.7 The Act also abolished 
the indirect control of the executive over the parliament secretariat. Under the provisions of 
the Parliament Secretariat Act all the administrative and financial power have been 
transferred to the hands of the Speaker and he has been granted legislative authority to protect 
the independence of the Parliament Secretariat. For all activities of the Secretariat the 
Speaker has been made accountable to the parliament.     
                                                 
7 Hashem, Abul (2001), “The Parliament Secretariat: Public Administration at the Service of the House”, 
(research monograph) Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, pp. 18-21.  
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The Bangladesh parliament secretariat is organized into four wings: the Legislative Wing, the 
Committee Wing, the Administration Wing and the Establishment Wing. Each Wing is 
headed by a Joint Secretary who works under the supervision of an Additional Secretary. 
There are two Additional Secretaries- Additional Secretary (Law) and Additional Secretary 
(Implementation). The Legislative Wing and the Committee Wing work under the 
supervision of the Additional Secretary (Law). The Additional Secretary (Implementation) 
supervises the works of other two wings. These two Additional Secretaries are responsible to 
the Secretary who is the administrative head of the Parliament Secretariat.  
 
Among the four wings, the Legislative Wing is perhaps the most important wing. It performs 
most of the legislative works of the parliament secretariat including processing and drafting 
of the Bills, keeping record of the debates, printing necessary papers and to provide 
secretarial support during question hour. This wing is divided into Legislation Section-I and 
Legislation Section-II; they deal with the Government and the Private Members’ Bill 
respectively. Besides the processing of the Government Bills, the Legislation Section-I also 
works for the Business Advisory Committee and the Committee on Rules of Procedure. The 
Legislative Drafting Unit is one of the important components of the Legislative Wing that 
provides assistance to the Standing Committee on Private Members’ Bills in drafting Private 
Members’ Bills and in assisting the standing committees in the examination of Bills. The  
‘Legislative Wing’ particularly provides secretariat service to six different committees 
including the standing committee on the Ministry of Establishment, the Business Advisory 
Committees, the Committee on Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Private Members Bills, 
the Committee on Privilege and the Petitions Committee. All works in connection with these 
committees are provided by the Legislative Wing. Legislative Wing has Reporters’ Cell that 
helps the committees in recording their proceedings. All the parliamentary papers including 
the committee reports are printed and distributed by the Printing and Publication Section of 
the same wing.     
 
The Committee Wing with its 15 different sections serves 36 departmental standing 
committees, three financial committees (the PAC, the GUC and the EC), the Government 
Assurance Committee and the Library Committee including their sub-committees. Each 
section of this wing is headed by the Assistant or the Senior Assistant Secretary. They report 
to the head of the Committee Wing whose position is equivalent to the Joint Secretary. Four 
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Deputy Secretaries, seven Assistant Secretaries and Senior Assistant Secretaries and six 
Committee Officers currently work in the Committee Wing under the supervision of the Joint 
Secretary. The Secretary of the parliament secretariat is the ex-officio secretary to every 
committee and sub-committee. Under the provision of the Rule 218 of the ROP, the Secretary 
authorizes other officers of the Secretariat to attend the committee and sub-committee 
meetings on behalf of the Secretary.8 The Secretary attends meetings headed by the Speaker, 
such as the Committee on Rules of Procedure and the Business Advisory Committee.  
 
The Committee Wing is mainly responsible for issuing notices to all the committee members 
and other concerned persons prior to a committee meeting. This wing prepares working 
papers for the meeting (sometimes the concerned Ministry would prepare the working paper) 
and also prepares minutes of the meeting as well as circulates the same after due approval. If 
a committee decides on calling for papers and witnesses, and desires to visit various places 
for inspection, inquiry etc the Committee Wing is responsible to arrange everything 
necessary. Finally, the Committee Wing is assigned for drafting reports of the committees 
and taking other actions as instructed by the committee. If a committee has set up sub-
committees, the Committee Wing also provides them with similar secretarial support. The 
functions of the Committee wing are mostly regarded to providing procedural support as 
needed by the committee chairperson and members.   
 
The Administrative Wing serves the parliament as a whole for its smooth functioning. It 
makes necessary arrangement for security of parliament building and surrounding areas and 
ensures maintenance of the parliament. This wing also provides various services to the 
members including medical facilities, transportation and accommodations. In this connection, 
it is associated with the “House Committee”. It serves the House Committee for maintaining 
and controlling the MP Hostel. “Office of the Serjent-at-Arms” and “Law Office” work under 
the supervision of the Administrative Wing.  The Establishment Wing is responsible for staff 
management. It works with its two distinct branches: Personnel administration and Accounts. 
The former is responsible for staff management and the later for preparing yearly budget and 
disbursement of funds. 
 
Compared to the parliaments of the developed countries the JS Secretariat works with small 
number of staff. As it is calculated, 138 staff are employed from three different grades (first, 
                                                 
8 Rule 218 (2), Rules of Procedure of the Parliament Secretariat, Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad, Dhaka, 2006. 
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second and fourth-class employees) for the committees (Table 6.1 & 6.2), which is on an 
average three for each permanent committee. Each committee office is provided with one 
first class ranked officer, one officer from second-class rank, one or two clerical staff and 
one-fourth class staff. Some committees such as the Public Accounts Committee, the Law, 
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs committee have more staff. Number of staff varies from 
committee to committee depending on their size and workload. None of the committees has 
research staff with expertise on related subject matters.  
  Table 6.1: Legislative Staff in the Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat 
Name of the Office 1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class 4th Class Total 
Secretariat 52 78 216 184 530 
Speaker Office 5 0 4 11 20 
Leader of the House 2 0 2 7 11 
Opposition Leader Off. 4 0 4 12 20 
Whip Office 13 0 13 35 61 
Committee Wing 24 22 23 24 93 
Total 100 100 262 273 735 
        Source: Establishment Section, Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, 2006. 
Human resources that are available in the Secretariat are not adequate for the committees. 
With inadequate staff it becomes very hard for different Wings to perform a lot of 
responsibilities. Until 2007, the committee chairpersons were provided a personal secretary 
by the concerned ministry. Considering this problem, one personal secretary for each 
standing committee chairperson was appointed in February 2007. But the committee offices 
needed more staff for handling the bulk of committee works.9 Most of the committee 
chairpersons therefore raised demand for setting up individual secretariat for each committee 
with sufficient staff and communicative technological facilities (computer, printer, telephone, 
internet access). They argued that more support services and facilities were required for 
proper functioning of the committees.10 In addition to increasing staff facilities the UNDP 
expert on committees suggested for improving the competency skill of the committee 
secretariat and committee officers. The expert also suggested standardized formats for 
preparing committee proceedings and writing report. Considering these recommendations 
measures have been taken to strengthen the committee secretariats. For example, since the 
                                                 
9 Five committee officers were interviewed in August 2006.   
10 The Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad and the Institute of Parliamentary Studies, Parliamentary Committee System, 
Conference Proceedings, Dhaka, 1999. 
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beginning of seventh JS, the committee secretariats started to improve and update record 
keeping. The committee proceedings and activity reports are mostly prepared in the seventh 
and the eighth JS following the format prepared by the committee expert.11 But there is still 
lacking in keeping record in the Committee Wing. For example, the Committee Wing did not 
properly keep record about the presence of members in the committee meetings.           
 
Table 6.2 Patterns and Size of the Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat Staff 
Name of the Wing Head of the 
Wing 
No. of Committees to be Served No. of Personnel 
The Legislative Wing Joint Secretary 6 214 
The Committee Wing Joint Secretary 41 93 
The Administrative Wing Joint Secretary 1 316 
The Establishment Wing Joint Secretary Appointments of the Personnel 
Staff of the Committee Chairmen.
111 
The Law Office Judicial Officer Provide legal Advice to the 
committees need. 
1 
Name of the Post No. of Existing 
Posts 
No. of Additional Approved 
Posts 
No. of Total Posts 
Secretary 1 0 1 
Addl. Secretary 2 1 3 
Joint Secretary 4 1 5 
Deputy Secretary 10 4 14 
Director equivalent to 
Deputy Secretary  
4 0 4 
Desk Off. /other Class I Off. 79 19 98 
Class II Off. 100 7 107 
Class III Staff 262 56 318 
Class IV Staff 273 10 283 
Total  735 98 833 
  Source: Establishment Wing, Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, 2007, Hashem, Abul (2001), “The Parliament 
Secretariat: Public Administration at the Service of the House”, (research monograph) Dhaka: Bangladesh 
Institute of Parliamentary Studies. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Information is collected from the Secretary, Committee Office II, Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat, Dhaka, 
August 2007. 
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There are numbers of shortcomings also identified in the staff management and decision 
making process. Firstly, the senior officials who had worked for the committees were deputed 
from various government departments belonging to the BCS (Administration) cadre service.12 
They normally worked in the Parliament Secretariat for three to five years, and then they 
moved to the government department. Under the provision of the new Act they are adopted in 
the Secretariat permanently but the top senior management posts of the Secretariat including 
Secretary are still filled on by deputation. Therefore they did not show interests to advance 
their expertise on parliamentary affairs. Secondly, they are not delegated authority to 
effectively mange the recruitment and deployment of staff.  
 
According to the UNDP Mission (2002) report, the management style of the Parliament 
Secretariat is characterized by risk-avoidance consistent with a hierarchical bureaucratic 
structure emphasizing control and top-down decision-making. The Mission raveled that the 
Parliament Secretariat being a traditional bureaucratic structure focused inward on rules and 
procedures and work being manually done. Thereby the Secretariat, in its present form, faced 
rigorous problems to respond adequately to the needs of the Parliamentarians. The Mission 
after having in-depth discussion with senior management of the Parliament Secretariat 
including the Speaker, the Chief Whips of government and opposition parties and the top 
ranking officials suggested to reorganize the Parliament Secretariat and to develop human 
resource management and planning process.13 
 
6.3 Logistics and Research Facilities  
 
It has been observed that the legislators of the developed countries enjoy more facilities than 
their counterparts in developing countries. In the parliaments of USA, UK, Germany and 
Japan, every member is provided with personal staff, research assistance and computers. For 
example, the Bundestag committee members have separate office room equipped with the 
latest information and communications technologies (computer, printer, telephone, internet 
access). They also have office in their constituencies. The members have online access to the 
parliament library as well as to the Reference and Research Service, so every request can be 
placed to the library service via an online. It has been observed that office automation and 
                                                 
12 World Bank, “Parliamentary Control over Public Expenditure in Bangladesh: The Role of Committees”, 
available at www.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/bangladeshParliamentary.doc, p.15.  
13 The UNDP, “UNDP support to Bangladesh Parliament Through “Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy 
Project (SPD): Enhancing the Parliamentary Process”, an assessment Report, 2006. 
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flow of information help members to be up to date for committee deliberations.14 Mostly 
similar facilities are also offered for the committee members of the British parliament and the 
Japanese Diet. The Congressional committee members comparatively enjoy more facilities 
than the legislators of any other parliament.   
 
In contrast with the developed countries, the committee members of the Bangladesh Jatiya 
Sangsad were not facilitated with separate office room and research service. Separate office 
rooms were only provided for the committee chairperson. The committee members had no 
other place to sit and to meet together. Only four meeting rooms were available for all the 
standing committees. Due to space shortage, some committee offices were shifted to other 
buildings (such as the MP hostel) near the main parliament building. To meet up the room 
crisis, the Cabinet Room some times was made available for committee meeting but it 
requires prior notice from the committee. In this respect the UNDP has suggested for 
systemic reorganization and improvement on the capacity of personnel engaged and 
provision of logistic.15  
    
As in the developed democracies legislators in the Bangladesh Parliament, according to the 
provisions of the “Remuneration and Allowances of Members of Parliament Act”, are not 
given financial support to employ personal assistant for assisting in their legislative activities. 
The lack of adequate and expert staff is one of the major problems to the effective 
functioning of the committees. As shown in the Table 6.3 about 93 staff are working in the 
Committee Wing for 41 standing committees and they are mostly general staff. The 
committee members have less chance to get research assistance and necessary information on 
subject matter from the committee staff for participation in the committee process. It is worth 
mentioning that three research officers work in the library for providing information as 
requested by the MPs. The Law Office has been included in the parliament secretariat in 1996 
for giving legal advice. The Law Office is headed by a Law Officer deputed from the civil 
service. The Law Officer was usually asked for giving advice on service matters in general 
and on disciplinary matters in particular. Law Officer also dealt with court cases of the 
Parliament and the Parliament Secretariat. The Law Officer attended the committee meetings 
                                                 
14 Rupert Schick and Wolfgang Zeh (1999), The German Bundestag: Functions and Procedure,  
    Rheinbreitbach: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsantstalt. 
15 The UNDP, A Needs Assessment of the Parliament of Bangladesh Private Draft, August 29th, 1996, available 
at http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/cap/asia/BGD/ZOVATTO.htm 
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when a committee examined Bills.16 But it was very hard for one officer to respond to all 
queries from the committees. As the committees did not have any expert staff, senior 
members of the bureaucracy were asked to supply information whenever necessary and to 
provide specialized or professional advice on matters particularly policy issues and to.17 Such 
practices had two major backdrops. Firstly, committees could not work independently from 
the influence of civil service. Secondly, the bureaucrats, who were asked about technical 
issues, seemed to be biased to the government side. This had a negative effect on overseeing 
functions.  
 
As in the other parliaments, the JS has its own library that is responsible for providing 
relevant information to the members. It operates under the Committee Wing of the parliament 
secretariat and is headed by a Director (Library and Research). In every electoral period, JS 
sets up the Library Committee that considers all matters concerning the library and makes 
suggestions for the improvement of the library. The library is primarily meant to meet the 
needs and requirements of the Members of the Parliament for performing their functions as 
legislators. The parliamentary staff can use the library. Also the researchers particularly from 
the universities and research institutions are allowed to use this library with prior permission 
from the Secretary of the Parliament. 18  
 
During the period of the seventh JS, the parliament library has been transformed into an 
information center named “Legislative Information Centre (LIC)” under the UNDP supported 
project “Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy”. The main objective of this center is to 
provide classified and relevant information, in the minimal possible time. The LIC is also 
responsible for producing research papers as per request of the members. The Library has a 
reading room for the Members where they have access to the library catalogue via on-line. A 
Computer User's pool with twelve computers and network printers are also made available 
for the members, and the parliamentary staff. But it is observed that the legislators 
occasionally come to use the computer pool. 19 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Bangladesh Parliament, official website, http://www.parliamentofbangladesh.org/general-14.html. 
17Hasanuzzamn, Al Masud (2007), “Role of Parliamentary Committees in Bangladesh”, in Nizam Ahemd and 
ATM Obiadullah (eds.), the Working of Parliamentary Committees in Westminster Systems: Lessons for 
Bangladesh, Dhaka: University Press Limited, p.44. 
18 http://www.parliamentofbangladesh.org/general-14.html 
19 LIC senior officers told the researcher with a personal interview in November 2006.  
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Table 6.3 Strength of Staff and other Support Service of the Bangladesh JS  
 
Facilities 5th JS 7th JS 8th JS  
Number of Parliament Members 330 330 330 
No. of existing staff  431 599 735 
No. of staff per MP 1.3 1.7 2.2 
No. of Committees 46 49 51 
No. Committees are Served by CW  41 41 41 
No. of Staff working in the CW 70 70 93 
No. of staff per committee 0.6 0.6 2.3 
No. of Committee Meeting Room  4 4 4 
No. of Computer for each Committee Section (on an average) 0 0 1 
Total Budget for Parliament (Figure in thousand BdTk.) NA 32,86,94 
(2000-2001) 
42,13,26  
(2004-2005)
Total Budget for Committees (Figure in thousand BdTk.) NA 1,54,27 1,77, 26 
Source: Committee Section-2, Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat. 
 
6.4 Pay and Allowances for the Members 
 
The parliamentary committees disburse their official expenditure including staff salary and 
allowances from their own budget. In every financial period the Parliament Secretariat 
prepares the budget and after the approval by the Speaker it is sent to the Ministry of Finance 
for including it to the National Budget. In every financial year certain amount of money is 
allocated in the budget for the committees. In the financial year of 2000-01, TK. 40, 38,000 
was allotted for the committees, which was 1.2% of the total budget of the parliament. In the 
next financial year, 4.35 % of the total parliamentary budget was allotted for the committees. 
As of 2001-02, a major portion of the budget (60.35%) was spent in the head of staff salary 
and allowances while a small portion of the allotted money was spent for committee meetings 
and conferences. The committee budget is gradually increasing since the beginning of the 
Fifth JS. In the context of the national revenue budget, 0.18 % was allotted for the JS during 
the financial year of    2000-01. 
 
The "Remuneration and Allowances of Members of Parliament Act" regulates financial 
benefits of the JS Members. Under the provision of this Act, the members receive salary and 
other allowances. The members are also allowed to earn outside income from their private 
business or private office. In doing so, they are not required to disclose this information to the 
Speaker. The salary and allowances of the MPs have been increased time to time to make 
them economically free and independent. According to the recent pay system (as of 
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September 2005) the members receive a total of Tk. 180,000 per annum as basic salary. In 
addition, they are also entitled to receive entertainment, medical bills, constituency 
allowances and telephone bills. Furthermore, they receive travel allowances for parliamentary 
sittings/business. They are also given facility of buying duty-free cars. In addition to the 
salary and allowances, they also receive Tk. 500 per day for attending the committee 
meetings or plenary session. Apart from all of these allowances, every MP has discretionary 
grant of Tk. 1, 00,000 per year at his/her disposal. The parliamentarians also have the 
opportunity to stay in the subsidized apartments provided by the parliament for their whole 
tenure. Pay and allowances that the parliamentarians get are free from tax (Box 6.1).  
 
Although the JS members are not highly paid compared to the members of the West 
European parliamentarians or even to the members of the Indian and Sri Lankan parliaments, 
parliamentary seats are attractive in Bangladesh from other grounds. The parliamentarians 
have an important link in resources distribution. They have opportunities to control all 
patronages in their constituencies and can use them for their re-election. Even the lawmakers 
misused their coveted privileges and convicted for receiving commission or bribes for legal 
and illegal favor.20  
 Box 6.1 Remuneration, Allowances and Facilities for the Members of the JS 
1. Remuneration (per month) Tk. 15,000/- 
2. Constituency allowances(per month) Tk. 5,000/- 
3. Sumptuary  allowances(per month) Tk. 2,000/- 
4. Constituency office expenses(per month) Tk. 6,000/- 
5. Insurance coverage for accident causing  death/permanent disablement Tk. 5,00,000/- 
6. Traveling allowances(annual)   Tk. 50,000/- 
7. Discretionary grant (annual) Tk.1,00,000/- 
8. Telephone bill (per month)  Tk. 6,000/- 
9. Daily allowance for attending session/committee meeting 500/= 
10. Import of duty free car/jeep  
 Source: The Members of Parliament (Remuneration and Allowances) (Amended) Act , 2005.   
 
It was alleged that the members often misused their position for material and personal 
interests. For example, the members were allowed to import a duty-free car or a jeep, once in 
                                                 
20 About hundreds MPs including 20 senior leaders were arrested by the military backed caretaker government 
in between 2007 and 2008 for receiving commission, bribes and misusing parliamentary privileges.  
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eight years without tax for carrying out their parliamentary business. This privilege was 
granted in May 1998 and was amended several times. According to the amendment of August 
2005, the members are granted to import up to 1600cc cars and 3000cc jeeps without tax. But 
the legislators who would have less than two years tenure after taking the oath are not granted 
this privilege.21 The law also restricted that duty-free vehicles would be used for carrying out 
parliament related activities and could not be handed over or sold before three years from the 
date of import.22 According to the statistics provided by the NBR, under the duty-free scheme 
303 cars, jeeps and SUV were imported by the lawmakers of the eighth JS and the members 
of the fifth imported 311 cars or jeeps while the members of the seventh JS imported 177 
vehicles. Compared to previous parliaments, most luxurious vehicles were imported from 
2001 to 2006 during the period of the eighth JS and their tax ranged from 73.91 per cent to 
196.10 per cent. It was reported in the major dailies that during the period of the eighth JS, 
about 200 luxury cars and jeeps like BMW, Merceedes Benz, Land Rover, Porsche, Range 
Rover, Cadillac, Hummer were imported.  The average import values of these vehicles ranges 
from 40 thousand to 200 thousand Euros.23 Many of these luxury cars and jeeps were seized 
by the interim government in 2007 because of misusing privileges. The NBR authority 
accused that the lawmakers released these vehicles flouting the existing rules. The NBR also 
detected that above 90 percent lawmakers either sold out their duty-free vehicles to 
businessmen or imported those for others in exchange of commission. According to a 
vernacular daily on February 8, 2007 each permit for duty-free cars was sold by the 
lawmakers of the eighth JS for as high as Tk 25 lakh and about Tk. 150 crore was smuggled 
out through under-invoice price of the imported car. Considering these facts the interim 
government cancelled the lawmakers’ privilege of importing duty-free vehicles in April 2007. 
It was alleged that the members misused their telephone facilities also. As it is calculated, 
The BTTB noticed that a total of 771 lawmakers from the first to the eighth parliaments owed 
over Tk. 83.07 million to the Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone Board. However, they 
received their telephone bill (fixed Tk.6000) from the government. According to a statement 
made by the Post and Telecommunications Minister in the eighth JS that 226 members of the 
fifth JS did not pay the bill of Tk. 38.5 million and 216 members of the seventh JS did not 
pay bill of Tk. 13.07 million. At the end of the eighth JS, it was reported that total 183 
members did not pay their telephone bill of Tk. 12.6 million. The Whips, the committee 
                                                 
21 The New Age, 11 March 2007 
22 Before purchasing the duty free vehicles, parliament secretariat issue a letter with the permission of the 
Speaker saying that “the vehicle is needed for carry our parliament related activities”. 
23 The Daily Prothom Alo, Dhaka, February 8, 2007.  
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chairpersons and the members from both treasury and opposition benches were among the 
defaulters.24           
6.5 Parliamentary Aid/Assistance 
The parliamentary assistance is a recent phenomenon in the world of development co-
operation. Since 1970s the parliamentary assistance program has been introduced by the 
developed countries as a part of their ‘democracy promotion’ program. This program has 
developed due to the evident failure of economic-assistance policies in many developing 
countries. The parliamentary assistance program is aimed at promoting good governance and 
it involves the NGOs to deliver social and economic aids.25 The post colonial states and the 
states that emerged from the Soviet Union are the recipients of the democracy assistance and 
the most active donor states are the USA, the UK, Germany, the Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands and Canada. Most of the donor states have different agencies that manage and 
operate the program.26 It is argued that the donor countries intervene into the emerging states 
in the name of promoting good governance for really protecting market economies by 
maintaining the conditions of political stability. 
 
The Bangladesh JS had received parliamentary assistance from various development agencies 
including the UNDP, the DFID/UK, the USAID, the World Bank and other agencies from 
1991 to 2007. These agencies closely worked with the government for developing 
interactions between the public and the parliament. The parliamentary aid/assistances 
program in Bangladesh considered committee system as more important program. The 
DFID/UK assisted projects mainly focused on strengthening parliamentary committees 
particularly those concerned with finances. The main objectives of the project were updating 
record-keeping systems, improving facilities for the committees, organizing training for the 
staff assigned to the committees, organizing orientation programs for the committee 
chairpersons and the members.   
 
The UNDP introduced a development project in 1997 named ‘Strengthening Parliamentary 
Democracy’ to overcome the drawbacks of Parliament Secretariat in respect to institutional 
                                                 
24 Daily Prothom Alo, Dhaka, February 27, 2007. 
25 Perlin, George, International Assistance to Democratic Development: A Review, IRPP Working Paper     
Series no. 2003-04, available at www.irpp.org 
26 Major donor agencies which fund the Global Programme for Parliamentary Strengthening are the CIDA 
(Canada), the DANIDA (Denmark), the DFID (UK), the French Co-operation, the GTZ (Germany), the JICA 
(Japan), the NORAD (Norway), the SIDA (Sweden) and the USAID (United States of America). 
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limitations and operational deficiency.27  The Parliament Secretariat closely worked with the 
UNDP to implement this project. Under this project, the UNDP provided fund for several 
program aimed at improving efficiency of the Members, reducing wastage of resources and 
time and raising the quality of services. Under the UNDP project ‘Legislative Information 
Centre’ had received thirty-one computers, two scanners, barcode machines and 
photocopiers.   
 
For the successful functioning of the parliament, a research and training institute is necessary 
for providing training and orientation to the members, the parliament secretariat staff and the 
government officials. To meet such requirements the Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary 
Studies (BIPS) Bill was passed in the parliament in 2001 and accordingly BIPS was 
established in the parliament compound.  The UNDP provided necessary financial and 
logistics supports for its initial establishment under the project of “the Strengthening 
Parliamentary Democracy (SPD)28”. One of the major objectives of the BIPS was to 
strengthen the committee system. In this regard, the BIPS organized training programs, 
conferences and conducts researches on subjects related to legislation and committee 
activities. As part of “the Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy” project a series of 
discussions were held focusing the role of the parliamentary committees in legislative and 
overseeing process. The project organized training based on well-prepared modules on 
parliamentary practices and procedures.  
 
With the assistance of the UNDP, the BIPS took initiatives for developing the parliament 
homepage with current and upcoming activities of the committees or the House.  The UNDP-
assisted project also developed a public relations mechanism to enable the parliamentarians, 
particularly the committee chairpersons to meet the civil society in dialogues. The BIPS also 
organized an Audiovisual Communication Orientation Program for the parliamentarians, in 
collaboration with ‘Ekushey Television’ during the period of the seventh JS. This orientation 
program provided a brief guideline to participate in television interviews, press conferences, 
debates and round-table discussions.  
 
For improving the quality of parliamentary democracy, seminars, conferences and workshops 
had been organized by the BIPS for exchange of experience and opinion between the 
                                                 
27 Hashem, Abul, The Parliament Secretariat: Public Administration at the Service of the House, (research 
monograph) Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, p.52. 
28 The SPD ended in 2007. 
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parliamentarians and various groups including parliamentary scholars, parliamentary 
delegation and civil society. During the period of the eighth JS, the BIPS organized 
orientation program for more than hundreds newly elected Members. Besides these, the BIPS 
publishes 15 monographs on the area of parliamentary practices and procedures. Library 
access system had been improved for better use of library and information materials. Under 
this project, rare documents were transformed into digital format so that the users can use 
such valuable documents easily.  
 
The UNDP gave special attention towards strengthening parliamentary committees. Among 
the committees, the financial committees were given special priority in matters of training, 
record keeping and computerization.29 These committees were facilitated with logistic and 
research supports to improve their legislative and oversight functions.  In accordance with the 
guidelines of the BIPS, every committee section has started to keep records of committee 
activities including meeting, reporting and presence of members. The Institute of 
Parliamentary Studies held its first International Conference in May 1999 on Committee 
Systems where fifteen national and international experts presented their papers. The 
Committee Systems of Bangladesh, the UK, and more generally Asia and the West, were 
discussed by the participants. More emphasis was given on the oversight of government, the 
budget, the role of committees, the function of the chairpersons of committees and women in 
the committee system. The members of civil society, including academia, national NGOs and 
international donor agencies participated in the conference. The then Speaker in his 
forwarding message termed the conference as an important step in promoting debate on the 
fundamental issues for strengthening parliamentary bodies.  
 
For strengthening parliamentary democracy, the donor agencies funded various programs 
initiated by the national and the international NGOs. The Centre for Analysis and Choice 
(CAC) was a national NGO which had worked during the period of the fifth JS for 
strengthening the parliament. “The CAC intended to participate in the process by providing 
members and committees with legislative analyses of issues related to bills, resolutions, and 
adjournment motions introduced in the House.”30 The CAC provided assistance to the 
committees with legislative analyses of issues related to bills, resolutions, drafting of 
                                                 
29 Hasem, Abul (2001), op. cit., p. 53. 
30 Munaim, Syed Fahim and Anam, Parveen (1994), “Bangladesh Center for Analysis and Choice", S. Reyes 
and M. Brillantes (ed.), Legislative Support Services in Asia: an Introductory survey, Queszen: Congressional 
Research and Training Service, pp.155-162. 
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proposals, collection of data and formulation of enquiries. Another national NGO that has 
been working on the parliament since 1990s is Khan Foundation. It provides training support, 
networking and mainly helps in strengthening people-parliament relationship. The 
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has a program on parliament and good 
governance. Every year the TIB publishes a report named ‘Parliament Watch’. In their watch 
report, committee activities are highlighted giving statistics about committee meetings, 
presence of members in the meetings, reporting and issues discussed at committee stage. The 
NDI is America based non-governmental organization working in the area of governance. 
Since 1985 the National Democratic Institute for International (NDI) has been working in 
Bangladesh with the political parties, the civil society and the academia to strengthen and 
promote democratic values. ‘Parliamentary Strengthening’ is one of their major programs. 
They organize seminars and workshop on various issues including the role of the opposition, 
committees and their responsibilities in overseeing public hearings, constituency relations 
and resource development for the members of the Parliament. They have organized two 
major international video conferences in December 2004. In these conferences, the NDI 
brought together the parliamentarians and experts from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the United 
Kingdom and the United States to discuss issues on “Parliament and the Media.”31 The 
parliamentary assistance provided by the donor agencies are intended to promote 
parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh through strengthening committee system and 
reducing public-parliament distance.  
                                                 
31 Detail information available at http://www.ndi.org/worldwide/asia/bangladesh/bangladesh.asp 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
Committee Process in the Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad 
 
 
Two most significant functions of the parliamentary committees are to deal with legislation 
and overseeing government activities. Unlike plenary session most of the legislative works 
including scrutinizing bills, collecting information, proposing amendments, revising texts are 
done in the parliamentary committees.1 The parliamentary committees are therefore often 
referred to as “a body for carrying, or making, laws”.2 The committees provide a forum in 
proposed bills, and other important issues can be reviewed in detail by the legislators. The 
oversight activities of the committees deal with scrutiny the ministerial performances and 
expenditures. This chapter intends to analyze the committee process in the Bangladesh 
parliament.  
 
7.1 Committees in the Legislative Process   
 
The Bangladesh Constitution entrusts the law making power to the Jatiya Sangsad. Article 65 
(1) states: “there shall be a Parliament for Bangladesh in which subject to the provisions of 
this Constitution shall be vested the legislative power of the Republic.”3 Like the parliaments 
of the USA, the UK, India, Sri Lanka and Germany law making process of the JS is 
accomplished through three distinct stages: first reading, second reading and third reading. 
Every legislative proposal is presented in the form of a Bill, which is categorized into two 
forms: Sorkari Bill (Government’s Bill) and Be-Sorkari Bill (Private Member’s Bill). 
According to the Rules 24(2) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the government bills are 
initiated and introduced by a minister and the private member’s bills are introduced by a 
member other than a minister. Like the parliaments of Australia, Canada, France, and India, 
the Bangladesh parliament has fixed one day in a week for the private members (belonging to 
both the treasury and the opposition benches) and on that day, they have the priority to 
introduce bills. Both of these types of bills are enacted into law through similar stages.  
 
The first reading stage includes the introduction of the bill. The ‘Government Bill’ is first 
formally introduced by the member-in-charge with a short description of objectives and 
                                                 
1 Muylle, Koen J. (2003), “Improving the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Legislative Procedures”, Statute Law 
Review, Vol. 24, No.3, p.176.  
2 Norton, Philip (1993), Does Parliament Matter?, New York: Harvester, p.1. 
3 The Government of Bangladesh (1998), The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, p.50.   
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reasons after giving seven days' written notice to the Secretary. The  ‘Private Member’s Bill’ 
requires fifteen days written notice to the secretary of the JS together with three copies of the 
Bill. The bills are then set down in the private member’s day.4 In case of the ‘Government’s 
Bill’, minister first places the proposed bill to the cabinet. After obtaining cabinet approval, 
the ‘Government’s Bill’ is submitted by the concerned Minister with a copy of the 
recommendation of the President for its introduction. If the bill involves expenditure from 
public money, a financial memorandum is attached with it stating an estimate of the recurring 
and non-recurring expenditures involved. Thereafter the Bill shall be entered in the Orders of 
the Day (diner karjo suchi) for the government business.5 Like the UK, the JS starts and 
finishes its first reading with the announcement of the title of the bill, and at this stage, no 
discussion takes place and no amendment can be moved.  
 
At the second reading, the principal provisions of a bill are discussed in the House. The 
Member-in-charge who introduces the bill may propose a number of measures. S/he may 
forward it for consideration by the House, or send it to standing or select committee or 
circulate it for eliciting public opinion thereon. As in the British House of Commons, the 
general principle of a bill first must be approved in the plenary before detailed consideration 
in the committees. After discussion in the House, the scrutiny by the committee takes place. 
But the American and the German legislatures set the committee stage before a plenary stage. 
Citing the British House of Commons as an example, Herbert Döring states that by placing 
before the committee stage, after a general plenary debate, the House of Commons severely 
constrains the committees’ ability to consider bills independently. As a result, the committee 
considerations are restricted to details only.6  
 
In the committee stage, each government bill is discussed clause-by-clause keeping 
consistency with the principle and subject matter of the bill. In this stage, the committee 
members may move amendments and put their suggestions about linguistic problems or 
vagueness of the bill. After a detailed scrutiny, the committee returns the bill to the House 
with a report, which may or may not contain proposed amendments. The copies of the 
committee report are made available to the members of the House. The committee procedure 
                                                 
4 Bangladesh parliament has fixed one day in week for the private members (government and opposition) on that 
day they have the priority to introduce bills. 
5 Gonoprajatantri Bangladesher Jatiya Sangsader Karjo Pronali Bidhi (Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of 
the People’s Republic of Bangladesh), Dhaka: Jatiya Sangsad Schibalya, 1994, Chapter XIII. 
6 Döring, Herbert (1995), “Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda”, in Herbert Döring 
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 233-235. 
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for introducing and examining the private member’s bills is to some extent different from the 
procedure of the government bills.  
 
The private members’ bills proposing amendments to the constitution are mandatory to go to 
the committee first before being introduced to the House. Nevertheless, the other bills are 
referred to the committee after the first reading. The Government bills are not subject to such 
rigorous scrutiny.7 In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, the ‘Committee on Private 
Members Bills and Regulations’ is responsible for examining all private members’ bills. 
However, some private members bills are also sent to the Select Committee. Once a Bill has 
been referred to the committee, meetings take place to consider the Bill and to make a report 
thereon within the time fixed by the House. In the process of scrutiny, the committee first 
categorizes all bills referred to it by the House into type A and B according to their nature, 
urgency and importance. After a detailed review, the committee sends it back to the House 
along with its recommendations. The committee allocates time limit for discussion of the 
Private Member’s Bill at different stages. It should be mentioned here that if a bill proposes 
amendments to the constitution, it first goes to the committee before being introduced in the 
House. However, the government bills with similar objectives are not subject to such rigorous 
scrutiny. At this stage, if the committee rejects the bill, it will not be included in the Orders of 
the Day. After committee stage, the member-in-charge makes a motion that the bill has to be 
passed.8  
 
At the ‘third reading’ stage, the Speaker submits the bill to the House clause-by-clause or 
schedule-by-schedule for a vote. In this stage the members may propose amendments and 
discuss in support of the bill or reject it. Thereafter the bill shall be put into the House for 
voting without allowing any discussion on it. The member-in-charge of the bill may withdraw 
the bill at any time before it is passed. 9 This process constitutes the third reading of the bill. 
As per rule 95(1) of the Rules of Procedure, when a Bill is passed by the House, it shall be 
signed in triplicate by the Speaker and presented to the President for his/her assent. Article 80 
(3) of the Constitution states: “the President, within fifteen days after a Bill presented to him, 
shall assent to the Bill.” After a bill is signed by the President, the secretary of the Parliament 
publishes the bill as an Act of Parliament in the Official Gazette.  
                                                 
7 Nizam Ahmed, op. cit., 2002, p.97 
8 Rule 223, “Rules of Procedure of the Bangladesh Parliament”, available at www.parliamentofbangladesh.org 
9 Murphy, Gavin (2006), “How Legislation is Drafted and Enacted in Bangladesh”, Statute Law Review, Vol. 
27, No. 3,p. 144. 
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Legislative Out put  
 
The trend of the domination of the executive in the legislative process is quite common.  In 
most of the parliaments, private members bills have little opportunity to be transformed into 
law. As in the parliaments of America, Japan and India individual members have opportunity 
to introduce a bill in the JS but few of them are finally enacted into law. Most of the bills 
passed in the Bangladesh JS are government bills. As shown in the (Table 7.1) altogether 549 
bills have been passed in the fifth, the seventh and the eighth JS; of these only three bills were 
private members bills. It is also observed that significant numbers of bills which were passed 
in the House were earlier promulgated as Ordinances.  
 
Government Bills 
 
Among the government bills passed in the JS, most of the bills were piloted by the Ministry of 
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs; for example, nearly 30% of the bills passed in the 
eighth JS were initiated by them. This figure shows that the Standing Committee on Ministry 
of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs was comparatively more engaged with legislative 
business particularly government bills while the Standing Committee on Private Bills dealt 
with all private members bills. In accordance with the provision of Rule 246 of Rules of 
Procedure, the committees were given power to examine bills at drafting stage. But there were 
few instances of such activity at the committee stage. During the period of the fifth JS, only 
eight bills were referred to the committees for detailed consideration (Table 7.1). Similar 
situations were also observed in the previous parliaments formed since the independence. 
Most of the government bills including some controversial constitutional amendment bills 
were not earlier referred to any standing committee or special committee. For example, in the 
first JS, the Fourth Constitutional Amendment bill was passed without completing all-
procedural stages and with a walkout by the main opposition party. Similarly, the Fifth 
Amendment Bill, 1979 was hurriedly passed in the Second JS within a short time without its 
stay in a committee stage or eliciting public opinion. However, the government during Ziaur 
Rahman’s regime intended to shift the focus of politics to the JS.10  With the passing of this 
bill, all the activities of the martial law government were legitimized and the state principles 
were changed. Most of the bills passed in the Second JS were not sent to the committees for 
                                                 
10 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., p. 44; Chodhury, Dilara  op. cit, p. 133; Ziring, L. (1993), Bangladesh : From 
Mujib to Ershad : An Interpretive Study, Dhaka: University Press Limited, p.148. 
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detailed review. Similarly, in the Third and the Fourth JS 39 and 142 bills respectively were 
passed escaping the committee stage. For example, the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) 
Bill and the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Bill were passed in the House in absence of the 
opposition members and the bills were not sent to any committee for detailed examination 
prior to the final consideration.  
 
           Figure 7.1 Committees in the Legislative Process 
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Source: Data is calculated by the researcher from the parliamentary proceedings (1991-2006). 
 
Among the post-1990 parliaments, the standing committees of the fifth JS had a little 
opportunity to review the legislative bills because most of the bills were passed in the House 
escaping committee stage (Figure 7.1). It is observed that in the fifth JS, only eight (4.6% of 
the total bills) bills including the Constitution (Eleventh Amendment) Bill and the 
Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Bill were earlier referred to the committee and some bills 
were referred back before the final consideration.11 Such practice has been identified as one 
of the major shortcomings in making the parliamentary committees effective and the 
committee experts thereby suggested bringing the necessary amendments in the Rules of 
Procedure.12  
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., 2002, p. 81 
12 The UNDP, “UNDP support to Bangladesh Parliament Through “Strengthening Parliamentary Demnocracy 
Project (SPD): Enhanching the Parliamentary Process”, Assessment Report, 2006. 
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Table 7.1 Committee Activities in the Legislative Process (1991-2006) 
 
Committee Activities Fifth JS Seventh JS Eighth JS Total 
Government Bills     
No. of Notices 214 195 172  581 
No. of Bills Introduced 182 192 157  531 
No. of Bills Passed 173 191 185 549 
No. of Govt. Bills Sent to-      
Select Committees 2 0 0 2 
Special  Committees 6 44 0 50 
Standing Committees 0 129 124 253 
No. of Bills Passed without Committee 
Stage   
166 18 61 245 
No. of Committee Reports on Bills 7 173 124 304 
Private Members Bills     
No. of Notices 82 46 50 178 
No. of Bills Introduced 12 14 13 39 
No. of Bills Passed 1 1 1 3 
No. of Bills Sent to-      
PMBC 29  20 26 75 
 Select Committee  5 - - 5 
Special Committee 1 - - 1 
No. of Committee Reports  5 8 5 18 
Source: Calculated by the researcher from the Summary of Parliamentary Proceedings (1991-2006), Jatiya 
Sangsad Schibalya (the Parliament Secretariat), Dhaka, 2007. 
 
The seventh JS has made a significant reform in the Rules of Procedure with regard to the 
committee’s scrutiny of government bills. This reform makes it mandatory to send all 
government bills to appropriate standing committees after the first reading. Of the 191 bills 
passed in the seventh JS, 17 bills were earlier promulgated as ordinance by the Caretaker 
Government and one was promulgated by the party government titled “Post-Flood 
Rehabilitation (Internal Resource Mobilization) Bill 1998.” These ordinance turned bills were 
not earlier sent to any committee before enacting into law. Of the total bills tabled in the 
House, 176 bills were sent to the standing committees and returned back 173 bills with 
committee reports while other 44 bills were scrutinized and returned back by the special 
committees (Table 7.1). It is worth mentioning that the seventh JS in its first session formed a 
special committee with 15 members from both the treasury and the opposition benches. This 
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special committee was formed to examine all bills until the formation of the departmental 
standing committees. This special committee submitted 44 reports scrutinizing the same 
number of bills. After the set up of departmental standing committees in the seventh and the 
eighth parliaments, all bills were automatically referred to the departmental standing 
committees. Until the formation of departmental standing committees, the eighth JS like its 
predecessor did not set up any special committee to examine the government bills. Therefore, 
compared to the seventh JS a large number of bills (33%) were passed in the House without 
scrutiny by any committee (Table 7.1 & Figure 7.1). Once the committees were constituted, 
every bill was automatically sent to the appropriate departmental standing committee for 
detailed review and was referred back to the House with a report.  
 
Private Members Bills  
 
Regarding the private members’ bills, Table 7.1 shows that the post-1990 parliaments received 
178 notices on private members’ bills. Of them 26 bills were introduced in the House with the 
recommendations of the Committee on Private Members’ Bill while other bills were dropped 
at various levels before final consideration. Available data show that the private members bills 
were mainly piloted by the individual members on constitutional issues, mostly for amending 
different clauses of the Constitution while a small portion of these bills dealt with 
administrative reorganization and electoral procedures. The table also shows that the number 
of bills examined by the CMBR during the period of the fifth JS was higher than those in the 
seventh and the eighth JS. During the tenure of the fifth JS, the CMBR submitted five reports 
scrutinizing 30 private members’ bills; of them five different private members’ bills were 
again sent to the select committee and one bill (Indemnity Ordinance Repealed Bill, ’91) was 
referred to the special committee for further review. The CMBR of the seventh JS has 
submitted eight reports scrutinizing twenty private members’ bills. Similarly significant 
numbers of private members bills were referred to the CMBR but only one bill was 
transformed into law in the eighth JS. For example, Abdul Manan, the Chairman of Standing 
Committee on Ministry Agriculture, submitted twenty private members’ bills in different 
sessions of the eighth JS, but none of them was introduced in the House.13 It is observed that 
the members routinely initiated private members’ bills though most of them were rejected or 
dropped at the various level of legislation process. Therefore, parliamentary scholar noted that 
                                                 
13 “Parliamentary Committees in Bangladesh: Watchdog or Onlookers? The Chairmen’s View”, workshop 
report, prepared and organized by Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy Project (SPD), Dhaka: SPD, 
March 2005, p.5. 
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private members’ bills have relatively little prospect of being enacted in the Bangladesh 
parliament.14 Most of the private members’ bills are rejected at various levels of legislation 
process and few bills are finally transformed into law.  
 
Legislation by Ordinance 
 
The Constitution has established a system of sharing legislative tasks between the parliament 
and the executive by delegating legislative power to the executive. Like the constitution of 
India, Netherlands, Italy and Spain, the Bangladesh Constitution delegates legislative power 
to the executive with a specific time limit and objectives. As stated in the Article 93 of the 
Constitution, the President may make and promulgate Ordinances within the statutory 
framework or constitutional custom when the parliament itself is not sitting or it stands 
dissolved or in a state of emergency. But the President requires a written advice of the Prime 
Minister. Ordinances have legally the same effect as law made by the JS but they have to be 
laid before the JS at its first meeting held immediately after their promulgation. In accordance 
with the Article 93 (2) of the Constitution, an ordinance only becomes a permanent law if the 
JS passes it. But the ordinance should be laid before the Parliament as a bill at its first 
meeting following the promulgation. If the JS does not pass it within a period of 30 days the 
ordinance will be atomically turned defunct.15 In accordance with the Constitution, the 
President cannot promulgate any ordinance for altering or repealing any provision of the 
Constitution or for continuing in force, any provision of an Ordinance previously made.16   
Figure 7.2  Legislation by Ordinance (1991-2006) 
 
    Source: Researcher 
                                                 
14 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., p.101. 
15 Bangladesher Sangbidhan (Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh), Ministry of Law, Justice & 
Parliamentary Affairs,  Dhaka, 2006. 
16 Article 93 (1, iii), Bangladesher Sangbidhan (the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh), 2006. 
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The provision for ‘legislation by ordinance’ has been traditionally used in Bangladesh by the 
executive branch of the government to establish and maintain their dominance over the 
legislative process.17 It is observed that the extent of ordinances turning into bills gradually 
decreased since the beginning of the fifth JS. This is manifested in the volume of ordinance 
turned bills passed by the different parliaments since the independence. It is calculated that 
53.3% of bills passed in the first JS were ordinance turned bills while in the fifth JS 34.10% 
of the total bills were earlier promulgated as ordinance. Of the 97 ordinance turned bills 
passed in the fifth JS 44 ordinances were promulgated by the caretaker government. During 
the period of the seventh JS 18 ordinance turned bills were passed in House. Of them 17 
ordinances were promulgated by the caretaker government. Comparatively lowest numbers of 
ordinances-turned bills (8 bills) were passed in the eighth JS. The ordinance-turned bills 
which were passed in the fifth JS were not earlier sent to the committee. The seventh and the 
eighth JS sent one bill each to the committee for detailed review.  
 
Limits of Legislative Scrutiny 
 
Although in the Bangladesh parliament, committees are regarded as the most important 
device because of their ability to amend the legislative proposals. But above discussion 
reveals that most of the bills passed in the JS were not earlier sent to the standing committees 
for detailed review. Most of the bills were hurriedly passed in the House. The committees had 
little opportunity to alter or amend these bills. For the following reasons legislative proposals 
did not receive proper attention in the course of securitization. Firstly, the government had an 
upper hand on legislative committee process as the committee chairs and majority members 
were appointed from the majority party. The members belonging to the government party 
were not intended to scrutinize the bills rigorously particularly if the bills were related to the 
interests of the government. On the contrary the opposition members had a little chance to 
amend the bill successfully. It is therefore observed that the government bills were not altered 
or massively amended at the committee stages. Recommendations and suggestions were 
mostly made on linguistic problems or vagueness. Major recommendations or amendments 
brought by the opposition members aimed at changing the government strategy were mostly 
rejected in the committees by the vote of the majority members belonging to the government 
party. Though, in few cases the opposition members recorded their note of dissents against 
the bills. Three of such bills were passed in the eighth JS ignoring the note of dissents made 
by the opposition members. For example, the International Financial Organizations 
                                                 
17 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., p.84. 
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(Amendment) Act, 2004 was placed in the parliament in 2005 amid widespread criticism by 
the opposition political parties. While the bill was scrutinized in the standing committee, the 
main opposition committee members gave note of dissent and walked out from the committee 
meeting, terming it a violation of constitution and democracy. The standing committee later 
finalized the bill and submitted the report to the house without inclusion of ‘note of dissent’ 
made by an opposition member. While the report was placed in the floor, an opposition party 
member again alleged in the floor that he had submitted eight amendments on the bill but 
those were not incorporated in the committee report. While he gave such a statement, the 
House turned into a chaotic situation with widespread shouting by the main opposition party 
legislators. Although the Speaker assured them to include their amendments but the bill was 
finally placed on the floor with the consent of the Speaker for consideration without 
incorporating the amendments brought by the opposition party. The bill was at last passed in 
2006 with a walk out staged by the main opposition party.18   
 
Secondly, the majority members of a committee can delay the legislation, if they desire so. In 
most cases this strategy was applied by the members belonging to the government party. 
Some bills were buried in the committees because of the government strategy. For example, 
the Bill for separation of the judiciary from the executive was not passed in the eighth JS due 
to the government’s insincerity. The bill was introduced in the House on February 26, 2006 
and it was referred to the standing committee on Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs for 
scrutiny and submission of report within two months. Although, the committee held six 
meetings but it did not even start the process of scrutinizing the bill. The committee did not 
make any scrutiny report on the bill, although the House extended time for preparing the 
committee report on several occasions. Finally, the effectiveness of the bill was lapsed with 
the dissolution of the eighth JS on October 27, 2006.19 Another example was also found in 
the eighth JS: the Bank Company Act 1991 Amendment Bill slept in the Standing Committee 
on Ministry of Finance for more than 27 months since 2004. There was an allegation that the 
government lingered the process of legislation to satisfy the powerful bank owners with 
stakes in policymaking and politics. One of the committee members said with an interview 
that an influential group of the government party did not want to pass such a bill. As a result 
the committee chairperson did not take any initiative to review the bill, or to call any meeting 
for examining this bill. The bill was finally lapsed with the end of the eighth parliament.20 In 
                                                 
18 The New Nation , Mon, 25 Sep 2006 
19 Weekly Holiday, November 23, 2006. 
20 The New Age, September, 27, 2006.  
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these circumstances, the committees had little opportunity to put their effort in the legislative 
process. 
 
Excessive party control over the committee members was another limitation in making the 
committees effective. Under the party government, the legislators can take initiatives for 
making law or bringing amendments in the existing law but cannot go beyond their party line. 
Article 70 of the Constitution makes them loyal to their own party because this Article 
restricts the legislators to vote in the parliament against his/her party. Therefore the 
committee members coming from the government or alliance party more frequently 
advocated government policies and the members belonging to the opposition party tended to 
stand against them in the committee process. In some cases, the opposition members not only 
gave ‘note of dissent’, they also walked out from the committee session. The committee 
thereafter finalized the decision in absence of the opposition members. It is argued that 
mutual intolerance between the two major parties and bi-partisanship makes it difficult for 
the committees to act as a platform of legislative compromise.21 For example, during the 
period of the seventh JS, ‘Public Safety’ bill was piloted by the Home Minster and it was 
introduced at the Private Members Day on 28 January 2000. The Bill was sent to the relevant 
standing committee on the same day. Thereafter, the committee chairperson called an 
emergency meeting the next day for scrutinizing the bill. During the placement of the bill in 
the committee, the committee members belonging to the main opposition party (BNP) termed 
the bill as 'objectionable’, ‘black law’ and ‘violation of democracy' . Rejecting their 
allegation the then Home Minister, Altaf Hossain Chowdhury argued, "It's not a black law. It 
will be used against criminals and not against any gentleman".22 In the course of 
securitization of this bill, the opposition members gave a note of dissent and walked out from 
the meeting. In absence of the main opposition party the committee hurriedly finalized the 
bill and submitted a report recommending for its passage. The bill was later passed in the 
House without the presence of the main opposition party. The cases cited above showed that 
the members had worked in the parliamentary committees according to their party line. The 
confrontational politics between the two major political parties prevented friendly 
deliberations in the committees.   
 
                                                 
21 Prothom Alo, 29 January, 2000; Hasanuzzaman, Al Masud (2000), “Rule Making in Bangladesh: Case of 
Seventh Parliament”, Asian Studies, Journal of the Department of Government & Politics, Jahangirnagar 
University, Bangladesh, Vol. 19, p.8.    
22 The Hindu April 9, 2002. 
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Concerning private members’ bills, three shortcomings are identified which prevented the 
legislation. First, a large number of private members’ bills were dropped at various levels of 
legislation process. Secondly, the CMBR takes a long time for the examination of bills and 
does not submit its report in proper time. In some cases, the CMBR delays the scrutinizing 
process if the government desires to delay legislation process. For example, the Indemnity 
(Repeal) Bill, 1991 was not referred back to the House for final vote until the end of the fifth 
JS as the government felt embarrassed with some provisions of this bill. Similar situation 
occurred in the seventh JS. The Constitution (14th Amendment) Bill (Parliamentary 
Privilege), 1997 slept in the committee for several months and finally it was buried in the 
House.23 Thirdly, it is observed in eighth JS that the Speaker either delayed or did not 
introduce some of the private members’ bills to the House. Therefore, the committee 
members accused the Speaker for violating rules and making the CMBR dysfunctional. The 
example cited bellow shows that private members’ bills had limited scope to become law in 
the JS(Box 7.1).  
 
Box 7.1 Puzzle of Processing Private Members Bills  
In the early January 2005, during the tenure of the eighth JS, the committee on the Private 
Members Bills and Regulations recommended a bill related to special privileges and power bill 
2002 for discussion in the House. The Speaker sent the bill to the President for his approval 
treating the bill as money bill. However, the committee had not certified it as money bill. The 
committee chairperson and the members became unhappy at such a decision and criticized his 
decision. They expressed their sentiment at a meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Private Members Bills and Resolutions, which observed that most of the decisions and 
recommendations made by the committee remained stalled for years.  The Speaker did not take any 
step to pass the private members bills, some of those seeking constitutional amendment, 
recommended by the committee. They accused the Speaker for making the committee non-
functional and threatened him that they would quit the parliament if he continues to the ignore 
committee’s recommendations. 
 
The committee members from both the opposition and the government Party untidily demanded for 
allowing private members’ bills recommended by the committee to be placed in the parliament. 
They asked the Speaker to initiate steps that would allow the lawmakers to place the bills finalized 
by the committee. Both the government and the opposition legislators in the committee on the 
Private Members Bills and Regulations criticized the Speaker with a heated discussion in a meeting 
and thereafter they stopped scrutinizing any new bill. The crisis was geared up again when the law 
ministry issued an instruction with the approval of highest authority to their legislators asking to 
consult with the Prime Minister before piloting any private members bills, otherwise they might, 
under the Article 70, lose their membership of the House. The members of the committee on 
                                                 
23 M. Abdul Latif Mondal, “Restrictions on BNP’S MPs”, the Daily Star, March 17, 2005 
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private members' bills and resolutions pressured the law ministry to withdraw the instruction. They 
argued that such instruction was not in consonance with the Rules of procedure. The ROP does not 
require a private member of a ruling party to take permission from the Leader of the House or the 
party's parliamentary wing before moving a bill in the parliament. However, the law minister 
claimed that it was made to avoid embarrassment of opposing a bill moved by a ruling party 
lawmaker.  
Source: Weekly Holiday, January 7, 2005. 
 
Regarding legislation by ordinances, it is observed that the ordinances that were turned into 
bills passed in the fifth and the eighth JS were not earlier sent to any committee for detailed 
review. The seventh JS was an exception to that case. The parliament passed 16 ordinances as 
bills, of them nine bills were earlier referred to special committee but other seven bills were 
passed without being scrutinized by any committee. For example, the ordinance titled “The 
Suppression of Terrorists Ordinance 1992” was promulgated by the President when a similar 
bill was under consideration of the standing committee on Law, Justice and Parliamentary 
Affairs. The ordinance was later passed in the House as a bill escaping the committee stage. 
Therefore, the bill, which was waiting in the committee, became lapsed just before the 
submission of its report. The legislators of the main opposition party strongly protested against 
this incident and moved a motion for disapproval of the ordinances placed in the House, but 
the government defeated their motions by using their majority votes in the parliament. The 
opposition legislators argued that such practices greatly reduced the prestige and power of the 
standing committees. 24 It was in fact an impingement on the sovereignty of the JS.  
 
7.2 Committees in Overseeing Process  
 
 
The committee system is one of the powerful oversight tools that offer legislators a means to 
make the government behave. They are appointed in the parliaments to keep a check on the 
activities of the executive. In doing so, the committees are given considerable power set out 
in the relevant law. Carrying out oversight functions effectively the committees have 
extensive power to request written answers from the government agencies. They are also 
given power to call for the persons including the ministers and the civil servants for obtaining 
information by posing direct question. The committees have power to invite experts and 
various elements of the society to comment on the effectiveness or efficiency of government 
programs. For scrutinizing government activities the committees are delegated power to 
investigate specific government policy or performance. In doing so, the committees can 
                                                 
24 Hasanuzzaman, Al Masud (1998), op cit., p.161; Ahmed, Nizam (2202), op. cit., pp.  86 and 202. 
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summon any person to appear before them and can hold public hearing. The purpose of 
public hearing is to clarify and test the evidence that already provided with witness. In most 
cases hearing takes place in public where general public and media representatives are 
allowed to attend.  25      
 
Like other parliaments, the Bangladesh JS also delegated considerable power to the 
committees to enable them to carry out their overseeing functions. In accordance with the 
ROP, the committees can sit with the distinguished citizens, important legislators, experts, 
civil servants, interests groups’ representatives and academia for discussing executive’s 
wrongdoings. Having oversight responsibility, the committee keeps track of what 
departments and agencies are doing by monitoring implementation of the projects under 
respective ministries. In this regard, the committees can also request for reports on specific 
agency’s practices and operations to determine whether the laws and programs are 
implemented or not or weather the program should be continued or not. However, in the 
Bangladesh parliament the committees are not given power to hold hearing in either public or 
private; they can request the ministers, the civil servants and the armed forces staff to be 
present before the committee meeting personally. Necessary information is gathered from 
their witness. In accordance with the Article 76(2) of the Constitution, the parliamentary 
committees are empowered to investigate or inquire into the activities or administration of a 
Ministry. For detailed investigation committee itself can visit places or institutions and can 
talk with relevant persons to find irregularities and mismanagement.  
 
There are several ways of measuring the efforts of committees in the overseeing process. 
Among important variables number of meetings held per year, attendance of members and 
ministers in the committee meeting, number of sub-committees formed and number of reports 
submitted are generally used to measure the working of the committees. The following 
sections separately focus on the working of the selected ministerial standing committees, the 
financial committees, the scrutinizing committees and the investigative committees. It is 
worth mentioning that the financial committees: the Public Accounts Committee, the Public 
Undertakings Committee and the Estimates Committee are set up in the JS for sanctioning, 
scrutinizing and monitoring of public expenditure while ministerial standing committees 
                                                 
25 Whaley, John and Benda, Susan R. (2000), “Strengthening Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive 
Relations”, Legislative Research Series, Paper No.6, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 
(NDI), p.28; House of Representatives Info sheet: Committees, No.4, Canberra : House of Representatives, 
December 2006. 
 
  - 176 -
oversee the government activities. The Government Assurance Committee and the Petitions 
Committee are by nature scrutinizing and investigating committees respectively.  
 
Working of the Ministerial Standing Committees  
 
Before discussing the working of the MSC in the post-1990 parliaments, it should be 
mentioned here that the first JS had no provision for setting up the ministerial standing 
committees; it had only eleven non-ministerial standing committees including the PAC and 
the EC. The ministerial standing committees were first introduced in the second JS but the 
Third JS did not set up any MSC. Committees were apparently inactive during the period of 
the first JS, the third JS and the fourth JS. Parliamentary committees of the first JS and the 
third JS did not submit any report. Among the ministerial standing committees set up in the 
second JS only one committee submitted a report to the House while in the fourth JS three 
MSCs submitted one report each.  
 
Apparently, the committee activities have been improved in the post 1990s parliaments both 
in terms of convening meetings and submitting reports to the House. Some of the standing 
committees, however, failed to meet and to submit report as per the Rules of Procedure.26 As 
shown in the Table 7.3 and Appendix IV, the standing committees of the eighth JS were more 
active in terms of convening meetings and preparing reports than their counterparts in the 
fifth and the seventh parliaments. As it is calculated, on an average, the standing committees 
of the eighth JS held 7.5 meetings, a year while the fifth and the seventh JS convened 6.8 and 
6.9 meetings per year respectively. There was an allegation against the chairperson of the 
Standing Committee on Ministry of Home for not holding committee meeting regularly. The 
law makers belonging to main opposition party suspected that the Speaker had not arranged 
any meeting for a long time to avoid the discussion on the ‘illegal’ president’s clemency 
given to former Juba Dal leader Mohiuddin Jintu.27 However, it is mandatory to hold the 
meeting of the standing committee every month as per the section of 248 of the rules of 
procedures of the parliament. Some of the committees failed to hold their regular monthly 
meetings.  
 
                                                 
26 The rule 248 of the ROP of Bangladesh Parliament stipulated that each standing committee shall meet at least 
once in the month. 
27 The order for the clemency given to the former president of Sweden unit BNP, Jintu, who was awarded death 
penalty by martial law court. New Age August 2, 2005. 
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The report prepared by the ministerial standing committees in the fifth JS was lower than 
their counterparts in the seventh and the eighth JS (Table7.2). The ministerial standing 
committees submitted 34 reports in the eighth JS. But the number of reports prepared by the 
non-ministerial standing committees was lower than their counterparts in the fifth and the 
seventh JS. It is worth mentioning that the most of the committee reports were submitted at 
the last three sessions. Therefore the findings and the recommendations of the standing 
committees had no chance to be discussed in the public forum. As discussed earlier, the Rules 
of procedure does specifically mentions that the ministerial standing committees shall have to 
submit report to the House relating their activities. There is also no provision in the Rules of 
Procedure for discussing committee report in the floor. In this regard the committee members 
and the academia demanded changes in the provision of the Rules of procedure by adding 
reporting provision and they argued that the committee report should be discussed in the 
floor. 28     
Table 7.2 Comparative Nature of Committee Activities in the Bangladesh JS 
 
Activities 5th JS 
(April 1991-
Nov.1994) 
7th JS 
(July 1996-
July2001) 
8th JS 
(Oct. 2001-
Oct. 2006) 
Number of Plenary Session 22 23 23 
Number of Plenary Sitting 400 382 373 
Number of MSC 35 35 37 
Number of NMSC 14 14 14 
Number of Special Committee  5 1 0 
Number of Sub-Committees 53 119 134 
Number of Standing Committee Meeting 1465 1493 1242 
Yearly av. meeting for each committee∗ 6.8 6.9 7.5 
Number of Sub-Committee  Meeting 136 455 321 
Yearly av. meeting for each Sub committee 0.5 0.76 0.5 
No. of Reports submitted by MSC 13 12 34 
No. of Reports submitted by NMSC 28 16 13 
Number of total Report submitted 41 28 47 
No. of MSCs did not submit report 22 23 5 
No. of NMSCs did not submit report 4 6 4 
∗Note: Departmental standing parliamentary committees were not duly formed. Standing committees worked in 
the fifth and seventh JS on average fifty-five months. In the eighth JS, committees were first formed in January 
2003 and were reconstituted in their full shape on September 16, 2004. Number of average meeting is calculated 
based on their actual working period.  
                                                 
28 Based on personal interview with committee members and academia, June 2007.  
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It was observed that with a few exceptions, committee members were reluctant to attend 
meetings regularly. Among the MSC, the average number of members present in the 
committee meetings varied from 4 to 8 persons. In the fifth JS, the Standing Committee on 
the Ministry of Finance conducted its meeting with the presence of the lowest number of 
members (on an average four persons). On the contrary, the highest numbers of members 
(seven persons) were present at the meeting of the Public Accounts Committee. In the 
seventh JS, on average two and three persons were present at the meetings of the Standing 
Committee on the Ministry of Planning and Standing Committee on the Ministry of Social 
Affairs Committee respectively. However, the attendance of the members of the Public 
Accounts Committee remained as before. It is observed that the presence of the members in 
the committee meetings was getting better in the eighth JS. The record reveals that most of 
the standing committees (64%) of the eighth JS convened their meetings with the presence of 
more than six members; for example, on an average, more than seven persons were present at 
the meetings of the Finance Committee, Post & Telecommunication Committee, Shipping 
Committee and the PAC. 
 
Available statistics revealed that some of the committee members did not show their 
seriousness in the committee process and even they did not attend committee meeting 
regularly. For example, the Standing Committee on the Ministry of Social Affairs conducted 
33 meetings during the period of the eighth JS. Among these meetings, the chairperson was 
present at all the meetings and eight members attended 12 to 20 meetings while one member 
was not present in any committee meeting. Another example is the Defense Committee which 
conducted most of its meetings with the presence of three to five members. Since the 
beginning of the fifth JS, the committee could not conduct any meeting with the presence of 
all the members. Most of the members, who did not attend the committee meetings regularly, 
came from the business profession.  The TIB in their study report shows that the legislators 
with business background were more interested in money-related pre-occupations, rather than 
parliamentary business. They often created the quorum crisis.29   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Parliament Watch:2005(15th to 19th Session, Eighth Parliament), Transparency International Bangladesh, 
Dhaka, June 2006, pp.44-45 .   
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Table 7.3:  Activities of the Parliamentary Committees (1991-2006) 
No. of meeting held  No. of  Sub-
committees Formed 
No. of Report 
Submitted 
    Types of Committees 
5th JS 7th JS 8th JS 5th JS 7th JS 8th JS 5th JS 7th JS 8th JS
MSCs  1118 1175 982 38 107 102 13 12 34 
NMSCs (11)          
a) Investigative Committees           
CP  23 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
PC 27 10 2 0 0  2 1 1 
b) Financial Committees            
PAC 52 103 46 4 1 9 4 3 1 
PUC 40 26 49 4 3 3 2 0 2 
PEC 27 23 27 5 7 11 0 0 2 
C) House Keeping 
Committees     
         
BAC 46 37 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CMB&R 23 43 33 0 1 1 10 8 5 
CRP 15 13 11 0 1 1 1 1 1 
d) Service Committees           
HC 20 7 19 0 0 8 0 0 0 
LC 5 3 1 0   0 0 0 
e) Scrutinizing Committees           
GAC 4 48 37 2 0 1 1 1 1 
Ad hoc Committees          
a) Select Committees  13 
(2) 
3 - - - - 7 2 - 
b) Special Committees  15(5) 36 - - - - 3 3 - 
Grand Total 1428 1528 1242 53 120 137 44 31 47 
Note:  MSC-Ministerial Standing Committees, PAC-Public Accounts Committee, EC-Estimate Committee, 
PUB-Public Undertaking Committee, CP-Committee on Privileges, PC-Petition Committee, GAC-Government 
Assurances Committee, BAC-Business Advisory Committee, MB & R- Committee on Private Members’ Bill & 
Resolutions, CRP-Committee on Rules of Procedures, HC-House Committee, LC-Library Committee, SCB-
Select Committee on Bills, SC-Special Committee. Number of select committees and special  committees were 
formed shown in the bracket. Source: Calculated by the researcher from the Jatiya Sangsader Karjobaher 
Sarangsho (Proceedings of the Parliament), 1991-2006. 
 
The attendance of the ministers to the ministerial standing committee meetings was not 
satisfactory in the seventh and the eighth JSs. As in the fifth JS, the committees were headed 
by the ministers they had to attend the committee meetings regularly. However, nearly 47 
percent of the committees failed to call more than 30 meetings because the committee 
chairpersons were busy with their ministries rather than the committees. Since the seventh JS, 
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the ministerial standing committees have been formed with non-minister members as 
chairpersons. It was observed that the ministers were reluctant to attend the committee 
meetings regularly. During the period of the eighth JS, nearly 60 percent of the ministers did 
not attend the committee meetings regularly. Even the Prime Minister who was a member of 
the Defense Committee was mostly absent from the meetings. During the period of the fifth 
JS, the Prime Minister nominated a member from the house as her representative and he 
presided over the meetings. Exceptionally in the seventh JS, the Prime Minister as a member 
of Defense Committee was present in one meeting. From these examples and statistics of the 
various ministerial standing committees, it is revealed that the ministers did not take their 
responsibility seriously.  
 
Most of the ministerial standing committees of the fifth and the seventh parliament did not 
submit any report (Table 7.2 & 7.3). In the fifth JS, 13 MSCs submitted one report each; of 
them 12 reports were submitted at the closing session and the other 23 committees (64 %) 
failed to submit any report. Similar numbers of reports were also submitted by the MSCs 
during the period of the seventh JS. The situation considerably improved in the eighth JS as 
nearly 84% MSCs submitted their report to the House. Altogether 31 ministerial standing 
committees submitted 34 reports; among them twenty-nine MSCs prepared one report each, 
the Defense committee submitted three reports and the Post and Tele-Communication 
committee submitted two reports. On the contrary, six ministerial standing committees 
including the standing committees on the Ministry of Establishment, Home Affairs, Housing 
and Public Works, Textile and Jute, Women and Children Affairs, and Commerce did not 
produce any report. It was also observed that nearly 77 percent of the reports were submitted 
at the closing session of the eighth parliament and therefore no follow-up action could be 
taken.30 It should be mentioned here that there is an unwritten rule or practice in the JS that 
the committee reports presented in the House shall not be discussed. A report of this kind 
when presented in the House is considered to have been referred to the concerned ministry 
for implementation. 
 
It was observed that some of the MSCs played active roles in the overseeing process. 
However, some of the ministerial standing committees could not fulfill the meeting 
requirement as per the ROP. Among the MSCs, comparatively speaking, the standing 
                                                 
30Fahreen Alamgir, Tanvir Mahmud, and Iftekharuzzaman, Corruption and Parliamentary Oversight:    Primacy 
of the Political Will”, Presented at the Seminar to mark the International Anti-Corruption Day, Dhaka, 9 
December 2006, organized by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB). 
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committees on the Ministry of Defense, Communication, Shipping, Health, Finance, 
Agriculture, Education and Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral resources appeared to be 
very active in detecting the gross irregularities and mismanagement in the government 
organizations. It is very difficult to know the activities of those standing committees that did 
not submit any report. Particularly the Parliament Secretariat or the committee offices did not 
preserve any document regarding the working of the MSCs in the fifth JS. Among the most 
active committees the Standing Committee (SC) on Ministry of Defense, the SC on Ministry 
of Communication, the SC on Ministry of Shipping and the SC on Ministry of Agriculture are 
purposively chosen for detailed discussion.  
Standing Committee on Ministry of Defense  
Amongst the ministerial standing committees, the Standing Committee on the Ministry of 
Defense (later Defense Committee) is the only committee of its kind that particularly 
scrutinizes the activities of the armed forces. From the beginning of the fifth JS, the Defense 
Committee started to look into the sensitive armed forces issues.  Including the Chiefs of the 
Army, the Navy and the Air force, the high officials were called before the committee 
meeting for witness. Ahmed identified three interrelated factors, which created a relatively 
autonomous space for the Defense Committee to promote greater civilian control over the 
armed forces. First, intense competition between the two major political parties influenced 
the opposition party members who were represented in the Defense Committee to restrict any 
possible alliance between the government party and the military. Second, the civil society and 
the media were active in constructing a public space for debating issues of the military’s 
accountability. Third, the pressure from the donors for democratization of the armed forces 
and their involvement in the international peacekeeping mission reduced the risk of challenge 
by the military prerogatives.31 
 
Since the beginning of the fifth JS, the Defense committee took initiative for questioning the 
Defense purchases, budget, Defense policy, civil recruitment, pension and other facilities. 
The committee also intended to reveal the irregularities in the armed forces. For the first time 
in Bangladesh, the committee dealt with the irregularities in Defense purchases. During the 
period of the seventh JS, the Defenec Committee first dealt with the frigate purchase from a 
Korean bank port company, for the Bangladesh Navy, in November 1999. The former Navy 
                                                 
31 Ahmed, Syed Imtiaz (2006), “Civilian Supremacy in Democracies with ‘Fault Lines’: The Role of the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense in Bangladesh”, Democratization, Vol. 13, No., 2, p.291. 
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chief and high officials were asked to witness before the Defense Committee with relevant 
documents. The committee members suspected irregularities in purchasing the frigate. During 
the period of the seventh JS the committee also scrutinized the purchase of Mig-29. In the 
course of scrutinizing the Defense purchasing the committee members, particularly from the 
opposition side, raised questions about the irregularities in purchasing of eight MIG-29 
aircrafts from the Russian Federation, by the Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) in 1999 under a 
military technical co-operation agreement with the Russian Federation. The purchase was 
made with 30% advance payment of the total amount of US $ 123.98 million.  
 
Regarding Mig-29, the Defense Committee members, particularly the opposition members 
alleged that purchasing these old aircrafts would be a misuse of public funds. They also 
alleged that the mode of purchase agreement lacked transparency. Therefore, they demanded 
it to be included in the committee agenda for detailed discussion. However, the committee 
chairperson and other members from the party in power were not interested to discuss this 
issue. The committee chairperson even tried to withdraw the issue from the agenda just 
before the meeting. The committee finally decided to review this matter in its 12th meeting, 
but the government officials and the armed force officials were reluctant to hand over the 
related papers to the committee. In the mean time Major (retd.) Aktharuzzaman, a member of 
the Defense Committee belonging to the main opposition party instituted a suit in the High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court in September 1999 against this purchase. Upon his writ 
petition, the High Court Division issued a Rule Nisi on the Government and ordered to stop 
further payment. The court asked the government to explain why the purchase agreement 
should not be declared illegal. This issue was hanging in the court until March 2000. While 
the court finally rejected the writ petition, the government went ahead to buy Mig-29.32  
 
The Mig-29 issue was again discussed in the Standing Defense Committee during the period 
of the eighth JS. Most of the committee members belonging to the government party accused 
the former AL government for misusing public money in purchasing Mig-29. However, the 
AL parliamentary party members rejected their allegation in a committee meeting and sent a 
rejoinder to the newspapers. This rejoinder was also posted in their homepage. In this letter, 
they argued that the frigate and Mig-29 were bought by following all necessary procedures 
for such a purchase. 
 
                                                 
32 Ahmed, Syed Imtiaz,  op. cit., p.292 
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The major effort of the Defense committee of the seventh JS was to take a decision for 
revocation of the court martial judgments in 1981 that convicted 37 army officers, of whom 
13 were hanged for the killing of President Ziaur Rahman. Cornel(retd.) Sahwkat Ali played 
a vital role in bringing this issue to the committee. A sub-committee was formed with three 
members to revoke the decision. The committee challenged the conviction of 37 army 
officers and the forced retirement of three hundred air force staff. But the committee could 
not review the court-martial decision as the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces Division 
did not provide the papers which were requested to be placed before the committees. The 
Armed Forces Division and the Defense Ministry delayed for more than one year but did not 
submit any paper.   At the committee meeting, held on 3 September 2000, the then Army 
Chief denied finally to show the court-martial proceedings before the committee. He argued 
that “the proceedings are confirmed or reviewed by the Services Chiefs and not reviewed by 
the President who is also the Supreme Commander of Armed Force or by the Judges of the 
Supreme Court and High Court”.33  However, he told the members keeping the microphone 
off, that there were some irregularities during the trial. The committee chairperson also 
suspected that some relevant provisions of the Army Act and Rules were violated during the 
trial.34 The discussions in the committee and then decisions taken were projected in the front 
page of all the major daily newspapers followed by analyses by some Army officers and 
lawyers. Talking with the media, General Ibrahim marked this committee decision as “a 
landmark decision to establish human rights, civilian control over the Armed Forces and to 
strengthen democratic institutions”.35 The committee also attempted to find out the 
irregularities in the military coup led by General H.H. Ershad in 1982 and a coup led by Lt. 
General Abu Saleh Mohamad Nasim in 1996.      
 
Apart from detecting the irregularities, the Defense committee scrutinized and discussed the 
Defense purchases, the budget and the Defense policy along with other issues. As most of the 
Defense Committee members of the eighth JS came from the Defense (80%) background, 
they had interests to go deep into the armed forces issues with their own professional 
experiences.        
 
There is no Defense policy in the country. In the eighth JS, the Defense Committee took 
initiative for making the Defense policy for the armed forces. The Committee in its fifth 
                                                 
33 The Sangbad, 28 September 2000.  
34 The Daily Star, 4 October 2000. 
35 The Daily Star, 4 October 2000, Protho Alo (Bengali News Paper), 4 October 2000. 
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meeting held on 17 December 2003, asked the Armed Forces Division (AFD) to formulate a 
Defense Policy. This issue was also discussed in the Defense Committee during the period of 
the seventh JS. Following the committee decision, the AFD appointed a committee with 
eleven members to prepare a draft policy in line with the country's foreign policy. Though the 
draft report was supposed to be presented to the Defense committee, the committee appointed 
by the AFD could not prepare the draft report timely.36 
 
The next major work of the Defense Committee was to review the armed forces budgetary 
allocation policy and its rationale in its ninth meeting held in April 2004. The Navy chief, the 
secretary of the Defense ministry and the army CGS were present in the meeting for 
explaining the committee about the budget allocation procedure and the problems. The 
committee recommended for modernizing the financial rules and asked them to ensure 
transparency on financial matters. Apart from the financial matter, the committee also 
discussed the role of the Navy in ensuring the security of the Territorial Water and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone. This issue was again discussed in the next 26th meeting. The 
committee recommended for modernizing the Navy with modern equipments.  
 
Among the issues discussed in the Defense Committee, the purchasing of Multi-role Combat 
fighters received special attention. The opposition members of this committee raised 
allegations of anomalies in purchasing the Combat fighters. They accused the government 
high-up and some of their party members of being involved in the irregularities in purchasing 
16 Multi-role Combat fighters and helicopters from China for the Bangladesh Air Force 
(BAF) in 2004. They claimed that the expenditure of the purchase increased after the 
budgetary offer for providing them with extra financial benefits. Answering to a question in 
the House in February 2006, the Air Force chief informed the committee that the actual 
budgetary offer for the 16 fighters was $117.9 million but he did not mention the extra cost.37 
While Major (retd,) Hafizuddin Ahmed, on behalf of the Defense Minster, informed the 
committee that the actual price of the 16 aircraft in the budgetary offer was $120 million and 
$15.4 million to cover some additional items and shipping costs. The shipment and other 
charges again increased to $24.3 million. Opposition members pointed out the differences 
between the statement of the Air Force Chief and Major (retd.) Hafizuddin about the price of 
aircrafts.  They alleged that if he told the committee only the basic price, it was also higher 
                                                 
36 1st and 3rd Report of the Standing Committee on Ministry of Defense of Bangladesh Parliament (in Bengali), 
September, 2004 and September 2006.    
37 The Daily Somokal, 17 February 2007 
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than the cost mentioned by the Air Force Cheif. Major (retd.) Hafizuddin did not explain how 
and why this extra expenditure soared to $24.3 million. So, the mismatch between the offer 
and the claimed cost becomes even more dubious.38  
 
The Defense Committee members suspected irregularities in purchasing the fighter planes 
and helicopters through ‘government to government’ discussion bypassing the Defense 
ministry. Cornel (retd.) Shawkat Ali, a Defense committee member of the main opposition 
party, alleged that the purchase procedure was not transparent. He suspected that a third party 
was benefited by the purchase procedure. In his words, “I am sure a third party was between 
the two sides and took commission from the procurement.”39  Echoing Cornel (retd.) Shawkat 
Ali, committee members belonging to the main opposition party questioned about fairness of 
the procurement process and claimed to set up a sub- committee to find out the irregularities. 
But the committee members belonging to the ruling party, particularly Major (retd.) Syed 
Eskandar rejected their demand. It was alleged that Major (retd.) Eskandar was involved in 
this unfair deal along with his business firm named ‘ABR Traders’.40 The members belonging 
to the government party raised their strong objections against the formation of any sub-
committee. Therefore, no sub-committee was formed and this issue was closed in the 31st 
meeting on 27 July 2006. The committee chairperson told the committee that the 
anticorruption and other government agencies would handle the issue if there were any 
irregularity. The eight fighters were finally handed over and fled into Bangladesh by the Air 
Force pilots in March 2005. Thus, it was proved that the shipment cost was intentionally 
increased to provide commissions for some groups of people. 
 
The Defense Committee scrutinized the report on the accident of PT-6 training frigate on 24 
April 2006 submitted by the Bangladesh Air Force. Examining the report, the committee 
recommended the air force to take measures for reducing the accident rate. The committee 
also discussed the activities of the Army Welfare Oraganization and the production capability 
of the Bangladesh Ordnance Factory. The Defense committee visited the Bangladesh 
Ordnance Factory (BOF) and Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory run by the Bangladesh 
Army. After visiting the Bangladesh Ordnance Factory, the committee chairperson, suggested 
the BOF commandant to send a proposal to the Defense ministry for modernizing the factory. 
                                                 
38 The Daily Star, April 17, 2006. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Major (retd.) Syed Eskandar established his business firm for dealing armed forces purchases after the 
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The committee asked the Bangladesh Ordnance Factory authorities to increase its production 
and supply to the paramilitary forces and the civil sectors. The committee visited the 
Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory used to assemble vehicles for the armed forces and 
supply to other organizations as per work orders. The committee asked the PDB, the REB 
and the Bangladesh Railway for sending work orders for flourishing this factory. Apart from 
these issues, the committee also discussed the service rule and structure, activities of the 
Bangladesh Armed Forces Medical College Hospital and the financial benefits for the 
gallantry award holders and their families. Including the Chief of the Army, the Navy and the 
Air Forces, the C&AG, the Secretary of the Defense Ministry and other high officials of the 
armed forces were present in the committee meetings for providing information and expert 
opinion on particular matters. Although the Defense Committee was active in scrutinizing 
armed forces issues but most of the decisions and recommendations made by the committee 
were not properly implemented. In the words of the Defense Committee chairperson, “Even 
though the committees take decisions and make recommendations in presence of ministers, 
the recommendations are not implemented."41     
 
Standing Committee on Ministry of Communication  
 
The TIB had leveled the Ministry of Communication as the most corrupt ministry in its report 
published in 2004. In reaction to this the Communication Minister blasted the TIB rejecting 
the report at a meeting of the standing committee on the Ministry of Communication (later 
Communication Committee) on 2 October 2005. He requested the committee for taking legal 
action against the organization for smearing the government. According to his request, a sub-
committee was formed at the same meeting for looking into the basis of the TIB report and 
taking legal action against it. The sub-committee was supposed to submit its report within a 
month of its formation but the committee could not meet as the Minister and the government 
high officials avoided the supply of necessary documents.  
 
The Communication minister, Barrister Nazmul Huda along with the state minister were 
alleged for gross irregularities in awarding licenses for importing and marketing CNG-run 
auto-rickshaws and allocation of land to set up CNG filling stations. Including the ruling 
BNP lawmaker SA Khaleq, the legislators in the House accused the state minister for 
communications of taking Tk 25 lakh as bribe to allocate land for setting up CNG refueling 
                                                 
41 The Daily Star March 2, 2005. 
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station in the capital.42 The major national newspapers published several news and reports 
projecting the allegations against the Communication Minister. Based on the allegations 
published in the newspapers, the second and third sub-committees were formed accordingly, 
to investigate the allegations of corruption regarding the import of CNG-run auto-rickshaws 
and allocation of land to set up CNG filling stations.43 But the Communication Committee 
failed to scrutinize the anomalies in the Ministry concerned and prepare report due to the lack 
of cooperation of the ministry and tremendous pressure from the party high ups.44 However, 
the parliamentary committee could not prove the irregularities of the Communication 
Minister. At last, he was arrested for the aforesaid allegations on 4 February 2007 by the 
Army-led joint forces during the period of the Caretaker Government of Dr. Fakruddin.  
 
Apart from the allegations against the Communication Minister and his ministry, during the 
period of the eighth JS, the Communication Committee also dealt with the anomalies at the 
Jamuna Resort Co. Limited, the Roads and High Ways Department and various development 
projects. The committee also reviewed activities of the Bangladesh Railway. The first sub-
committee was formed on 6 November 2003 to find out the anomalies of the Jamuna Resort. 
The sub-committee held five meetings and made some recommendations in its report to solve 
the problems between the ministry and the Jamuna Resort Co. Limited. The Communication 
Committee formed its fourth Sub-committee to review the overall activities of the 
Bangladesh Railway. From the proceedings of the committee report, it appeared that the 
ministry did not follow the recommendations made by the committee. The committee 
chairperson disclosed at the committee meeting that the committee made 56 decisions until 
October 2005 but none of them was implemented as the Communication Minster did not take 
initiative in implementing the committee decisions. Therefore, the committee members 
expressed their deep dissatisfaction and grilled the Communication Minister for his 
wrongdoing. Such a reaction made the party’s high officials annoyed and kept them under 
pressure for their initial hard stand on the irregularities. Syed Manzur Hossain, chairman of 
the standing committee on communications ministry, said his committee came under pressure 
from the government high-ups when it began to probe irregularities and corruption of the 
                                                 
42 The Daily Star, 14 July 2005. 
43 The Daily Star, 16 July 2006. 
44 In an interview, Syed Manzur Hossain, chairman of the Standing Committee on Communications Ministry, 
said his committee came under pressure from the government high-ups when it began to probe irregularities 
and corruption of the ministry. The Daily Star, March 2, 2005. 
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ministry.45 The committees were initially very active in revealing wrongdoing of the different 
ministries, but they lost spirit the later while the government high-ups asked them not to go 
against the ministers. As a result standing committees became ‘paper tiger’, argued Abdul 
Hamid, deputy leader of the AL parliamentary party. He again argued that the government 
failed to implement committee decisions properly as a result committee gradually became 
weaken, in his words, “committeer suparish bastobaoner khetre sorker phel koreche, ebong 
ae karone committeegolo porjaekrome durbol hoe poreche.” 46 
 
Standing Committee on Ministry of Shipping 
 
The standing committee on the Ministry of Shipping (later Shipping Committee) was 
apparently active in the post-1990 parliaments in overseeing the activities of the ministry 
concerned. The Shipping Committee held, on an average, more than nine meetings yearly and 
submitted report on each committee in the last three parliaments. In the eighth parliament, the 
committee was mainly concerned with the irregularities in the shipping sector. Besides 
discussing the activities of the ministry and its subordinate offices, the committee also 
reviewed the implementation of different projects and operational management of the New 
Mooring Container Terminal project. 
 
The BNP led four party alliance government had been amazed with repeated massive launch 
accidents during the period of eighth parliament. Therefore, one of the major attentions of the 
Shipping Committee was to find out the reasons of those accidents. When the committee 
requested, the Shipping Ministry submitted a report identifying the reasons of accidents and 
attempts were made by the ministry for protecting the passengers and goods from accidents.  
It is worth mentioning that 30% of goods and 13% of passengers use river transports. The 
report revealed that overloading, structural faults, unskilled masters and mariners are 
responsible for 69% of the accidents while 15% of accidents occurred due to weather 
problem. This report received a special attention of the committee members. The committee 
detected gross irregularities of MV Nasreen-1, M V Kirtonkhula-1 and 50 vessels of the 
‘Basundhara Group’. It was identified that the Association of Naval Architect and Marin 
Engineers Bangladesh did not properly monitor the making of those vessels and prepared 
                                                 
45 Views are expressed in workshop on “The role of Parliament in Increasing Transparency and Accountability”, 
organized by Transparency International Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1998, the Daily Star, March 2, 2005. 
 
46 Daily Shomkal, Dhaka, October 14, 2005. 
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false report favoring them.47 The shipping committee discussed these issues at its three 
consecutive meetings and made suggestions against the prevailing accidents. The committee 
recommended for strengthening the ‘Bangladesh Shipping Poribahan Odidoptor’ and asked 
the ministry to ensure proper monitoring of ship making and issuing licenses.  The ministry 
was also asked to find out the officials who were involved in approving design and for giving 
rout permits for launching their vessels. However, the committee decisions were not wholly 
implemented.  
 
The Shipping Committee also dealt with the demands of the labor unions. At the presence of 
labor union leaders, local politicians and stevedore’s association leaders, the committee 
discussed their demands, problems and the total strength of the labors of the Mongla Port. 
The committee asked the port authority for restructuring labor union, reducing the total labor 
strength by giving forced retirement and suggesting the ministry concerned to amend the 
Dock Labor (Recruitment-Control) Law 1980. The Mongla port authority was also asked to 
allow the private sector to employ labor privately, for which the employer required the 
consent of the Mongla Port chairperson before the appointment. The committee altogether 
made six decisions for solving the labor issues in the Mongla Port. It was observed that out of 
all the decisions taken by the committee, only one was implemented regarding the prevention 
of new labor from registration. 
 
The proceedings of the Shipping Committee disclosed that the committee set up two sub-
committees during the period of the eighth JS for investigating the land uses like leasing land 
owned by the Chittagong and the Mongla port. The sub-committees were supposed to submit 
their report as early as possible. However, the subcommittees did not prepare any report. The 
Shipping Committee in its 31 meetings scrutinized the irregularities and mismanagement in 
Bangladesh Shipping Corporation, the BIWTC and in the two ports of the country. Some 
cases of irregularities were detected and necessary recommendations were made by the 
committee to stop these anomalies. But they were not properly implemented.48  
 
The Shipping Committee brought allegations against the Shipping Minister for making 
decisions by abusing power. It was alleged that the Minister granted a number of importers 
exemption from paying the port penal charges levied worth over TK. 140 million. He 
                                                 
47 Report of the Standing Committee on Ministry of Shipping, September 2006, p.115 
48 The Report of the Standing Committee on Ministry of Shipping (in Bengali), 2006, Dhaka: The Parliament 
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exempted them from penal charges ranging between 50 and 100 percent on the basis of 
‘special discretion.’ The committee members argued, “The minister could not use his 
discretion unless it is in the interest of the nation or the port or on humanitarian ground.”49 
The Shipping Minster said that he just exercised his discretion power for quick release of 
containers to ease the port congestion. He argued that he had taken that decision for the 
greater interest of the businessmen and the port and by doing this he did not violate the 
existing rule. The standing committee members were not happy with his attitude and 
explanation. They suggested the political leaders including the minister concerned to 
reconcile with the democratic system of accountability. As it was extensively projected in the 
national newspapers, the committee decided to discuss this issue in the next meeting in detail 
but no further discussion took place.50 The story behind the incident was that the inland port 
authority had provided the committee chairperson with a Pajero Jeep and arranged visits to 
Singapore and Malaysia for ten days. In fact, this initiative was taken for the interest of the 
Shipping Minister who had been asked in the committee meeting many awkward questions 
on various malpractices in his ministry.51  
 
The Shipping committee members made controversies by seizing unexpected facilities and 
taking bribes. Among various cases, one was the stevedoring license griped by the committee 
members. The shipping committee in its 17th meeting, held in 4 May 2005, decided to issue 
seven stevedoring licenses for the Chittagong port and five for the Mongla port. The daily 
Prothom Alo explored that at least six committee members from both the opposition and 
ruling party abused their portfolios to issue stevedoring licenses of the Chittagong port for 
seven business firms which were directly or indirectly owned by six committee members.52 
The report also said that the committee members belonging to the opposition bench 
influenced the port authority for issuing license for clearing and forwarding agents for 
handling imported goods worth TK.1700 crore.     
 
 
 
                                                 
49 The New Age, 10 July, 2005 
50 Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad, “Report of the Standing Committee on Ministry of Shipping”, September, 2006, 
p.199.  
51 The Shipping Committee members formally expressed their gratitude to the Speaker, Prime Minister and 
others for providing support them for visiting Singapore and Malaysia in a committee meeting held on 
August 9, 2005, for details see “Report of the Standing Committee on Ministry of Shipping”, September, 
2006, p.203 .  
52 Daily Prothom Alo, Dhaka, May 11,2006. 
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Standing Committee on Ministry of Agriculture 
 
Formation of the Standing Committee on Ministry of Agriculture was delayed like other 
standing committees. The fifth parliament formed the committee in its third session while the 
seventh JS and the eighth JS appointed it in the seventh and the eighth session respectively. 
As shown in the Appendix-1 the committee was more active during the period of the eighth 
JS with regard to holding meeting. In the course of three years covering the period from July 
2003 to October 2006, the committee held 39 meetings and took 197 decisions. The minutes 
of such all meetings shows us that the main attention of the committee was to make 
recommendations for making the activities of the agricultural ministry and its attached 
departments transparent. Three sub-committees were formed to identify the irregularities of 
different projects implemented by the attached departments of the agricultural ministry and 
one sub-committee was formed to make recommendations regarding setting up and selling 
deep tube wells to the framers of the Mymensingh district. During the period of the eighth JS, 
the committee visited China and Vietnam to see their agricultural management. During this 
visit committee members met with ministers concerned and talked with agriculturalists.53   
 
Irregularities of the various departments under the Ministry of Agriculture, anomalies in the 
project implementation and crisis of fertilizer, seeds and pesticides distributions were the 
major issues discussed in the committee meetings. Committee’s dissatisfaction over the crisis 
of fertilizer distribution was widely reported in the national dailies. The committee in its 8th 
meeting recommended the Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC), the agency 
responsible to produce and oversee distribution of fertilizer in Bangladesh, to make easy the 
fertilizer import process so that farmers can get sufficient fertilizer properly. The committee 
members particularly members belonging to the opposition party expressed their deep 
dissatisfaction since ministries concerned did not initiate any step for improving the fertilizer 
management system. In the ninth meeting the committee suggested the BCIC to set up 
necessary cold storages in the northern part of the country for preserving potato, banana and 
vegetables for the off season. Committee’s recommendations to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and attached departments to take necessary actions against the trend of increasing fertilizer, 
seeds and pesticides crisis were partially implemented; most of the decisions were yet to be 
implemented. It was observed that the decisions taken in one meeting were not follow up the 
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status of implementation in the next meeting. There is also evidence that the Committee 
lacked a sense of responsibility in regard to functions entrusted to them by the parliament.54 
The case presented in the Box 7.2 shows us that the Committee some times worked in 
arbitrary manner.   
 
 
Box 7.2 Case of   The Barendra Multi-Purpose Development Authority (BMDA) 
 
The Barendra Multi-Purpose Development Authority (BMDA) is a pubic body set 
up by a resolution of the government in 1989. Its major functions include 
integrated development of some selected districts in Rajshahi Division located in 
the Northwest region. In one of the procurement cases, a supplier called Hasan 
Traders failed to perform and accordingly BMDA forfeited its performance 
guarantee (PG) in accordance with the terms of the contract executed before 1996. 
Hasan Traders filed a number of representations to the Ministry of Agriculture 
claiming that the amount of Taka one million forfeited by BMDA should be given 
back to it because in a similar case, prior to 1996, another supplier’s PG was 
released. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture sent it for disposal by BMDA. BMDA declined to reopen 
the case on the ground that the case cited by Hasan Traders in respect of a similar 
case was not based on facts and further that the Ministry of Agriculture prior to 
1996 gave the order for such release. Hasan Traders kept on pursuing its case. 
Some MPs both inside and outside the Standing Committee for Ministry of 
Agriculture became involved and supported Hasan Traders by way of personal 
approaches to the Secretary who explained the correct position. 
 
The case ultimately caught the attention of the Committee. It became part of the 
agenda for meetings. The Minister for Agriculture requested SC not to reopen the 
case as it was not covered by the terms of the contract signed between BMDA and 
Hasan Traders. The majority members of SC wanted that the PG forfeited by 
BMDA should be released. Ultimately written advice from the SC was sent to the 
Executive Director of BMDA. BMDA sent to back to Ministry of Agriculture 
seeking its instruction on action to be taken on the advice given by SC. Ministry 
of Agriculture thought it prudent not to take any further action on the case. 
 
Source: Ali Shwkaht, A.M.M. (2004), Bangladesh Civil Service: A Political-Administrative 
Perspective, Dhaka: University Press Limited, p.279. 
 
The four different ministerial standing committees, as discussed above, seemed to be active. 
They met more or less regularly and submitted reports. In the course of overseeing 
government activities the committee members were more interested to detect irregularities 
and mismanagement in the ministries concerned rather than policy issues. They appeared to 
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be very much critical about the implementation of government projects and expressed their 
deep dissatisfaction due to gross mismanagement, irregularities and corruption in the 
implementation of development projects. The committee members often and strongly 
criticised the ministers and the senior civil servants for their indifference to the parliamentary 
bodies. They were also critical about the manner through which some senior civil servants 
interacted with the committee members. One example can be cited here. This case occurred 
in October 2003 and it related to a complaint of misconduct by a senior civil servant of a 
committee member. The Standing Committee on Ministry of Agriculture strongly criticized 
the Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture as he denied giving an appointment Alhaj Safi 
Ahmed, member of the Standing Committee on Ministry of Agriculture. The committee also 
requested the Agricultural Minister to take necessary action against the secretary. 55   
 
The committee proceedings unveiled that the ministerial standing committees were confined 
to reviewing some of the routine findings of ministries and other agencies rather than in-
depth investigation into budgetary and implementation performance.56 With few exceptions, 
the committee members had worked in the committees following their party line. Thereby the 
committee members belonging to the opposition party were intended to find out the 
irregularities of the ministry, while the members belonging to the ruling party were reluctant 
regarding this matter. However, in some cases, the committee members from both the ruling 
and opposition party became united to detect particular irregularities. The Ministry of 
Communication is one of those examples. But the ministers and the government high officials 
did not cooperate with them by providing with necessary documents. Most of the committees, 
thus, could not contribute towards investigating against corruption and irregularities of the 
ministries.  
 
Most of the committee chairpersons accused the concerned ministries for negligence in 
implementing their recommendations. As it is calculated of 1,675 recommendations made by 
the different standing committees in the eighth JS, 530 decisions were fully implemented 
while other recommendations were not implemented until October 2005.57 For making the 
parliamentary committees effective in scrutinizing government activities the committee 
                                                 
55 Report of the Standing Committee on Ministry of Agriculture, August,2006, p.5. 
56 The UNDP, Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy, News Letter, January-June, 2005. 
57 Data is calculated from the committee reports and documents provided by the Committee Office II. 
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chairpersons suggested amendment to the constitution by making it mandatory for the 
ministries to carry out the committees' recommendations within a limited time frame.58  
 
7.3 Financial Overseeing 
 
Among the standing committees, three financial committees namely the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC), the Public Undertakings Committee (PUC) and the Estimates Committee 
(PEC) are responsible for keeping the government accountable for its financial actions and 
policies. These three financial committees use number of techniques to ensure financial 
discipline. The following sections focus on the working of three financial committees. 
 
Public Accounts Committee 
 
Amongst the standing committees, the PAC is often referred as the most important 
committee. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, examining the accounts of public 
corporations, trading and manufacturing schemes, concerns and projects together with their 
profit and loss statements, the PAC takes measures against irregularities and mismanagement. 
The PAC deals with audit objections based on the annual audit report, the performance audit 
report and the special audit report prepared by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). 
The PAC mainly examines those reports on which the CAG has made reservations. While the 
committee discusses the audit objections, the CAG or any representative of the CAG office 
and high officials along with the accounting officer of the concerned ministry or department 
are to be present in the committee meeting. 
 
The first parliament came into being in 1973 and formed the PAC on July 10, 1974. This 
committee met only three times but there was no discussion on audit report; the committee 
only discussed the role of the CAG during the preparation of the audit report. The second 
PAC was set up on 30 April 1979 after 28 days of the formation of the second parliament. 
This committee discussed 64 audit objections in its nine meetings and submitted one report to 
the House. An ad hoc PAC was constituted by the military government on 19 October 1983. 
This committee scrutinized the audit reports of 1978-79 and submitted three reports to the 
President. The third PAC was formed in the fourth parliament on 25 June 1988 and was 
                                                 
58 The Daily Star March 2, 2005. 
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apparently more active than its predecessors. They held 65 meetings, discussed 635 audit 
objections and reviewed the progress of the recommendations of the previous PACs.  
 
The nature, scope and functions of the PAC have been increased considerably since the 
formation of the fifth parliament in 1991.59 The fourth PAC was set up in the fifth JS on July 
8, 1991. In all, 52 meetings were held and four reports were submitted to the House. The 
PAC at that time mainly dealt with old audit reports (until 1986-87) and settled 440 audit 
objections. Nevertheless, the fourth PAC could not deal with    70.49 % of the audit 
objections prepared by the CAG. It was difficult for the PAC to discuss all the previous audit 
reports within the limited time and facilities. The committee thus suggested setting up of a 
task force for each ministry to settle their old audit objections. Though a large number of old 
audit objections have been discussed and settled in the PAC meetings, it was not possible for 
them to implement on practical grounds.60 However, the PAC of the fifth parliament took an 
exemplary decision to set up an “Action Token” committee with seven members in its 
meeting on 17 November, 1992 to review the progress of the implementation of decisions 
taken in the PAC meetings.61 This token committee held seven meetings and was dissolved 
when the fifth parliament finished its tenure.  
  Table 7.4 Activities of the Public Accounts Committee (1991-2006) 
Activities Fifth JS Seventh JS Eighth JS
Number of meetings held 52 103 46 
Attendance of Committee members (on average) 7.28 7.17 8.73 
Number of Sub-committee formed 4 1 9 
Number of sub-committee meetings 83 6 48 
Number of sub-committee reports - 1 2 
Number of committee reports 4 3 1 
Number of Audit objections Disposed 440 497 149 
  Source: Calculated by the researcher from the 4th, 5th and 6th PACs reports. 
 
The seventh JS set up the fifth PAC four months after the establishment of the parliament. 
This committee had examined both the current and the old audit reports in 103 meetings, 
including four policy-planning meetings (Table 7.4). The Committee had examined the audit 
reports from 1987-88 as the previous committee scrutinized the audit reports until 1986-87. 
                                                 
59 Nizam Ahmed, op. cit., 2006,p.93 
60 Standing Committee on Public Accounts, working paper, Transparency International Bangladesh, 2002.   
61 This committee was formed only in the fifth JS by the PAC. Such type of committee was not set up in the  
seventh and eighth JS. 
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The Committee was able to examine some of the reports for 1996-97 until 23 April 2001. For 
the year 1996 and 2001, the PAC discussed 1301 audit objections and settled 497 objections 
involving a total of Tk. 176,300 million.62  
 
Comparatively, the PAC of the eighth JS discussed only a few audit objections because it was 
set up after one and a half year of the establishment of the parliament. From July 2003 to 
October 2006, the committee held 46 meetings and examined 149 audit objections on 15 
ministries involving a total amount of Tk. 131540.54 million and recovered only Tk. 637.7 
million which is 0.5 percent of the total money involved in these audit objections. The PAC 
submitted only one report in the eighth parliament with seven general recommendations. 
Among these recommendations, they expressed their deep dissatisfaction about the 
secretaries of the six different ministries, as they did not follow the PAC decisions about 
resolving the audit objections. Another important recommendation was to ask the executive 
departments to be careful about providing with necessary documents to the CAG office. The 
PAC made this recommendation upon the appeal of the CAG. The CAG complained that the 
officials of the railway division misbehaved with the team of CAG's office and refused them 
access to the papers while they went to the railway division to check purchase documents. In 
this circumstance, the then CAG wanted the protection of the PAC against violation of the 
constitutional rights of his office by the Railway Division. The PAC in its 16th meeting 
discussed this issue and examined the rules and regulations to dispose of the appeal, the first 
of its kind in Bangladesh. 63  
     
Although, the PAC was serious about their responsibility, they could not settle all the audit 
objections. It was observed that from the beginning of the first parliament to the eighth 
parliament (until April 2004), altogether 799 audit reports were placed to the parliaments. 
Among the audit reports placed in the parliament, only 166 (20. 78%) audit reports on 
various ministries were discussed in the PAC meeting while 633 audit reports were not 
discussed due to time shortage. Considering the overall financial management of the country, 
the PAC of the seventh parliament made recommendations to discuss the reports of the PAC 
along with other financial committees in the House. It is relevant to mention here that this 
request was never discussed in any meeting of the standing committee on Rules of Procedure.  
 
                                                 
62Ahmed, Nizam (2006), op. cit.,p.94   
63 The Daily Star, 8th July 2005 
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The major shortcoming in the committee procedure is that like any other standing committees 
the PAC is not given power to take any punitive measure against the ministry or department 
if they do not properly implement committee decisions. It was observed that the decisions 
and recommendations made by the PAC were not properly implemented by different 
ministries. Ministries were reluctant to implement the committee decisions as these were not 
mandatory for them.64 Most of the ministries appeared to be unable to implement all 
recommendations and decisions within the allotted time. Considering such circumstances the 
PAC of the eighth JS asked the concerned authorities to be mindful enough in implementing 
the recommendations and decisions made by them.  
 
Public Undertakings Committee (PUC) 
 
The Public Undertakings Committee (PUC) is seen more active in the post-1990 parliaments 
than its counterpart in the previous parliaments in terms of scrutinizing the activities of 
various government organizations, holding meetings and preparing reports.  The PUC of the 
fifth JS set up in July 1991, held 40 meetings with 19 public sector organizations and 
submitted two reports. At that time, the committee mainly dealt with corruption, irregularity 
and mismanagement that plagued various public sector organizations. The PUC identified the 
organizations and persons responsible for creating mismatch in running the public sector 
organizations.65 However, in one case, the committee made a controversy while scrutinizing 
the activities of a government bank named Sonali Bank. The Finance Minister strongly 
argued that the PUC could not scrutinize the activities of banks. However, the Speaker 
accepted the committee report where it was revealed that the chairperson of the bank granted 
millions of Taka as loans by manipulating the rules. 
 
The PUC unveiled huge irregularities and corruption in the implementation of different 
projects under the Ministry of Energy, Power and Mineral Resources. The Committee found 
anomalies in various departments. For example, taking the evidences from various sources 
the PUC of the eighth JS found the PDB and the DESA employees involved in making fake 
bills. The committee, therefore, set up two sub-committees to review all the activities of the 
PDB, the REB, the DESA and the DESCO. During the period of the eighth JS, the PUC 
mainly dealt with the staff recruitment, fake billing, system loss, pre-paid metering, increase 
                                                 
64 Former CA&G, M. Hafizuddin Khan agreed with the researcher in this point in a personal discussion, Oct. 23, 
2008. 
65 Ahmed, Nizam (2002), op. cit., pp.98-99. 
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in electricity production and some other issues regarding power sectors. The PUC in its 
meetings with the power sector organizations expressed its concern about the lack of power 
generation. “The committee asked the Power Division to fix a uniform model for 
privatization of the billing system immediately to check power pilferage and systems loss”.66 
The committee also recommended installation of pre-paid meter to check fake billing, 
disconnection of illegal power connection and setting up of a research cell. The PUC dealt 
with the audit objections raised by the CAG to check the misappropriation of the public 
funds. Scrutinizing the audit reports on the DESA, the DESCO, the PDB and the REB, the 
PUC asked them to settle the pending audit objections within December 2005.67 
 
The PUC held a discussion on much talked- Tengratila blowout and handing over of the 
Tengratila gas field to Niko Resources Limited through a joint venture instead of the 
Production Sharing Contract (PSC). The PUC observed that the country faced a huge 
financial loss due to rampant corruption in handing over of the Tengratila gas field to Niko. 
Before visiting the Tengratila, a four-member team of the PUC visited the Petrobangla Head 
office in Dhaka to have a briefing on the Tengratila gas field disaster.  However, the 
committee members were not satisfied with their briefing and clarification. One of the 
committee members, Faruk Khan suspected "there were irregularities and corruption at every 
stage including the agreement with Niko." 68 However, the committee recommended for 
recovering financial loss by compensating but the government did not take initiative in this 
regard.     
  
The financial corruption and mismanagement of the Bangladesh Chemical and Industries 
Corporation (BCIC) were also discussed in a PUC meeting on 20 December 2005. The 
committee observed that 5, 748 audit objections involving Tk 6,000 crore remained 
unresolved for years. In the following meeting, the committee discussed the issue again in 
presence of the representatives of the CAG and asked the BCIC officials to settle the audit 
objections within a possible short time. The committee also observed that BCIC incurred a 
loss of about Tk 300 crore a year. It is worth mentioning that the BCIC was set up in 1974 
with 88 industries, and 12 of those were functioning until 2006. The rest of the industries did 
                                                 
66 The Weekly Holiday 6 May 2005. 
67 The PUC Report (1st), Bangladesh Jatiya Sangsad, January 2006,p.34.  
68 The Daily Star, 22 July 2005. 
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not run properly. The committee identified that the BCIC regularly incurred huge loss due to 
system losses and irregularities. 69  
 
  Table 7.5 Activities of the Public Undertakings Committee (1991-2006) 
Activities Fifth JS Seventh JS Eighth JS 
No. of meetings held 40 26 49 
Attendance of Committee members (on average) 5.3 7.17 5.9 
Number of Sub-committee formed 4 3 3 
Number of sub-committee meetings 83 6 3 
Number of sub-committee reports - 1 - 
Number of committee reports 2 - 2 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on information provided by Committee Office II,   August 2007. 
 
The mismanagement and irregularities received major attention of the PUC. Besides them, 
the audit objections and the activities of the above mentioned organizations were also 
examined by the committee. From the witness and documents, the PUC pointed out the gap 
between the government policies and implementations. They also identified the following 
major reasons for making losses in several organizations under the public sectors: trade union 
politics, mismanagement, system loss, over staffing, wrongdoings in granting work orders for 
developing work and irregularities in awarding tender for selling or purchasing. The 
committee in the eighth JS had set up four sub-committees to find out the irregularities and 
mismanagement in several organizations working under public sector. Among these sub-
committees, only the sub-committee-2, which was set up to examine the overall activities of 
the DESA and the DESCO, held three meetings while the other three sub-committees failed 
to call any meeting. Finally, the sub-committees failed to prepare any report. However, the 
main committee submitted two reports. It was observed that the ministries were reluctant to 
implement the committee’s recommendations, which discouraged the committees from 
preparing any report. Available evidences revealed that in the eighth JS, the PUC in its 49 
meetings took 287 decisions; of them only 16% of decisions were implemented and nearly 
28% of decisions were under consideration while about 56% of decisions were not 
implemented until dissolve of the eighth parliament in October 2006.  
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Estimates Committee (EC) 
 
Among the financial committees, the Estimates Committee (EC) has traditionally remained 
very inactive until 1990. However, theoretically, this committee has better potential than the 
other financial committees in ensuring financial discipline.70 It was observed that the EC of 
the first and the second parliaments did not make any important decision; they met in nine 
and five meetings respectively. The EC of the first parliament prepared a special report but 
could not place it to the House because of the resistance from within the ruling party. The 
Speaker first suggested showing of the report to the Chief Whip and the Law Minister. 
However, the Chief Whip gave his consent in favor of submission of the report but both the 
Speaker and the Law minister objected to it.71 The third parliament did not set up any 
financial committee and no data were preserved in the parliament on the working of the EC 
of the fourth parliament.      
 
The EC of the fifth parliament was set up after three months of the first sitting of the 
parliament. The committee convened its first meeting nearly after three months of its 
establishment and held 27 meetings altogether. However, the committee could not prepare 
any report. The EC mainly dealt with the corruption and misappropriation of funds in the 
public sector and made recommendations for their overall development. During the period of 
the fifth parliament, the EC set up four sub-committees in its different meetings. The first 
sub-committee was assigned to prepare a report on the sugar mills under the Bangladesh 
Sugar and Food Industries Corporation. The second sub-committee was formed to prepare a 
report on the development of Bangladesh Jute Industries, the third sub-committee was set up 
to review the activities of the PDB and the fourth sub-committee worked on the activities of 
the Bangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Resources Corporation, the Bangladesh Petroleum 
Corporation and its subsidiary organizations.72 However, the sub-committees held 11 
meetings altogether, but none of them prepared any report. The main committee also did not 
submit any report to the House.  
 
Since the beginning of the seventh parliament, the Estimates Committee has been very active 
with respect to detecting financial irregularities and misappropriation of fund by the 
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71 M. Mufazzalul Hoque, “Parliamentary Committees and Public Enterprise Accountability in Bangladesh 
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government organizations. The seventh parliament set up the EC on November 20, 1996 and 
the committee in its first meeting, held on December 19, 1996, settled the strategy and policy. 
As the committee did not prepare any report, detailed data on the working of the EC of the 
seventh parliament are not available. Based on the secondary data, it is revealed that the 
committee scrutinized the tender bidding and purchase documents, appointment of 
consultants and contractors, uses of public transport, development of projects where 
irregularities were assumed to be involved. The EC had issued a circular in June 1997, 
requiring different organizations to supply the copies of terms of reference of the consultants 
before they were appointed. It also asked for schedule of tender for undertaking public works 
and appointment of contractors for transport, purchase and sale before advertisement.73    
 
Table 7.6 Activities of Estimates Committee (1991-2006) 
Activities Fifth JS Seventh JS Eighth JS 
No. of meetings held 27 23 27 
Attendance of Committee members (on average) 7.28 5.3 6.2 
Number of Sub-committee formed 5 7 11 
Number of sub-committee meetings 83 10 54 
Number of sub-committee reports - - 5 
Number of committee reports - - 2 
Source: Calculated by the researcher based on data provided by the Committee Office II and the Report of the 
Estimates Committee (in Bengali), 2006. 
 
The EC of the seventh JS detected gross irregularities in appointing contractors by the Dhaka 
City Corporation (DCC). The committee, therefore, asked the DCC to get confirmation from 
the committee before advertising for the appointment of contractors for purchase, transport 
and development works. The committee also asked the Anti Corruption Bureau and the 
Public Works Department to evaluate a World Bank funded project implemented by the 
DCC. The committee scrutinized the tender processing system of various development 
projects under the Ministry of Food. The EC also reviewed the overall staff position 
according to the organogram and look into the purchase of transports, the issue of tender and 
the appointment of consultants on development projects. The committee, in fact, identified 
various cases of irregularities in several other organizations. Altogether ten sub-committees 
were, therefore, set up to investigate the irregularities in various organizations including the 
DCC, the RAJUK, the Dhaka Urban Transport Project, the Jamuna Bridge Authority, the 
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Roads and High Way Division, the Chittagong Railway Station and the Directorate of 
Housing and Public works.    
 
The EC scrutinized a large number of cases to find out the irregularities and mismanagement 
in the public sector organizations. The EC chairperson issued a circular asking various 
government organizations to send files and documents on the appointment of consultants, 
contractors, purchase of goods and vehicles, implementation of development projects. It 
proved to be very inconvenient for the organizations to supply with files and documents. 
Some organizations reported that the EC activities and their requirement halted their routine 
works, particularly, the Dhaka City Corporation, the Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management, the Ministry of LGRD, the BCIC, the PDB raised questions about the intention 
of the committee chairperson and they challenged his authority to write a formal letter to the 
Speaker.74 While, such incidents were reported in the national newspapers, the Prime 
Minister called the committee chairperson to clarify his activities. In turn, the EC chairperson 
requested the Prime Minister to appoint a committee with her Parliamentary Advisor and the 
Chief Whip to investigate the committee activities.75 The committee continued its activities 
with same manner until ending of tenure of the seventh parliament. The committee 
chairperson in this situation took all documents including resolutions of the committee 
meetings in his custody just a month before the dissolution of the seventh parliament and he 
did not return any document to the parliament secretariat yet.76       
        
During the period of the eighth parliament, the committee held its first meeting on 12 May 
2003 but they could not follow up the activities of its predecessor. Most of the committee 
members including the chairperson expressed their deep dissatisfaction and strongly 
criticized the previous committee chairperson for keeping the committee documents in 
personal custody violating the norms and procedures. The EC in its working period 
particularly scrutinized the activities of the RAJUK, the REB, the DESA, the DESCO, the 
Bangladesh Biman Corporation, the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, the T&T 
Board, the BWDB, the BIWTA, the Agricultural Extension Department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Engineering Department of the Ministry of Education. The committee 
mainly dealt with their audit objections, purchases, tender procedure and construction works 
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76 Estimate Committee, Parliamentary Report (first), September 2005, pp.1-5, personal interview with concerned 
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mainly road, bridge and culvert. Among the various organizations, the RAJUK, the LGED, 
the REB, the DESA, the DESCO and the BWDB received special attention.   
 
The EC detected gross irregularities in the implementation of different projects under the 
RAJUK. As mentioned earlier, two sub-committees were formed to identify the irregularities 
in the NAM Villa and NAM Village apartments, Uttara Model Residential City, Purbachal, 
Nikunja, Hatirjhil, Jhilmil housing projects and construction of some roads including, 
Kamlapur to Sayedabad link road and Gulshan Square to Pragati Sarani link road undertaken 
by the RAJUK. The committee scrutinized the sector development plan, budget and 
expenditure of various projects. The committee also examined the plot allocation process, 
land acquisition and remittance to the landholder. The committee guessed that some officials 
and staff of the RAJUK were involved in corruption but the committee failed to identify them 
due to non-cooperation of the RAJUK. One thing should be noted here that the sub-
committee-I issued several letters to the RAJUK authority for sending a list of its staff 
particularly employed in the design and planning section, estate section, land section and 
finance section from 1996 to 2003, but the RAJUK did not prepare this list for the sub-
committee until April 2006. The committee also found that 27 audit objections involving a 
total amount of Tk. 235 crore and 96 lacks were unsettled in the Uttara Model Residential 
City (3rd Phase) and the Purbachal Sub-Town projects. The committee then asked the relevant 
authority to settle audit objections within a possible time.     
 
The EC also identified some major faults in the tender bidding process in the LGED under 
the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (LGRD). The committee 
chairperson alleged that most of the tenders went to musclemen. They even did not complete 
the work properly. The EC chairperson told in a meeting to find out an alternative procedure 
for tender bidding which will be useful to avoid such circumstances. The committee 
suggested the making a new policy eliminating the faults of the tender bidding procedure 
practiced currently. In the fifth meeting, held in 16 February 2004, the committee members 
asked the LGED authority to be active to reduce the scope of irregularities. However, the 
committee decision was not implemented in the last three years.  
 
The activities of the Water Development Board under the Ministry of Water and Resource 
received special attention in the PEC. The committee members alleged that most of the 
projects undertaken by the Water Development Board (WDB) were not implemented 
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satisfactorily due to massive irregularities. From newspapers, they noticed that 
mismanagement and irregularities became common features of this institute. The secretary of 
the concerned ministry was present in the meeting and answered several questions, but he 
could not satisfy the committee members. The committee decided to appoint a sub-committee 
to investigate the progress of several projects including ‘Food for Work’ undertaken by the 
WDB. The sub-committee was also assigned to take initiative for settling the audit 
objections. Since its establishment, the sub-committee held seven meetings, visited four 
project areas and finally submitted a report to the main committee.  
 
The sub-committee mainly dealt with the faults and irregularities of the projects. The sub-
committee identified ten defective projects out of 308 projects undertaken by the WDB under 
the ‘River-Cannel Re dredging’ project. These faulty projects were completed without 
following the estimated project deigns properly. The committee also detected fund 
appropriation in the implementation of these projects. After visiting and scrutinizing the work 
orders and schedules, the committee members asked the concerned authorities to take 
effective measures. Apart from the misappropriation of fund, the committee also found that 
the Machinery Department under the Water and Resource Ministry kept pending a total 
amount of Tk. 33.64 lacs for renting of machinery and vehicle from 59 private companies. 
The sub-committee detected that some officials of the previously mentioned department had 
some kind of personal contracts with the private companies and therefore they did not show 
interest in collecting the pending rent.   
 
The committee identified that a total of 21, 587 audit objections were unsettled in the WDB, 
involving a total of Tk. 3417,50,24,820 from 1972 to 2004. Discussing the statistics of the 
audit objections from 1971-72 and onwards, the committee asked the concerned officials to 
take initiative with the representatives of the CA&G’s office to settle audit objections. 
Thereafter, a total of 2,706 audit objections involving Tk. 237.90 crore were settled but 17, 
813 audit objections involving Tk.3822.83 crore were still unsettled. The Committee 
members again asked the concerned officials to settle the pending audit objections taking a 
crash program. The committee suggested the ministry to take action against the officials who 
were involved in misappropriation of fund and corruption. The Committee also asked the 
officials to be more transparent and accountable for their work.      
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The EC in its fourth meeting formed a sub-committee with its four members to find out 
irregularities and to examine the working progress of the PDB, the REB, the DESA, the 
DESCO and the RPC under the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources.  The sub-
committee met in seven meetings and submitted a report with a set of suggestions for each 
organization separately. The project background or history, production, operating revenue, 
expenses, income, system loss, irregularities in tender bidding process and some other issues 
of each project were discussed in the committee meetings separately. The committee detected 
massive irregularities in meter reading and billing, giving power connection and tender 
bidding. The sub-committee also discussed on the statistics of the settled and unsettled audit 
objections.  There were 9, 585 unsettled audit objections on the accounts of the REB, the 
PDB and the DESCO. The committee thus suggested for settling the audit objections within 
next two months.   
 
The power crisis received a special attention of the EC members. The secretary of the Power 
Division and other high officials who worked under the power sector were asked to be 
present in the committee meetings to answer questions and clarify some particular issues. The 
REB, the DESA and the DESCO briefly informed the committee about their production 
capacity and actual demand. The committee was informed that the country generated 3,721 
MWs of electricity against a demand of 3,900 MWs. The committee thus asked them to 
reduce the gap between the demand and the supply by implanting the on going projects as 
early as possible. The committee members suggested the PDB, the REB, the DESA and the 
DESCO to pay their best efforts for collecting the pending bills. The EC also suggested them 
to distribute electricity through rationing system in order to manage power crisis. According 
to the rationing system, electricity will be used in the irrigation pump and commercial sector 
after 10 pm at night while from 6 pm to 10 pm it will be scheduled for the normal consumers. 
The EC of the eighth JS gave special attention to the government policies on power sector. 
They rigorously discussed the activities and performances of the power sector organizations 
and made necessary suggestions for improving their overall activities.  
 
Until the last session of the eighth JS, the EC held 27 meetings and set up eleven sub-
committees to find out the financial irregularities in different organizations and projects. The 
sub-committees met in 54 meetings and submitted five reports altogether. The EC prepared 
two reports containing the proceedings of the total meetings of the main committee. The 
reports of the sub-committees were also included in the committee reports. The EC made 116 
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decisions scrutinizing the estimates of the various government organizations; of them 49 
decisions (42.24%) were implemented, 16 decisions (13.79%) were under implementation 
and 51 decisions (43.97%) were under the process of implementation. Among the 
unimplemented issues, 13 issues (15%) were placed in the next meeting for detailed 
discussion but they were never included for discussion.77            
 
Of all the financial committees, the PAC of the three parliaments of the post 1990s was 
relatively more active, the fourth, fifth and the sixth PAC had submitted ten reports to the 
parliament. The PACs had worked more or less in non-partisan manner. However, they could 
not settle all audit objections raised by the CAG office due to time limitation. Like the PAC, 
other two financial committees the PUC and the EC were also active to make financial 
discipline. They were particularly devoted to identify the persons and the organizations 
involved in financial irregularities. Examining the financial anomalies of the different 
ministries, the financial committees made more than a hundred recommendations but few of 
them were implemented due to negligence of the ministries in implementing the committee 
decisions. They claimed in their reports that different ministries did not take proper initiative 
against irregularities in expenditure. The major limitation of the committees is that they can 
make the recommendation against any irregularity but cannot force the ministries for 
implementing their decisions. They cannot supervise or monitor whether or not their 
recommendations have been implemented because the implementation of their decisions is 
not mandatory for the ministries.78   
 
7.4 Working of the Government Assurance Committee    
 
The Committee on Government Assurance (CGA) has been a new beginning in examining 
the performances of the ministries in implementing government assurances given on the floor 
since the seventh JS. Comparatively speaking, the CGA of the fifth parliament was less active 
in the fifth JS. It met only in fourteen meetings, which means that the committee seriously 
failed to meet the mandatory meeting requirement in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. 
The CGA of the seventh and the eighth parliaments convened their meetings more frequently. 
In the seventh parliament, the CGA convened, on an average, 10.3 meetings per year which 
was increased to 10.6 meetings per year in the eighth parliament. In accordance with the 
                                                 
77 Calculated from the PEC Report (2nd), Bangladesh Parliament, September 2006. 
78 Transparency International Bangladesh, Standing Committees on Public Accounts, Working Paper, 2002, 
available at www.ti-bangladsh.org   
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decision of the CGA, the concerned ministry compiled government pledges given on the floor 
and sent an updated report every three months to the committee. Based on these reports, the 
CGA reviewed the performances of the executive departments and identified the gap between 
the pledges and their implementations. The CGA of the fifth JS showed in its report that 30% 
government assurances were implemented. The seventh JS identified that the Prime 
Ministers, the ministers, the deputy-minister and the state minister of the concerned ministry 
gave 1221 promises; of them only 620 pledges were implemented and the rest of the 
promises were either implemented partially or were under implementation. The CGA of the 
eighth JS revealed that nearly 70% of the promises remained unfulfilled. Since the beginning 
of the fifth JS, the CGA attempted to follow up the implementation of pledges given on the 
floor of the JS.  
 
7.5 Working of the Petitions Committee 
 
Among the Non-Ministerial Standing Committees, the Petitions Committee was traditionally 
inactive. From the discussion with the committee members and staff it was appeared that the 
citizens rarely come to the committee as they were not aware about the jurisdiction of the 
Petitions Committee. Though it was found more active in the fifth and the seventh JS 
compared to the eighth JS. The parliamentary records reveal that covering the period from 
May 2002 to October 2005 altogether 21 petitions were submitted to the committee of them 
20 were rejected as these were not submitted properly according to the Rules of Procedure. 
Although under Rule232 of the Rules of Procedure the duty of the committee was to report 
on specific complaints made in the Petitions referred to the committee but the committee did 
not submit any report on the above petition. The Petition Committee of the fifth JS met in 27 
meetings and submitted two reports. Among the petitions considered by the committee since 
1991, one caught the attention of the media and the civil society. The case cited in the 
following paragraphs was a suo motu complaint against a medicine company. This case 
revealed that the parliamentary committee itself raised personal and party interest and took 
remedial measures. 
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Box 7. 3 Suo Motu Action of the Petitions Committee 
In 1993 alarming reports were being published in the newspapers that hundreds of children were 
dying in different child Hospitals. Investigating reports suggested that the cause of such death be 
due to a medicine named "Flamodel" manufactured by Adflem Pharmaceutical Ltd., which were 
being used in those hospitals for treatment of children. When the Petitions Committee chairman, 
the then Speaker, found that neither the Drug Control Department nor any administrative 
Authority took any step to inquire into the matter and adopt remedial measures. The chairman 
put it up as an agenda in a meeting of the Petition Committee based on the newspaper reports 
although it was not the rule to take up suo motu cognizance of any such matter by the speaker. 
The chairman placed the news paper reports before each of the members and appealed to their 
good conscience to make the hands of this Committee long so as to take up suo-motu cognizance 
of such alarming incidents by the Chairman. Considering the reports published in various 
national dailies all members took the decision to summon the concerned medicine companies, 
Hospital authorities, Drug Control Department and others concerned. The ultimate result was 
that the medicine companies manufacturing such harmful medicine by using cheap chemicals 
were punished. 
Source: Functions of the Committee Chairpersons, Paper presented by former Speaker of the Bangladesh JS 
Sheikh Razzaque Ali in the International  Conference on “Parliamentary Committee System”, in 1999. 
  
7.6 Working of the Special Committees 
 
As discussed earlier the Bangladesh Parliament may form a special committee if necessary. 
Among the post-1990 parliament, the fifth Parliament formed five special committees and 
one was appointed by the seventh JS while the eighth JS did not set up such committee. 
Among the special committees set up in the fifth JS two committees dealt with legislative 
bills including the Indemnity Ordinance Bill, and the Local Government (Zilla Parishad) 
Amendment Bill 1993. One special committee was appointed to deal with the violence 
occurred in the educational institutions. These three special committees could not submit any 
report to the House. The fifth JS appointed one special committee to deal with five 
remuneration bills regarding the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker, the 
Ministers and the MPs. This committee submitted a report to the House and considering the 
committee report remuneration was increased. Another special committee was formed to 
investigate complains regarding the corruption of the Agriculture Minister. This special 
committee held 15 meetings and submitted a report to the House though the committee could 
not make any decision owing to the differences between the members belonging to the 
treasury and the opposition benches. The seventh JS in its first session appointed a special 
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committee under Rule 266 to scrutinize every legislative bill. Thereby all the legislative 
proposals tabled in the House before appointing the standing committees were sent to the 
special committee for detailed scrutiny. As it is mentioned earlier special committees in this 
parliament submitted 44 reports scrutinizing the same number of bills. The eighth Parliament 
is an exception which did not appoint any special committee.    
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CHAPTER VIII  
 
The Committee and the Public  
 
Having discussed the committee performances in legislative and overseeing process this 
chapter attempts to discuss and analyze the role of media and civil society in making a 
linkage between the committees and the public. Reaching the public involves mechanisms 
like open committee meetings, public hearing, broadcasting deliberations, press conference, 
interview, informal contacts between the committee members and the citizens, the media and 
the civil society. The parliaments, where committee meetings take place behind the closed 
door, will remain distant from the people if there is no provision for public hearing. In these 
parliaments, the media and the civil society are two important channels that can keep the 
committees closer to the public. The media unfasten numerous windows of opportunity to 
enhance communication between individuals and organizations. The civil society is another 
channel for the public to reach the legislators and influence public policy. At the same time, it 
provides a conduit for the legislators to communicate their decisions and policies to the 
people.1  
 
The committee activities in the western developed democracies are generally linked by two-
way communication with the members of the society. Regarding the activities of the US 
Congress, it has been observed that the openness of committee meetings and public hearing 
enable citizens to follow up the on going committee activities and to provide opportunities to 
the legislators to know about public sentiment. When a committee deals with any sensitive 
issue, like the Watergate scandal, both the electronic and the print media covered such 
meetings extensively. Unlike the American Congress, where committee meetings are not, in 
principle, open to the public, for example in Germany, the media, the interest group, the 
public relations department and the legislators themselves provide information about closed-
door committee meetings. Besides, public hearing provides opportunity for the citizens and 
the interest groups to give their informed opinion on matters under consideration of the 
committees.  
 
                                                 
1 Bouchet, Nicolas and Kariithi, Nixon K. (2003), “Parliament and Media: Building an Informed Society “, 
working paper, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.; Raik, Kristi, “Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU’s 
Policy towards the Eastern Neighborhood”, Centre for European Policy Studies Working Paper, No. 
37/February 2006. 
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8.1 Media 
 
It has been observed that many parliaments want themselves to be open to the public and the 
public also want to be better informed about what the parliament is doing.2 In this regard, the 
media is one of the important and popular channels that can play a key role in keeping 
relations between the parliament and the citizens. Mughan and Gunther noted that through 
mass media the citizens and their elected representatives communicate in their reciprocal 
efforts to inform and influence.3 Where the parliamentary committees meet in private, the 
media can communicate the parliamentary activities to the citizens and provide a conduit 
through which the committee members receive feed back from the public. Even the 
parliaments where the committees meet in public, a few people observe the committee 
deliberations from the public gallery, whereas all the citizens need information about the 
activities of their representatives.  
 
In today’s parliaments, the most obvious purpose of the committees is to oversee the 
executive. In doing so, the committees need information about their activities. The media can 
facilitate the committee members with neutral and good quality of information about the 
activities of the executive. In all political systems, the media provide opportunity for the 
committees to scrutinize and criticize the executive by disclosing information about the 
activities of the executive. Bert A. Rockman notes that interest of the media in scrutinizing 
government behavior has an impact on the success of the parliamentary committees because 
it may turn any legislative and overseeing issue into a more salient issue. He argues that if 
issues become more salient, the committee members have a stronger incentive to perform 
their oversight activities effectively as this behavior may bring them greater visibility.4  
The mass media can be categorized into three types: print, electronic and digital media. 
Among them the print media is still important in keeping the legislators and the public closer. 
In the developed countries, the parliaments publish weekly/monthly magazines to inform the 
citizens about their ongoing activities. The parliaments in most cases distribute these 
papers/magazines among the institutions and the interested citizens free of cost.  It was 
                                                 
2 Parliamentarians and representatives from parliamentary TV Channels expressed such opinion in a conference 
on “Broadcasting of Parliamentary Business through Dedicated TV Channels and Public Broadcasting 
Systems”, in Geneva on 19 October 2006.  
3 Mughan, Anthony and Gunther, Richard (2000), “The Media in Democratic and No democratic Regimes: A 
Multilevel Perspective”, in Mughan, Anthony and Richard Gunther (eds.), Democracy and the Media: A 
Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.1. 
4 Rockman, Bert A. (1984), “Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight”, Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 9 (3): 387-440. 
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observed that the newspapers/magazines, which cannot employ correspondent to the 
parliament, depend upon the public relations department of the parliament for necessary 
information. For the journalists the parliaments provide separate media room with modern 
equipments, so that the journalists can cover the parliamentary news conveniently.  
 
The parliaments which allow the media to publicize the parliamentary proceedings, plenary 
or the committee sessions are televised by both the public and the private TV channels. 
Besides the private and the public TV channels, some of the parliaments like the German 
Bundestag, the French and the Italian national parliaments have their own TV stations within 
the parliament building, so that they can telecast the parliamentary procedures live to create a 
direct link between the citizens and the parliament. It is worth mentioning that some private 
TV channels like C-SPAN of Canada, SVT 24 Direct of Sweden and the BBC Parliament 
broadcast the parliamentary proceedings and public hearing. A survey on public broadcasting 
of the parliamentary proceedings, carried out by the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 2005 
among 70 countries, shows that 83 per cent regularly broadcast parliamentary proceedings 
and 70 per cent do so on a daily or weekly basis.5 
 
In the information world, a recent significant development is the introduction of Internet 
Technology. It enables the parliaments to open their parliamentary archives and make the 
information about ongoing committee activities available to the public through their home 
pages. Internet technology (such as E-mail and other dialogue applications) enables the 
public and the legislators to contact with each other. Internet technology is also used for 
internal communication.  
 
In the last decade of this century, both the developed and the developing countries improved 
their information facilities to make the legislators more efficient, transparent and accountable 
than those in older parliaments.6 Like the USA, the UK, Germany and Japan some of the 
developing countries like Bangladesh introduced Internet Technology to make information 
available to the public as part of public relations. It is observed that in the developed 
democracies, the legislators widely use Internet Technology for their day-to-day work. 
                                                 
5 Cited from “The Challenge of Broadcasting Parliamentary Proceedings” Conference Proceedings, organized 
by the Inter Parliamentary Union on “Broadcasting of Parliamentary Business through Dedicated TV 
Channels and Public Broadcasting Systems”, in Geneva, on 19 October 2006. 2006, p.29.  
6 Coleman, S.; J.A, Tailor and Donk, W. Van De (1999), “Parliament in the Age of the Internet”, Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol. (52 (3), p.365. 
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Internet enables them to contact with their constituencies and the public.7 The developing 
countries where Internet facilities are not easily available depend on the print and electronic 
media for connecting their legislators to the public.         
 
The committee meetings in the Bangladesh parliament are generally closed to the public and 
the press. The committee reports are not available for public scrutiny. Interested citizens or 
researchers can collect the committee reports or the bulletin from the members of the 
parliament or the parliamentary staff if they have good relation with them. Generally the 
parliament circulates a weekly bulletin to their members, which covers parliamentary 
procedures of the week. It does not present any comprehensive report about the ongoing 
parliamentary activities. It is observed that unlike the developed democracies, the Bangladesh 
parliament does not provide information materials to the public. Therefore, interested citizens 
and researcher depend on the media for necessary information about the parliamentary 
activities. Among a verity of media, the print media historically played an important role in 
promoting democratic values and norms in the society. During the colonial period the print 
media was one of the important channels for the Indian leaders to communicate with their 
people and to inspire them to protest against the colonial rulers. Since the colonial rule, the 
print media played a significant role against the non-democratic policies and actions of the 
government. Soon after the independence of Bangladesh, though it was assumed that the 
media will be independent from the state control, successive governments brought the media 
under their control by imposing censorship.      
 
After the restoration of the parliamentary democracy in 1991 the electronic and the print 
media emerged in Bangladesh as an industrial sector in association with the professionals and 
the media interested business houses. According to recent information more than 700 
registered newspapers are published on daily and weekly basis. About 15% of the total 
populations of the country are regular readers of the newspapers. Among the Bengali dailies, 
the Prothom Alo, the Jugantor, the Janakantha, the Samokal, the Ittefak, the Ajker Gagoj and 
the Bhorer Kagoj stand out as the most popular. On the other hand, the Daily Star, the 
Observer and the New Age are the most circulated (estimate readership 65,000) English 
dailies. The main readers of these English dailies are the policy elites, the civil servants, the 
                                                 
7 Mambrey, Peter et. All (1999), “Bridging the Gap Between Parliament and Citizen- the Internet Service of the 
German Bundestag”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. (52 (3), p.480. 
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academia, the diplomats and the representatives of the donor agencies. Therefore, the English 
dailies are publicly recognized as more influential than their circulation figures suggest.8  
     Table 8.1 Number of News Papers and Magazines Published in Bangladesh in 2006  
Frequency Dhaka-Based Regional 
Daily 183 225 
Weekly 130 104 
Fortnightly 34 3 
Monthly 53 5 
Quarterly 5 1 
Total 405 338 
Source: Centre for Governance Studies, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006: 
Knowledge, Perceptions, Reality, Dhaka: BRAC University and BRAC RED, 2006, p.100. 
  
Since 1990, the committee activities received special attention of the print media. The print 
media brought the important issues to the public and created pressure on the government 
departments to respond to the Committee queries.9  Most of the national newspapers have 
their special correspondence for covering the parliamentary deliberations and performances. 
They collected necessary information on the committee activities through personal contact 
with the committee members, the chairpersons or the parliamentary staff and from the press 
briefing. The regional or the local newspapers, which did not have their own correspondence 
in the capital or in the JS, depended on the BSS and other media network for information on 
the committee activities.  
 
Since the beginning of the restoration of parliamentary democracy, the major dailies draw 
public attention to the committee activities. The committee discussions and decisions were 
widely covered in the national dailies, particularly when controversial issues were discussed 
there. Most of the national newspapers presented detailed information about the on-going 
committee activities based on the briefing given by the committee chairperson or members. 
Both the Bengali and English dailies focused on the performances of the committees in their 
lead news and often published exclusive reports about the activities of the committee 
chairpersons and the members. Some important issues (i.e. irregularities of the different 
ministries, partisan role of the Speaker, party control over the committee members) were 
brought before the public with exclusive reports, features, articles and expert opinions.    
                                                 
8 Centre for Governance Studies, the State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006: Knowledge, Perceptions, 
Reality, Dhaka: BRAC University and BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, 2006, p.100. 
9 ibid,  p. 24. 
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Traditionally the Defense sector was kept beyond the public gaze. The debates over the 
defense issues were brought to public attention since 1990. Through investigation, the 
standing committee on the Ministry of Defense detected inconsistencies in the purchase 
procedures. Picking up this issue the major dailies published several exclusive news and 
editorials. Particularly, the purchases of Mig-29 fighter jets and frigate were brought to public 
attention. The BNP-led alliance government accused the previous government of mishandling 
funds for the purchase and filed cases against Sheikh Hasina and others. But the AL rejected 
all the allegations discussed in the meetings of the Defense Committee in a rejoinder, which 
was later published in the newspapers and was posted in the AL home page on 24 January 
2004. In this rejoinder the AL strongly claimed that the government intentionally fabricated 
the issue (Box-8.1).   
 
Box 8.1 Fabrication of Defense Committee  
The Bangladesh Awami League posted several rejoinders in their home page rejecting all the 
allegations brought into the Defense Committee. The AL argued that the most modern battle 
Frigate was purchased with a reasonable price following all processes. They also claimed in this 
rejoinder “Standing Parliamentary Committee on Defense in the seventh parliament, in which the 
BNP and the Jatiya Party members were included, visited Korea and observed the naval exercise. 
Only after their fully satisfactory report on return to the country, the Frigate started its journey to 
Bangladesh.” The AL also denied the allegations about the purchase of Mig-29 in the same 
rejoinder posted on 23 January 2004. They claimed that the Mig-29 was brought with the 
recommendation of purchase committee consisting of the members of Air Force and high-level 
officers from other concerned ministries including the Defense. On the basis of the committee 
decision, international tenders were called for by the Directorate General Defense Purchase 
(DGDP). The lowest price quoted against this tender was $289m. This price was considered to be 
on the high side. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina then ordered direct government-to-government 
negotiations for the purchase. After fruitful negotiations between the two governments the price 
was brought down to $119m, marking a reduction of $170m from the original offer received by 
the DGDP. The AL blamed the BNP-Jamat Alliance government for filing baseless cases against 
Sheikh Hasina alleging corruption. The AL brought allegation against the standing Defense 
Committee for raising its voice to corruption allegations following the deliberate Alliance 
Government campaign for discrediting the AL and diverting attention from the national 
discontent on other governance issues.  
Source: Compiled from the Bangladesh Awami League official webpage. 
 www.albd.org/autoalbd/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=59&Itemid=37  
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Simultaneously in the eighth JS, the opposition members accused the BNP- led alliance 
government for misgivings in purchasing 16 Chinese F-7 fighters for the Bangladesh Air 
Force at a cost of $117.9 million. In mid-2006, the opposition members raised this issue in a 
meeting of the Defense Committee when they alleged that a third party had taken ‘undue 
commission’ from the deal.10 Apart from the Defense purchase, controversy surrounding the 
import of Converted Natural Gas (CNG) auto-rickshaws was also brought to public attention. 
A sub-committee was set up by the standing Committee on the Ministry of Communication in 
January 2004 to probe the allegation. The CNG story published in the national newspapers 
illustrated the weakness of the standing committees. First, the reports published in the dailies 
revealed that the parliamentary sub-committee could not submit its report within the time 
fixed by the main committee. Secondly, the ministry repeatedly refused to supply relevant 
information and documents to the sub-committee.  
    
The major national newspapers repeatedly published exclusive news on the mismanagement 
and corruption of different ministries. These reports disclosed dissatisfactions of various 
standing committee chairpersons about the irregularities and corruption of several ministries. 
The reports presented in Box-8.2 shows that the standing committees detected 
mismanagement and irregularities in at least 20 out of 39 ministries. When the committee 
chairpersons moved to talk about the mismanagement of the ministries, they were thrown into 
trouble. The news presented in Box-8.3, illustrates two pictures. First, the committee 
recommendations were not implemented, and ministries did not cooperate with the 
committees. Second, the Government high-ups restricted the committee chairpersons to talk 
publicly about corruption and irregularities of the government departments. Criticizing this 
situation an editorial was published in the same newspaper (Box -8.3). The editorial 
demanded expansion of the committee’s power for performing their role more seriously.  
 
The print media not only disclosed the unlawful activities of the executive, they also brought 
the wrongdoings of the committees to the public. For example, the daily Sangbad disclosed in 
their lead news on December 28, 2005 that a member of the Standing Committee on the 
Ministry of LGRD took bribe before submitting a fake report on the wrongdoing in tender 
processing in the Public Health Engineering Department. The daily Prothom Alo illustrated 
another story. The report explored that the standing committee on the Ministry of Shipping 
and Transport first asked the Chittagong Port Authority to issue seven stevedoring licenses 
                                                 
10 The Weekly Holiday, 9 January 2004; the Daily New Age, 16 May 2006. 
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for quick delivery of goods from the dock and later six members of this standing committee 
influenced the CPA to issue seven stevedoring licenses to them anonymously. Such reports 
informed the public about the wrongdoings of the committee members as well.  
 
Since 1990s the journalists tended to be more serious in reporting on the parliamentary 
affairs. Special correspondents of the daily national newspapers working in the JS formed 
‘Bangladesh Parliament Journalists Association’ (BPJA). They have been raising their voice 
demanding access of the journalists to the parliamentary standing committee meetings. The 
BPJA organized a round table discussion in 2005, titled “Active Committee: Effective 
Parliament” in Dhaka in co-operation with a national NGO. In this discussion the 
parliamentarians expressed their views in favor of holding the standing committee meetings 
in public and demanded amend the ROP. Some necessary amendments to the parliamentary 
rules of procedure are required to hold the committee meetings in public. 
 
Box 8. 2  Twenty ministries embroiled in graft, irregularities 
 
Different parliamentary standing committees have raised allegations of irregularities and 
corruption in the activities of at least 20 out of the 39 ministries. Although the ruling BNP and 
Jamaat-e-Islami lawmakers dominate the standing committees, they found performance of the 
ministries below par due to gross mismanagement, irregularities and corruption. Thirty-nine 
parliamentary bodies on as many ministries are still reviewing their activities. Most of them 
held two or three meetings and found mismanagement and irregularities, especially in different 
projects. Four of the ministries blamed for such misdeeds are under the prime minister -- 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) affairs, energy, power and mineral resources, establishment, 
primary and mass education ministries. Sources said other ministries accused of 
mismanagement and corruption are home, commerce, housing and public works, food, health, 
communication, religious affairs, cultural affairs, land, water resources, fisheries and livestock, 
information, environment and forestry, science, information and communication technology, 
liberation war affairs, and expatriates welfare and overseas employment. Parliamentary bodies 
on ministries of finance, industry, planning, foreign affairs, agriculture, law, justice and 
parliamentary affairs and industry have not started monitoring implementation of the projects 
under respective ministries. 
 
The Public Undertakings Committee held three meetings on power sector and upon finding 
huge irregularities and corruption in the sector decided to form two committees to look into the 
anomalies. Abdul Alim, chairman of the committee, observed that irregularities and corruption 
were rampant in the sector. The committee found irregularities in implementation of different 
projects under the energy, power and mineral resources ministry and fake billing by the Power 
Development Board and Dhaka Electric Supply Authority. 
 
The Public Accounts Committee raised allegations against the Roads and Highways 
Department under the communication ministry. Besides, the parliamentary standing committee 
on communication ministry raised allegations of irregularities at the Bangladesh Road 
Transport Corporation under the ministry. 
 
The Estimate Committee found gross irregularities in different organisations, including Rajuk, 
under the housing and public works ministry and formed two sub-committees to identify the 
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irregularities. The sub-committees are now investigating the alleged irregularities and 
corruption at Uttara Model Residential City, Purbachal, Nikunja, Hatirjhil, Jhilmil and 
construction of some roads including Kamlapur to Sayedabad link road and Gulshan Square to 
Pragati Sarani link road. Chairman of the committee Syed Mehedi Ahmed Rumi termed it a 
huge work and said the two sub-committees took an additional two months to complete their 
investigation. 
 
The parliamentary standing committee on the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) affairs ministry 
observed that the ministry was performing poorly because of a lack of coordination among its 
top officials. Even the deputy minister of the ministry raised allegations of corruption in the 
implementation of every project in the CHT and has already threatened to quit office. … 
Moreover, there are allegations of irregularities in the non-formal education project under the 
primary and mass education ministry, allocation of food grains of TR and Kabikha projects 
under the relief and disaster management ministry, and promotion of government officials 
under the establishment ministry. 
 Source:  The Daily Star, November 8,2003. 
Box 8. 3 Committees Under Pressure 
 
The parliamentary standing committees are facing pressure from the government high-ups in 
their move to probe corruption and irregularities in the ministries, the committee chiefs alleged 
yesterday. Speaking at a seminar, the committee chairmen accused the ministers and high 
officials of various ministries of non-cooperation with the committee moves and non-
implementation of their recommendations. They said the parliamentary committee system is not 
functioning properly due to the prevailing situation. Speaker Jamiruddin Sircar, who chaired the 
seminar, said he would inform the prime minister and other ministers about the grievances of the 
committee chairmen. Some 20 parliamentary committee chairmen, all from the ruling BNP and 
Jamaat-e-Islami, spoke at the seminar. They strongly criticised the ministers for their 
indifference to the parliamentary bodies. They said the committees are not functioning properly 
as most of the ministers, secretaries and other high officials are reluctant to join parliamentary 
committee meetings and to provide the committees with necessary documents. The committee 
chiefs demanded amendment to the Rules of Procedure to ensure that ministries are obliged to 
implement committees' recommendations and be accountable to the committees for not carrying 
out the recommendations. (Staff Correspondent, Daily Star, 2nd of March 2005) 
 
Move to stop talks between JS body chiefs, ministries 
 
The government high-ups have moved to stop holding open dialogues between the parliamentary 
body chiefs and the ministry high officials, apparently to save the ministers and secretaries from 
public criticism by the standing committee chiefs. Sources said the speaker has asked the 
officials not to hold open dialogue with the committee chairmen and secretaries until further 
directive as the government high-ups were embarrassed by the committee chiefs' accusations 
against the ministries. The move to stop such dialogue has virtually stalled an UNDP-sponsored 
project aiming at strengthening the parliamentary committee system, under which a series of 
discussions were planned between the committee chiefs and ministry officials. The chairmen of 
a number of parliamentary standing committees at the March 1 dialogue openly accused the 
ministers and high-ups of creating pressure against their move to probe corruption and 
irregularities in the ministries. The following day, the speaker met with the prime minister at her 
office where a number of senior ministers were present. They reacted sharply against the 
committee chiefs' allegations against ministers and asked the speaker to stop such dialogues. The 
IPS officials said they had planned to hold a dialogue with the secretaries of different ministries 
in the first half of this month but could not hold it. Another joint meeting of the committee chiefs 
and the secretaries is scheduled to be held also this month. "But now we are in confusion 
whether we can hold any such meeting," a senior official told The Daily Star wishing anonymity. 
Speaker Jamir Uddin Sircar who extended full support to the dialogues has now asked the 
officials not to arrange such meetings until further orders, sources said. Earlier, inviting 
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committee chiefs and secretaries to the March 1 dialogue, the speaker in a letter said, "I have 
decided to hold several meetings with the parliamentary committee chiefs, secretaries of 
different ministries in phases, both individually and jointly." "There is an urgent need for 
promoting collaboration between committees and the executive agencies of the government," the 
speaker said. "The open discussion on the promotion of better understanding and collaboration 
among the parliamentary committees and ministries of the government is a crucial issue to 
strengthening of parliamentary democracy," he said in the letter. The committee chairmen in the 
March 1 dialogue accused the ministers and high officials of non-cooperation with the 
committee moves and non-implementation of their recommendations. They said the 
parliamentary committee system was not functioning properly due to the prevailing situation.  
 
(Staff Correspondent, Daily Star, March 18, 2005) 
 
Like the print media, the electronic media also play an important role in democratic inter-
action. Until 1998, the state-owned BTV was the only medium of entertainment and 
information.  Parliamentarians belonging to the opposition often blamed that the state-owned 
radio and TV served the purpose of the government; they called the Bangladesh Betar and the 
Bangladesh Television ‘mouthpiece of the government party’. Since 1990, the autonomy of 
the radio and TV became an issue. After fall of autocratic Ershad regime, three major 
political party alliances pledged in a joint statement that the mass media, including 
Bangladesh Betar and BTV will be made into independent and autonomous bodies. Rashed 
Kahn Menon, leader of the Left Democratic Front, moved a resolution seeking withdrawal of 
state control over the public broadcasting in the fifth parliament. He proposed in the 
resolution that the authority of the parliamentary committee on the ministry of information be 
strengthened to conduct the affairs of Betar and BTV. But the resolution was not passed.11 
Although it was expected that the democratic government will grant autonomy of the state-
owned radio and TV, but they denounced the idea of neutrality of the state-run media.  
 
Since 1998, the private TV channels started to telecast their programs with the government 
permission. The government first decided to grant permission for terrestrial broadcasting to 
the private sector in 1998. The ETV was first granted terrestrial broadcasting permission. As 
its owners were suspected to be closer to the AL government and there were allegations about 
irregularities in the licensing process, the ETV lost their license and went off the air in March 
2002. The then BNP government announced that no terrestrial permission would be given. 
They granted permission to fifteen companies for telecasting their program through satellite. 
But the all companies did not come to launce their program. As of June 2007, about twelve 
private TV channels broadcast their program through satellite. Besides the entertainment 
programs, talk shows, discussions are the main features of their programs which focus on 
                                                 
11 The Forum (a monthly publication of the Daily Star) , Vol.2,Issue 4, May 2007.  
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recent political issues. One study argues that the private TV channels provide political space 
where politicians from both sides sit and debate.12 In absence of the parliament, talk shows 
and discussion programs emerge as the alternative places of political compromise. Although 
the privatization of the electronic media has opened a new window for building society 
democratic, but there are still some problems. The owners of the private media houses are 
mostly party members or associated with the party high-ups. They often use their media 
houses for advancing their political career or promoting particular ideology.      
 
The political government had considerable control and influence over the state-run BTV and 
the Bangladesh Betar. The Bangladesh Betar and the BTV have been misused as the 
propaganda machine of the ruling party. Thereby the opposition parties, the civil society and 
the academia brought allegations against the government for fabricating political news and 
parliamentary debates. Although, it was expected that the private media will be neutral but 
there has been a trend towards involvement of the owners of several print and electronic 
media in politics. They have a tendency to promote particular political ideology or program 
and protect their political and business interests through their media houses, which is likely to 
have impact on news and reporting. There are allegations against the print media owners that 
they use their news papers to destroy the careers of the rival politicians or business houses by 
fake reporting. These fake reports add natural tension between the legislators and the 
journalists. Despite these limitations, the print and the electronic media have enabled a large 
section of people of the country to have access to the political events. It is therefore argued, 
“a major success of the media is the creation of space for political debate which is still absent 
within the institutionalized political form.”13  
 
It is generally observed that the main consumers of the print and the digital media are the 
urban, educated middle classes while the state-run BTV and the Bangladesh Betar (radio) are 
the principal sources of information for the rural people.14 Compared to the urban people, 
information access of the rural people is very limited. Therefore the NGOs and the civil 
society organizations are implementing political awareness programs in the rural areas to 
reduce the gap between the mass people and the parliament. They are bringing the important 
issues to public attention and are raising public awareness about governance.  
                                                 
12 Rahman, Hussain Zillur (2007), Unbundling Governance: Indices Institutions Process Solutions, ed., Dhaka: 
PPRC, p.132. 
13 Centre for Governance Studies, BRAC University & BRAC Research and Evaluation Division (2006), op. cit., 
P. 106. 
14 ibid, p.101. 
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More recently, the Internet facilities have enabled the educated urban people to have access 
to information. Internet opens a new window for the legislators and the public to contact with 
one another. By using computers the members can rapidly prepare discussion papers for the 
plenary as well as for the committees. Several computers were installed in the Legislative 
Information Centre (LIC) with Internet facilities but few of the legislators actually used these 
computers. The fact is that most of the members of the Bangladesh parliament were not 
familiar with computer applications. Therefore, the computers are mainly used in the 
committee offices for writing memos, minutes of the meetings and reports.  
 
Like other parliaments, the JS also entered into the World Wide Web network in 1996 with 
its own homepage containing very general information on the Constitution, the Rules of 
Procedure and parliamentary procedures. A few Weekly News Letters are also made 
available. But it does not provide information about current legislative activities.  In contrast 
with the other parliaments like Indian Lok Shabha or Sri Lankan Parliament, there is no 
particular information about the ongoing committee activities. The committee composition, 
the meeting schedule and the reports are not available in the home page. In the age of 
technological revolution, it is surprising that most of the members of the Bangladesh 
parliament were not used to respond to the public through email. Even the officers worked in 
the committee offices did not reply to any email query. As mentioned earlier, the donor took 
initiatives to improve legislative information flow so that the parliamentarians and the public 
can contact with one another. As part of this effort in the beginning of the eighth JS, the 
Local Consultative Group (LCG) has published a “Parliamentary Guide” in their website.15 
The biography of the committee members and their contact addressed are available in their 
homepage for the users.   
 
The academia, the interest group, the party activists, the journalists, the citizens who were 
interested to know about legislation, policy matters and other issues under consideration of 
the committees depended on the print media as necessary legislative information was not 
available in the parliament website. Although, internet users have been tremendously 
increased in Bangladesh, majority people particularly at the local level still rely on the print 
                                                 
15LCG is set up in 1988 with 32 Bangladesh-based representatives of bilateral and multilateral donors of the 
Bangladesh Development Forum and the Secretary, Economic Relations Division (ERD), representing the 
Government. The LCG Sub-Group on Governance functions primarily as a medium of coordination and 
dialogue on a wide range of governance issues within the donor community in Bangladesh. 
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and the TV media.16 The print media often draw public attention disclosing the wrongdoings 
and mismanagements of the government organizations. They also wanted the parliamentary 
committees to be better informed about the government activities so that the committees hold 
the executive accountable for their activities. Considering the importance of the media in 
keeping the government accountable to the people, the PAC members argued in the seventh 
JS in favor of the media access to the committee meetings. They demanded that the media 
access would make the committees more transparent. In turn the trust of the people in the 
democratic system will be strengthened. The PAC requested the ‘Standing Committee on 
Rules of Procedure’ to provide the committee chairperson is discretionary power, so that they 
can allow the journalists to the committee meetings’.17   
 
8.2 Civil Society 
 
Since mid 1980s the civil society has been seen more active in Bangladesh as an alternative 
force along with the conventional political parties and the pressure groups for promoting 
democratic environment. During the military rule in the 1980s the civil society attempted to 
resist authoritarian regimes. Their contributions have been recognized in the country as a part 
of the process of gaining democratic freedom for their citizens.18 After the restoration of 
democracy they led movements to pursue reforms in the political institutions and raising 
public awareness towards democratic values and practices. According to Parnini, in the early 
1990s the donor agencies (i.e. the World Bank, the IMF, the ADB and the UNDP) involved 
the civil society organizations for ensuring good governance in Bangladesh for the following 
reasons. First, the civil society considers improvement of people’s lives as the top priority 
and an end in itself. Second, the civil society organizations are usually independent and can 
act as the watchdogs by monitoring the implementation of governmental commitments in 
different sectors. Third, civil society can fill the legislative and policy gap by advancing anti-
corruption proposals that may not be supported by the political parties. Fourth: the civil 
society can operate on the basis of ideas rather than prestige, power and money.19 
 
                                                 
16 Internet users have been increased in Bangladesh from 0.1 million in 2000 to 0.45 million in 2007 which is 
0.3% of the total population. Source: www.internetworldstatus.com  
17 The Public Accounts Committee Report, p.2, October 1998. 
18 Parnini, Syeda Naushin (2006), “Civil Society and Good Governance in Bangladesh”, Asian Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 2, December 2006,p. 195. 
19 ibid., p.197.  
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The civil society has opened a new ‘window of opportunity for the community to monitor 
public institutions and to identify critical issues. They indemnify the limitations of the 
government policy and actions and propose remedial measures. Through discussions, 
research, writings and conferences, they attempt to raise public awareness, stimulate public 
debate and create constituencies in favor of reform. Along with other issues they are 
advocating for strengthening the parliamentary bodies. Among the prominent civil society 
organizations the Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), the Centre for Policy 
Dialouge (CPD), the Manabik Shahajya Sangstha (MSS), and the Power and Participation 
Research Centre (PPRC) are well known organizations that are working to make a bridge 
between the parliamentarians and the public. Major activities of the civil society 
organizations in strengthening parliamentary democracy are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
The Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) started their program in 1994. Since the 
beginning they have been working to ensure transparency and accountability in both the 
government and the non-government spheres. One of the major projects of the TIB is 
‘Parliament and Good Governance’. The main objective of this project is to strengthen 
parliamentary accountability. In doing so, they give emphasis on the working of the 
committee system. The TIB watches the parliamentary sessions and publish regularly 
‘Parliament Watch Report’ in both Bengali and English. The Parliament Watch reports 
mainly focuses on the working of the parliament particularly illustrated the activities of the 
committees. They are advocating for raising public awareness against corruption and for 
strengthening the parliamentary committees. There is an argument that the corruption can be 
reduced through strengthening the parliamentary committees. As part of this effort they 
organize seminar, workshop and round-table discussion where the civil society members, the 
parliamentarians and the public came together to exchange their views. For example, the TIB 
organized a workshop on “The Role of Parliament in Increasing Transparency and 
Accountability” in 1998. The MPs who participated in this workshop identified the following 
institutional weaknesses to the effective functioning of the committee system : (a) the 
standing committees are not composed according to the proportional representation in the 
parliament, (b) the ministers are not required to disclose the recommendations of the 
committees, (c) the report of the committees on issues of national importance may not be on 
the agenda for discussion in the parliament, (d) the decisions taken by the standing committee 
are not binding, (e) the standing committees lack visibility in the media though the main 
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functions of the committees are to inform and expose important issues to the public. They 
suggested that the standing committees should be composed according to the proportional 
representation and the MPs from the opposition should be allowed to chair some of the 
standing committees. They also demanded that the ministers should be present at meetings 
and they should be bound to disclose the committee recommendations to the parliament and 
the press. It was also suggested that strong links with the civil society should be created 
through the committee system.20 The TIB also publish monographs, reports and discussion 
papers on various topics including the performances of the parliamentary committees; for 
example, an investigative report on the PAC was published in 2002. 
 
The Manabik Shahajjo Sangstha (MSS) is a non-governmental organizations working for 
promotion of democracy and strengthening democratic institutions. The Legislative Support 
Service Project (LSSP) is component of the MSS. Under this project the MSS is working for 
promoting parliamentary democracy. In doing so it brings public opinion to the parliament and 
therefore assists the parliamentarians in preparing private bills and enriches policy makers 
with relevant and current information through organizing seminars, workshops, dialogues and 
publishing articles on legislative issues, fact finding information on much debated issues. It is 
worth mentioning that MSS through its LSSP assists the parliamentarians in drafting Private 
Members Bills. It offers secretarial support and provides with necessary information on 
legislative parliamentary issues. It is working for making a closer working relationship with 
the civil society actors and the parliamentary committees. Since 2002 it has organized about 
20 discussion programs and seminars where the civil society actors directly exchanged their 
views with the committee members and the chairpersons.21  
 
The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) is a prominent research organization of the country. It 
is also well known for the civil society activities. After ending the eighth JS, the CPD has 
organized a nation-wide dialogue to involve the citizens in a debate of fair candidate selection 
for the national parliamentary election. The media widely covered the dialogue program to 
raise public awareness. The Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC) is another well-
known research organization established in 1996. It mainly works with the political 
development, the governance, the quality of education and the development of local 
                                                 
20 Workshop on 'Conscientization of the Civil Society and the Transparency International (TI) Chapters in 
Strategic Planning within the context of Strengthening Integrity', organized by TIB, July 14-15, 1998.  
21 Information is provided by the Legislative Support Service, Project of MSS, Dhaka, October, 2003. 
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governance. The PPRC strives to develop a holistic approach towards issues of development, 
knowledge management and citizen empowerment.22  
In the 1990s, the civil society organizations appeared to be active in raising the demand for 
strengthening the parliamentary bodies. The academia and the journalists in their writings 
provided with a strong voice for creating reciprocal environment in the parliament so that the 
committees can function properly. In this regard, the civil society members made the 
following recommendations in various seminars and workshops: firstly, the Speaker should 
be neutral in conducting the parliamentary business; secondly, the chairmanship of important 
committees, such as the Business Advisory Committee, different ministerial standing 
committees and the financial committees should go to the opposition; thirdly, the standing 
committees should be composed according to the proportional representation in the 
parliament; fourthly,  the media should have access to the standing committee meetings; and 
fifthly, the members should not involve in any activities other than legislative. They also 
recommended for opening the parliamentary committees to civil society groups allowing for 
more open consultations and discussions.23 However, the above mentioned recommendations 
were repeatedly discussed in various forums and the government and the parliamentarians 
were accordingly informed, but none of these recommendations was implemented. Major 
success of the civil society organizations in strengthening parliamentary democracy in raising 
voice for amending the ROP to avoid delaying the standing committee formation. It is worth 
mentioning that when the standing committee formation was delayed during the period of the 
eighth JS, number of sub-editorials were published both in Bengali and English dailies 
demanding the amendment of the rules of procedure to ensure that all the parliamentary 
standing committees are to be formed within a minimum time from the beginning of first 
session. There is no doubt that the civil society turned this issue for public discussion. They 
demanded that the standing committees should be formed within a limited time from the first 
session of the new parliament. Major national dailies include the Daily Star, the Prothom Alo, 
the Somakal   published editorials and sub-editorials giving emphasis on this demand. 
As a result of the civil society’s demands, the eighth JS amended the ROP in its last session 
and decided that the parliamentary committees should be formed within the first three 
sessions of the parliament which means that the committee formation will be completed in 
                                                 
22 Rahman, Hussain Zillur  (2007), op. cit., back cover illustration.  
23 The Daily Star, March 24, 2006; civil society members expressed their opinion in the workshop on “The Role 
of Parliament in Increasing Transparency and Accountability”, organized by TIB, July 14, 1998 
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four months of the first session. As it was observed, every new parliament convened its third 
session within four months. The lawmakers, the civil society members and the media 
appreciated the chairperson and the members of the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Procedure for taking such decision to avoid unwanted delay in forming the parliamentary 
watchdog bodies.    
The media reports revealed the extent to which these sub-committees have failed or have 
been unwilling to do the job they were assigned to do. The New Age in its editorial titled  "JS 
sub-committees, verily silent" dated May 15, 2005 writes: “… the many sub-committees set 
up by parliament to inquire into the allegations of ministerial as well as the administrative 
corruption have not been working, there is something of a shock that comes into our 
sensibilities.” Again the Daily Star in its editorial titled "Allegations of corruption" of June 
17, 2005 writes, "Investigations into the charges of corruption against ministers and high 
officials by parliamentary sub-committees have made little headway and, in most cases, come 
to a complete halt.” The print media repeatedly noticed that the committee chairpersons 
belonging to the ruling party were reprimanded by the party’s high command for their initial 
hard stand on the irregularities in the ministries concerned.  Taking this issue seriously, the 
academia and the journalist have raised questions on the role of the parliamentary standing 
committees on ministries. The civil society members argue for strengthening the 
parliamentary committees so that they can perform their due responsibilities. One member of 
the civil society writes in his column: “the standing committees on ministries must discharge 
their assigned responsibilities without fear or favor. They should be objective rather than 
being subjective in the discharge of their functions. The ministries must render all co-
operation and assistance to the committees. Any non-cooperation by a ministry should be 
seriously dealt with. The parliament should give due importance to the recommendations 
made by these committees to give effect to the constitutional stipulation that the executive is 
responsible to the parliament.”24 It was largely observed that the civil society together with 
the media raise demands for strengthening the parliamentary committees to ensure 
democratic accountability. The members of civil society by appearing in the talk shows in the 
electronic media and by writing in the print media have successfully created a discourse on 
democratization in Bangladesh. The broader impact of the inputs given by the civil society 
organizations in raising people’s awareness is by no means a proactive trend to build a 
proactive committee system.  
                                                 
24 The Daily Star, 17 July 2005. 
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CHAPTER IX 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study has intended to explain how parliamentary committees perform in a country where 
the political institutions, at least partly, have been imposed from outside rather than being 
fully indigenous. In the foregoing chapters, it has been observed that Bangladesh has adopted 
many of its parliamentary structure and procedures from the British model that was 
transplanted in this soil during the colonial days. Like other post-colonial states, the countries 
of this region had first exposure to the western parliamentary system during the British 
colonial days. The analysis of the development of the parliamentary structure under the 
British colonial era presented in this study showed that until 1909 the parliamentary 
structures in both the central and provinces functioned more or less as an advisory council of 
the executive and the parliament had not much scope for criticizing and controlling the 
government activities. Though the Government of India Acts 1909, 1919 and 1935 added 
democratic elements and introduced committee system in the central and provincial 
parliamentary structures, the executive dominance remained almost the same as before 
because the British government did not establish representative institutions in this region to 
the full requirements of the Westminster model. The analysis of the functioning of the 
parliamentary committees of the Indian Central and Bengal Provincial Assemblies showed 
that the parliamentary committees did not perform any useful work in terms of holding 
executive accountability to the representative institutions. During this period the committees 
helped to enlighten the members to be familiar with the parliamentary process. Following the 
end of British colonial role parliamentary democracy was adopted as form of government 
both in India and Pakistan. Though parliamentary institutions and procedures successfully 
worked in India, it failed to take roots in Pakistan. It has been observed that lack of consensus 
among the competitive political parties, delaying of constitution making, absence of 
democratic principles within the political parties, military interventions in state power halted 
the growth of parliamentary practices in Pakistan. The government failed to accommodate the 
East Pakistani (Bengali) political elites in the decision making process. Given facts showed 
that the legislative compromise was lacking to solve conflict and differences within the 
society. In this consequence, unusual tension, wide variety of conflicts and differences within 
the two wings finally led to the breakdown of united Pakistan in 1971.  
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After the independence of Bangladesh, the parliamentary system of the government was 
introduced to fulfill the aspirations of the people. The Constitution of Bangladesh came to 
effect on 16 December, 1972. Though the Constitution vested all legislative power to the 
parliament, officially named Jatiya Sangsad, under a Westminster style of democracy, it 
could not function successfully in post-liberation period. It is important to note here that 
successful functioning of parliamentary democracy depends upon certain conditions, such as 
consensus among the competitive political parties, presence of democratic norms and values 
within the party structure, peaceful transfer of power and responsibility equally by the 
government and opposition party. The analysis of the functioning of the Bangladesh Jatiya 
Sangsad (JS) presented in this study revealed that the first JS was totally controlled and 
dominated by the government party. Because of the minimal presence of the opposition 
parties in the parliament, the ruling party (AL) did not recognize any official opposition. The 
overwhelming majority of the AL in the first parliament and their authoritarian attitudes 
played a negative role making the parliament ineffective. It was observed that the legislative 
devices were not properly used in the legislative and the overseeing process. In all the eight 
sessions of the first parliament, the committees were mostly inactive. During this period, the 
committees did not hold their meetings regularly and did not submit any report. The study 
also showed that the committees established in the first parliament could not ensure 
parliamentary accountability for the following reasons. Firstly, authoritarian attitudes of the 
leaders of the ruling party played a negative role in growing parliamentary culture. Secondly, 
due to the absence of official opposition in the parliament, the committees were formed only 
with the members of the treasury bench. Thirdly, due to the absence of democracy within the 
party structure and procedure, the parliamentarians could not go against their party leaders 
who occupied ministerial positions. Fourthly, the committee members were more concerned 
with achieving political patronage rather than ensuring parliamentary accountability. The 
present study showed that the conditions which required for proper functioning of Western 
liberal democracy were absent in the post-liberation Bangladesh. The parliamentary system 
of the government was thus replaced with one-party presidential rule by the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution in 1975. But it could not last longer. 
   
In a sweeping change, Bangladesh came under the military rule by a bloody coup on August 
15, 1975 and remained under military dominated civil-military regimes until 1990. In the 
post-colonial states where democracy was broken down by military intervention, parliaments 
were either abolished or suspended. The present study showed that the process of 
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civilianization of the military regime began in Bangladesh with the formation of political 
parties under state patronization. The BNP and the JP are such kinds of political parties 
established by military governments respectively in 1978 and in 1986. Both parties had 
overwhelming majority in the parliaments. Between 1975 and 1990, three parliaments had 
been formed to civilianize the military regime. Under a presidential form of government they 
had a record of poor performance in holding the government accountable to the parliament. 
Though the departmental standing committees were, for the first time, created in the second 
JS, they seemed to be failed in ensuring departmental accountability. The analysis of the 
functioning of the parliamentary committees of the second, the third and the fourth 
parliaments showed that the committees had limited scope to oversee the government 
activities due to lack of parliamentary sovereignty. Though military regimes attempted to 
civilianize their regimes by launching political parties, holding referendum and general 
elections, dominance and control of the civil-military bureaucrats over political power 
essentially weakened the parliament. Given facts showed that parliamentary committee 
members could hardly raise their voices against the misgivings of the government 
departments since the departmental standing committees were headed by the ministers. 
Through party hierarchy ministers dominated and controlled their MPs in the committee 
process. Secondly, like many other post-colonial states Bangladesh inherited powerfully 
organized bureaucratic structure that became overdeveloped compared to the socio-economic 
structure of the country. The present study showed that since 1975 civil-military bureaucrats 
emerged as the power-bloc in decision making apparatus. It was thus observed that the 
parliaments from 1975 to 1990 served the purposes of the government and the committee 
system could therefore not work properly.  
 
There was a new beginning since the reintroduction of the parliamentary system of the 
government in 1991. Due to the fragile base of Western liberal democracy, significant 
changes have been made in the political system since 1991 for strengthening the democratic 
process. One of these efforts was to introduce Non-Party Caretaker Government (NCG) 
headed by the Chief Adviser. The provisions regarding the NCG were added in the 
Constitution with the formal approval of the 13th Amendment in 1996. According to the 
provisions of Article 58 of the Constitution, an NCG shall be appointed for an interim term to 
assist the Bangladesh Election Commission in holding the general elections imperially and 
freely. The concept of the NCG came from the crisis of confidence between the major 
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political parties on holding free and fair elections. After the installment of the NCG, the 
seventh and the eighth JS elections took place.  
 
Unlike the committees of the previous parliaments the post-1990 standings committees 
seemed to be comparatively more active both in legislative and overseeing process. 
Examining the performances of the parliamentary committees the present study showed that 
in the post 1990 parliaments the committees spent most of their time for scrutinizing 
legislative proposals and monitoring activities of the executive departments. Though 
theoretically the committees were not granted authority to propose a bill or to rewrite a bill, 
they were allowed to move amendments on every proposal referred to them. The introduction 
of automatic referral system in 1997 allowed the committees to scrutinize every bill before 
legislation. However, 25 bills in the seventh JS and 61 bills in the eighth JS were passed 
without scrutinizing by a committee because the committee formation was delayed in these 
two parliaments owing to the disagreement between the treasury and the opposition benches. 
Once the committees were formed, every bill was automatically sent to the appropriate 
standing committee and referred back to the House with a report. As observed, despite the 
privilege of moving amendments and suggestions on a bill, most of the bills passed in the JS 
were not altered or amended at the committee stage. Though in the developed countries 
legislative compromise takes place in the committees, the present study found a different 
picture in Bangladesh. The study revealed that the members belonging to the government or 
the ruling alliance more frequently endorsed the government bills while the members 
belonging to the opposition bench opposed them. In some cases, they gave ‘note of dissent’ 
and even walked out of the committee session. Some of the bills were so hurriedly backed to 
the House; the committee members had little opportunity to review such bills. 
 
The committees also could not scrutinize the ordinance-turned bills before being enacted into 
laws. The analysis of the law making process of the post 1990 parliaments presented in this 
study showed that the ordinance-turned bills passed in the fifth and the eighth JS were not 
earlier referred to a committee. The seventh JS was an exception; among the 16 ordinance-
turned bills passed by the House, nine bills were earlier referred to the special committee and 
others were passed without detail review by concerned committee. Even a bill was earlier 
promulgated as ordinance when a similar bill was under consideration of the standing 
committee. Though the legislation process of such type greatly reduced the prestige and 
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power of the standing committees, the government with majority in the JS repeatedly passed 
ordinance-turned bills.     
 
Most of the bills passed in the JS were government bills. The Private Member’s Bills tabled 
in the House were dropped at the various level of legislation process. It is recorded that the 
fifth, the seventh and the eight parliaments each passed one Private Member’s Bills. A large 
number of bills moved by the private members were dropped at various level of the 
legislation process. Following shortcomings are identified regarding the process of private 
members bills- the Private Members’ Bills Committee usually took a long time for 
scrutinizing the bills; secondly the PMBR committee did not submit its report in due time; 
thirdly, the bills those were referred back to the House with a report, were not introduced to 
the House; fourthly, most of the members did not have expertise in making a legislative 
proposal properly. Due to these difficulties only three private members’ bills were finally 
enacted into law in the post-1990 parliaments.  
 
Since the beginning of the fifth JS, the parliamentary committees appeared to be active and 
vibrant in detecting misgivings of the government departments. The analysis of the 
performances of the parliamentary committees presented in this study showed that at least 
twenty ministries were accused of mismanagement of public funds including the Ministry of 
Defense, the LGRD, the Shipping, the Communication, the Education, the Health and the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. The standing committees detected major lapse 
and mismanagement of these departments and recommended necessary remedies. However, a 
few of them were finally implemented. From the discussions of functioning of the 
departmental standing committees presented in this study showed that several government 
departments were reluctant to implement committee decisions since the adversary 
relationship between the minister and the committee chairpersons. The indifference of the 
government departments to the parliamentary committees was another major problem for 
proper functioning of the parliamentary bodies. During the period of the seventh JS, at least 
20 committee chairpersons publicly accused the bureaucrats and ministers for ignoring their 
decisions. The analysis of this study showed that the adversary relationship between the 
minister and the committee chairperson considerably affected the working of parliamentary 
bodies properly.   
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The present study showed that the departmental standing committees were more concerned 
with detecting misgivings of the government departments and discussing some of the routine 
affairs of the ministries rather than policy related issues. In this regard, the Defense 
Committee was an exception. During the period of the eighth JS, the Defense Committee 
took initiative to review the Armed Forces budgetary allocation policy and make a draft 
Defense policy. In doing so, the committee held several meetings and the Armed Forces 
Division (AFD) appointed a committee in accordance with the suggestions made by the 
committee. 
 
In today’s political systems, one of the major responsibilities of the parliament is to oversee 
the financial activities of the government departments. Like other post-colonial parliaments 
(i.e India and Sri Lanka), the Bangladesh JS relies on the PAC for ensuring the financial 
discipline of the government departments. The Bangladesh JS has other two financial 
committees (the PEC and the PUC). The idea of the PAC was transplanted in this region 
during the colonial period following the practice of the British Parliament while the PEC and 
the PUC are comparatively new. The analysis of the working of the financial committees 
presented in this study showed that during the post-1990 period the financial committees 
made their efforts to bring discipline in financial management of the public sectors. Among 
the financial committees, the PAC was found comparatively more active in the eighth JS than 
the other two financial committees. Though the PAC dealt with a good number of audit 
objections, the committee could not settle all objections due to staff crisis and delaying of 
committee formation. It was observed that other two financial committees were devoted to 
identify the persons and organizations involved in financial irregularities. While examining 
the financial anomalies of different ministries, the financial committees made more than 
hundreds of recommendations but few of them were implemented due to negligence of the 
government departments in implementing the committee decisions. They claimed in their 
reports that different ministries did not take proper initiative against the expenditure 
irregularities. It may be mentioned that the committees can make the recommendation against 
any irregularity but cannot force the ministries for implementing their decisions, even they 
cannot supervise or monitor whether or not their recommendations have been implemented 
because implementation of their decisions is not mandatory for the ministries.  
 
Though the committee meetings, in principle, were not open to the public, the media played a 
major role in communicating committee activities and their weakness to the public. The 
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media particularly the print media provided with an incentive for the committees to oversee 
government activities. On the one hand, they highlighted the misgivings of government 
departments and on the other hand, they took the committees close to the people. The public 
exclusively depended on the print media to know the committee activities because the 
parliament did not provide with necessary information about an ongoing committee work in 
their home page and in the bulletins, the newsletters and the monographs that were published 
by the IPS.  Including the committee reports, information materials were not circulated to the 
public. The media also highlighted the wrongdoing of the committee members. The present 
study cited several examples from the reports published in the national dailies. These reports 
showed the nature of wrongdoing of the parliamentary bodies.  
 
Along with the media, civil society organizations for some years had raised their voices for 
strengthening the parliamentary committees. Since the 1990s, they seemed to be active in 
raising public awareness for establishing an accountable and transparent government. The 
civil society in their writings, speeches and in other activities gave emphasis on the better 
functioning of the committee system. They identified the factors that prevented the 
parliamentary committees from functioning properly and recommended the remedies.  
Although the committees seemed to be active in the post-1990 parliaments compared to 
previous parliaments, certain weakness made difficulties for the committees to work 
independently and properly. The absence of separation of power, lack of consensus between 
the political parties, the lack of democratic principles within the party structure, the lack of 
expertise of committee members on particular subject matter and the scarcity of staff and 
resources affected the proper functioning of the committee system in varying degrees. 
Drawing on contemporary evidence, this study analyzes the factors underlying the non-
functioning of committees in the post 1990 parliaments. 
 
The parliamentary committees set up in the Bangladesh parliament are regulated and guided 
by the Constitution and the ROP. Thereby, these are the two sources of legal basis of the 
committee structures and procedures. Article 76 of the Constitution formally granted the 
parliament to appoint standing committees as necessary for discharging its functions and the 
ROP constructs their number, size and way of operation. But the ROP does not mention 
anything about the distribution of the committee seats among the parliamentary parties. The 
analysis of the committee formation and procedure presented in this study showed that the 
committee formation were delayed for one and a half years both in the seventh and the eighth 
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parliaments owing to disagreement between the party in power and the opposition party. 
There was no legal binding for the parliamentary parties to form the committees within a 
fixed period. An important reform of the committee system was made in this regard by the 
eighth JS. In the last session of the eighth JS, the ROP was amended to avoid unwanted delay 
in forming the parliamentary committees. Under the new parliamentary rule all parliamentary 
standing committees must be formed within the third session of a parliament.  
 
Responsibility equally of the government party and the opposition party is necessary for 
upholding the parliamentary democracy. The analysis of the role of parliamentary parties in 
functioning of committee system presented in this study revealed that both the government 
and the opposition party were reluctant about their responsibility. It is revealed that the main 
opposition party repeatedly boycotted the parliamentary session. Their repeated boycott and 
difference with the treasury bench badly affected the committee performances. Although in 
some cases the opposition members attended the committee meetings during their boycott 
program, intolerance among major parliamentary parties created a chaotic situation in the 
committee session. The study also showed that confrontational politics outside the parliament 
fostered the differences between the government and the opposition parties in the 
committees. Due to the lack of responsibility, the committee chairperson could hardly come 
out of his/her party line. The opposition members thus brought the allegations against the 
committee chairperson for his/her partisan behavior.  
 
Lack of responsibility of the government departments also affected the proper functioning of 
the parliamentary committees in Bangladesh. It was observed that the government with its 
majority tended to control committee procedures. The government departments often ignored 
the committee decisions or recommendations. Though the committee chairpersons and 
members criticized the ministers and bureaucrats for their indifference to the parliamentary 
bodies, they often ignored the committee decisions. It so happened because the committees 
were formally granted authority and power to oversee the government activities but their 
decisions were not mandatory for the government departments for implementation.  
 
For effective functioning of liberal democracy, political parties should be democratic 
internally. The present study showed that the political parties in Bangladesh are not 
democratic internally. Although every party has a supreme decision making body, major 
decisions are taken by the party chiefs. Formation of various levels of party committees and 
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their office-bearers are subject to the party chief. However, it is assumed that the steering or 
executive committee will take the decision regarding party policy the meeting of the 
executive committee seems to be ceremonious. There had been a great gap between the 
theoretical role of the parliamentary board and the personal power and authority of the party 
chiefs. Though all political parties in Bangladesh have parliamentary boards but 
parliamentary candidate selection is highly centralized to the party chiefs. Parliamentary 
candidate selection was not made through democratic process. In the absence democratic 
means of the candidate selection process, businessmen and retired civil-military bureaucrats 
got party nomination because of their wealth and influence in the sate apparatus. It thus 
created a new political class who intended to use their parliamentary positions to make 
money and social status. Such practices prevented the nurture of a parliamentary political 
culture. 
 
Absence of democratic practice within the party organization restricted the legislators to work 
in the parliamentary committees freely. It was observed that the party chiefs both formally 
and informally controlled their parliamentarians assigned to various parliamentary positions 
and committees. Through sanction and rewarding capacity the party chiefs control their 
committee members. The analysis of the party constitutions presented in this study showed 
that the party chief enjoys enormous authority in controlling their members.  The party 
constitution prescribes their MPs to be loyal to the party chief. Article 70 of the Bangladesh 
Constitution also restricts the parliamentarians from going against party line while decisions 
are made in the parliament. The party dominance and the constitutional provisions of party 
discipline do not encourage their members to work in the committees independently. The 
present study showed that under the party constitutions the party chief and the parliamentary 
party leader is the same person. S/he enjoys overwhelming authority to control party 
members in and out side the legislature. The analysis of this study showed that the committee 
members who were loyal to the party chief and complied with he decision of party chief 
promoted to an important position rather than others who were reluctant to follow such 
guidance. This study also revealed that the legislators who criticized their party leaders or 
challenged their decision had been expelled from the party in the name of party discipline. It 
can therefore be argued that strong party dominance reduces the ability of the legislators to 
work in the committees effectively. 
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The social standing of the committee members also had considerable effect in the functioning 
of the committees. As discussed in the fifth chapter, most of the members of the JS came 
from business profession while lawyers; professionals, farmers and professional politicians 
were poorly represented in the post-1990 parliaments. It was observed that the business-
industrialist class entered into parliament mostly because of their money, muscle power and 
patronage rather than any sort of political experience. They chose politics as a second 
profession and hardly spent much time in parliament-related business. Therefore, quorum 
crisis became a regular phenomenon in the parliament as well as in the committees. Most of 
the committees could not convene their meeting regularly and did not submit report in 
accordance with the ROP. It was also observed that the direct involvement of business-
industrial class in politics made a significant change in the social composition of the JS. 
Statistics reveals that the parliament became more unrepresentative of the majority of the 
population. The JS had a little opportunity to nominate the committee members on the basis 
of their professional experiences. As such, the standing committees like the Education 
Committee, the Health Committee or the Environment Committee lacked members with 
specialized knowledge or professional background. Thereby, most of the committees 
depended on the bureaucrats for expert opinion or advice. Due to the lack of expertise on 
subject concerned, the committees were keen to discuss the misgivings of the government 
departments rather than policy matters. Though, the committees were expected to have role in 
policymaking, their activities ended up with finding corruption cases. Another dimension was 
that most of the woman parliamentarians were indirectly elected and they were usually 
appointed to the less important committees. The Committee on Women and Children Affairs 
had seen it as a firm place for the women legislators. It was noticed that their male colleagues 
often ignored them in the committee session, which in turn discouraged them to participate in 
the committee process actively.   
 
The members of the JS were facilitated with financial benefits including salary, insurance, 
travel allowances, constituency allowances and entertainment allowances. The members had 
also been provided with furnished family apartment with subsidized rate having the right to 
import vehicle without tax. With all of these things the legislators enjoyed a good number of 
facilities. But the committees did not have adequate staff and professionals which was a basic 
requirement for their proper functioning. The analysis of the parliamentary support services 
presented in this study showed that most of the committee staff were appointed for clerical 
jobs. They were mostly engaged for keeping records, preparing notice for meeting, drafting 
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report and conducting with the government departments. They could not provide research 
assistance or technical advice. Though the parliament library has some research officers, they 
hardly claimed to have expertise on parliamentary affairs. Due to the lack of sufficient 
professional staff, the committees depended on the ministries for technical advice. In this 
circumstance, the committee members found it difficult to accomplish their responsibilities 
properly. In the recent years, the donor agencies, particularly the UNDP took significant steps 
for providing necessary supports for strengthening the committee system under the Project of 
Strengthening of the Parliament. The UNDP funded project assisted the parliament to 
develop a home page and installed about 50 computers and printers with Internet facilities. 
Although the numbers of computers were supplied, these were insignificant compared with 
the total number of staff and parliamentarians. However, it was observed that most of the 
legislators were not inclined to use these computers.  
 
From the above discussion, one can generalize the conditions that matter for proper 
functioning of the parliamentary committees in a post-colonial state in general and in 
Bangladesh particular. The analysis of this study showed that a number of factors such as the 
colonial legacies, the absence of inner-party democracy, the overdeveloped bureaucracy, the 
military intervention and the breakdown of democracy, the dominance of business-industrial 
class in politics and the lack of parliamentary support services hindered proper functioning of 
parliamentary committees in Bangladesh. Though all these factors have a considerable 
influence on the functioning of the parliamentary committees, the analysis and findings of 
this study showed that breakdown of democracy and authoritarian style of leadership of the 
party organization greatly affected their performance negatively.  
 
Considering the above problems and constraints, the following measures can be taken for 
strengthening the parliamentary committees in Bangladesh: 
 
- The analysis presented in this study showed that the standing committees served 
as advisory body, and their recommendations were not binding for the government 
departments. For strengthening the oversight role of the parliamentary 
committees, it should be obligatory for the government departments to implement 
committee decisions, and they should be accountable to the committees for not 
carrying out the recommendations. To promote parliamentary accountability, the 
committee reports should be discussed and followed up the implementation status 
in the House.  
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- For strengthening the financial accountability of the executive, the CAG office 
should be independent from the executive and build up a good tie with the 
financial committees, particularly with the PAC. It is also necessary to empower 
the financial committees to examine and rewrite the draft budget before being 
placed to the House.  
- An important reform of the committee system was made in the seventh JS by 
introducing the practice of heading up the standing committees with non-
ministers. Despite the appointments of non-minister member chairperson of the 
committee, they were often seen helpless when the ministry delayed to supply 
necessary information. The views of the committee chairpersons presented in this 
study showed that the ministers and high officials of various ministries did not 
properly cooperate with the committees in implementing of their 
recommendations. Due to the prevailing situation, the committees could not work 
properly. In this regard, status and power of the committee chairpersons should be 
defined in the ROP.  
- Though the ROP makes it mandatory that parliamentary committees must meet at 
least once in a month, most of the committees did not follow the rule. It is 
necessary to ensure holding committee meetings regularly and make it mandatory 
for the committees to submit at least one report to the House timely.  There should 
be an evaluation of their performances, or at least committee reports should be 
discussed in the House. 
 
- It is observed that committee formation took much time due to disagreement 
between the political parties. To develop healthy parliamentary traditions, the 
ROP can be amended to adopt one of the following two methods for distributing 
committee positions among the parliamentary parties. First, following the example 
of the German parliament, the committee chairs can be distributed on the basis of 
proportional strength of the parties in the House, and each committee may have a 
Vice Chairperson who will be appointed from the opposite party. Second, like the 
British and the Indian parliaments, important watchdog committee chairs can be 
offered to the opposition parliamentary party. 
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- It is observed that political parties in Bangladesh are not democratic to the extent 
they ought to be. The study showed that parliamentary candidates were not 
democratically selected, decisions were mostly taken by the party chief and 
legislators relied on their chief for settling their parliamentary strategy. For 
strengthening the parliament, political parties should emphasis on political 
professionalism rather than the personal choice and loyalty in the selection of 
parliamentary candidates. The analysis presented in this study showed that the 
political advancement of the legislators depended upon the satisfaction of the 
party chief rather than their performances in the parliamentary process. The 
legislators therefore seemed to be active in gratifying their party chiefs rather than 
playing constructive role in the parliament. Political parties therefore should be 
democratic internally and they should encourage their members to take part in the 
parliamentary committees more seriously. 
 
- Unlike the developed democracies, party chief and parliamentary leader in 
Bangladesh is the same person. Party chiefs formally enjoy enormous authority to 
decide which member will go to which committee in the party organization. The 
legislators could hardly criticize decisions or policy taken by the parliamentary 
party leader. The parliamentary party chief and senior leaders had decisive control 
over their committee members, which in turn weakened the committees. It is thus 
important to make the political parties democratic and reduce party control over 
committee members so that they can perform in the committees in a non-partisan 
manner.  
 
- For strengthening the parliament, parliamentary parties should have some 
specialized working groups and subgroups on particular policy area. Like the 
parliamentary parties of the German Bundestag, parliamentary decision is 
profoundly prepared by these groups. Parties should introduce some mechanism 
so that party members can develop their knowledge about particular policy area.  
 
- Though Article 70 was farmed for stability of the government, it has a negative 
impact. It restricts the parliamentary party members to go against the party line. 
Article 70 (2) of the Bangladesh Constitution states that in the matter of voting in 
Parliament, any member does not comply with the direction of the leadership so 
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determined, he shall be deemed to have voted against that party under clause (1) 
and shall vacate his seat in the Parliament. This provision of the Article can be 
explained in a manner that suits the party chief. So, it becomes the best instrument 
for the party chief to control party members in parliamentary process. As we 
observed in Chapter IV, an MP has been expelled from the party under Article 70, 
though he neither voted against nor resigned from the party, he only attended 
parliament sessions by denying the party decision. In this regard, Article 70 of the 
Constitution can be amended to ensure democratic rights of the parliamentarians. 
To make the parliamentary committees effective there should be consensus and 
compromise among the parties on national issues and the committee members 
should have commitment to take an issue from pluralistic viewpoint.  
 
- In order to facilitate the standing committees to function successfully, 
parliamentary support services including staff facilities, research assistance, 
financial benefits and necessary logistic support should be increased. Each 
committee should have an individual secretariat with professional staff.   
 
- Finally, there should be an effective mechanism to link the people with the 
committee activities. For expert suggestions and public input, the committees have 
to be given the right of holding public hearing. The important committee reports, 
relevant information and activity reports should be made public. For making a 
bridge between the parliament and the public, mass media should be given access 
to the committee meeting, and the parliamentary web site must be reconstructed 
and enlarged with necessary information.    
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
 
 
Activities of the Ministerial Standing Committees 
 
No. of meeting held  No. of  Sub-committees 
Formed 
No. of Report 
Submitted 
Standing Committee on 
Ministries 
 5th JS 7th JS 8th JS 5th JS 7th JS 8th JS 5th JS 7th JS 8th JS
Agriculture 29 29 39 0 6 3 1 - 1 
CHT NE NE 27 3 0 3 - - 1 
Civil Aviation 42 34 27 3 4 7 1 0 1 
Commerce 39 30 26 1 4 5 0 0 0 
Communication 34 37 17 0 9 5 0 1 1 
Culture 42 28 31 3 2 4 0 0 1 
Defence 26 34 33 0 1 0 0 1 3 
Education 47 32 35 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Environment & Forestry 33 32 28 1 2 9 0 0 1 
Establishment  28 31 21 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Expatriate Welfare NE NE 30 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Finance 23 60 21 0 2 0 1 1 1 
Fisheries & Livestock 38 27 27 0 5 3 0 0 1 
Food & Disaster 
Management  
NE NE 17 0 NE 2 0 0 1 
Food 30 36 NE 0 3 NE 0 0 NE 
Flood & Disaster 
Management 
24 27 NE 2 0 NE 0 0 NE 
Foreign Affairs 25 30 23 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Health 27 31 38 0 3 5 0 0 1 
Home 26 24 16 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Housing & Works 34 23 28 0 3 4 0 0 0 
Information 26 35 20 3 1 1 0 1 1 
Industry 27 26 34 0 0 7 0 1 1 
Labor and Manpower 31 40 20 4 3 1 0 0 1 
Land 15 39 25 3 18 4 0 0 1 
Legal & Parliamentary 
Affairs 
46 43 48 0 7 0 1 0 1 
Liberation War NE NE 16 0 NE 3 0 0 1 
LGRD 34 38 23 0 0 2 1 0 1 
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No. of meeting held  No. of  Sub-committees 
Formed 
No. of Report 
Submitted 
Standing Committee on 
Ministries 
 5
th JS 7th JS 8th JS  5th JS 7th JS 8th JS  5th JS
Planning 36 33 20 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Primary & Mass 
Education 
NE NE 39 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Post & 
Telecommunication 
26 21 25 1 2 1 0 0 2 
Power & Energy 39 16 43 7 3 6 1 0 1 
Religious Affairs 36 37 32 5 2 5 1 0 1 
Science & ICT 9 20 17 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Shipping 39 35 31 0 4 1 1 1 1 
Social Welfare 32 34 26 0 9 2 0 1 1 
Textile & Jute NE NE 15 0 NE 2 0 0 0 
Textile 46 24 NE 0 3 NE 1 1 0 
Jute 29 39 NE 0 0 NE 0 0 0 
Water Resource 25 50 22 0 4 2 0 0 1 
Women & Children 36 31 22 1 2 4 1 0 0 
Youth & sports 22 27 20 0 2 3 1 0 1 
Grand Total 1118 1175 982 38 107 102 13 12 34 
 
Note: NE- Not Existing. Ministry of Textile & Ministry Jute were later merged into a single ministry as the 
Ministry of Textile & Jute, similarly the Ministry of Food & Disaster Management was formed with Ministry of 
Food and Ministry of Disaster Management. Source: Compiled by the researcher based on the Summary 
Parliamentary Proceedings (1991-2006) and the committee reports. 
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APPENDIX II  
 
Parliament and Committees in the Constitution of Bangladesh 
(as modified up to 30th April, 1996) 
 
CHAPTER I- PARLIAMENT 
65. Establishment of Parliament 
• (1) There shall be a Parliament for Bangladesh (to be known as the House of the Nation) in which 
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, shall be vested the legislative power of the Republic: 
Provided that  
nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from delegating to any person or authority, by 
Act of Parliament, power to make orders, rules, regulations, bye-laws or other instruments 
having legislative effect. 
• (2) Parliament shall consist of three hundred members to be elected in accordance with law from single 
territorial constituencies by direct election and, for so long as clause (3) is effective, the members 
provided for in that clause; the member shall be designated as Members of Parliament.  
• 30[(3) Until the dissolution of Parliament occurring next after the expiration of the period of ten years 
beginning from the date of the first meeting of the Parliament next after the Parliament in existence at 
the time of commencement of the Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1990, there shall be reserved 
thirty seats exclusively for women members, who shall be elected according to law by the members 
aforesaid: Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent a woman from being elected to any of the 
seats provided for in clause (2)].  
• (4) The seat of Parliament shall be in the capital.  
66. Qualifications and disqualifications for election to Parliament 
• (1) A person shall subject to the provisions of clause (2), be qualified to be elected as, and to be, a 
member of Parliament if he is a citizen of Bangladesh and has attained the age of twenty-five years.  
• (2) A person shall be disqualified for election as, or for being, a member of Parliament who-  
o (a) is declared by a competent court to be of unsound mind;  
o (b) is an undercharged insolvent;  
o (c) acquires the citizenship of, or affirms of acknowledges allegiance to, a foreign state;  
o (d) has been, on conviction for a criminal offence involving moral turpitude, sentenced to 
imprisonment for a term of not less than two years unless a period of five years has elapsed 
since his release; 31 *  
o 32[(dd) holds any office of profit in this service of the Republic other than an office which is 
declared by law not to disqualify its holders; or]  
33* * * * * * 
34* * * * * * 
o (g) is disqualified for such election by or under any law.  
• 35[(2A) For the purposes of this article a person shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit in the 
service of the Republic by reason only that 36[he is a President, 37 * Prime Minister], 38* * * Minister, 
Minister of State or Deputy Minister.]  
39* * * * * *  
• (4) If any dispute arises as to whether a member of Parliament has, after his election, become subject to 
any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (2) or as to whether a member of Parliament should 
vacate his seat pursuant to article 70, the dispute shall be referred to the Election Commission to hear 
and determine it and the decision of the Commission on such reference shall be final.  
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• (5) Parliament may, by law, make such provision as it deems necessary for empowering the Election 
Commission to give full effect to the provisions of clause (4).  
67. Vacation of seats of members 
• (1) A member of Parliament shall vacate his seat-  
o (a) if he fails, within the period of ninety days from the date of the first meeting of Parliament 
after his election, to make and subscribe 40* * the oath or affirmation prescribed for a member 
of Parliament in the Third Schedule: Provided that the Speaker may, before the expiration of 
that period, for good cause extend it;  
o (b) if he is absent from Parliament, without the leave of Parliament, for ninety consecutive 
sitting days;  
o (c) upon a dissolution of Parliament;  
o (d) if he has incurred a disqualification under clause (2) of article 66; or  
o (e) in the circumstances specified in article 70.  
• (2) A member of Parliament may resign his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker, 
and the seat shall become vacant when the writing is received by the Speaker or, if the office of 
Speaker is vacant or the Speaker is for any reason unable to perform his functions, by the Deputy 
Speaker.  
68. Remuneration, etc., of members of Parliament 
Members of Parliament shall be entitled to such 41[remuneration], allowances and privileges as may be 
determined by Act of Parliament or, until so determined, by order made by the President.  
69. Penalty for member sitting or voting before taking oath 
If a person sits or votes as a member of Parliament before he makes or subscribes the oath or affirmation in 
accordance with this Constitution, or when he knows that he is not qualified or is disqualified for membership 
thereof, he shall be liable in respect of each day on which he so sits or votes to a penalty of one thousand taka to 
be recovered as a debt due to the Republic. 
42[70. Vacation of seat on resignation, etc. 
• (1) A person elected as a member of Parliament at an election at which he was nominated as a 
candidate by a political party shall vacate his seat if he resigns from that party or votes in Parliament 
against the party. Explanation. - If a member of Parliament-  
o (a) being present in Parliament abstains from voting, or  
o (b) absents himself from any sitting of Parliament, ignoring the direction of the party which 
nominated him at the election as a candidate not to do so, he shall be deemed to have voted 
against that party.  
• (2) If, at any time, any question as to the leadership of the Parliamentary party of a political party 
arises, the Speaker shall, within seven days of being informed of it in writing by a person claming the 
leadership of the majority of the members of that party in Parliament, convince a meeting of all 
members of Parliament of that party in accordance with the Rules of procedure of Parliament and 
determine its Parliamentary leadership by the votes of the majority through division and if, in the 
matter of voting in Parliament, any member does not comply with the direction of the leadership so 
determined, he shall be deemed to have voted against that party under clause (1) and shall vacate his 
seat in the Parliament.  
• (3) If a person, after being elected a member of Parliament as an independent candidate, joins any 
political party, he shall, for the purpose of this article, be deemed to have been elected as a nominee of 
that Party.]  
71. Bar against double membership 
• (1) No person shall at the same time be a member of Parliament in respect of two or more 
constituencies.  
• (2)Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent a person from being at the same time a candidate for two or more 
constituencies, but in the event of his being elected for more than one-  
o (a) within thirty days after his last election the person elected shall deliver to the Chief 
Election Commissioner a signed declaration specifying the constituency which he wishes to 
represent, and the seats of the other constituencies for which he was elected shall thereupon 
fall vacant;  
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o (b) if the person elected fails to comply with sub-clause (a) all the seats for which he was 
elected shall fall vacant;  
o (c) the person elected shall not make or subscribe the oath or affirmation of a member of 
Parliament until the foregoing provisions of this clause, so far as applicable, have been 
complied with.  
72. Sessions of Parliament 
• (1) Parliament shall be summoned, prorogued and dissolved by the President by public notification and 
when summoning Parliament the President shall specify the time and place of the first meeting:  
43[Provided that a period exceeding sixty days shall not intervene between the end of one session and 
the first sitting of Parliament in the next session:  
Provided further that in the exercise of his functions under this clause, the President shall act in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister tendered to him in writing.] 
• (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (1) Parliament shall be summoned to meet within thirty 
days after the declaration of the results of polling at any general election of members of Parliament.  
• (3) Unless sooner dissolved by the President, Parliament shall stand dissolved on the expiration of the 
period of five years from the date of its first meeting.  
Provided that at any time when the Republic is engaged in war the period may be extended by Act of 
Parliament by not more than one year at a time but shall not be so extended beyond six months after the 
termination of the war. 
• (4) If after a dissolution and before the holding of the next general election of members of Parliament 
the President is satisfied that owing to the existence of a state of war in which he Republic is engaged it 
is necessary to recall Parliament, the President shall summon the Parliament that has been dissolved to 
meet.  
44* * * * * * *  
• (5) Subject to the provisions of clause (1) the sittings of Parliament shall be held at such times and 
places as Parliament may, by its rules of procedure or otherwise determine.  
73. President's address and messages to Parliament 
• (1) The President may address Parliament, and may send messages thereto.  
• (2) At the commencement to the first session after a general election of members of Parliament and at 
the commencement of the first session of each year the President shall address Parliament.  
• (3) Parliament shall, after the presentation of an address by the President, or the receipt of a message 
from him, discuss the matter referred to in such address or message  
45[73A. Rights of Ministers as respects Parliament 
• [(1) Every Minister shall have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, 
Parliament, but shall not be entitled to vote 46[or to speak on any matter not related to his Ministry] 
unless he is a member of Parliament also. .  
• (2) In this article, "Minister" includes a Prime Minister, 47* *, Minister of State and Deputy Minister.]  
74. Speaker and Deputy Speaker 
• (1) Parliament shall at the first sitting after any general election elect from among its members a 
Speaker and a deputy Speaker, and if either office becomes vacant shall within seven days or, if 
Parliament is not then sitting, at its first meeting thereafter, elect one of its members to fill the vacancy.  
• (2) The Speaker or Deputy Speaker shall vacate his office-  
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o (a) if he ceases to be a member of Parliament;  
o (b) if he becomes a Minister;  
o (c) if Parliament passes a resolution (after not less than fourteen days, notice has been given of 
the intention to move the resolution) supported by the votes of a majority of all the members 
thereof, requiring his removal from office;  
o (d) if he resigns his office by writing under his hand delivered to the President;  
o (e) if after a general election another member enters upon that office; or  
o (f) in the case of the Deputy Speaker, if he enters upon the office of Speaker.  
• (3) While the office of the Speaker is vacant or the Speaker is 48[acting as] President, or if it is 
determined by Parliament that the Speaker is otherwise unable to perform the functions of his office, 
those functions shall be performed by the Deputy Speaker or, if the office of the Deputy Speaker is 
vacant, by such member of Parliament as may be determined by or under the rules of procedure of 
Parliament; and during the absence of the Speaker from any sitting of Parliament the Deputy Speaker 
or, if he also is absent, such person as may be determined by or under the rules of procedure, shall act 
as Speaker.  
• (4) At any sitting of Parliament, while a resolution for the removal of the Speaker from his office is 
under consideration the Speaker (or while any resolution for the removal of the Deputy Speaker form 
his office is under consideration, the Deputy Speaker) shall not preside, and the provisions of clause (3) 
shall apply in relation to every such sitting as they apply in relation to a sitting from which the Speaker 
or, as the case may be the Deputy Speaker is absent.  
• (5) The Speaker or the Deputy Speaker, as the case may be, shall have the right to speak in, and 
otherwise to take part in, the proceedings of Parliament while any resolution for his removal from 
office is under consideration in Parliament, and shall be entitled to vote but only as a member.  
• (6) Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (2) the Speaker or, as the case may be, the deputy speaker, 
shall be demeed to continue to hold office until his successor has entered upon office.  
75. Rules of procedure, quorum, etc. 
• (1) Subject to this Constitution-  
o (a) the procedure of Parliament shall be regulated by rules of procedure made by it, and until 
such rules are made shall be regulated by rules of procedure made by the President;  
o (b) a decision in Parliament shall be taken by a majority of the votes of the members present 
and voting, but the person presiding shall not vote except when there is an equality of votes, in 
which case he shall exercise a casting vote;  
o (c) no proceeding in Parliament shall be invalid by reason only that there is a vacancy in the 
membership thereof or that a person who was not entitled to do so was present at, or voted or 
otherwise participated in, the proceeding.  
• (2) If at any time during which Parliament is in session the attention of the person presiding is drawn to 
the fact that the number of members present is less than sixty, he shall either suspend the meeting until 
at least sixty members are present, or adjourn it.  
76. Stading committees of Parliament 
• (1) 49* * * Parliament shall appoint from among its members the following standing committees, that is 
to say-  
o (a) a public accounts committee;  
o (b) committee of privileges; and  
o (c) such other standing committees as the rules of procedure of Parliament require.  
• (2) In addition to the committees referred to in clause (1), Parliament shall appoint other standing 
committees, and a committee so appointed may, subject to his Constitution and to any other law-  
o (a) examine draft Bills and other legislative proposals;  
o (b) review the enforcement of laws and propose measures for such enforcement;  
o (c) in relation to any matter referred to it by Parliament as a matter of public importance, 
investigate or inquire into the activities or administration of a Ministry and may require it to 
furnish, through an authorised representative, relevant information and to answer questions, 
orally or in writing;  
o (d) perform any other function assigned to it by Parliament.  
• (3) Parliament may by law confer on committees appointed under this article power for-  
o (a) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining then on oath, affirmation or 
otherwise;  
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o (b) compelling the production of documents.  
77. Ombudsman 
• (1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the establishment of the office of Ombudsman.  
• (2) The Ombudsman shall exercise such power and perform such functions as Parliament may, by law, 
determine, including the power to investigate any action taken by a Ministry, a public officer or a 
statutory public authority.  
• (3) The Ombudsman shall prepare an annual report concerning the discharge of his functions, and such 
report shall be laid before Parliament.  
78. Privileges and immunities of Parliament and members 
• (1) The validity of the proceedings in Parliament shall not be questioned in any court.  
• (2) A member or officer of Parliament in whom power are vested for the regulation of procedure, the 
conduct of business or the maintenance of order in Parliament, shall not in relation to the exercise by 
him of any such power be subject to the jurisdiction of any court.  
• (3) A member of Parliament shall not be liable to proceedings in any court in respect of anything said, 
or any vote given, by him in Parliament or in any committed thereof.  
• (4) A person shall not be liable to proceedings in any court in respect of the publication by or under the 
authority of Parliament of any report, paper, vote or proceeding. (5) Subject to this article, the 
privileges of Parliament and of its committees and members may be determined by Act of Parliament.  
79. Secretariat of Parliament 
• (1) Parliament shall have its own Secretariat. Secretariat of Parliament.  
• (2) Parliament may, by law, regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to 
the secretariat of Parliament.  
• (3) Until provision is made by Parliament the President may, after consultation with the Speaker, make 
rules regulating the recruitment and condition of service of persons appointed to the secretariat of 
Parliament, and rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any law.  
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APPENDIX III 
(Excerpts from the Rules of Procedure of Bangladesh) 
CHAPTER XXVII 
Rules Regulating Committees 
(A) General 
187. Committee 
In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, "Committee" means and includes "Committee" as defined 
in sub-rule (1) (f) of rule 2.  
188. Appointment of Committee 
(1) The members of a Committee shall be appointed by Parliament on a motion made by it.  
(2) No member shall be appointed to a Committee who has a personal, pecuniary or direct interest in any matter 
which may be considered by that Committee. Nor shall a member be appointed to a Committee if he is not 
willing to serve on it. The proposer shall ascertain whether the member whose name is proposed by him is 
willing to serve on that Committee. 
Explanation – For the purpose of this sub-rule the interest of the member should be direct, personal or pecuniary 
and separately belong to the person whose inclusion in the Committee may be objected to and not in common 
with the public in general or with any class or section thereof or on a matter of State policy.  
(3) Casual vacancies in a Committee shall be filled by appointment by the Parliament on a motion made, and 
any member appointed, to fill such vacancy shall hold office for the unexpired portion of the term for which the 
member in whose place he is appointed, would have normally held office.  
189. Term of office of a Committee 
(1) Subject to the provisions of the Constitution in this behalf, the term of office of a Committee of the House 
other than a Select Committee on a Bill or a Special Committee constituted by the House for a specific purpose, 
[shall be valid during the duration of the Parliament]:  
[Provided that a Committee may be reconstituted by the House, if necessary.] 
(2) A Committee nominated by the Speaker under these rules shall, unless otherwise specified in the rules 
contained in this Chapter, hold office for the period specified by him or until a new Committee is nominated. 
[* * * * * * * *] 
190. Resignation from Committee 
A member may resign his seat from a Committee by writing under his hand, addressed to the Speaker.  
191. Chairman of Committee 
(1) The Chairman of a Committee shall, unless designated by the House, be elected by the Committee from 
amongst the members of that Committee. 
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[(2) If the Chairman ceases to be a member of the Committee, remains absent from any sitting of the Committee 
or is otherwise unable to perform his duties, the Committee shall choose another member to act as Chairman for 
that sitting.] 
192. Quorum 
(1) The quorum to constitute a sitting of a Committee shall be, as near as may be, one-third of the total number 
of members of the Committee.  
(2) If at any time fixed for any sitting of the Committee or if at any time during any such sitting, there is no 
quorum, the Chairman of the Committee shall either suspend the sitting until there is a quorum or adjourn the 
sitting to some future day.  
(3) When the Committee has been adjourned in pursuance of sub-rule (2) on two successive dates fixed for 
sittings of the Committee, the Chairman shall report the fact to the House. 
193. Discharge of members absent from sittings of Committee 
If a member is absent from two or more consecutive sittings of a Committee without the permission of the 
Committee, a motion may be moved in the House for the discharge of such member from the Committee. 
194. Voting in Committee 
All questions at any siting of a Committee shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members present 
and voting. 
195. Casting vote of Chairman 
In the case of an equality of votes on any matter, the Chairman, or the person acting as such, shall have a second 
or casting vote. 
196. Power to appoint Sub-Committees 
(1) A Committee may appoint one or more Sub-Committees, each having the power of the undivided 
Committee, to examine any matters that may be referred to them, and the reports of such Sub-Committees shall 
be deemed to be reports of the whole Committee, if they are approved at a sitting of the whole Committee. 
(2) The order of reference to a Sub-Committee shall clearly state the point or points for investigation. The report 
of the Sub-Committee shall be considered by the whole Committee. 
197. Sittings of Committee 
The sittings of a Committee shall be held on such days and at such hour as the Chairman of the Committee may 
fix. 
Provided that if the Chairman of the Committee is not readily available, the Secretary may fix the date and time 
of a sitting: 
Provided further that in the case of Select Committee on a Bill, if the Chairman of the Committee is not readily 
available, the Secretary may, in consultation with the Minister concerned fix the date and time of a sitting. 
198. Committee may sit whilst Parliament is sitting 
A Committee may sit whilst the Parliament is sitting provided that on a division being called in the House the 
Chairman of the Committee shall suspend the proceedings in the Committee for such time as will in his opinion 
enable the members to vote in a division.  
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199. Sittings of Committee in private 
The sittings of a Committee shall be held in private. 
200. Venue of sittings 
The sittings of a Committee shall be held within the precincts of the [ * ] House, and if it becomes necessary to 
change the place of sitting outside the 52 [ * ] House, the matter shall be referred to the Speaker whose decision 
shall be final.  
201. All strangers to withdraw when Committee deliberates 
All persons other than members of the Committee and officers of the Parliament Secretariat shall withdraw 
whenever the Committee is deliberating.  
202. Power to take evidence or call for documents 
(1) A witness may be summoned by an order signed by the Secretary and shall produce such documents as are 
required for the use of a Committee.  
(2) It shall be in the discretion of the Committee to treat any evidence given before it as secret or confidential.  
(3) No document submitted to the Committee shall be withdrawn or altered without the knowledge and approval 
of the Committee.  
203. Power to send for persons, papers and records 
A Committee shall have power to send for persons, papers and records:  
Provided that if any question arises whether the evidence of a person or the production of a document is relevant 
for the purposes of the Committee, the question shall be referred to the Speaker whose decision shall be final. 
Provided further that Government may decline to produce a document on the ground that its disclosure would be 
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State. 
 204. Evidence on oath 
(1) A Committee may administer oath (or affirmation) to a witness examined before it. 
(2) The form of the oath (or affirmation) shall be as follows: 
"I, ................................. , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the evidence which I shall give in this case shall be 
true, that I will conceal nothing, and that no part of my evidence shall be false". 
205. Procedure for examining witnesses 
The examination of witnesses before a Committee shall be conducted as follows:-  
(i) The Committee shall, before a witness is called for examination, decide the mode of procedure and 
the nature of questions that may be asked of the witness.  
(ii) The Chairman [* *] may first ask the witness such question or questions as he may consider 
necessary with reference to the subject-matter under consideration or any subject connected therewith 
according to the mode of procedure mentioned in clause (i) of this rule. 
(iii) The Chairman may call other members of the Committee one by one to ask any other questions.  
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(iv) A witness may be asked to place before the Committee any other relevant points that have not been 
covered and which a witness thinks are essential to be placed before the Committee. 
(v) A verbatim record of proceedings of the Committee shall, when a witness is summoned to give 
evidence, be kept.  
(vi) The evidence given before the Committee may be made available to all members of the 
Committee. 
206. Record of decisions of Committee 
A record of the decisions of a Committee shall be maintained and circulated to members of the Committee 
under the direction of the Chairman. 
207. Evidence, report and proceedings treated as confidential 
(1) A Committee may direct that the whole or a part of the evidence or a summary thereof may be laid on the 
Table. 
(2) No part of the evidence, oral or written, report or proceedings of a Committee which has not been laid on the 
Table shall be open to inspection by anyone except under the authority of the Speaker.  
(3) The evidence given before a Committee shall not be published by any member of the Committee or by any 
other person until it has been laid on the Table:  
Provided that the Speaker may, in his discretion, direct that such evidence be confidentially made available to 
members before it is formally laid on the Table.  
208. Special reports 
A Committee may, if it thinks fit, make a special report on any matter that arises or comes to light in the course 
of its work which it may consider necessary to bring to the notice of the House, notwithstanding that such matter 
is not directly connected with, or does not fall within or is not incidental to, its terms of reference. 
209. Report of Committee 
(1) Where the House has not fixed any time for the presentation of the report by a Committee, the report shall be 
presented within one month of the date on which reference to the Committee was made: 
Provided that the House may at any time, on a motion being made, direct that the time for the presentation of the 
report by the Committee be extended to a date specified in the motion.  
(2) Reports may be either preliminary or final.  
(3) The report of the Committee shall be signed by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee: 
Provided that in case the Chairman is absent or is not readily available the Committee shall choose another 
member to sign the report on behalf of the Committee.  
210. Availability of report to Government before presentation 
A Committee may, if it thinks fit, make available to Government any part of its report before presentation to the 
House. Such reports shall be treated as confidential until presented to the House.  
211. Presentation of report 
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(1) The report of a Committee shall be presented to the House by the Chairman or in his absence by any member 
of the Committee. 
(2) In presenting the report the Chairman or in his absence, the member presenting the report shall, if he makes 
any remarks, confine himself to a brief statement of fact, but there shall be no debate on that statement at this 
stage. 
212. Printing, publication or circulation of report prior to its presentation to House 
(1) The Speaker may, on a request being made to him and when the House is not in session, order the printing, 
publication or circulation of a report of a Committee although it has not been presented to the House. In that 
case the report shall be presented to the House during its next session at the first convenient opportunity. 
 213. Power to make suggestions on procedure 
(1) A Committee shall have power to regulate its own procedure. 
[(2) A committee may obtain co-operation and advice from any expert in its respective field, if deemed 
necessary.] 
214. Power of Speaker to give directions 
If any doubt arises on any point of procedure or otherwise, the Chairman may, if he thinks fit, refer the point to 
the Speaker whose decision shall be final.  
215. Business before Committee not to lapse on prorogation of House 
Any business pending before a Committee shall not lapse by reason only of the prorogation of the House and the 
Committee shall continue to function notwithstanding such prorogation.  
216. Unfinished work of Committee 
A Committee which is unable to complete its work before the expiration of its term or before the dissolution of 
the House may report to the House that the Committee has not been able to complete its work. Any preliminary 
report, memorandum or note that the committee may have prepared or any evidence that the Committee may 
have taken shall be made available to the new Committee. 
217. Applicability of general rules to Committees 
Except for matters for which special provision is made in the rules relating to any particular Committee, the 
general rules in this Chapter shall apply to all Committees; and in so far as any provision in the special 
provisions relating to a Committee is inconsistent with the general rules, the former rules shall prevail. 
218. Secretary to be ex-officio Secretary of Committees or he may authorise any officer 
(1) The Secretary shall be ex-officio Secretary to every Committee of the Parliament.  
(2) The Secretary may authorise any officer of the Secretariat to perform such duties as he may direct.  
(B) Business Advisory Committee 
219. Constitution of Business Advisory Committee 
[The] Speaker may nominate a Committee called the Business Advisory Committee consisting of not more than 
[fifteen] members including the Speaker who shall be the Chairman of the Committee. 
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220. Functions of the Committee 
(1) It shall be the function of the Committee to recommend the time that should be allocated for the discussion 
of the stage or stages of such Government Bills and other business as the Speaker, in consultation with the 
Leader of the House, may direct for being referred to the Committee.  
(2) The Committee shall have the power to indicate in the proposed time-table the different hours at which the 
various stages of the Bill or other business shall be completed.  
(3) The Committee shall have such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Speaker from time to time. 
Explanation.- The expression 'other business' referred to in this rule means business, other than private 
members' Bills and private members' Resolutions under these rules.  
221. Notification of allocation of Time Order 
The allocation of time in respect of Bills and other business as may be decided by the Committee, shall be 
notified in the Bulletin: 
Provided that the Speaker may, after taking the sense of the House, vary the time-table to such extent as may be 
considered necessary. 
(C) Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions 
222. Constitution of Committee on Private Members’ Bills and Resolutions 
(1) There shall be a Committee on Private Members' Bills and Resolutions consisting of not more than ten 
members. 
(2) The Committee shall be appointed by the House on a motion made by it.  
223. Functions of the Committee 
(1) The functions of the Committee shall be-  
(a) to examine every Bill seeking to amend the Constitution notice of which has been given by a private 
member, before a motion for leave to introduce the Bill is included in the Orders of the Day;  
(b) to examine all private members' Bills after they are introduced and before they are taken up for 
consideration in the House and to classify them according to their nature, urgency and importance into 
two categories namely, category A and category B;  
(c) to recommend the time that should be allocated for the discussion of the stage or stages of each 
private members' Bill and also to indicate in the time-table so drawn up the different hours at which the 
various stages of the Bill in a day shall be completed;  
(d) to recommend time-limit for the discussion of private members' Resolutions and other ancillary 
matters.  
(2) The Committee shall perform such other functions in respect of private members' Bills and Resolutions as 
may be assigned to it by the House from time to time.  
 
224. Notification of classification and allocation of Time Order 
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The classification of Bills and the allocation of time in respect of Bills and Resolutions as may be decided by the 
Committee, shall be notified in the Bulletin:  
Provided that the Speaker may, after taking the sense of the House, vary the time-table to such extend as may be 
necessary.  
(D) Select Committees on Bills 
225. Constitution of Select Committee 
The members of a Select Committee on a Bill shall be appointed by the House when a motion that the Bill be 
referred to a Select Committee is made; 
Provided that the member-in-charge of the Bill shall be a member of the Committee, even if his name be not 
included in the motion for constitution of such a Committee:  
Provided further that a Minister who is not a member of the Committee may, with the permission of the 
Chairman, address the Committee.  
226. Notice of Amendments and procedure generally 
A member of a Select Committee may propose amendments to any of the provisions of the Bill after giving one 
day’s notice unless the Chairman allows amendments to be proposed without such notice.  
227. Power of Committee to take evidence 
A Select Committee may hear expert evidence and representatives of special interests affected by the measure 
before them. 
228. Report of the Committee 
(1) As soon as may be, after a Bill has been referred to a Select Committee, the Select Committee shall meet 
from time to time in accordance with rule 197 to consider the Bill and shall make a report thereon within the 
time fixed by the House:  
Provided that where the House has not fixed any time for the presentation of the report by a Select Committee, 
the report shall be presented before the expiry of three months from the date on which the House adopted the 
motion for the reference of the Bill to the Select Committee:  
Provided further that the House may at any time, on a motion being made, direct that the time for the 
presentation of the report by the Select Committee be extended to a date specified in the motion.  
(2) The Select Committee shall in their report state whether the publication of the Bill required by these rules 
has taken place, and the date on which the publication has taken place.  
(3) Where a Bill has been altered, the Select Committee may, if they think fit, include in their report a 
recommendation to the member-in-charge of the Bill that his next motion should be a motion for circulation, or, 
where the Bill has already been circulated, for re-circulation.  
(4) Any member of the Select Committee may record a minute of dissent on any matter or matters connected 
with the Bill or dealt with in the report.  
(5) A minute of dissent shall be couched in temperate and decorous language and shall not refer to any 
discussion in the Select Committee nor cast aspersion on the Committee.  
229. Presentation of report 
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The report of the Select Committee on a Bill together with the minutes of dissent, if any, shall be presented to 
the House by the Chairman or in his absence by any member of the Committee.  
230. Printing and publication of reports 
The Secretary shall cause every report of a Select Committee to be printed, and a copy of the report shall be 
made available for the use of every member of the House. The report and the Bill, as reported by the Select 
Committee, shall be published in the Gazette. 
(E) Committee on Petitions 
231. Constitution of Committee on Petitions  
[The] Speaker shall nominate a Committee on petitions consisting of not less than ten members:  
Provided that a Minister shall not be nominated a member of the Committee, and that if a member, after his 
nomination to the Committee is appointed a Minister he shall cease to be a member of the Committee from the 
date of such appointment.  
232. Functions of the Committee 
(1) The Committee shall examine every petition referred to it, and if the petition complies with these rules, the 
Committee may direct that it be circulated. Where circulation of the petition has not been directed, the Speaker 
may at any time direct that the petition be circulated.  
(2) Circulation of the petition shall be in extenso or in summary form as the Committee or the Speaker, as the 
case may be, may direct.  
(3) It shall also be the duty of the Committee to report to the House on specific complaints made in the petition 
referred to it and to suggest remedial measures in a concrete form.  
(F) Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
233. Functions of Committee on Public Accounts 
(1) There shall be a Committee on Public Accounts for the examination of accounts showing the appropriation 
of sums granted by the House for the expenditure of the [Government], the annual finance accounts of the 
58[Government] and such other accounts laid before the House as the Committee may think fit. [Upon 
examination of irregularities and lapses of Institutions, the Committee shall report to Parliament with 
recommendations of remedial measures.]  
(2) In scrutinising the Appropriation Accounts of the 2[Government] and the report of the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General thereon, it shall be the duty of the Committee to satisfy itself-  
(a) that the moneys shown in the accounts as having been disbursed were legally available for, and 
applicable to, the service or purpose to which they have been applied or charged;  
(b) that the expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it; and  
(c) that every re-appropriation has been made in accordance with the provisions made in this behalf 
under rules framed by competent authority.  
(3) It shall also be the duty of the Committee-  
(a) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of state corporations, 
trading and manufacturing schemes, concerns and projects together with the balance-sheets and 
statements of profit and loss accounts which the President may have required to be prepared or are 
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prepared under the provisions of the statutory rules regulating the financing of a particular corporation, 
trading or manufacturing scheme or concern or project and the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-
General thereon;  
(b) to examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of autonomous and semi-
autonomous bodies, the audit of which may be conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of 
Bangladesh either under the directions of the President or by a statute of Parliament; and  
(c) to consider the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General in cases where the President may 
have required him to conduct an audit of any receipts or to examine the accounts of stores and stocks.  
(4) If any money has been spent on any service during a financial year in excess of the amount granted by the 
House for that purpose, the Committee shall examine with reference to the facts of each case the circumstances 
leading to such an excess and make such recommendation as it may deem fit.  
234. Constitution of the Committee 
The Committee shall consist of not more than fifteen members who shall be appointed by the House:  
Provided that a Minister shall not be appointed a member of the Committee, and that if a member, after his 
appointment to the Committee, is appointed a Minister he shall, cease to be a member of the Committee from 
the date of such appointment. 
(G) Committee on Estimates 
235. Functions of Committee on Estimates 
There shall be a Committee on Estimates for the examination of such of the Estimates as may seem fit to the 
Committee or are specifically referred to it by the House. The functions of the Committee shall be-  
(a) to report what economies, improvements in organisation, efficiency or administrative reform, 
consistent with the policy underlying the estimates, may be effected;  
(b) to suggest alternative policies in order to bring about efficiency and economy in administration;  
(c) to examine whether the money is well laid out within the limits of the policy implied in the estimates; 
and  
(d) to suggest the form in which the estimates shall be presented to the House.  
236. Constitution of the Committee 
The Committee shall consist of not more than ten members who shall be appointed by the House from amongst 
to its members:  
Provided that a Minister shall not be appointed a member of the Committee, and that if a member, after his 
appointment to the Committee, is appointed a Minister he shall cease to be a member of the Committee from the 
date of such appointment. 
237. Examinations of Estimates by Committee 
The Committee may continue the examination of the estimates from time to time throughout the financial year 
and report to the House as its examination proceeds. It shall not be incumbent on the Committee to examine the 
entire estimates of any one year. The demands for grants may be finally voted notwithstanding the fact that the 
Committee has made no report.  
(H) Committee on Public Undertakings. 
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238. Functions of Committee on Public Undertakings 
There shall be a Committee on Public Undertakings for the examination of the working of the public 
undertakings specified in Schedule IV. The functions of the Committee shall be-  
(a) to examine the reports and accounts of the public undertakings specified in the Schedule IV;  
(b) to examine the reports, if any, of the Comptroller and Auditor-General on the public undertakings;  
(c) to examine, in the context of the autonomy any deficiency of the public undertakings, whether the 
affairs of the public undertakings are being managed in accordance with sound business principles and 
prudent commercial practices; [the Committee shall report to Parliament on remedy of irregularities and 
lapses of the public undertaking and recommend measures to free the institution from corruption and, if 
considered necessary, a part of its report in this respect may be sent to the Government before the report 
is placed before Parliament;] and  
(d) to exercise such other functions vested in the Committee on Public Accounts and the Committee on 
Estimates in relation to the public undertakings specified in the Schedule IV as are not covered by 
clauses (a), (b) and (c) above and as may be allotted to the Committee by the Speaker from time to time:  
Provided that the Committee shall not examine and investigate any of the following, namely:-  
(i) matters of major Government policy as distinct from business or commercial functions of the public 
undertakings;  
(ii) matters of day-to-day administration; and  
(iii) matters for the consideration of which machinery is established by any special statute under which a 
particular public undertaking is established.  
239. Constitution of the Committee 
The Committee shall consist of not more than ten members who shall be elected by the House:  
Provided that a Minister shall not be elected a member of the Committee, and that if a member, after his election 
to the Committee, is appointed a Minister he shall cease to be member of the committee from the date of such 
appointment. 
[ * * * * * * * ] 
(I) Standing Committee of Privileges 
240. Constitution of Committee of Privileges 
[At its first session] [the] Parliament shall appoint a Committee of Privileges consisting of not more than ten 
members. 
241. Examination of question by Committee 
(1) The Committee shall examine every question referred to it and determine with reference to the facts of each 
case whether a breach of privilege is involved and, if so, the nature of the breach, the circumstances leading to it 
and make such recommendations as it may deem fit.  
(2) The report may also state the procedure to be followed by the House in giving effect to the recommendations 
made by the Committee. 
242. Consideration of report 
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After the report has been presented, the Chairman or any member of the Committee or any other member may 
move that the report be taken into consideration whereupon the Speaker may put the question to the House.  
243. Priority for consideration of report of the Committee 
A motion that the report of the Committee be taken into consideration shall be accorded the priority assigned to 
a matter of privilege under rule 167 unless there has been undue delay in bringing it forward: 
Provided that when a date has already been fixed for the consideration for the report, it shall be given priority as 
a matter of privilege on the day so appointed.  
(J) Committee on Government Assurances 
244. Functions of Committee on Government Assurances 
There shall be a Committee on Government Assurances to scrutinize the assurances, promises, undertakings, 
etc., given by a Minister, from time to time, on the floor of the House and to report on-  
(a) the extent to which such assurances, promises, undertakings, etc. have been implemented; and  
(b) where implemented, whether such implementation has taken place within the minimum time 
necessary for the purpose.  
245. Constitution of the Committee 
The Committee shall consist of not more than eight members who shall be appointed by the House.  
(K) Standing Committees on certain other subjects 
[246. Appointment of Committees on certain other subjects 
Parliament shall, as soon as may be, after the inauguration of each new Parliament, appoint the Standing 
Committees on each Ministries which may, subject to the Constitution and to any other law,-  
(a) examine draft Bills and other legislative proposals;  
(b) review the enforcement of laws and propose measures for such enforcement; and  
(c) examine any other matter referred to them by Parliament under Article 76 of the Constitution.]  
[247. Constitution of the Committee 
(1) Every Standing Committee, as referred to in Rule 246, shall consist of not more than ten members including 
the Chairman.  
(2) Members including the Chairman shall be appointed by the House: 
Provided that a Minister shall not be the Chairman of the Committee.  
(3) If a member, after being elected as Chairman under Sub-Rule (2), is appointed as Minister, he shall cease to 
be the Chairman of the Committee from the date of such appointment.  
(4) the Minister in-charge or if there is no Minister, the Minister of State or if there is no Minister of State. 
Deputy Minister of a Ministry shall be the ex-officio member of the Committee provided he is a member of 
Parliament.  
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(5) Even if the Minister-in-charge or the Minister of State or the Deputy Minister of a Ministry is not a member 
of Parliament, he may remain present in the meeting of the Committee and take part in the proceedings but shall 
abstain from voting.  
(6) If there be no Minister in-Charge or Minister of State or Deputy Minister of a Ministry, the Leader of the 
House shall nominate a member of the Cabinet to the Standing Committee of such Ministry and if he is a 
member of Parliament he shall be a member of the Committee and if he is not a member of Parliament, he may 
remain present in the meeting and take part in its proceedings but shall abstain from voting.] 
[248. Functions of Committee 
Each such Standing Committee shall meet at least once in a month and the functions of a Committee shall be to 
examine any Bill or other matter referred to it by Parliament, to review the works relating to a Ministry which 
falls within its jurisdiction, to inquire into any activity or irregularity and serious complaint in respect of the 
Ministry and to examine, if it deems fit, any such other matter as may fall within its jurisdiction and to make 
recommendations. 
Provided that if for any reason the meeting of a Committee is not called in accordance with these rules, the 
Speaker may direct the Secretary to call a meeting of that Committee and the Secretary shall convene a meeting 
of the Committee at a date, time and place fixed by the Speaker.] 
(L) House Committee 
249. Constitution of House Committee 
(1) There shall be a House Committee consisting of not more than twelve members including the Chairman.  
(2) The Committee shall be nominated by the Speaker [* * * * *]. A member may be renominated by the 
Speaker to the new House committee. 
250. Functions of the Committee 
(1) The functions of the House Committee shall be – 
(i) to deal with all questions relating to residential accommodation for members of Parliament; and 
(ii) to exercise supervision over facilities for accommodation, food, medical aid and other amenities 
accorded to members in M.P. House in Dacca. 
(2) The functions of the Committee shall be advisory. 
251. Accommodation Sub-Committee 
(1) There shall also be an Accommodation Sub-Committee consisting of not more than four members including 
the Chairman of the House Committee who shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Sub-Committee. 
(2) The members of the Sub-Committee shall be nominated by the Chairman of the House Committee from 
amongst the members of the House Committee. 
(3) The quorum to constitute a sitting of the Sub-Committee shall be two.  
(4) The function of the Sub-Committee shall be to advise on the allotment of residential accommodation to 
members.  
252. Power to appoint Sub-Committee 
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(1) The Committee may appoint one or more Sub-Committees, each having the power of the undivided 
committee, to examine any special points relating to residential accommodation, food, medical aid and other 
amenities in M.P. Houses and the reports of such Sub-Committees shall be deemed to be the reports of the 
whole committee, if they are approved at a sitting of the whole Committee. 
(2) The order of reference to a Sub-Committee shall clearly state the point or points for investigation. The report 
of the Sub-Committee shall be considered by the whole Committee. 
253. Secretariat for Committee 
The Secretariat for the House Committee or its Sub-Committees shall be provided by the Parliament Secretariat. 
An Officer of the Parliament Secretariat nominated in this behalf by the Secretary of the Parliament shall be the 
Secretary to the House Committee and the Accommodation Sub-Committee. 
254. Record of proceedings and Minutes of Committee 
(1) A record of the proceedings of the sittings of the House Committee and the Accommodation Sub-Committee 
shall be maintained.  
(2) The draft minutes shall be prepared by the Secretary to the Committee and approved by the Chairman.  
(3) The minutes of each sitting shall be circulated to members of the Committee or the Sub-Committee, as the 
case may be. Relevant extracts therefrom may be forwarded to appropriate authorities for necessary action.  
255. Appeal against decision of Committee or Sub-Committee 
An appeal against the decision of the House Committee or Accommodation Sub-Committee shall lie to the 
Speaker whose decision shall be final. 
256. Provisions applicable in other respects 
In other respects, the general rules applicable to [other Committees] shall apply with such adaptations, whether 
by way of modification, addition or omission, as the Speaker may consider necessary or convenient. 
(M) Library Committee 
257. Constitution of Library Committee 
(1) There shall be a Library Committee consisting of the Deputy Speaker and nine other members from the 
Parliament nominated by the Speaker. 
[(2) * * * * * * *] 
(3) The Deputy Speaker shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Committee 
(4) Casual vacancies in the Committee shall be filled by nomination by the Speaker from the members of the 
Parliament. 
  
258. Functions of the Committee 
The functions of the Committee shall be – 
(a) to consider and advise on such matters concerning the Library as may be referred to it by the 
Speaker from time to time; 
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(b) to consider suggestions for the improvement of the Library; and  
(c) to assist members of Parliament in fully utilising the services provided by the Library. 
[ * * * * ] 
262. Provisions applicable in other respects 
In other respects, the general rules applicable to other Committees [***] shall apply with such adaptations, 
whether by way of modification, addition or omission, as the Speaker may consider necessary or convenient.  
(N) Standing Committee on Rules of Procedure 
263. Functions of Rules Committee 
There shall be a Committee on Rules of Procedure to consider matters of procedure and conduct of business in 
the House and to recommend any amendments [by way of addition, alteration, substitution or repeal] to these 
rules that may be deemed necessary.  
264. Constitution of the Committee 
The Committee on Rules of Procedure shall be appointed by the House and shall consist of twelve members 
including the Chairman [**]. The Speaker shall be the ex-officio Chairman. 73[***]. 
265. Laying of report on the Table 
(1) The recommendations of the Committee shall be laid on the Table and within a period of seven days, 
beginning with the day on which they are so laid, any member may give notice of any amendment to such 
recommendation. 
(2) The House shall consider the Report of the Committee and amendments, if any, proposed thereto and the 
Rules shall stand amended [accordingly] after the same has been adopted by the House.  
(3) The amendments or additions to the rules shall come into force on their adoption by the House and shall be 
notified in the official Gazette.  
(0) Special Committee 
266. Composition and Functions 
The Parliament may, by motion, appoint a Special Committee which shall have such composition and function 
as may be specified in the motion. 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
Bangladesh: Chronology of Important Political Events 
 
Independence of Bangladesh  
 
December 7, 1970   First general elections; Awami League under Mujib secures absolute 
majority in new Constituent Assembly; West Pakistan-dominated 
government declines to convene assembly 
 
March 26-28, 1971  East Pakistan attempts to secede, beginning civil war; Mujib, 
imprisoned in West Pakistan, declared provisional president. 
 
April 10, 1972 The Proclamation of Independence is drafted by the Members of both 
National Assembly and Provincial Assembly who earlier met together 
in Kolkata and formed themselves into a constituent assembly in exile.  
 
April 17, 1971 The Constituent Assembly formally meet at Baidyanathtala (re-named 
Mujibnagar after the proclamation), a border area in present Meherpur 
district and read out the Proclamation of Independence at a simple 
ceremony. Mujib named president. 
 
December 3-4, 1971 Pakistan launches preemptive air strikes against India and India invades 
East Pakistan. 
 
December 6, 1971 India recognizes Bangladesh 
 
December 16, 1971 Bangladesh came into being as an independent and sovereign state after 
a nine- month long liberation war. 
 
Mujib Regime (1972-1975)   
 
January 10-12, 1972 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returns from prison in West Pakistan; 
promulgates interim constitution and is sworn in first as president, then 
as prime minister. 
 
March 23, 1972  Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declares Presidential Order-22. This order 
provided for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly comprising 
the members elected in 1970 from East Pakistan to Pakistan’s National 
Assembly. 
 
April 10, 1972 The Constituent Assembly starts its first session. 
 
Nov.4, 1972   The Constituent Assembly adopts a Constitution for the country. The 
Constitution introduces Westminster model of parliamentary 
democracy. 
  
December 16, 1972    The Constitution comes to effect. 
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December 23, 1972 The Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) calls its first convention. In the 
convention JSD declares its committee and objectives. The JSD 
considers Awami League as an agent of the bourgeois. One of the 
major objectives of the JSD is to overthrow the Awami League 
government. 
 
March 7, 1973  The general election takes place. Fourteen parties contest in the 
parliamentary election. Including the reserved women seats Mujib's 
Awami League win 308 seats while the opposition parties secure 2 
seats and Independents candidates win 5 seats. 
 
April 7, 1973 The Jatiya Sangsad starts its first session. 
 
April 8, 1973 Justice Abu Syeed Chowdhury is elected president. 
 
July 22, 1974 The parliament promulgates its new Roles of Procedure. 
 
April –Nov., 1973  The Jatiya Sangsad has appointed eleven permanent committees but 
there were no provision for the departmental standing committees.  
 
January-March, 1974  The JSD appears as a strong opposition. They observe countrywide 
general strike is called on 20 January to protest against the American, 
Soviet Union and Indian hegimonism and exploitation. On 17th March 
they gherao(confinement) offices and residences of cabinet members to 
protest against corruption, nepotism and exploitation of the regime. 
Three people are killed on the spot by police firing and numbers of 
peoples are injured.  
   
Dec. 28, 1974  State of emergency is declared as political situation deteriorates; 
fundamental rights under Constitution suspended. 
 
January 25, 1975  Constitution is amended to replace parliamentary system with a one-
party presidential system. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman becomes president 
of Bangladesh. 
 
February 24, 1975  President Mujibur Rahman through a decree announces formation of 
the single legitimate national party- Bangladesh Krishak Sramik 
Awami League (BAKSAL).  
 
June 7, 1975  President Mujibur Rahman as the chairman of BAKSAL declares its 
constitution. He declares a 15 member- executive committee and a 115 
member- central committee. Due to the announcement of the BAKSAL 
all other political parties get abolished. He declares himself to be the 
chairman of BAKSAL.  
  
July 17, 1975  The Jaiya Sangsad ends its eighth session. It was the last session of the 
first Jatiya Sangsad. 
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August 15, 1975   Mujibur Rahman is assassinated in "majors' plot"; Khondakar 
Mushtaque Ahmed takes the presidency. BAKSAL dissolves after 
assassination of Mujibur Rahman. 
 
Civil-Military Regime (1975-1990) 
 
After assassination of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Gen. Ziaur Rahman assumed the 
presidency in November 1977 and continued until 1981. He was also assassinated by a 
military coup in May 1981. Gen.H.M. Ershad seized state power in March 1982 by 
overthrowing the civilian President Justice Abdus Satter. Through a mass movement Gen. 
Ershad handed over power to the civilian government in December 1990. After fall of the 
military dictator, parliamentary style of democracy is restored again in 1991.    
 
The Zia Era 
 
August 25, 1975  Gen. Ziaur Rahman became the chief of army staff. 
 
November 3, 1975  Khaled Mosharraf stages a coup d'etat on 3 November 1975 and forces 
Gen. Ziaur Rahman (Zia) to resign his command. Zia was put under 
house arrest. 
 
November 7, 1975  A third coup stages under Colonel Abu Taher and a group of socialist 
military officers and supporters of the left-wing JSD, called the Sipoy-
Janata Biplob (Soldiers and People's Coup). Colonel Taher freed Ziaur 
Rahman (Zia) and re-appoints him as army chief.  
 
An interim government is formed with Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad 
Sayem as Chief Martial Law Administrator and Zia, Air Vice Marshal 
M. G. Tawab and Rear Admiral M. H. Khan as Deputy Chief Martial 
Law Administrators.  
 
November 8, 1975  The first Jatiya Sangsad dissolves through a presidential proclamation 
after two and half years.   
 
July 30, 1976   The army regime permits activities of political parties within the frame 
work of multi-party system.  
 
Under the provisions of the Political Parties Regulation (PPR) Act the 
government allows indoor politics. 
 
November 19, 1976 Army chief of staff Gen. Zia  becomes Chief Martial Law 
Administrator. 
 
April 21, 1977  Gen. Zia takes the charge of the president replacing Justice Sayem on 
health grounds. He banns political parties, censors the media, re-
impose martial law and order the army to arrest dissidents.  
 
 
April 23, 1977  General Zia issued a proclamation order amending the Constitution of 
Bangladesh to insert Bismillah-ir- Rahmanir Rahim (In the name of 
Allah, the Beneficent, the merciful) and other Islamic principles in the 
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of the Constitution in place of secular ideals. The principle of socialism 
was given a new meaning – ‘economic and social justice’. 
 
May 30, 1977  General Zia legitimizes his own presidency by holding a presidential 
referendum.  
 
June 3, 1977  Gen. Zia appoints Supreme Court justice Abdus Sattar as his vice 
president. 
 
April 22, 1978  Gen. Zia announces schedule for presidential elections and lifts ban on 
political parties. 
 
June 3, 1978 Gen. Zia is elected president for five years term. 
 
September 1, 1978  Gen. Zia launches his own political party named the Bangladesh 
Jatyotabadi Dal (Bangladesh Nationalist Party-BNP). 
 
February 18, 1979  Gen. Zia's BNP wins 207 out of 300 seats in parliamentary election. 
 
April 6, 1979  Martial law revokes; Constitution restores in full; Fifth Amendment 
ratifies all actions of Gen. Zia's martial law administration. 
 
March 21, 1980  For the first time, the Jatiya Sangsad appoints the ministerial standing 
committees. 
 
May 30, 1981  Gen. Zia assassinated; Justice Sattar becomes acting president. 
 
Nov. 15, 1981  Presidential election takes place. Justice Sattar elected president. 
 
Feb. 15, 1982  President Sattar admitted the presence of corruption and crisis in the on 
going system in his presidential address in the Jatiya Sangsad. 
 
March 2, 1982  President Sattar dissolved the second Jatiya Sangsad. 
  
The Ershad Era 
 
March 24, 1982  President Sattar ousted in coup engineered by Lieutenant General 
Hussain Muhammad Ershad (Ershad); Constitution suspends 
Parliament dissolves, and banns political activities; Ershad assumes full 
powers as chief martial law administrator. Justice Abdul Fazal 
Muhammad Ahsanuddin Chowdhury is appointed as president. 
 
Feb.14-15, 1983  Student riots mark first major expression of public opposition to 
Ershad's martial law administration. 
 
April 1, 1983 Ban on indoor politics is withdrawn.   
 
Nov. 27, 1983  President Justice Ahsanuddin Chowdhury declares the central 
committee of a political front known as ‘Janadal’ (Peoples Party). Party 
stands up in favor of the regime. 
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Dec. 11, 1983  Ershad assumes presidency replacing Justice Ahsanuddin Chowdhury. 
At the same time he also holds the position of the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator.  
 
March 21, 1985  General Ershad obtains 94.14% of the affirmative votes from the 72% 
of the voters. Referendum supports the continuance of Ershad's 
administration until the formation of an elected civilian government. 
 
May 16- 20, 1985  General Ershad holds Upzila (Police station based local government) 
elections.    
 
January 1, 1986  General Ershad forms a new political party named ‘Jatiya Party’. 
 
March 2,1986  General Ershad announces his decision to hold parliamentary election 
in late April of 1986. 
    
March 21, 1986  The final day for filling nominations for the third parliamentary 
election, the AL led15-party alliance suddenly decides to participate in 
the parliamentary election. The BNP led 7-party alliance stands 
position for resisting the poll. 
 
March 1986  Ershad removes military commanders from key civil posts and 
abolishes martial law offices and more than 150 military courts in an 
attempt to ease martial law restrictions. 
  
May 7, 1986  Third parliamentary election takes place. Eight party-alliances 
comprising the Al and some smaller parties contests in the 
parliamentary election while the seven party-alliances led by the BNP 
boycott the election.  
 
Parliamentary elections give pro-Ershad Jatiyo Party (National Party) 
majority in the Jatiya Sangsad. Bangladesh Awami League appears as 
the major opposition party. 
 
July 10, 1986  The third Jatiya Sangsad starts its first session but the AL boycotts the 
session in protest against the sitting of the parliament with martial law 
in the country.   
 
October 15, 1986  Gen. Ershad elected president. 
 
October 23, 1986  Gen.Ershad sworn in as elected president. Opposition parties include 
the AL, the BNP and the left parties organized a nation wide protest 
program against Gen.Ershad. 
      
November 10, 1986 Parliament passes Seventh Amendment to Constitution, ratifying all 
actions of Ershad's martial law administration; Gen.Ershad lifts Martial 
Law.  
 
July 13, 1987 The third Jatiya Sangsad ends its last session.  
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July 24, 1987 The longest general strike in Bangladesh's history (54-hour) led by the 
Workers-Employees United Council (Sramik Karmachari Oikkiya 
Parishad) ended after 11 people were killed and 700 injured in street 
violence between demonstrators and security forces. 
 
Oct. 23-24, 1987 The Workers-Employees United Council (Sramik Karmachari Oikkiya 
Parishad) led another lengthy nation-wide strike.   
   
October 28, 1987 Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia meet signaling a new phase of 
cooperation between the two leading opposition coalitions. 
 
Nov.10-12, 1987 Opposition parties untidily hold mass demonstrations- "Siege of 
Dhaka" against Ershad's government.  
 
Nov. 27, 1987  After opposition demonstrations and nation wide strike Ershad declares 
state of emergency.  
 
December 6, 1987  Series of protests, demonstrations, hartal and rallies paralyze the 
administration. The state of emergency is declared.  
  
 The third Jatiya Sangsad dissolves which was inactive since July. 
 
Jan.– Feb.1988  Opposition coalitions repeatedly implement nationwide general strike. 
 
March 3, 1988  The nation goes to poll to elect 300 members of the fourth Jatiya 
Sangsad. Parliamentary elections reaffirm Jatiya Party control of 
Parliament.  
  
The Awami League led eight-party coalition, the BNP led seven-party 
coalition, the leftist five-party coalition and Jamaat-e- Islami 
Bangladesh boycott the parliamentary election. 
 
April12, 1988  Ershad lifts the state of emergency. 
 
April 25, 1988  The Fourth Jatiya Sangsad convenes its first session amid general strike 
called by the opposition coalitions. 
    
 
June 7, 1988  The Constitution (Eighth Amendment) establishes Islam as state 
religion. 
 
1989   In this year opposition observed blocked and hartals for more than 
60days demanding the resignation of Ersahd.  
 
December 6, 1990  Ershad dissolves the fourth Jatiya Sangsad and resigns from the post of 
the president. He transfers power to a nominee of the combined 
opposition alliances, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice 
Shabuddin Ahmed. 
 
Post 1990s 
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February 27, 1991  The fifth Jatiya Sangsad election is held under a neutral caretaker 
government. The BNP emerges as the single largest party by obtaining 
140 seats out of 300; Awami League appears as the main opposition 
party securing 88 seats followed by the Jatiya Party and the Jamat-e-
Islami Bangladesh.      
 
October 8, 1991  The Jatiya Sangsad’s members for the first time cast their votes to elect 
the President under parliamentary form of government. 
 
August 5, 1992 
 The opposition submits seven notices of no-confidence against the 
government. The opposition lost the vote on this motion. 
 
October 27,1992 The government proclaims the Anti-terrorist Ordinance. The opposition 
terms this ordinance as an anti-opposition move. 
 
March-April1994 The Bangladesh Awami League and the Jatiya Party observed strikes 
and gherao program against the government for their failure in 
governing the country properly. They repeatedly boycotted the 
parliament. 
 
October 1994 Commonwealth Secretary General, Emeka Anyoaku offered for a 
formal dialogue between the two rival parties- the AL and BNP- to 
solve the political crisis. In this process the former Governor General of 
Australia, Sir Ninian Stephan came to Dhaka and hold dialogues.     
 
December 28, 1994 The main opposition (147 MPs of the AL) resigns en masse from the 
parliament. But it became invalid because of Speaker’s ruling on it.   
 
May 1995 The government party offers a dialogue with the main opposition to 
solve the political crisis. But the opposition did not accept their 
proposal. The observed various types of protest program.    
 
July 28,1995 The main opposition comes back to the parliament but the Speaker 
declares thei seats vacant because of their absence in the House for 90 
consecutive days. 
 
Aug.–Nov.1995 The major opposition parties, namely, the AL, the JP and the JIB, and 
other smaller parties observed protest program in favor of holding fresh 
elections under a Non-Party Caretaker Government. 
 
Nov.24, 1995 The BNP chief and the Prime Minister, Begum Khaleda Zia  advices 
the president to dissolve the parliament and arrange the next 
parliamentary elections.        
 
February 15, 1996 The sixth Jatiya Sangsad election is held despite opposition boycott and 
violence. Awami League chief, Sheikh Hasina urges the donor 
countries not to recognize the 15 February election. 
 
Feb.- March 1996 Awami League urges for holding parliamentary elections under a 
neutral caretaker government. Continues nation wide demonstration, 
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hartal and gherao paralyze the administration. Major donor countries 
and agencies express serious concern over the political crisis. 
 
March 19, 1996 Sixth parliament session opens despite anti-government demonstration.  
 
March 21, 1996 A Constitutional Amendment Bill introduced and passed in parliament 
which provides an 11-members non-party caretaker government headed 
by the Chief Advisor.   
 
March 30, 1996 Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia resigns. Former Chief Justice 
Mohammad Habibur Rahman sworn in as the Chief Advisor of the 
non-party caretaker government. President Abdur Rahman Biswas 
dissolves the parliament.   
  
May 18, 1996 President Abdur Rahman Biswas issues a premature retirement order to 
two army officer because they maintain contacts with the AL but the 
army chief refuse to implement his order. 
 
May 20, 1996 Upon the order of the Army Chief General Abu Saleh Mohammad 
Nasim troops from Bogra and Mymensinhg cantonment marched 
towards Dhaka to remove the President but he failed to get much 
support from the commanding officers of other cantonments.    The 
President issued a compulsory retirement order of Gen.Nasim. 
 
June 12, 1996 The seventh Jatiya Sangsad election takes place. Awami League 
emerges as the single majority party in the parliament to form a new 
government. 
 
June 22, 1996 Awami League Chief Sheikh Hasina is elected as the leader of the 
Awami League parliamentary party.  
 
July 14, 1996 The first session of the seventh Jatiya Sangsad was convened and 
continued till September 2, 1996. 
 
October 9, 1996 Former Chief Justice and Chief Advisor of the Non-Party Caretaker 
Government, Justice Shabuddin Ahmed sworn in as elected President 
for the second time. 
 
1997-2000  The BNP repeatedly boycotted the parliament and observed strikes, and 
other agitation program against the government. 
 
October 1, 2001 The eighth parliamentary election takes place. The BNP led four party 
alliance won majority in the parliamentary election. The AL rejects the 
election result because of massive vote rigging. 
 
October 10, 2001 Begum Khaleda Zia is sworn in as the Prime Minster. With the support 
of the Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh, the BNP comes to the State power 
again.    
     
September 6, 2002 Professor Iajuddin Ahmed is sworn in as the seventeenth president of 
the country.     
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October 17, 2002 The government calls out the army troops to tackle deteriorating law 
and order situation called ‘operation clean heart’.     
 
Oct. 2001- Oct. 2006 The main opposition repeatedly boycotted parliament and walked out. 
They observed strikes and other agitation program against the BNP led 
government.      
   
October 28, 2006  Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia ends her five years term. 
 
October 31, 2006 Professor Iajuddin Ahmed appoints himself as the chief of the Non-
Party Caretaker Government (NCG). 
 
January 11, 2007 Replacing Professor Iajuddin’s  NCG, Dr. Fakruddin Ahmed sworn in 
as the chief of the NCG. Professor Iajuddin Ahmed remains in his 
earlier position.  
 
December 29, 2008  The ninth parliamentary election takes place. The AL won the 
overwhelming victory in the election.  
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APPENDIX V  
 
Interview Questionnaire  
 
Research Title: Parliamentary Committee System in Bangladesh: An Analysis of its Functioning 
 
I am a Ph.D candidate at the Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute, University of 
Heidelberg, Germany. As you served in the JS's Committee/s, I would like to get some information 
from your own experiences to enrich my thesis. I only use this interview and findings for my research, 
which will be published at a later date. It would be grate help for my research project if you kindly 
spare some time to answer following questions.  
 
Personal Experiences 
 
1) When did you first enter the JS? When are you first appointed in a JS committee? 
 
 
2) What was your position in the party when you were first appointed? 
 
 
3) What was your position in the party when enter the JS? 
 
 
4) What Position do you currently hold in the party? 
 
 
5) Why were you selected on a committee?  (Tick as many as relevant) 
 
Ο  Personal Interests  Ο  Professional expertise  
Ο  Previous Experiences  Ο  As per party's decision  
Ο   Constituency Interests  Ο others (Please specify) 
 
 
6) How often did you attend a committee meeting for month ? 
 
 
7) To which three parliamentary organs: plenary, parliamentary party, or committees do you 
devote most of your time? 
 
Information and Staff Support 
 
1) Please tell me which of information source do you use for your committee assignment?   (you 
can also cross one more option ) 
 
O   Parliamentary / Committee staff  O Interests Group 
 
O  Personal Staff     O   Internet  
 
O  Parliamentary Reference and Research Service  
 
O  Friends and colleagues  O  Public 
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2) Please tell me which staff gave you necessary support for your committee assignment 
 
Ο  Committee staff   Ο  Personal Staff 
 
Ο  Parliamentary Group Staff  Ο  Bundestag Staff 
 
 
3) Do you think that committee staff/personal staff/parliamentary group staff were satisfactory 
for you? (Please give me your detail comments)  
 
 
 
4) What facilities do you consider important for a committee member/chairperson to have? 
 
Opinion about Parliament and Committees 
 
1) What is your opinion about the parliament? ( Please, cross one) 
 
Ο Parliament plays a decisive role in the governance of the country 
 
Ο Parliament is the place for talking 
 
Ο Parliament is a rubber stamp of the executive 
 
Ο Parliament holds government accountable? 
 
2) Do you consider that parliament is dependent on its committees? If yes, please explain why- 
  
 
 3) What is your opinion about the committee? 
 
Ο Committee is the hub of the parliament which furnish major works of the parliament 
 
Ο Committees do not play important role  
 
Ο  Other (Please comment) 
 
  
4) What is your opinion about party role in the committees 
 
Ο Committee is the place where government and opposition party can negotiate each and 
other. 
 
Ο Committee is dominated by the government party where opposition cannot play important role 
 
Ο Opposition does not cooperate with government party 
 
      Ο Committee has a non-partisan/partisan character in its work. 
 
       Ο others (please comments) 
 
5) What is your opinion about committees working environment ( Please cross over the 
right word and cross on the circle of the relevant answer)   
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Ο  Chairperson was dominating/ friendly 
 
Ο Members from other parties were friendly/ rigid 
 
Ο Discussions took place with a friendly/ hostile environment 
 
Ο others (please comment) 
 
 
6) Would you kindly tell me how committee's agenda were set up? 
 
 
7) Would you kindly tell me How do committees set their agenda ? 
 
 
8) What is your opinion about committee deliberation process (Please cross one) 
 
Ο  Decision  was taken on a compromise basis Ο Minority Neglected 
 
Ο  Decision  was dominated by majority Ο  other (please comment) 
 
Personal Information 
 
Name: 
 
Age: 
 
Party Affiliation: 
  
Education: 
 
Gender: O Male O Female 
Profession 
Before entering in the JS: 
 
Thank you very much. 
 
K.M. Mahiuddin 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute 
Im Neuenheimer Feld 330, 69120, Heidelberg 
E-mail: mahiuddinbd@yahoo.com  
